



# MODERN EUROPE TO 1870

by

CARLTON J. H. HAYES,

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# FOREWORD

The author's *Political and Social History of Modern Europe,* in two volumes, first appeared almost forty years ago. His *Political and Cultural History of Modern Europe,* likewise in two volumes, was published some twenty years ago. He now presents another two-volume history: *Modern Europe to 1870,* and *Contemporary Europe since 1870.* Though this history embodies certain features and phrasings of its predecessors, it is an essentially new work.

It is differently organized, with the separating date of the two volumes moved forward from 1815 or 1830 to 1870 in order to admit of fuller treatment of the momentous last half-century. In its writing, which aims at clarity and accuracy, it utilizes new findings of historical scholarship. It is provided with new maps closely articulated with the text, and with new and up-to-date bibliographies. Above all, it reinterprets the historical evolution of Europe from the standpoint of the Atlantic Community which has been developing since the sixteenth century and especially of the crisis in that Community resulting from the world wars and revolutions of our own time.

National politics and policy, as the central concern of modern Europe (and America), receive chief attention, but not to the neglect of those social, economic, and ideological factors which shape or at least condition political thought and action. While the treatment of these factors has been simplified by the omission of many names and other details which perhaps overburdened the *Political and Cultural History,* enough is here presented, in special chapter or sections, to make clear the comprehensive character of our historic civilization and the interrelationship of its component elements.

The work is intended for college and university students and for others curious about the troubled world of today. For how can anybody really understand this world without knowing something

of how it has come about, and particularly of Europe's stellar role in it during the past five centuries?

It is impossible to list here, with due acknowledgment, all those to whom I am indebted for advice and help. They would include hundreds of colleagues and more hundreds of students, reaching back over many years, and also innumerable librarians, authors, and critics. I can only thank them in general terms, quite inadequately but very sincerely. Special thanks I owe most recently to the publishers, to the Columbia University libraries and, for the maps, to Mr. Theodore R. Miller.

C.J.H.H.

JERICHO FARM
AFTON, NEW YORK.

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# PART I

## BEGINNINGS OF MODERN EUROPE

I. POLITICAL IDEAS AND INSTITUTIONS AT THE OPENING OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY
II. ECONOMIC AND TRANS-ATLANTIC EXPANSION
III. INTELLECTUAL QUICKENING
IV. RELIGIOUS UPHEAVAL

# CHAPTER I

## POLITICAL IDEAS AND INSTITUTIONS AT THE OPENING OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY

### I. CHRISTENDOM AND THE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE



T the opening of the sixteenth century, the vast mass of Europeans professed the Christian religion and regarded themselves as members of a distinctively Christian society. This society, usually called "Christendom," had long been the distinguishing badge of European civilization, marking it off from the civilizations of other continents. It had originated within the confines of the ancient Roman Empire and had thence spread northward, over the Irish in the fifth century, over the Franks in the sixth century, over the Anglo-Saxons in the seventh century, over the Germans in the eighth century, over the Czechs and Slovaks in the ninth century, over the Poles in the tenth century, over the Magyars, Scandinavians, Finns, and Russians in the eleventh century. For four hundred years prior to 1500, Christendom had been Europe, and Europe had been Christendom.

**Christendom**

For many centuries the idea had been prevalent in Europe that Christendom was a political as well as a cultural society, and that its government should ultimately be directed by two great coextensive institutions, independent of each other, but working in close alliance and alike commanding the allegiance of all Christians. One of these institutions was the church, and the other was the empire. The church was the supreme spiritual power; the empire, the supreme temporal power. In theory at least, Europeans owed obedience to both.

Such an idea, however, had not been fully realized. The original Roman Empire had early fallen prey to civil war and barbarian

invasion and had been transformed into an essentially Greek or "Byzantine" Empire, confined to southeastern Europe. Here, the church, under the nominal headship of the patriarch of Constantinople, had lost much of its independence and become subservient to the Empire. Moreover, in the eleventh century, it had definitely separated itself from the church in western and central Europe; and as the Russians were converted to Christianity by missionaries from Constantinople, the church in Russia patterned itself after the church in the Byzantine Empire and supported a rising Russian Empire.

Thus it befell that Europe was split into two Christendoms. One was Eastern Christendom, embracing Greeks, Balkan peoples, and Russians, adhering to the so-called Orthodox Church, and greatly influenced by Oriental traditions of despotic imperial supremacy, whether Byzantine or Russian. The other was Western Christendom, including a wide variety of nationalities from Finns and Scandinavians in the north to Spaniards and Italians in the south and from Poles and Magyars in the east to Irish and Icelanders in the west, and acknowledging a common loyalty to the Catholic Church.

**Western and Eastern**

The Catholic Church of the West was much freer of political control than was the Orthodox Church of the East. Western Christendom had grown up in a weakening and dissolving Roman Empire and among peoples outside of it who were accustomed to tribal states rather than to an empire. Hence, the Church in Western Christendom had no such restrictions upon it as the Byzantine and Russian Empires imposed on the Church in Eastern Christendom. It was an arbitrator among a variety of states, not the servant of an empire. It was the dominant unifying force of Western Christendom.

Yet, however much predominance the Catholic Church might exercise, the ideal remained from the days of the ancient Roman Empire that Western Christendom should be governed temporally by an Emperor as it was governed spiritually by the Pope. In the eighth century, Charlemagne, the King of the Franks, with the sanction of the Pope, had united what are now France, Germany, Italy, Holland, and Belgium into a state which he called the "Roman Empire" and of which he was crowned Emperor. And nearly two centuries later, Otto the Great, a prince in Germany, again with papal approval, had given new form to the same ideal

and taken the title of Emperor of the "Roman Empire." This "holy" empire still endured in the year 1500.

In theory, the Holy Roman Empire claimed temporal predominance over all Christian rulers and peoples of central and western Europe, and after the extinction of the Byzantine Empire in 1453 it could claim that it was the sole secular heir to the ancient Roman tradition and the paramount temporal agency of all Christendom. But the vastness of the theoretical claims of the Holy Roman Empire was matched only by the insignificance of their actual acceptance.

**Holy Roman Empire**

For centuries before 1500 the basic social and political institution in western and central Europe had been feudalism, involving the exercise, on the part of a large number of landed nobles—dukes, counts, barons, etc.—of direct and almost independent political power over the people on their respective estates. Against this institution, various princes or "kings" had gradually made headway, reducing the feudal nobles to royal obedience. But the more the authority of the kings was strengthened the less inclined were the kings to yield any obedience to the Holy Roman Emperor. The Emperor had been too hard pressed by struggles with his immediate feudal vassals to prevent the rise of independent national kingdoms; and at the same time the vigorous rise of these kingdoms had contributed to the weakness of the Empire.

By the year 1500 the Holy Roman Empire was virtually restricted to German-speaking peoples and to the Czechs in the kingdom of Bohemia. The papacy and the Italian cities had been freed from imperial control, and the Netherlands—that is, Holland and Belgium—and likewise the Swiss cantons, were only nominally subject to it. England, France, Portugal, and Spain admitted no real dependence upon it, and it was inoperative over the Scandinavians to the north and over most of the Slavic peoples to the east—Poles, Russians, etc. By the year 1500 the words Empire and Germany had become almost interchangeable terms.

By the year 1500, moreover, the Holy Roman Empire was internally weak. It consisted of a hodgepodge of city states and feudal survivals—archduchies, such as Austria; margravates, such as Brandenburg; duchies, like Saxony, Bavaria, and Württemberg; counties, like the Palatinate; and a host of free cities, baronies, and domains, some of them smaller than an American township. In all there were over three hundred states which collectively

were called "the Germanies" and which were united only by the slender imperial thread. The idea of empire had been narrowed practically to one nation; and, in its failure to overcome feudalism, it had prevented the growth of a real national monarchy in Germany.

What was the nature of the tie that nominally held the Germanies together? There was the form of a central government with an Emperor to execute laws and a Diet to make them. The Emperor was chosen by seven "electors," who were the chief princes of the realm. These seven were the archbishops of Mainz, of Cologne, and of Trier, the King of Bohemia, the Duke of Saxony, the Margrave of Brandenburg, and the Count Palatine of the Rhine. Frequently the electors used their position to extort from the Emperor-elect concessions which helped to destroy German unity and to promote the separate interests of the princes. The imperial Diet was composed of the seven electors, the lesser princes (including the higher ecclesiastical dignitaries, such as bishops and abbots), and representatives of the free cities, grouped in three separate houses. The Emperor was not supposed to perform any imperial act without the authorization of the Diet, and petty jealousies between its members or houses often prevented action in the Diet. The individual states, moreover, reserved to themselves the management of many affairs which in western Europe had been surrendered to the central national government. The Diet, and therefore the Emperor, was without a treasury or army, unless the individual states acted favorably upon its advice and furnished the requested quotas. The Diet resembled far more a congress of diplomats than a legislative body.

It will be readily perceived that under these circumstances the Emperor as such could have little power. Yet the fear of impending Slavic or Turkish attacks upon the eastern frontier frequently operated to secure the election of some prince who had sufficient military might to stay the attack. In this way, the custom developed in the later middle ages of choosing as Holy Roman Emperor the Habsburg Archduke of Austria, the easternmost of the German states. And in the Habsburg family the headship continued until the final extinction of the Empire in 1806. Several of these Habsburg Emperors were powerful, but it must always be remembered that they owed their power less to the Empire than to their own hereditary states.

**Habsburg Emperors**

The family fortunes of the Habsburgs had begun in the thirteenth century with Count Rudolph. He was elected to the headship of the Holy Roman Empire in 1273 and utilized this position to acquire the valuable archduchy of Austria, with its capital-city of Vienna, as an hereditary possession. Subsequently the family intermarried with reigning families in Hungary and in Italy, as well as in Bohemia and other states of the Empire. In 1477 the Emperor Maximilian I (1493–1519) married Mary of Burgundy, daughter of Charles the Bold and heiress of the wealthy provinces of the Netherlands; and in 1496 his son Philip was united to Joanna, the daughter of Ferdinand and Isabella and heiress to the crowns of Aragon and Castile. The fortunes of the Habsburgs were decidedly auspicious. By a process of dynastic accretion they were constructing a far flung hereditary empire which would assure them, as the Holy Roman Empire could not, a commanding position in Europe.

Indeed, the *dynastic* empire of the Habsburgs (as distinct from the Holy Roman Empire) was a type of political idea and institution quite prevalent throughout Europe at the beginning of the sixteenth century. It was not only the imperial family of the Habsburgs at Vienna which sought an accretion of domains by marriage alliances and other dynastic devices. The royal families of Spain, France, England, and most other kingdoms, as well as the petty princes and barons of more diminutive states, were likewise vying with one another and with the Emperor to arrange such marriages and inheritances as would redound to the wealth and prestige of their respective dynasties. Germany was especially the prey of just such rival ambitions, and these in turn militated against the solidarity of the German people and the unity of the Holy Roman Empire.

**German Disunion**

Of course, signs were not wanting of some national life in Germany. Most of the people spoke a common language; a form of national unity existed in the Diet; and some patriots raised their voices in behalf of a stronger and more centralized government. In 1495 the Diet met at the city of Worms to discuss with Emperor Maximilian projects of reform. After protracted debates, it was agreed that private warfare, an attendant of feudalism, should be abolished; a perpetual internal peace should be proclaimed; and an imperial court should be established to settle disputes between states within the Empire. These efforts at reform.

like many before and after, were largely unfruitful, and, despite occasional protests, political disunion and weakness continued to prevail within the Holy Roman Empire.

Yet, so obsessed were men's minds with the old Roman tradition of empire that most Europeans continued to regard the Holy Roman Empire with awe. It was thought of as venerable and eternal. It was deemed worth fighting about. Its titles were coveted, even by the national monarchs of England, France, Spain, and Hungary. It long continued to evoke an interest and a fascination curiously disproportionate to its actual strength.

### 2. ISLAM AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

The awe which Europeans felt for the old Holy Roman Empire was matched in the year 1500 by their dread of the new Ottoman Empire. In this, they were justified. For, if the Holy Roman Empire was weaker in fact than in appearance, the Ottoman Empire displayed a vigor commensurate with its pretensions and ambitions.

In a sense the Ottoman Empire was not "new." It represented, politically and geographically, a continuation of the imperial tradition of the Near East—of the Byzantine Empire of the middle ages, and of the much earlier empire of Alexander the Great. It was built directly on the ruins of the Byzantine Empire; it embraced the same area and the same populations; and it took over, with changed names, the same institutions and similar practices.

What was "new" about the Ottoman Empire was the shift of southeastern Europe from Christian to Moslem control, the accompanying renewal of military energy in that quarter, and the fair promise that a large part if not all of Europe might speedily be incorporated in a vast empire which in its government and culture would be based on Islam rather than on Christianity.

**Religion of Islam**

Islam was the religion of Mohammed, neatly summarized in the formula, "There is no God but Allah, and Mohammed is his prophet." It had originated in Arabia in the seventh century; and within a hundred years, thanks to proselyting zeal and military conquest, it had largely supplanted Christianity in western Asia and northern Africa and had penetrated into Spain. Against southeastern Europe and Asia Minor, it had at that time beaten in vain. The Christian Roman

Empire of the Byzantine Greeks had then been too strong for it. Thereafter, the huge Arab Empire had broken up into mutually warring fragments and the expansive force of Islam had seemingly been exhausted. During the middle ages Christians of western Europe joined those of the Byzantine Empire against the Moslems, and for a time it appeared as though the whole Near East might be wrested from Islam and restored to Christendom.

The crusades eventually failed, however. Indeed, they aroused and revivified the forces of Islam, while sowing new seeds of discord between Catholic Christians of the West and Orthodox Christians of the East. Indirectly, too, they prepared the way for a second great wave of Moslem conquest, that of the Ottoman Turks.

The Turks were a tribal people whose original home was in the steppes and deserts of the Turkestan of central Asia and who had emigrated thence, during the middle ages, both as nomads and as permanent settlers, to Mesopotamia, Syria, Egypt, and particularly to Asia Minor. They had adopted the Moslem religion of the populations among whom they roved or settled. One of the Turkish tribes which penetrated into Asia Minor had a chieftain, about the year 1300, whose name was Osman or Othman and who assumed the title of emir (prince) of the Turks. The Turks who were subject to Othman and his successors were henceforth called the Ottoman Turks.

**Moslem Turks**

Othman and his immediate successors were valiant warriors. They conquered other Turkish tribes and built up a powerful military state. It was this growing state of the Ottoman Turks which was destined to become the outstanding champion of Islam and to renew with Christendom the struggle for mastery of the Near East and perhaps of all Europe.

In the first half of the fourteenth century, the Ottoman Turks devoted their energies to the conquest of Asia Minor. They extended their sway over all the Moslem peoples in the region, and to the east they reduced the Christian Armenians. Simultaneously, to the west, they pushed back the boundary of the Byzantine Empire, capturing one Greek city after another—Ephesus, Brusa, Nicæa, and Nicomedia. By the middle of the century they had undone the work of the crusaders and had wrested all Asia Minor from the Greeks. They made Brusa the capital of their empire, and the Ottoman emir took the title of Sultan.

As the territory of the Moslem Empire grew, that of the Christian Byzantine Empire diminished. Asia Minor was finally surrendered to the Turks. Crete, the Ægean islands, and most of the Greek peninsula were occupied by the Venetians. A large part of the Balkan peninsula was already in possession of Slavic peoples —Yugoslavs and Bulgarians—who maintained independent states of their own.

The Christian Emperors in Constantinople thus found themselves, by the middle of the fourteenth century, hemmed in on all sides. Their Empire was restricted to the capital, to a part of Thrace, and to a narrow strip of seacoast along the Ægean. They were confronted with foreign foes—Turks, Slavs, and Italians. They were beset with grave domestic problems: they were short of soldiers and money; they were weakened by recurring revolutions and quarrels over the imperial succession.

In the second half of the fourteenth century the Ottoman Turks transferred their military activities and successes from Asia Minor to southeastern Europe. They crossed the straits in force in 1360, and in the following year they captured Adrianople and made it their capital. In 1387 they conquered Salonica. Two years later, on the fateful field of Kossovo, they overwhelmed the Yugoslavs. In 1393 they decisively defeated the Bulgarians. In the meantime they were seizing islands in the Ægean and fighting the Venetians in the Greek peninsula. At the end of the century the Ottoman Turks dominated the entire Balkan peninsula except Constantinople and a few other posts still held by Greeks or Italians.

In desperation the Byzantine Emperors begged aid of western Europe, and in alarm the Popes preached new crusades and besought all Christians to go to the assistance of the Greeks. Some Christian princes did lead armies against the Turks; the Kings of Poland and Hungary repeatedly tried to stem the tide of Moslem conquest; and the Venetians, with their commercial interests in the Near East at stake, turned crusaders and fought manfully against the Turks. It was in vain. The Turks still advanced.

In 1453, after elaborate preparations, Mohammed II, the ablest and greatest of the Ottoman Sultans, with an army of 150,000 men, laid siege to Constantinople. The city was defended by a pitifully small Christian army, numbering not more than 8,000, of whom half were Greek (including monks and priests) and the

other half comprised detachments sent by the Pope and by the city states of Venice and Genoa "for the glory of God and the safety of Christendom." What the Christians lacked in numbers they made up in grim determination and reckless bravery, and for almost two months the little garrison held the Moslem host at bay. It was only when they were still further reduced by deaths and wounds and utterly exhausted, that the Christians gave way and the Turks poured in, and even then the gallant band of Greeks and Italians fought on until they were all killed. In their midst, fighting to the very end, perished Constantine XI, the last of the Græco-Roman emperors.

**Fall of Constantinople**

The transfer of Constantinople from the rule of the Emperor Constantine XI to that of the Sultan Mohammed II was a sensational step in the revolution which was transforming the traditional empire of the Near East from Greek and Christian hands to hands that were Moslem and Turk. The events at Constantinople in 1453 depressed all Christendom, as they elated the Turks and all Islam. For Constantinople was viewed by both Christians and Moslems as one of the greatest and strongest cities in the whole world, embodying most perfectly the traditions of ancient Roman rule and antique Greek culture. It was *the* city. Its possession carried prestige. As Christians had held it from the time of the first Constantine in the fourth century to the days of the last Constantine in the fifteenth century, so the Moslems were determined to possess it ever after. As it had been for more than a thousand years the center of a Christian empire of the Near East, so it would be in modern times the capital of a Moslem empire of the Near East.

Indeed, Mohammed II (1451–1481) succeeded in doing what the preceding Byzantine Emperors had failed to do. He not only ruled in Constantinople but he brought together within his empire many territories which had been lost to the Byzantine Empire. He reunited the whole of Asia Minor and the entire Balkan peninsula. He did more: he conquered the Rumanian lands at the mouth of the Danube and the Russian and Mongol lands north of the Black Sea.

For almost a century after the death of **Mohammed II** — from 1481 to 1571—the Ottoman Empire grew rapidly and flourished mightily. In large part it grew at the expense of other Moslem

states. The Sultans, as the champions of Moslem (Sunnite) orthodoxy, waged war against the Persians as the exponents of the principal Moslem (Shiite) heresy and wrested from the Shahs of Persia the city of Bagdad and the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates. One of the Sultans—Selim I (1512–1520)—conquered Syria and Egypt, and obtained from the chief claimant to the old Arab Empire, then resident in Egypt, the title of Caliph, that is, head of all orthodox Moslems. Thenceforth the Sultans of the Ottoman Turks claimed to be successors both of the Roman Emperors and of the Moslem Caliphs. The Sultans likewise gained recognition of Ottoman supremacy in the holy cities of Jerusalem, Mecca, and Medina, and in other Arab towns. Also, by means of growing maritime power, they acquired suzerainty over all the north African coast from Egypt to Morocco, including Tripoli, Tunis, and Algeria.

**Expansion of Ottoman Empire**

Under the Sultan Suleiman II (1520–1566), who was appropriately termed "the Magnificent," the Ottoman Empire comprised virtually the same territory as had constituted the East Roman Empire in the time of Justinian. But Suleiman the Magnificent would not stop here. Eager to expand his dominions in Europe, as they were already extended in Asia and Africa, he, with the main force of the Moslem world behind him, turned anew against Christendom.

In 1521 Suleiman captured Belgrade and crossed the Danube. In 1526 he defeated the King of Hungary and destroyed the flower of Hungarian chivalry in the terrible battle of Mohács, and occupied Budapest. Pushing on against Austria, which had sought to aid Hungary, he laid siege to Vienna in 1529. Though he could not take Vienna, he compelled the Holy Roman Emperor to agree to a partition of Hungary, the smaller portion going to Austria and the larger portion passing to the Ottoman Empire and becoming a Turkish province. Thereafter the Holy Roman Emperor, and the King of Poland too, made repeated and protracted attempts to drive the Turks out of Hungary and Rumania, but almost invariably they met defeat at the hands of Suleiman. They could get little real help from the West. As the Byzantine Empire had fallen prey to the Moslem Turks in the fifteenth century, so in the sixteenth century the weakened and distracted Holy Roman Empire appeared to be Christendom's last poor bulwark against the Moslems.

In the meantime Suleiman subdued the Caucasus and made the Black Sea a lake within the Ottoman Empire. Simultaneously his warships and pirate-ships wrought havoc in the Mediterranean; they successfully combated Venice and Genoa and terrorized the seafaring merchants from Christian countries. Christendom, in the first half of the sixteenth century, seemed to be peculiarly exposed to Moslem assault on land and on sea, at the very time when Christendom was faced internally with political rivalries of unprecedented rancor and with a grave religious upheaval. Yet so great was the external threat that rival Christian monarchs and mutually vituperative Christian clergymen could agree with Pope and Holy Roman Emperor in cursing the Turk—"the infidel." With few exceptions, however, western Europe was more inclined to curse with words than to join battle with the Turks.

**Nature of Ottoman Empire**

The Ottoman Empire of the sixteenth century was similar to the earlier Byzantine Empire not only in territorial extent but also in political institutions. It was not a national state, any more than the old Roman Empire had been. It was a military political union, under Turkish leadership, of many diverse peoples. Only in Asia Minor did the Turks constitute a large proportion of the total population, and even there sizable minorities of Armenians, Kurds, and Greeks persisted. In Mesopotamia, Syria, and Palestine, and across northern Africa, the Turks were a mere sprinkling among the mass of Arabs, Jews, Egyptians (Copts), Berbers, and Moors. In southeastern Europe the conquered nationalities remained—Greeks, Yugoslavs (Serbs), Bulgarians, Albanians, Rumanians, and Hungarians (Magyars)—and some of them, notably the Greeks, continued to furnish the Near East with its leading merchants and traders. Most of the conquered Christians, however, were reduced to a condition of serfdom and were obliged to support the Moslem Turks who came to live among them as soldiers and officials and formed a privileged upper class.

The government of the Ottoman Empire was an autocracy, not unlike that of the Byzantine Empire which it supplanted. The Sultan was "commander of the faithful" and master of the conquered peoples. In theory, his word was supreme; he made and enforced the laws; he appointed the local governors and army officers; he declared war and concluded peace. In practice, he was often influenced or controlled by his harem, army, or officials; and

local agents and tax-gatherers were frequently harsher and more despotic than the Sultan.

The Ottoman Empire was a Moslem empire, as the Byzantine Empire had been a Christian empire. Only Moslems could be full-fledged "citizens"; Christians and Jews were "subjects." For "citizens," there was the closest union of church and state; the Sultan was head alike of temporal and spiritual affairs; and civil law as well as religious faith and teaching were derived from Mohammed and the Koran. Moreover, the Sultans supported the public worship of Islam. They transformed the historic Christian cathedral of Saint Sophia in Constantinople—one of the architectural wonders of the world—into a Moslem edifice, and wherever their armies marched they appropriated the principal Christian churches and converted them into mosques. The Sultans set aside a share of the spoils taken from Christians for the financial support of Moslem institutions. They taxed Christians more heavily than Moslems and excluded the former from most public offices. They did not allow Christians to bear arms or serve in the Ottoman army, but every year they conscripted a certain number of Christian boys, reared them as Moslems, and trained them as a special army—the so-called army of the Janizaries—which proved to be a peculiarly effective auxiliary to the main Turkish army.

**Christian Peoples in Ottoman Empire**

Some Christians, especially among the Albanians, became Moslems, but the Armenians and the mass of the conquered peoples in southeastern Europe clung to Christianity. As a matter of fact, the Turks were not supremely intolerant; they did not force conversion to Islam. As soon as the Sultan Mohammed II had captured Constantinople, he issued a famous edict of toleration, according religious freedom to the Greek Orthodox Christians and constituting them a special "nation" (or "millet") under their own Patriarch and with their own laws and law-courts. Other Sultans created similar "millets" for the Armenian Christians, the Catholic Christians, and the Jews. In this way, the Sultan was enabled to hold the Patriarch and other heads of "millets" personally responsible for the good behavior of the subject Christians. At the same time the priviliges accorded to the several "millets" kept alive the spirit of nationality among the conquered peoples and served to emphasize the heterogeneous character of the Ottoman Empire.

Besides, beginning with the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent, the Sultans entered into treaties with Christian states, granting to their citizens permission of pilgrimage to the Holy Land, privileges of trade in the Near East, and the right to live under their own laws and to maintain their own law-courts while they were residing in the Ottoman Empire. The first of such treaties—or "capitulations," as they were called—was concluded in 1535 with the King of France.

### 3. THE CITY STATES

Before the dawn of the Christian era, the Greeks and Phœnicians and early Romans had entertained a general idea of political organization which was quite at variance with any idea of extended empire, such as we have observed in the case of the Holy Roman Empire or of the Ottoman Empire of the sixteenth century. It was an idea which would seem very strange to most of us at the present time, accustomed as we are to a fairly large national state. Those ancient peoples believed that every city with its adjacent countryside should constitute an independent state, with its own particular law-making and governing bodies and with distinctive army and coinage. This belief retained a tenacious hold on European minds, despite the rise of Greek and Roman empires; it was employed as a more or less reasoned justification of separatist tendencies in medieval feudal Europe; and it naturally survived as long as there were serious obstacles to travel and trade and to the development of acute national consciousness. It survived well into modern times.

Now it so happened, as we shall see in the following chapter, that the commerce of the middle ages rendered especially important certain towns in Italy, in Germany, and in the Netherlands. These towns, in one way or another, managed to secure a large measure of self-government, so that by the year 1500 they had become strikingly similar to the city states of antiquity. In Germany, though they still maintained their local self-government, they were loosely attached to the Holy Roman Empire and were overshadowed in political significance by other states. In the case of Italy and in that of the Netherlands, however, they played leading roles in the politics of the sixteenth century.

In the Italy of the year 1500 there was only an intangible tie with the Holy Roman Empire and there was not even the sem-

blance of national political unity. Despite the ardent longings of a few Italian patriots,[1] and the development of a common language and literature, the people of the peninsula had not built up a national monarchy like those of western Europe nor had they even preserved the form of allegiance to the Holy Roman Empire. This was due to several significant events of earlier times. In the first place, the attempt of the medieval German Emperors to dominate Italy not only had signally failed but had left behind two contending factions throughout the peninsula—one, the Ghibellines, supporting the doctrine of maintaining the traditional connection with Germany; the other, the Guelphs, rejecting that doctrine.

**Italian Political Divisions**

In the second place, the Pope, who exerted important political as well as religious influence, felt that his ecclesiastical position would be seriously impaired by the creation of political unity in the country. A strong lay monarch with a solid Italy behind him might in time reduce the papacy to a subservient position and diminish the prestige which the head of the church enjoyed in foreign lands. The Popes, therefore, participated actively in the game of Italian politics, always endeavoring to prevent any one state from becoming too powerful. Thirdly, the comparatively early commercial prominence of the Italian towns had stimulated trade rivalries which tended to make each town jealous of its independence and wealth; and as the cities grew and prospered to an unwonted degree, it became increasingly difficult to join them together. Finally, the riches of Italy, and the local jealousies and strife, to say nothing of the papal policy, marked the country as natural prey for foreign interference and conquest; and the peninsula became a battleground for Spaniards, Frenchmen, and Germans.

Before reviewing the chief city states of northern Italy, it will be well to say a word about two other political divisions of the country. The southern third of the peninsula comprised the king-

[1] Of such patriots was Machiavelli (see below, p. 115). Machiavelli wrote in *The Prince:* "Our country, left almost without life, still waits to know who it is that will heal her bruises, put an end to the devastation and plunder of Lombardy and to the exactions and imposts of Naples and Tuscany, and stanch those wounds of hers which long neglect has changed into running sores. We see how she prays God to send some one to rescue her from these barbarous cruelties and oppressions. We see too how ready and eager she is to follow any standard, were there only some person to raise it."

dom of Naples, which had grown up about the city of that name, and which, together with the large island of Sicily, was later called the kingdom of the Two Sicilies. This state, having been first formed by Scandinavian adventurers in the eleventh century, had successively passed under papal suzerainty, under the domination of the German Emperors, and at length in 1266 under French control. A revolt in Sicily in the year 1282, commonly called the Sicilian Vespers, had severed the relation between the island and the mainland, the former passing to the royal family of Aragon, and the latter troublously remaining in French hands until 1442. The reunion of the Two Sicilies at this date under the crown of Aragon served to keep alive the quarrel between the French and the Spaniards; and it was not until 1504 that the King of France definitely renounced his Neapolitan claims in favor of Ferdinand of Aragon.

**Naples and Sicily**

About the city of Rome had grown up in the course of centuries the Papal States. It had early fallen to the lot of the Pope, as the most important person in the city, to exercise political power over Rome, when barbarian invasions no longer permitted the exercise of authority by Roman Emperors; and his control over neighboring districts, as well as over the city, had been expressly recognized by Charlemagne in the eighth century.

**Papal State**

Subsequently the papacy had extended its territories through central Italy from the Tiber to the Adriatic, long using them merely as a bulwark to its religious and ecclesiastical independence. By the year 1500, however, the Popes were prone to regard themselves as Italian princes who might normally employ their states as so many pawns in the game of peninsular politics. The Italian policy of the notorious Alexander VI (1492–1503) centered in his desire to establish his son, Cæsar Borgia, as an Italian ruler; and Julius II (1503–1513) was famed more for statecraft and military prowess than for religious fervor.

North and west of the Papal States were the various city states which were so distinctive of Italian politics at the opening of the sixteenth century. Although these towns had probably reached a higher plane of material prosperity and intellectual culture than any other part of Europe, nevertheless they were deeply jealous of each other and carried on an interminable series of petty wars, the brunt of which was borne by professional hired soldiers and

final destruction of the state in 1797, it knew no political revolution. In foreign affairs, also, it possessed considerable influence; it was the first European state to send regular envoys, or ambassadors, to other states. Venice seemed in 1500 to be particularly prosperous and strong, but already had been sowed the seed of subsequent decline and impoverishment. Its commercial supremacy was being undermined by the advance of the Ottoman Turks in the eastern Mediterranean and by the opening up of trans-Atlantic trade routes in the west; and its unscrupulous foreign policy was creating hostility abroad. In 1508 France and Spain joined the Pope and the Holy Roman Emperor in the League of Cambrai, which wrung many concessions from Venice.

**Genoa**

Second only to Venice in commercial importance, Genoa, in marked contrast with its rival, passed through all manner of political vicissitudes. In 1499 it was conquered by King Louis XII of France, but in 1528 the resolution of an able citizen, Andrea Doria, freed Genoa from the French and restored its republican institutions.

**Florence**

The famed city state of Florence may be taken as a type of the democratic community, controlled by a political leader. The city, as celebrated for its free institutions as for its art, had come, in the first half of the fifteenth century, under the tutelage of a family of traders and bankers, the wealthy Medici, who preserved the republican forms, and for a while, under Lorenzo de' Medici, "the Magnificent," made Florence the leading center of Italian culture. Soon after the death of Lorenzo, a democratic reaction took place under an enthusiastic and puritanical monk, Savonarola, who welcomed the advent of the French King, Charles VIII, in 1494 and aided materially in the expulsion of the Medici. Savonarola soon fell victim to the plots of his Florentine enemies and to the vengeance of the Pope, whom Charles VIII had offended, and was put to death in 1498. The democracy managed to survive until 1512 when the Medici returned. The city state of Florence subsequently became the grand-duchy of Tuscany.

Before we take leave of the Italian states of the year 1500, mention should be made of the insignificant duchy of Savoy, tucked away in the fastnesses of the northwestern Alps, whose duke, after varying fortunes, was to become, in the nineteenth century, king of a united Italy.

The city state was a characteristic form of political organization not only in Italy but also in the Netherlands.[1] The Netherlands, or "Low Countries," were seventeen provinces occupying the flat lowlands along the North Sea—the Holland, Belgium, and northern France of our own day. Most of the inhabitants were Flemings or Dutch, who spoke "Netherlandish," a language akin to German; but many of them in the south—the so-called Walloons—spoke French. At first the provinces had been mere feudal states at the mercy of various warring noblemen, but gradually in the course of the twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth centuries, important towns had arisen so wealthy and populous that they were able to wrest charters from the lords. Thus arose a number of municipalities which were still in theory vassals of feudal nobles but which in fact were self-governing republics, and in many instances the early oligarchic systems of municipal government had given way to more democratic institutions. Industrially important were Ghent, Bruges, Antwerp, Brussels, Liége, Utrecht, Delft.

**Netherlands**

Beginning in 1384 and continuing throughout the fifteenth century, the dukes of Burgundy, who as vassals of the French King had long held the duchy and county of that name in eastern France, succeeded by marriage, purchase, intrigue, or force in bringing one by one the seventeen provinces of the Netherlands under their rule. This extension of dominion on the part of the dukes of Burgundy implied the establishment of a strong monarchical authority, which was supported by the nobility and clergy and opposed by the cities. In 1465 a common parliament, called the "States General," was constituted at Brussels, containing deputies from each of the seventeen provinces; and eight years later a grand council was organized with judicial and financial functions. Charles the Bold, who died in 1477, was prevented from constructing a central kingdom between France and Germany only by the shrewdness of his implacable foe, King Louis XI of France. On the death of Charles the Bold, Louis seized the *duchy* of Burgundy, thereby extending the eastern frontier of France, but the duke's inheritance in the Netherlands and in the *county* of Burgundy (Franche Comté) passed to his daughter Mary. In 1477 Mary's marriage with

**Burgundy**

[1] It was also important in Germany (within the Holy Roman Empire). On the German city states—the so-called Hanseatic towns—see below, p. 60.

Maximilian of Austria began the long domination of the Netherlands by the house of Habsburg.

Throughout these political changes, the towns of the Netherlands maintained many of their former privileges, and their prosperity steadily increased. The country became the richest in Europe, and the splendor of the ducal court surpassed that of any contemporary sovereign. A permanent memorial of it remains in the Order of the Golden Fleece, which was instituted by the Duke of Burgundy in the fifteenth century and was so named from English wool, the raw material used in the Flemish looms and the foundation of the country's prosperity.

### 4. THE NEW NATIONAL MONARCHIES

A new kind of political state was coming into prominence at the beginning of the sixteenth century. It was different from an extensive empire, such as the Ottoman Empire, and also from a restricted city state, such as Venice or Genoa. It was a kind of state which had hardly existed in ancient times and which had evolved only slowly and dimly during the middle ages. It was the medium sized "national" state, the political entity which was to become the unit of the modern state-system of Europe.

If we look at the political map of Europe of the year 1500, we quickly perceive, in contrast with the sprawling territories strangely labeled "Ottoman Empire" and "Holy Roman Empire" and the unfamiliar petty divisions of central Europe indicative of a hodgepodge of feudal principalities and city states, a certain number of areas which correspond in name and roughly in extent to states of the twentieth century with which we are acquainted—England, France, Portugal, Spain, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Hungary, Poland. These are the new national monarchies of the year 1500. They are independent of empires and yet they represent unifications of feudal localities—baronies and municipalities—under the sovereignty of a monarch. Each of them possesses a population the core of which is a single nationality, with distinctive language, literature, and some self-consciousness. They are *national* monarchies.

How these national monarchies had originated in the tribal states which succeeded the dissolution of the old Roman Empire and how they had kept free of the Holy Roman Empire and had slowly overcome the disruptive tendencies of feudalism are

themes for the student of medieval Europe and lie outside the purview of modern history. Suffice it here to remark that by the year 1500 these national states had taken firm root and were undergoing a significant alteration of government in the direction of absolute monarchy.

"Absolutist" National Monarchies

Several factors in European history just prior to the sixteenth century had combined to arrest the development of medieval constitutional government, medieval magna cartas, and medieval parliaments, and to give rise to monarchical absolutism. The crusades had had something to do with it. They brought Christian rulers of the West into contact with Moslem and Byzantine rule in the East; and from the East, the ancient traditional seat of absolutism, the West derived oriental notions about the scope and method of government.

Then, too, the crusades stimulated trade and travel and thereby contributed to the growth, in numbers, wealth, and influence, of a middle class, which looked to strong monarchs for protection of travel and trade against fighting nobles. Moreover, the crusades diverted the attention and activity of numerous feudal lords and ambitious churchmen from the internal politics of European states to foreign affairs and distant enterprises, with the result that monarchs were less handicapped than formerly by feudalism and by the church.

The feudal nobles who during the middle ages had been leaders in limiting monarchy and establishing constitutional government on the basis of contract between prince and people, now lost much of their earlier influence and leadership. Some of them were killed during the crusades. Others emigrated to the Near East. Some settled in cities, engaged in commerce, and came to share the townsmen's desire for strong and stable government. Still others were forcefully subjected to the king and made into servants and supporters of royal monarchy. By the sixteenth century, feudalism was decaying, and soon the feudal lords would be in no position to oppose royal absolutism.

The church had likewise been a foe of royal absolutism during the middle ages, but its energetic opposition was now changing to toleration and resignation and even aid. The church, while a foe to royal absolutism, had been no friend to the anarchy and disorder which feudal society at its height imposed upon Europe, and accordingly the church, in conjunction with the middle class,

patronized early royal attempts to check private warfare and dominate feudalism. Thereby the church contributed to the growth of royal power. When the royal power turned against the church and sought to enhance itself at the expense of pope, bishops, and monks, the churchmen found themselves so weakened by the crusades, by previous political struggles, by internal abuses, and by popular criticism and dissent, that they felt it natural or expedient to acquiesce in much that the kings did, and eventually many churchmen became convinced supporters of absolute monarchy.

**Growth of Middle Class**

The growth of the middle class and its alliance with royalty were perhaps the most significant features of the period of transition from the middle ages to modern times. This class comprised an increasing number of men of wealth and brains. The kings catered to it, and it served—and worshipped—the kings. The middle class furnished the kings with lawyers and most useful officials, with more and more money for the mounting expenses of central government, and with reliable men for national armies; and in return the kings bestowed commercial monopolies and other financial favors upon the middle class. Gradually, under middle-class influence, the institution of monarchy in the national states was transformed. The monarch, instead of being a titular suzerain of feudal landed lords, became the real head of a big national business in which the middle class was an important stockholder.

The importance of the middle class was augmented in national states in the sixteenth century by a startling economic expansion of Europe, in the fostering of which it was kings, rather than emperors or city states, who took the lead. Simultaneously, the consciousness of nationality was stimulated, especially among the middle class and to the profit of the monarchs of national states. These monarchs, enriched by overseas plundering and exploitation on the part of their faithful subjects and regarded as the embodiments of national achievement and ambition, were about to eclipse in majesty and might not only feudal nobles and city states but the Empire and the papacy.

To the same end contributed a change, which was brought about in the fifteenth century, in the methods of warfare. Hitherto, during the middle ages, royal armies had been composed chiefly of feudal vassals and retainers, and they had fought with spears,

pikes, swords, bows and arrows. Now, with the introduction of gunpowder and firearms, a prince could maintain a standing army of hired soldiers and equip it with guns and muskets; and a national monarch, with larger and surer revenue, could surpass city states and Holy Roman Empire in the size and effectiveness of his military establishment. He could use it to subdue rebellious feudal lords, to quell popular uprisings, or to wage war against foreign powers. In a word, he now possessed a novel instrument of monarchical absolutism.

Predisposing men's minds to the idea of monarchical absolutism and to a veritable worship of the prince was the revived study of Roman law. According to a basic maxim of the ancient Roman law, as compiled by the Byzantine Emperor Justinian in the sixth century, the prince or ruler of a state not only had authority to make laws but also to break them or to change them at will. This doctrine—that the prince can do no wrong, that the will of the prince is law—was quite contrary to the medieval theory that the ruler is bound by feudal contract and must respect the fundamental law (or "constitution") of the land. The kings of the later middle ages, disliking the medieval theory, prompted the revival of Roman law; they encouraged its teaching and study; and the large lawyer-class, that by the sixteenth century were trained in it, naturally invoked it in behalf of the claims of the kings who employed them.

The cause of national monarchy and the conviction that national monarchs are absolute and superior to constitutions and parliaments, received classical and cogent expression in the sixteenth century in the political writings of Niccolò Machiavelli, an Italian scholar and statesman of the city state of Florence. In his most celebrated book, *The Prince* (1513), Machiavelli argued that national monarchy is preferable to any other form of government, that the power of a national monarch should be absolute and unhampered by religious or moral considerations, and that a prince, in order to promote the interests of his nation or to safeguard his own position, may properly employ deception or bribery or even assassination. Despite protests of the Pope and condemnation by the Church, Machiavelli's *The Prince* was widely read and its counsels were acted upon by many ambitious rulers of the sixteenth century.

All the factors which have just been described cooperated to

produce in sixteenth-century Europe a group of powerful national states, which were politically independent of the Holy Roman Empire and of each other, and which, under ambitious and frequently unscrupulous monarchs, were uprooting feudalism, undermining the church, and paving the way for a modern political regime very different from that of previous centuries. They heralded the rise of modern nationalism and the advent of divine-right absolute monarchy.

By the year 1500 two national monarchies had emerged on the British Isles. The more important was England, which had been a kingdom since the ninth century, but which during the middle ages had been not so much a national state as part of a dynastic dominion. Its Kings had been Norman French in origin and sympathy and ambitious to extend their sway both in France and in the British Isles. They had conquered a part of Ireland (the so-called Pale of Dublin) in the twelfth century and had subdued the principality of Wales in the thirteenth century. They had attempted repeatedly but in vain to subjugate the kingdom of Scotland. For several centuries, too, they had sought, with considerable success, to dominate a large part, if not all, of France.

**England**

The Hundred Years' War (1337–1453), beginning as a dynastic and feudal struggle between the royal families of England and France, had a significant national outcome. The English sovereign was compelled to surrender the bulk of his domains on the Continent and to confine his ambitions to Britain. At this very time, the sense of English nationality and English patriotism was exalted; the English language acquired definite literary form; and peculiar national institutions took hardy root in England. For several years after the conclusion of the Hundred Years' War, England was harassed by bloody and confused struggles, known as the Wars of the Roses, between rival claimants to the throne, but at length, in 1485, Henry VII, the first of the Tudor dynasty, secured the crown and ushered in a new era of English history.

Henry VII (1485–1509) sought to create a "strong monarchy." During the middle ages the power of the King had been restricted by a Parliament, composed of a House of Lords and a House of Commons, and as the former was then more influential than the latter, political control had practically been divided between the King and the members of

**Henry VII**

the upper house—great land-holding nobles and leading churchmen. The Wars of the Roses had two effects which redounded to the King's advantage. First, the struggle, being really a contest of two factions of nobles, destroyed many noble families and enabled the crown to seize their estates, thereby lessening the influence of an ancient class. Second, the struggle, being long and disorderly, created in the middle class or "common people" a longing for peace and a conviction that order and security could be maintained only by repression of the nobility and the strengthening of monarchy. Henry took advantage of these circumstances to fix upon his country an absolutism which lasted throughout the sixteenth century, during the reigns of the four other members of the Tudor family, and until a revolution in the seventeenth century.

Henry VII repressed disorder with a heavy hand and secured the establishment of an extraordinary court, afterwards called the "Court of Star Chamber," to hear cases, especially those affecting the nobles, which the ordinary courts had not been able to settle. Then, too, he was very economical. By means of frugality and a foreign policy of peace, the expenditure was appreciably decreased, while the public revenue was enhanced by means of more careful attention to the cultivation of the crown lands and the collection of feudal dues, fines, benevolences,[1] import and export duties, and past parliamentary grants. Henry VII was thereby freed in large measure from dependence on Parliament for grants of money, and the power of parliament naturally declined. In fact, Parliament met only five times during his whole reign and only once during the last twelve years, and in all its action was quite subservient to the royal desires.

Henry VII refrained in general from foreign war, but sought by other means to promote the international welfare of his country. He negotiated several treaties by which English traders might buy and sell goods in other countries. One of the most famous of these commercial treaties was the Intercursus Magnus concluded in 1496 with the duke of Burgundy, admitting English goods into the Netherlands. He likewise encouraged English companies of

[1] "Benevolences" were sums of money extorted from the people in the guise of gifts. A celebrated minister of Henry VII collected a very large number of "benevolences" for his master. If a man lived economically, it was reasoned he was saving money and could afford a "present" for the King. If, on the contrary, he lived sumptuously, he was evidently wealthy and could likewise afford a "gift."

merchants to engage in foreign trade and commissioned the explorations of the Cabots in the New World. Henry increased the prestige of his house by politic marital alliances. He arranged a marriage between the heir to his throne, Arthur, and Catherine, a daughter of Ferdinand and Isabella, the Spanish sovereigns. Arthur died a few months after his wedding, but it was arranged that Catherine should remain in England as the bride of the King's second son, who subsequently became Henry VIII. The King's daughter Margaret was married to King James IV of Scotland, thereby paving the way for the later union of the crowns of England and Scotland.

England in the year 1500 was a real national monarchy, and the power of the King appeared to be distinctly in the ascendant. Parliament was fast becoming a formal and perfunctory body.

Scotland in the year 1500 was also a national monarchy. But it was much weaker than England, and its monarchs, who were of the Stuart family, had been much less successful in overcoming the clannishness of the Scottish highlanders, in disciplining the feudal nobles, and in establishing absolutism. The Scottish monarchs, anxious to secure foreign aid against English arms, leaned heavily on France; but, in the meantime, the English language, succeeding where English arms failed, was gradually supplanting in many parts of Scotland the native Gaelic language. The Scottish national monarchy was a pawn, rather than a chief piece, in the sixteenth-century game of international politics.

**Scotland**

On the Continent, at this time, the national monarchy of France was being consolidated territorially and politically. It had been a slow and painful and almost accidental process, for long ago in 987, when Hugh Capet came to the throne, the France of his day was hardly more than the neighborhood of Paris. It had taken five full centuries of dynastic war and intrigue to unite the petty feudal divisions of the country into the state which we call France.

**France**

The Hundred Years' War had finally freed the western duchies and counties from control by English sovereigns and at the same time had aroused French national feeling and created a need and desire for strong national monarchy. Just before the opening of the sixteenth century the wily and tactful Louis XI (1461–1483) had rounded out French territories. On the east he had occupied

the powerful duchy of Burgundy. On the west and on the southeast he had possessed himself of most of the inheritance of the Angevin branch of his own family, including Anjou, and Provence east of the Rhône. On the south the French frontier had been carried to the Pyrenees. Finally, Louis's son, Charles VIII (1483–1498), by marrying the heiress of Brittany, had absorbed this western duchy into France.

Meanwhile, centralized political institutions had been taking slow but tenacious root in the country. Of course, many local institutions and customs survived in the various provinces which had gradually been added to France, but the King was now recognized from Flanders to Spain and from the Rhône to the Ocean as the chief source of law, justice, and order. There was a uniform royal coinage and a standing army under the King's command. The monarchs had struggled valiantly against the disruptive tendencies of feudalism; they had been aided by the middle class; and the proof of their success was their comparative freedom from political checks. The Estates General, to which French commoners had been admitted in 1302, resembled in certain externals the English parliament—for example, in comprising representatives of the clergy, nobles, and commons—but it had never had final say in levying taxes or in authorizing expenditures or in trying royal officers. And unlike England, France had no live tradition of popular participation in government and no written guarantee of personal liberty.

Consolidated at home, the French monarchy on the eve of the sixteenth century sought conquests abroad. By attempting to enforce an inherited claim to the crown of Naples, Charles VIII in 1494 started that career of foreign war and aggrandizement which was to mark the history of France throughout following centuries. His efforts in Italy were far from successful, but his heir, Louis XII (1498–1515), continued to lay claim to Naples and to the duchy of Milan as well. In 1504 Louis was obliged to resign Naples to King Ferdinand of Aragon, in whose family it remained for two centuries, but about Milan continued a conflict which ultimately merged into the general struggle between Francis I (1515–1547) and the Emperor Charles V.[1]

France in the year 1500 was also a national monarchy, with the beginnings of a national literature and with a national patriotism

[1] For this struggle, see below, pp. 195–198.

centering in the King. It was becoming self-conscious. Like England, France was on the road to "strong government."

In southwestern Europe, beyond the Pyrenees, were the two national monarchies of Spain and Portugal, which, in a long process of unification, not only had had to contend against the same disuniting tendencies as appeared in France and England, but also had been compelled to solve the problem of the existence side by side of two rival religions—Christianity and Islam. Moslem invaders from Africa had secured political control of nearly the whole peninsula as early as the eighth century, but in course of time several diminutive Christian states had appeared in the northern and western mountains. These states included: Catalonia, in the northeast, along the Mediterranean; Aragon, occupying the south-central portion of the Pyrenees and extending southward toward the Ebro River; Navarre, at the west of the Pyrenees, reaching northward into what is now France and southward into what is now Spain; Castile, west of Navarre, circling about the town of Burgos; Leon, in the northwestern corner of the peninsula; and Portugal, south of Leon, lying along the Atlantic coast. Little by little these Christian states had extended their southern frontiers at the expense of the Moslem power, and through intermarriages and other dynastic policies of their ruling families they were being combined and consolidated. In this way, Catalonia was united with the kingdom of Aragon in the twelfth century, and a hundred years later Castile and Leon were finally joined. Thus, by the close of the thirteenth century, there were three major states in the peninsula—Aragon on the east, Castile in the middle, and Portugal on the west; and two minor states—Navarre in the extreme north, and Moslem Granada in the extreme south.

Dynastic policy was gradually constructing a united Spain, as it was building a united Britain and a united France. While Portugal had acquired its full territorial extension in the peninsula by the year 1263, the unification of Spain was delayed until after the marriage, in 1469, of Isabella of Castile with Ferdinand of Aragon. Granada, the last foothold of the Moslems, fell in 1492, and in 1512 Ferdinand acquired that part of Navarre which lay upon the southern slope of the Pyrenees. The peninsula was thenceforth divided between the two states of Spain and Portugal.

Portugal, the older and smaller of the two states, had become a conspicuous national state by the year 1500, thanks to a line of able rulers and to a remarkable series of foreign discoveries that cluster about the name of Prince Henry the Navigator. Portugal possessed a distinctive language of Latin origin and already cherished a literature of no mean proportions. In harmony with the spirit of the age the monarchy was tending toward absolutism, and the parliament, called the Cortes, which had played an important part in earlier times, ceased to meet regularly after 1521. The Portuguese royal family was closely related to the Castilian line, and there were people in both kingdoms who hoped that one day the whole peninsula would be united under one sovereign.

**Portugal**

From several standpoints the Spanish monarchy was less unified in 1500 than England, France, or Portugal. The union of Castile and Aragon was, for over two centuries, hardly more than personal. Each retained its own customs, parliament (Cortes), and separate administration. Each possessed a distinctive language, although Castilian gradually became the literary "Spanish," while Catalan, the speech of a part of Aragon, was reduced to an inferior position. Despite the continuance of great pride in local traditions and institutions, the cause of Spanish nationality received marked impetus during the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella. It was under them that territorial unity was obtained. It was they who turned the attention of Spaniards to foreign and colonial enterprises. The year that marked the fall of Granada and the final extinction of Moslem rule in Spain was likewise signalized by the first voyage of Christopher Columbus, which prefigured the establishment of a greater Spain beyond the seas. On the continent of Europe, Spain speedily acquired a commanding position in international affairs, largely as the result of Ferdinand's ability. The royal house of Aragon had long held claims to the Neapolitan and Sicilian kingdoms and for two hundred years had freely mixed in the politics of Italy. Now, in 1504, Ferdinand secured recognition from France of his claims in Naples, Sicily, and Sardinia. Spain was becoming the rival of Venice for leadership of the Mediterranean.

**Spain**

While interfering very little with the forms of representative government in their respective kingdoms, Ferdinand and Isabella worked ever, in fact, toward uniformity and absolutism. They

sought to ingratiate themselves with the middle class, to strip the nobility of its political power, and to enlist the church in their service. The Cortes were more or less regularly convened, but their functions were almost imperceptibly transferred to royal commissions and officers of state. Privileges granted to towns in earlier times were gradually revoked. The Crown, by becoming the head of the military orders which had borne prominent part in the struggle against the Moslems, gained control of considerable treasure and of an effective fighting force. The sovereigns prevailed upon the Pope to transfer control of the ecclesiastical court of the Inquisition in their country to the crown, and they utilized it not only to penalize dissenters from Catholic Christianity but also to enforce political uniformity.

In population and in domestic resources Spain was not so important as France. But the exploits of Ferdinand and Isabella, the wealth which temporarily flowed in from a vast colonial empire, and the prestige which long attended Spanish arms and diplomacy, exalted Spain throughout the sixteenth century to a position beyond its inherent national strength and resources.

**Scandinavian Monarchies**

In northwestern Europe, in the year 1500, were three kingdoms, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, corresponding to the present-day states of those names. They had been built during the middle ages, when their people, the Scandinavians, were most vigorous and venturesome, when they were emigrating in all directions, raiding and settling the coasts of England, Ireland, France, and southern Italy, colonizing Iceland and Greenland, conquering Finland, and invading Russia. The three Scandinavian countries had many racial and social characteristics in common, and they had been politically united under the King of Denmark by the union of Calmar in 1397. This union, however, was never popular among the Swedes, and after a series of revolts and disorders extending over fifty years, Sweden (with its dependent grandduchy of Finland) became, in the sixteenth century, an independent national state with Gustavus Vasa (1523–1560) as monarch. Norway (with Iceland and Greenland) remained in subjection to the national state of Denmark. The Kings both of Sweden and of Denmark labored in the sixteenth century with complete success to dominate the church and with considerable success to enlarge their realms and to reduce the power of parliaments and the influence of the nobility.

In the Scandinavian peninsula, as in the Iberian peninsula and in France and England, royal absolutism was arising.

In eastern Europe, that is, east of the Holy Roman Empire and north of the Ottoman Empire, were certain other states of some importance at the beginning of the sixteenth century. However, these eastern states, with one very notable exception, were not destined in modern times to play such leading roles as the national states of western Europe.

**Bohemia**

Bohemia, a country at the headwaters of the Elbe and Oder rivers and the core of what is now known as Czechoslovakia, was peopled mainly by a Slavic nationality, the Czech, with distinctive language and literature and national feeling, and it had had Kings of its own continuously since the twelfth century. But the Czechs were a small island in a large German sea. Bohemia was traditionally a part of the Holy Roman Empire; its Kings were electors of the Empire and were often more concerned with imperial and German politics than with national Czech affairs; and the kingdom was permeated with German immigrants and German influences. Besides, the kingship in Bohemia had been elective, rather than hereditary; and Bohemian nobles frequently elected foreigners to the kingship. In this way a Polish prince became King of Bohemia in 1471; and when in 1490 this same prince was elected King of Hungary and transferred his seat of government to Budapest, Bohemia passed, to all intents and purposes, under foreign rule.

In 1526 the King of Bohemia and Hungary perished at Mohács in battle with the Turks, and the nobles of the two countries, terrified by the rapid advance of the Ottoman power, elected as his successor the prince most likely to protect them. This was Ferdinand of Habsburg, grandson of the Emperor Maximilian and of Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain, brother of the Emperor Charles V, and heir to the hereditary Habsburg archduchy of Austria. Thenceforth, for almost four centuries, Bohemia—and all the lands of the Czechs and Slovaks—were part and parcel of the Habsburg dominions; and although Bohemia retained a local parliament and some local privileges, its government was directed from Vienna, and it ceased to be, in any sense, an independent national state.


Hungary had given promise, during the middle ages, of becoming a national monarchy on at least an equal footing with

France and England. Its territorial extent was as great, and its native Kings, from the time of Stephen the Great (Saint Stephen) in the eleventh century, had displayed a high average of administrative ability and military prowess. Moreover, its population had originally been composed of a homogeneous nationality, the Magyar, descendants of a horde of Asiatic nomads, and they retained a considerable degree of national consciousness and pride. On the other hand, the Magyar nobles were particularly powerful and disorderly; no middle class developed in sufficient number to restrain them; they exploited their peasants most miserably; and, by placing drastic restrictions on the kingship and rendering it elective, they had prevented the growth of strong and effective monarchy. At the same time the Magyar nobles, by conquering neighboring alien peoples—Slavic Croats and Slovaks and Latin Rumanians—made Hungary less homogeneous and more difficult to govern as a centralized national state.

**Hungary**

Eventually, distracted Hungary received a mortal blow from the Ottoman Turks on the battlefield of Mohács (1526), and after a protracted and terribly destructive contest between the Turks on one side and rival claimants to the Magyar throne on the other side, Hungary was partitioned by a truce in 1547. The Ottoman Sultan secured the southern and central counties (including the capital city of Budapest); a native nobleman obtained a group of eastern counties (including the Rumanian-speaking district of Transylvania) with the title of "prince"; and Ferdinand of Habsburg, already Archduke of Austria and King of Bohemia and later Holy Roman Emperor, was recognized as sovereign of some thirty-five northern and western counties (including Croatia) with the title of King. Thus, in the sixteenth century, Hungary was divided into three separate states with divergent aims and interests, a condition of things which, with frequent rearrangements, endured for more than a century and a half. National monarchy seemed to be hopelessly lost to the Magyars at the very time it was being solidly acquired by Englishmen, Frenchmen, and Spaniards.

Northeast of Bohemia and the Holy Roman Empire were the independent national states of Poland and Lithuania. The former, though recognized as a "kingdom" in the year 1000, had long been the victim of internal dissensions and foreign, especially


THE EUROPEAN PEOPLES
LATINS
FRENCH
CASTILIANS
PORTUGUESE AND GALICIANS
CATALANS (AND PROVENÇALS)
ITALIANS
RUMANIANS
TEUTONS
GERMANS
DUTCH (AND FLEMISH)
ENGLISH (AND LOWLAND SCOTS)
SCANDINAVIANS
SLAVS
RUSSIANS
POLES
UKRAINIANS (RUTHENES)
CZECHS AND SLOVAKS
YUGOSLAVS (SERBS, CROATS, SLOVENES)
BULGARS
CELTS
IRISH AND SCOTS
BRETONS AND WELSH
GREEKS
LETTS AND LITHUANIANS
ESTONIANS AND FINNS
MAGYARS
TURKS
IN CERTAIN AREAS THE MIXTURE OF PEOPLES NECESSITATES A CANTONAL SYSTEM. SOME OF THE MORE OBVIOUS OF THESE ARE SHOWN THUS:
MACEDONIA BULGARS, TURKS, SERBS, ETC.
Riga
DANES
Danzig
Kiev
Lemberg
GERMANS SLOVAKS
Vienna
GERMANS MAGYARS
BANAT MAGYARS SERBS GERMANS RUMANIANS
TRANSYLVANIA MAGYARS GERMANS RUMANIANS
UKRANIANS RUMANIANS GERMANS BULGARS
UKRAINIANS TURKS
SWITZ. FRENCH GERMANS ITALIANS
BASQUES
Belgrade
MACEDONIA BULGARS, TURKS, SERBS, ETC.
TURKS BULGARS GREEKS
Constantinople
ARMENIANS TURKS KURDS
ALBANIANS
ALBANIANS GREEKS

German, invasions; and it was not until the fourteenth century that it had entirely freed itself from the Holy Roman Empire and become a conspicuous state in Europe. Lithuania had emerged as a kingdom in the year 1250. Then, in 1386, by the election of the King of Lithuania as King of Poland, a political union had been effected between the two countries. Thereafter the Kings of Poland-Lithuania had extended the frontiers of their joint kingdom, so that by the year 1500 it occupied a wide stretch of territory through east-central Europe and was reckoned a great military power. Internally, however, the monarchy was faced with conditions almost as difficult and perilous as those which confronted Hungary. There was friction between Poles and Lithuanians and between each of these peoples and the aliens whom they had conquered. There was a relatively weak middle class, and a very strong nobility, which insisted upon keeping the monarchy elective and extorting an ever greater number of paralyzing concessions and privileges from the crown. There was abiding enmity on the part of Germans, and a new threat to the southern lands of the monarchy from the advancing Ottoman Empire.

**Poland and Lithuania**

Northeastern Europe—beyond the confines of Finland, Lithuania, and the Ottoman Empire—was peopled by Slavic Russians, but it had long been prey to internal tribal feuds, to Scandinavian raids from the west, and to Mongol conquest from the east and south, and it was a rude and backward region. At the opening of the sixteenth century the chieftain of one of the large Russian principalities, Ivan III (Ivan the Great, 1462–1505), Grand-Duke of Muscovy, himself of Scandinavian extraction, was just beginning to lay the foundations of national monarchy. He put an end to Mongol domination, united the numerous tribal states, conquered the important towns of Novgorod and Pskov, and extended his sway as far as the Arctic Ocean and the Ural Mountains. Ivan III, moreover, married a princess who was the nearest in blood-relationship to Constantine XI, the last of the Byzantine Emperors at Constantinople. Through her influence Ivan aspired to be regarded as the successor of the Græco-Roman Emperors, grew more and more absolutist, and adopted for his court at Moscow the ceremonious etiquette of Constantinople together with the emblem of the imperial double-headed eagle. In 1547, Ivan IV, appropriately called "Ivan the Terrible,"

**Russia**

the grandson of Ivan III, solemnly assumed the title of Tsar, or Emperor, of "All the Russias." A new national monarchy, an absolute and imperialist one, was clearly arising in northeastern Europe.

### 5. GROWTH OF NATIONAL PATRIOTISM

The rise of national monarchy in the sixteenth century was paralleled by a quickening of national consciousness and national patriotism among European peoples. For centuries previously there had been in Europe many different nationalities, using different languages, but the masses of Europeans had been less concerned with loyalty to their respective linguistic groupings than with patriotic devotion to empire or city state, to military chieftain or local landlord, to feudal principalities or to Christendom as a whole.

**European Nationalities**

In the latter part of the middle ages and at the dawn of modern times, European nationalities became more crystallized and began to command greater and more patriotic attention on the part of their members. The nationalities of Europe at the opening of the sixteenth century can be grouped principally in seven general divisions, according to the "family" of the language spoken by each. Six of these "families" were "Aryan" and distantly related to each other as well as to the Sanscrit, Persian, and Armenian languages of Asia. The six Aryan families of Europe, with their linguistic national subdivisions, may be outlined as follows:

(1) GREEK: (a) *Greeks,* in southeastern Europe, and also along the coasts of Asia Minor.

(2) LATIN or ROMANIC: peoples speaking languages derived from Latin: (a) *Italians,* in south-central Europe; (b) *French* in western Europe; (c) *Catalans,* in northeastern Spain, and their kinsfolk, *Provençals,* in southeastern France; (d) *Castilians,* in central Spain; (e) *Portuguese,* to the west of Spain; and (f) *Rumanians,* in the principalities of Moldavia, Wallachia, and Transylvania, at the mouth of the Danube and to the west of the Black Sea.

(3) CELTIC: (a) *Gaels* of Scotland and Ireland; (b) *Welsh;* (c) *Bretons,* on the Continent, in the far west of France.

(4) GERMANIC OR TEUTONIC: (a) *Germans,* in north-central Europe; (b) *Netherlanders—Flemish* or *Dutch*—along the low

coasts of the North Sea; (c) *Scandinavians,* in northwestern Europe, with dialectical differences among *Danes, Norwegians,* and *Swedes.*

(5) SLAVIC: (a) *Czechs,* in Bohemia, and their kinsmen, *Slovaks,* to the east of them in northern Hungary; (b) *Poles,* northeast of Bohemia; (c) *Russians,* in northeastern Europe; (d) *Ukrainians,* or *Ruthenians,* southeast of the Poles and southwest of the Russians; (e) *Yugoslavs,* or "Southern Slavs," in southeastern Europe, including *Slovenes* in the Austrian province of Carniola, *Croats* in the western part of Hungary, *Serbs* to the south of Hungary, and *Bulgarians* to the east of the Serbs.

(6) BALTIC: (a) *Lithuanians,* east of the Poles; (b) *Latvians,* or *Letts,* north of the Lithuanians.

In England had arisen a distinct nationality, speaking the hybrid *English* language curiously compounded of Teutonic and Latin elements.

The seventh "family" of languages, the TURANIAN, differed radically from the preceding Aryan "families" and was represented in Europe by three distinct langages, spoken by as many disparate nationalities: (a) *Magyars,* or *Hungarians,* in the middle plains of the Danube River; (b) *Finns,* in northern Europe, northeast of Sweden and northwest of Russia, and their neighboring kinsmen, the *Estonians,* just south of the Gulf of Bothnia; (c) *Turks,* the dominant people within the Ottoman Empire.

In addition, there were two peculiar peoples, neither Aryan nor Turanian in speech, but retaining langages probably of very great antiquity: (a) *Basques,* in the Pyrenees, between France and Spain; and (b) *Albanians,* along the Adriatic, north of the Greeks. Besides, there were groups of *Moors* and *Arabs* in Spain, remnants of earlier Moslem invaders; and throughout Europe were settlements of Semitic *Jews,* fairly numerous in Spain, Portugal and the Ottoman Empire, and most numerous in Poland and Lithuania.

Altogether, there were more than thirty nationalities in Europe. And by the year 1500 some of them were developing a self-consciousness and a national patriotism which boded ill both to the petty medieval divisions of feudalism and to the older unity of Christendom.

**National Patriotism**

The crusades had been especially significant in stimulating national feeling. By inducing travel on an unprecedented scale,

they had taught many Europeans to surmount their localism and to acquire a surer knowledge not only of large aggregates of people who spoke the same language or kindred dialects but also of other large aggregates who conversed in alien tongues. Such persons grew proud of their own nationalities and scornful of others.

The crusading spirit, moreover, had produced special national rivalries within Christendom. The major crusades, in which Frenchmen were the foremost participants, had fostered French national feeling and French rivalry with German and English participants. The so-called fourth crusade had aroused great bitterness between Frenchmen and Italians, on the one hand, and Greeks, on the other hand. From the conflict between Christians and Moslems in the Iberian peninsula had emerged a lively national consciousness among Castilians, Catalans, and Portuguese. It was the crusading efforts of a military-religious German Order, the Teutonic Knights, against pagan Slavs on the eastern Baltic which, in conjunction with commercial activities of the Hanseatic League and political endeavors of the German rulers of the Holy Roman Empire, had proudly carried German conquests and colonies eastward and had eventually stirred Slavic peoples to national resistance. The sanguinary wars of the fifteenth century between the states of the Teutonic Knights and the Polish monarchy were at once a result and a continuing cause of national rivalry between Germans and Slavs.

Religious dissent, or heresy, had become a cloak for national movements, and its suppression a means of gratifying rival national ambitions. For example, the Albigensian heresy had spread among the Provençal nationality, and the crusade which had stamped out that heresy had been undertaken by Frenchmen and had resulted in the subjugation of Provence by France and the subordination of Provençal to French. Likewise, the Hussite heresy of the fifteenth century had been adopted by Czechs, and the crusades which repressed it were manned by Germans and followed by the national subjection of Bohemia to German nobles and German princes.

From religious crusades to national crusades was only a step. The Hundred Years' War between the Kings of England and France (1337–1453), beginning as a feudal conflict, ended as a national crusade of Frenchmen, inspired by Jeanne d'Arc, against

the "Goddams," that is, the English. It promoted the growth of national feeling in both countries. It united the French-speaking people under a French monarch, and it restricted the realm of the English monarch chiefly to English-speaking people. It also promoted the growth of absolutism in both countries, for henceforth the monarchs could count upon the patriotic support of their respective peoples against divisive tendencies at home as well as against threatening dangers abroad.

National patriotism before the year 1500 had been principally personal. It was directed toward a national monarch more than toward a nationality as such. It was strongest in those countries whose monarchs had succeeded in uniting a people of the same language under a common scepter and a common law. The rise of national patriotism aided the development of national monarchy, and, in turn, the development of national monarchy stimulated the rise of national patriotism.

**Role of National Monarchy**

The monarchs themselves built *national* states less by design than by chance. It was a fortune of war which obliged the English monarchs in the fifteenth century to abandon their possessions in France and to devote their main energies to Britain. It was a dynastic marriage alliance which united Spain under Ferdinand and Isabella. Indeed, the national monarchs of the sixteenth century waged wars and contracted marriages for personal and dynastic purposes, rather than for nationalist ends; and they entertained no idea of confining their ambitions to lands and peoples of their own language. They frequently acquired territory inhabited by "foreigners," and they bartered their subjects as if they were sheep and cattle. They thought in terms of dynasty, not in terms of nationality.

Yet in all dynastic conflicts and family transactions, the core of each monarchy was increasingly a nationality of common language and common traditions, imbued with patriotic loyalty to the monarch. Such was certainly the case in England, France, Spain, Portugal, and the Scandinavian countries. Such was at least the aspiration in Bohemia, Poland, Hungary, and Russia. Such, too, was the hope of many prominent citizens in regions, such as Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, and southeastern Europe, where empires or city states existed and national monarchies were lacking.

Absolute monarchy, it should be emphasized, played a leading role in exalting national consciousness at the dawn of modern

times. The monarch was becoming the symbol of national unity and independence, and in him resided national sovereignty. In fact, "monarch" and "sovereign" already were interchangeable terms. It was the monarch who coined money, levied taxes, maintained the army, declared war, and made peace; and it was the nation which patriotically acquiesced in these acts of its sovereign. It was around the institution of monarchy that national traditions accumulated, and it was under the patronage of the new national monarchs that much national literature was produced.

The rise of national patriotism was evidenced in the rise of national absolute monarchy. It was also evidenced at the same time in the rise of vernacular literatures.

**Role of National Literature**

Latin and Greek had long been regarded as the classical literary languages of Europe. Prevailing within the old Roman Empire, they had early become the official languages of Christendom; and so long as most writing was done by Christian priests and missionaries, it was done in Greek in eastern Europe and in Latin in central and western Europe. Of course, side by side with these written international languages persisted the variety of national languages—the so-called vernaculars—which have been outlined above and which were spoken by the common people. But literary production in these vernaculars had at first been relatively slight in quantity and religious rather than national in content; even the requisite alphabets and forms of letters had been borrowed and adapted from Greek or Latin.

Throughout the middle ages and into the sixteenth century, all educated persons in central and western Europe knew Latin as well as their native tongue. They thus belonged not only to diverse nationalities but also to the international society of Christendom. They possessed a comprehensive literary tradition, a single medium for oral and written communication, and a tool by which they could readily bridge national differences. For instance, Erasmus, the foremost scholar of Europe at the opening of the sixteenth century, was a Netherlander by birth, but his mastery of Latin made him at home in many countries. He lived among educated Frenchmen, Englishmen, Italians, Germans, and Flemings, with all of whom he could correspond and talk in Latin. For a time he lectured in Latin at the College of France. By means of Latin he communicated with the Pope, with the Kings of England,

France, and Spain, with his famous publisher at Venice, and with his numerous critics in all parts of Western Christendom.

Before the time of Erasmus, however, educated men were already beginning to write in the vulgar tongues and not by any means exclusively on religious subjects; and presently literary masterpieces were appearing in the vernacular languages of the masses as well as in the ancient languages of scholars. In the fourteenth century, Dante wrote in Italian and Chaucer in English. Thenceforth one vernacular after another became the vehicle of distinctive and splendid literary expression. Two developments of the fifteenth century aided the process. The one was the attempt of certain scholars—the so-called Humanists—to purify Latin of its medieval developments, which had been in the direction of greater simplicity, and to restore ancient classical Latin with its involved sentence-structure and its complicated grammar, an attempt which did much to discredit Latin as a living literary language and to restrict its use to the classroom, to scientific treatises, and to ecclesiastical services. The other development was the invention of printing, which served to stereotype the common spoken languages, to fix for each a norm of literary usage, and to render possible the dissemination of national literature among the masses.

The rise of vernacular literatures in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries tended to emphasize nationality, for not even a well-educated person could be expected to know all the languages spoken in Europe, and the large majority of Europeans were familiar only with the language of their own nationality. English authors naturally began to write for readers in England and to stress what they thought was peculiar to England; French authors did the same for France; Italian authors for Italy; German writers for Germany; etc. Gradually, national characteristics were imaginatively depicted and national aspirations were poignantly voiced. In the sixteenth century, Machiavelli made eloquent national appeals to the Italians, Camoëns celebrated glorious national exploits of the Portuguese, Luther addressed stirring patriotic letters to the Germans, Cervantes played fancifully with Spanish character, and Shakespeare glamorously penned the praises of England.

A new patriotic and political ideal was obviously possessing Europeans in the sixteenth century, the ideal of strong national

monarchy backed by the firm loyalty of a national citizenry. It seems to have originated in a reaction alike against the practice of anarchical feudalism and against the theory of paramount imperialism, and it appears to have been nourished by the gradual rise of national vernacular literatures and by the example of certain princes who more or less fortuitously established an absolute sway over particular linguistic nationalities.

The new ideal was menacing to old historic institutions of Europe. It threatened the destruction of feudalism, the disruption of Christendom, and the extinction of the Holy Roman Empire. In truth, before the sixteenth century was ended, Christianity was largely nationalized and the Holy Roman Empire was irreparably weakened, while commerce and the rivalries of commerce took on a complexion predominantly national. National patriotism, as exploited by ambitious national monarchs, inspired much of the commercial expansion and conflict and likewise much of the religious upheaval which characterized the sixteenth century; and, in turn, these events magnified national patriotism.



# CHAPTER II

## ECONOMIC AND TRANS-ATLANTIC EXPANSION

### I. AGRICULTURE AND THE COUNTRYSIDE



O sharp change occurred in the basis of European society at the opening of the sixteenth century. That society still rested, as it had long rested, on agriculture. People reckoned their wealth and social position not so much by the quantity of cash and paper they held as by the extent of farm land they owned. Farming was the occupation of the vast majority of the inhabitants of every European state. The "masses" lived in the country, not, as today, in the city.

In certain respects a remarkable uniformity prevailed in rural districts throughout Europe. Whether one visited Germany, Hungary, Poland, France, or England, one was sure to find the agricultural population sharply divided into two social classes—nobility and peasantry. There might be varying gradations of these classes in different regions, but everywhere the two classes were clearly distinguishable.

The nobility comprised families who gained a living from the soil without manual labor. They held the land on feudal tenure, that is to say, they were supported by the peasants living on their estates, and, in return, they owed to some higher or wealthier nobleman or to the king certain duties, such as fighting for him, attending his court at specified times, and paying him irregular taxes (the feudal dues). The estate of each nobleman might embrace a single farm, or "manor" as it was called in England, enclosing a petty hamlet, or village; or it might include several manors.

**Noble Landlords**

Each nobleman had his manor-house or, if he were rich enough, his castle, lording it over the humble thatch-roofed cottages of the

villagers. In his stables were spirited horses and a carriage adorned with his family crest; he had servants and lackeys, a footman to open his carriage door, a game-warden to keep poachers from shooting his deer, and men-at-arms to quell disturbances, to aid him against quarrelsome neighbors, or to follow him to the wars.

In earlier times, when feudal society was young, the nobility had performed a very real service as the defenders of the peasants against foreign enemies and likewise against marauders and bandits of whom the land had been full. Then fighting had been the profession of the nobility. And to enable them to possess the expensive accoutrements of fighting—horses, armor, swords, and lances—they had been assured of liberal incomes.

Now, at the opening of the sixteenth century, feudalism was disappearing. At least in the national monarchies the king had undertaken the defense of the land and the preservation of peace; he had deprived the nobility of much of their earlier independence and had drawn many of them from active life in the field to an ornamental existence at his court. Such nobles, by right of inheritance, continued to enjoy the income from their rural estates and the social prestige which their forbears had earned. They frequently held high honorary positions, especially in the royal army. But they were no longer as indispensable as they had once been.

In striking contrast to the small minority of nobles, were the peasantry—the mass of the people. They were the human beings who toiled for their bread, and, being of ignoble birth, were treated as social inferiors. Actual farm work was "servile labor," and between the man whose hands were stained by servile labor and the person of "gentle birth" a wide social gulf was fixed.

**Peasantry**

During the early middle ages most of the peasants throughout Europe had been "serfs." For various reasons, serfdom had tended gradually to die out in western Europe. On the other hand, however, serfdom was actually intensified in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in Prussia, Hungary, Poland, and Russia; and even in France and Spain a considerable number of serfs continued to live and work on nobles' estates in accordance with medieval customs which can be described collectively as the "manorial system."

The serf occupied a position in rural society which it is difficult for us to understand. He was not a slave, such as was usual in the southern states of the American Union before the Civil War; he was neither a hired man nor a rent-paying tenant-farmer, such as is common enough nowadays. The serf was not a slave, because he was free to work for himself at least part of the time; he could not be sold to another master; and he could not be deprived of the right to cultivate land for his own benefit. He was not a hired man, for he received no wages. And he was not a tenant-farmer, inasmuch as he was "attached to the soil," that is, he was bound to stay and work on his land, unless he succeeded in running away or in purchasing complete freedom, in which case he would cease to be a serf and would become a freeman.

To the lord of the manor the serf was under several obligations, the most essential of which may be grouped as follows: (1) The serf had to work without pay two or three days in each week on the strips of land and the fields whose produce belonged to the nobleman. In the harvest season extra days, known as "boon-days," were stipulated on which the serf left his own work in order to harvest for the lord. He also might be called upon in emergencies to supply the manor-house with wood from the forest, or to keep the highway in repair. (2) The serf had to pay occasional dues, customarily "in kind." Thus at certain feast-days he was expected to bring a dozen fat fowls or a bushel of grain to the pantry of the manor-house. (3) Ovens, wine-presses, grist-mills, and bridges were usually owned by the nobleman, and each time the peasant used them he was obliged to contribute one of his loaves of bread, a share of his wine, a bushel of his grain, or a toll-fee, as a kind of rent, or "banality" as it was styled. (4) If the serf died without heirs, his holdings were transferred to the lord, and if he left heirs, the nobleman had the right of "heriot," that is, to appropriate the best animal owned by the deceased serf, and of "relief," that is, to oblige the designated heir to make a special payment which was equivalent to an inheritance tax.

Out of crusades and civil wars and the rise of national monarchy, and out of simultaneous pestilences destructive both to man and beast, had emerged in the later middle ages an agricultural change which, especially in western Europe, constituted a distinctive economic foundation for modern times. This was the development of capitalistic agriculture. Nobles, instead of farm-

ing their estates by the traditional cooperative services of their peasants, were becoming receivers of rent; they were beginning to view their estates as capitalistic enterprises and to expect from them not mere living but profits. This meant that a large number of peasants who had once been serfs were now becoming free-tenants, lessees, or hired laborers. Of course rent of farm-land in our present-day sense—each owner letting out his property to a tenant and, in return, exacting as large a monetary payment as possible—was still unknown. But there was a growing class of peasants who were spoken of as free-tenants to distinguish them from serf-tenants. These free-tenants, while paying regular dues, as did the others, were not compelled to work two or three days every week in the nobleman's fields, except occasionally in busy seasons such as harvest. They were free to leave the estate and to marry off their daughters or to sell their oxen without the consent of the lord; and they came to regard their customary payments to the lord as rent for their land.

While more prosperous peasants were becoming free-tenants, many of their poorer neighbors found it so difficult to gain a living as serfs that they were willing to surrender all claim to their own strips of land on the manor and to devote their whole time to working for fixed wages on the fields which were cultivated for the nobleman himself, the so-called demesne of the lord. Thus a body of hired laborers was growing up, claiming no land beyond that on which their cottages stood and possibly their small garden-plots.

Besides hired laborers and free-tenants, a third group of peasants was appearing in places where the noble proprietor did not care to superintend the cultivation of his own land. In this case he parceled it out among particular peasants, furnishing each with livestock and a plough and exacting in return a fixed proportion of the crops, which in France usually amounted to a half. Peasants who made such a bargain were called in France *métayers,* and in England "stock-and-land lessees." The arrangement was not different essentially from the familiar present-day practice of working a farm "on shares."

In western Europe the serfs had mostly become hired laborers, free-tenants, or *métayers* by the sixteenth century. The old obligations of serfdom had proved too galling for the peasant and too unprofitable for the noble. It was much easier and cheaper

for the latter to hire men to work when he needed them, than to bother with serfs, who could not be discharged readily for slackness, and who naturally worked for themselves more zealously than for him. For this reason many landlords were glad to allow their serfs to make payments in money or in grain in lieu of the performance of customary labor. In England, moreover, many nobles, finding it profitable to enclose their land in order to utilize it as pasturage for sheep,[1] voluntarily freed their serfs. The result was that serfdom had virtually disappeared in England before the sixteenth century. In France as early as the fourteenth century the majority of the serfs had purchased their liberty, although in some districts serfdom survived in its pristine vigor. In other countries, notably in Germany and the lands of eastern Europe, agricultural conditions were more backward, the eagerness for profits was less in evidence, and serfdom was still usual.

**Decline of Serfdom**

Emancipation from serfdom by no means released the peasants of western Europe from all the disabilities under which they had labored as serfs. True, the freeman no longer had week-work to do, provided he could pay for his time, and in theory at least he could marry as he chose and move freely from place to place. But he might still be called upon for an occasional day's labor, he still was expected to work on the roads, and he still had to pay fees for oven, mill, and wine-press. Then, too, his own crops might be eaten with impunity by doves from the noble dove-cote or trampled underfoot by a merry hunting-party from the manor house.

In another important respect the manorial system survived long after serfdom had begun to decline. This was the method of farming. An insistent tradition had fixed agricultural method on the medieval manor and tended to preserve it unaltered well into modern times. The tradition was that of the "three-field system" of agriculture. The land of the manor, which might vary in amount from a few hundred to five thousand acres, was not divided up into separate farms, as it would be now. The waste-land, which could be used only for pasture, and the woodland on the outskirts of the clearing, were treated as "commons." That is to say, each villager, as well as the lord of the manor, might freely gather fire-wood, or he might

**Farm Methods**

[1] Enclosing a plot of ground meant fencing or hedging it in. There had been no fences on the old manors.

turn his swine loose to feed on the acorns in the forest and his cattle to graze over the entire pasture. The arable land was divided into several, usually three, grain fields. Ridges or "balks" of unploughed turf divided each field into long parallel strips, which were usually forty rods or a furlong (furrow-long) in length, and from one to four rods wide. Each peasant had exclusive right to one or more of these strips in each of the three great fields, making, say, thirty acres in all; [1] the nobleman too had individual right to a number of strips in the great fields.

This so-called three-field system of agriculture was distinctly disadvantageous in many ways. Much time was wasted in going back and forth between the scattered plots of land. The individual peasant, moreover, was bound by custom to cultivate his land as his ancestors had done, without attempting to introduce improvements. He grew the same crops as his neighbors—usually wheat or rye in one field; barley, oats, beans, or peas in the second; and nothing in the third. Little was known about preserving the fertility of the soil by artificial manuring or by rotation of crops; and, although every year one third of the land was left "fallow" (uncultivated) in order to restore its fertility, the yield per acre averaged hardly a fourth as large as now. Farm implements were crude: scythes and sickles did the work of mowing machines; ploughs were made of wood, occasionally shod with iron; threshing was done with flails. After the grain had been harvested, cattle were turned out indiscriminately on the stubble, on the supposition that the fields were common property. It was impossible to breed fine cattle when all were herded together. Moreover, there were no potatoes or turnips, and few farmers grew clover or other grasses for winter fodder. Consequently few cattle could be kept through the winter; most of the animals were killed off in the autumn and salted down for the cold months when it was impossible to secure fresh meat.

Crude farm-methods and the dues exacted by the lord of the manor [2] must have left the poor man little for himself. Compared with the lot of the farmer to-day, the poverty of sixteenth-century

[1] In some localities it was usual to redistribute these strips every year. In that way the greater part of the manor was theoretically "common" land, and no peasant had a right of private ownership to any one strip.

[2] In addition to the dues paid to the lay lord, the peasants were under obligation to make to the church a regular contribution which was called the "tithe" and amounted to a share, less than a tenth, of the annual crops.

peasants must have been distressful. The lack of heat, light, and sanitation, the winter diet of salt meat, the scarcity of vegetables, the chronic filth and squalor, and the ignorance of laws of health opened the way to contagion and disease. If crops failed, famine was added to plague.

Country Life

On the other hand, the serf did have the open air in which to work. When times were good, he had grain and meat in plenty, and wine or ale, and he hardly envied the tapestried chambers, the bejewelled clothes, and the spiced foods of the nobility, for he looked upon them as belonging to a different world.

In one place nobleman and peasant met on a common footing —in the village church. There, on Sundays and feast-days, they came together as Christians to hear Mass; and afterwards, perhaps, holiday games and dancing on the green, benignantly patronized by the nobleman's family, helped the common folk to forget their labors. The village priest,[1] often of humble birth, though the most learned man on the manor, was the friend and benefactor of the poor and the spiritual director of the lord. Occasionally a visit of the bishop to administer confirmation to the children, afforded an opportunity for special celebration.

At other times there was little to disturb the monotony of village life and little to remind it of the outside world, except when a gossiping peddler chanced along, or when the squire rode away to court or to war. Traffic with other villages was not vital, unless there were no blacksmith or miller on the spot, and in any case it was not easy. Europe in those days was relatively "roadless." The fine road system of the ancient Romans had disintegrated long ago; no comparable system had been developed during the middle ages; and the roads which actually existed were poor and in bad weather well-nigh impassable. Long-distance communication was therefore difficult and insecure. No transportation in bulk was possible, except by water. Land travel was almost wholly on horseback, and what commodities were transported by land were carried by pack-horses. Of the inhabitants of a rural village, only a few soldiers and pilgrims, and possibly a priest,

[1] Usually very different from the higher clergy, who had large landed estates of their own, the parish priests had but modest incomes from the tithes of their parishioners and frequently eked out a living by toiling on alloted patches of ground. The individual monks too were ordinarily poor, although the monasteries might be wealthy, and they likewise often tilled the fields.

had traveled very much; they were the only geographies and the only books of travel which the village possessed, for relatively few peasants could read or write.

Self-sufficient and secluded from the outer world, the rural village went on treasuring its traditions, keeping its old customs, century after century. The countryside instinctively distrusted all novelties; it preferred old ways to new; it was heartily conservative. Country-folk did not open up new routes to Asia or discover America. It was the enterprise of the cities, with their growing industries and commerce, which brought about the overseas expansion of Europe; and to the development of commerce, manufacturing, and the towns, we now must turn our attention.

### 2. COMMERCE, MANUFACTURING, AND THE TOWNS

Except for the wealthy Italian city states and certain other cities which traced their history back to ancient Roman and Greek times, most European towns, it must be remembered, date from the later middle ages. In the early middle ages there had been little excuse for their existence except to sell to farmers salt, fish, iron, and a few ploughs. But with the increase of commerce, which marked the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries, more merchants traveled through the country, ways of spending money multiplied, and the little agricultural villages learned to look on the town as the place to buy not only luxuries but such tools, clothing, and shoes as could be manufactured more conveniently by skilled town artisans than by farm-hands. The towns, moreover, became exchanges where surplus farm products could be marketed, where wine could be bartered for wool, or wheat for flax. And as the towns grew in size, the prosperous citizens proved to be the best customers for foreign luxuries, and foreign trade grew apace. Town, trade, and industry thus worked together: trade stimulated industry, industry assisted trade, and the town profited by both. By the sixteenth century many towns had grown out of their infancy and were becoming highly influential.

Originally many a town had belonged to some nobleman's extensive manor, and its inhabitants had been under much the same servile obligations to the lord as were the strictly rural serfs. But with the lapse of time and the growth of the towns, the towns-

men or burghers had begun a struggle for freedom from their feudal lords. They did not want to pay servile dues to a baron, but preferred to substitute a fixed annual payment for individual obligations. They besought the right to manage their market. They wished to have cases at law tried in a court of their own rather than in the feudal court over which the nobleman presided. They demanded the right to pay all taxes in a lump sum for the town, themselves assessing and collecting the share of each citizen. These concessions they eventually had won, and each city had its charter, in which its privileges were enumerated and recognized by the authority of the nobleman, or of the king, to whom the city owed allegiance. In England these charters had been acquired generally by merchant guilds, upon payment of a substantial sum to the nobleman. In France and the Netherlands the townsmen had formed associations, called *communes,* and had rebelled successfully against their feudal lords. In Germany the cities had leagued together for mutual protection and for the acquisition of common privileges. Some towns, founded by bishops, abbots, or counts, had received charters at the very outset. In the rising national states, the monarchs had usually favored the towns in order to weaken feudalism, and the townsmen had become correspondingly devoted to the cause of strong national monarchy.

**Growth of Towns**

Within most European towns of the year 1500, whether those included in national monarchies or those still constituting free city states, there had long existed a typically urban organization known as the merchant guild or the merchants' company. The merchant guilds were everywhere in decline, but they still preserved many of their earlier traditions. At the time of their greatest importance they had embraced merchants, butchers, bankers, and candlestickmakers; in fact, all who bought or sold in the town were included in the guild. And the merchant guild had then possessed wide functions.

**Merchant Guilds**

But with the expansion of trade and industry in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the merchant guilds, instead of keeping pace with the times, became oppressive, limited, or merely nominal. Where the merchant guilds became oppressive oligarchical associations, as they did in Germany and elsewhere on the Continent, they lost their power by the revolt of the more democratic "craft guilds." In England specialized control of industry and

trade by craft guilds, journeymen's guilds, and dealers' associations gradually took the place of the general supervision of the older merchant guild. By the sixteenth century the merchant guild was losing its vitality and being divested of its functions. It quietly succumbed, or it lived on with influence in a limited branch of trade, or it continued as an honorary organization with occasional feasts, or (and this was especially true in England) it became practically identical with the town corporation, from which originally it had been distinct.

Alongside of the merchant guilds, which had been associated with the growth of commerce and the rise of towns, were other guilds which were connected with industrial enterprise and which retained their importance long after 1500. These were the craft guilds. Springing into prominence in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the craft guild sometimes, as in Germany, voiced a popular revolt against a corrupt and oligarchical merchant guild, and sometimes—most frequently so in England—worked harmoniously with the merchant guild, to which its own members belonged. In common with the merchant guild, the craft guild had religious and social aspects, and like the merchant guild it insisted on honest dealings. But unlike the merchant guild, the craft guild was composed of men in a single industry, and it controlled in detail the manufacture as well as the marketing of commodities. There were bakers' guilds, brewers' guilds, smiths' guilds, saddlers' guilds, shoemakers' guilds, weavers' guilds, tailors' guilds, tanners' guilds, even guilds of masters of arts who constituted the teaching staff of colleges and universities.

**Craft Guilds**

When to-day we speak of a boy "serving his apprenticeship" in a trade, we seldom reflect that the expression is derived from a practice of the craft guilds, a practice which survived after the guilds were extinct. Apprenticeship was designed to make sure that recruits to the trade were properly trained. The apprentice was usually selected as a boy by a master-workman and indentured—that is, bound to work several years without wages, while living at the master's house. After the expiration of this period of apprenticeship, during which he had learned his trade, the youth became a "journeyman," and worked for wages, until he should finally be admitted to the guild as a master, with the right to set up his own shop, with apprentices and journeymen

This restriction of membership was not the only way in which the trade was supervised. The guild had rules specifying the quality of materials to be used and often the methods of manufacture; it might prohibit night-work, and it usually fixed a "fair price" at which goods were to be sold. By means of such provisions, enforced by wardens or inspectors, the guild not only perpetuated the "good old way" of doing things, but assured the purchaser a good article at a fair price.

By the opening of the sixteenth century the craft guilds, though not so weakened as the merchant guilds, were suffering from various internal diseases which gradually sapped their vitality. They tended to become exclusive and to direct their power and affluence in hereditary grooves. They steadily raised their entrance fees and qualifications. Struggles between guilds in allied trades, such as spinning, weaving, fulling, and dyeing, often resulted in the reduction of several guilds to a dependent position. The regulation of the processes of manufacture, once designed to keep up the standard of skill, eventually hindered technical improvements; and in the method as well as in the amount of his work, the enterprising master found himself handicapped. Even the old conscientiousness often gave way to greed, until in many places inferior workmanship received the approval of the guild.

Many craft guilds were exhibiting in the sixteenth century a tendency to split somewhat along the modern lines of capital and labor. On the one hand the old guild organization would be usurped and controlled by the wealthier master-workmen, called "livery men," because they wore rich uniforms, or a class of dealers would arise and organize a "merchants' company" to conduct a wholesale business in the products of a particular industry. Thus the rich drapers sold all the cloth, but did not make it. On the other hand, it became increasingly difficult for journeymen and apprentices to rise to the station of masters; oftentimes they remained wage-earners for life, and as such some found employment outside the guilds rather than within.

The craft guilds, with all their imperfections, remained influential in the sixteenth century. Yet they slowly declined as new trades arose outside of their control, and as competition increased with capitalists who refused to be bound by guild rules

and evolved a new "domestic system." In national monarchies, the freedom of the guilds was restricted by royal interference and dictation.

**Town Life**

The European towns of the year 1500 were comparatively small, for the vast majority of people still lived in country villages. A town of 5,000 inhabitants was then accounted large; and even the largest places, like Paris, London, Seville, Venice, Lübeck, and Bruges, had populations of less than a hundred thousand. The approach to an ordinary city of the time lay through suburbs, farms, and garden-plots, for the townsman still supplemented industry with small-scale agriculture. Usually the town itself was enclosed by strong walls, and admission was gained by passing through gates, where one might be accosted by soldiers and obliged to pay toll. Inside the walls were clustered houses of every description. A magnificent cathedral, town-hall, or guild building might stand amid tumble-down dwellings. Here and there a prosperous merchant would have his luxurious home, built in western Europe in what we now call the Gothic style, with pointed windows and gables, and, to save space in a walled town, with the second story projecting out over the street.

The streets were usually in deplorable condition. A few might be highways, but the rest were mere alleys, devious, dark, and dirty. Often their narrowness made them impassable for wagons. In places the pedestrian waded through mud and garbage; pigs grunted ponderously as he pushed them aside; chickens ran under his feet. There were no sidewalks, and only the main thoroughfares were paved. Dirt and filth were ordinarily disposed of only when a heaven-sent rain washed them down the open gutters constructed along the middle, or on each side, of a street. There was no general sewerage for the town, and no public water supply. In many of the garden-plots at the rear of the low-roofed dwellings were dug wells which provided water for the family; and the visitor, before he left the town, would be likely to encounter water-sellers calling out their ware. To guard against the danger of fires, each municipality encouraged its citizens to build their houses of stone and to keep a tub full of water before every building; and in each district a special official was equipped with proper hooks and ropes for pulling down houses on fire. At night respectable town-life came to a halt: the gates were shut; the curfew sounded; no street-lamps dispelled the darkness, except an

occasional lantern which an altruistic or festive townsman might hang in his front window; and no adequate police-force existed. Some townsmen were drafted from time to time as "watchmen" to preserve order, but the "night watch" was famed rather for its ability to sleep or to roister than to protect life or purse. Under these circumstances the citizen remained prudently indoors at night and retired early to bed. Picturesque and quaint the sixteenth-century town may have been; but it was apt to be an uncomfortable and unhealthful place in which to live.

Yet, despite the inconveniences of European cities in the year 1500, it was their inhabitants—the bourgeoisie, or town dwellers—rather than peasantry or nobility, who were creating the economic foundations for the predominantly middle-class society of modern times. The towns were growing, their commerce was expanding, their manufacturers were becoming more skilled and their merchants more venturesome; they were beginning to search for new and distant sources of wealth and to establish the regime of modern capitalism.

The economic revolution in evidence in the sixteenth century was not a sudden upheaval. It had been unobtrusively developing with the commercial expansion of the later middle ages within Europe and between Europe and Asia.

Trade between Europe and Asia, which had been a feature of the antique world of Greeks and Romans, had been very nearly destroyed by the barbarian invasions of the fifth century and by subsequent conflicts between Moslems and Christians, so that during several centuries the old trade routes were traveled only by a few Jews and Syrians. In the middle ages, however, a revival had occurred, greatly quickened by the crusades. Venice, Genoa, and Pisa, on account of their convenient locations, were called upon to furnish the crusaders with transportation and provisions, and their shrewd citizens made certain that such services were well rewarded. Italian ships, plying to and from the Holy Land, gradually enriched their owners. Several Italian cities profited, but Venice secured the major share. It was during the crusades that Venice gained special trade concessions in Constantinople and created a maritime empire.

**Growth of Trade**

The crusades not only enabled Italian merchants to bring Eastern commodities to the West; they increased the demand for

them. Crusaders—knights, pilgrims, and adventurers—returned from the Holy Land with astonishing tales of the opulence of the East. Frequently they had acquired a taste for Eastern silks or spices during their stay in Asia Minor or Palestine; or they brought curious jewels stripped from fallen infidels to awaken the envy of the stay-at-homes. Wealth was increasing in Europe at this time, and many well-to-do people, eager to affect magnificence, provided a ready market for the wares imported by Italian merchants.

We may note what these wares were and why they were demanded so insistently. First were spices, far more important then than now. The diet of those times was simple and monotonous without our variety of vegetables and sauces and sweets, and the meat, if fresh, was likely to be tough in fiber and strong in flavor. Spices were the very thing to add zest to such a diet, and without them the epicure of the sixteenth century would have been truly miserable. Ale and wine, as well as meats, were spiced, and pepper was eaten separately as a delicacy. No wonder that, although the rich alone could buy it, the Venetians were able annually to dispose of 420,000 pounds of pepper, which they purchased from the Sultan of Egypt, to whom it had been brought, after a hazardous journey, from the pepper vines of Ceylon, Sumatra, or western India. From the same regions came cinnamon-bark; ginger was a product of Arabia, India, and China; and nutmegs and cloves grew only in the far-off Spice Islands of the Malay Archipelago southeast of Asia.

Precious stones were then, as always, in demand for personal adornment as well as for the decoration of shrines and ecclesiastical vestments; and in the middle ages they were thought by many to possess magical qualities which rendered them doubly valuable.[1] The supply of diamonds, rubies, pearls, and other precious stones was then almost exclusively from Persia, India, and Ceylon. Other miscellaneous products of the East were in

[1] Medieval literature is full of this idea. Thus we read in the book of travel which has borne the name of Sir John Maundeville: "And if you wish to know the virtues of the diamond, I shall tell you, as they that are beyond the seas say and affirm, from whom all science and philosophy comes. He who carries the diamond upon him, it gives him hardiness and manhood, and it keeps the limbs of his body whole. It gives him victory over his enemies, in court and in war, if his cause be just; and it keeps him that bears it in good wit; and it keeps him from strife and riot, from sorrows and enchantments, and from fantasies and illusions of wicked spirits. . . . It heals him that is lunatic, and those whom the fiend torments or pursues."

demand for various purposes: camphor and cubebs from Sumatra and Borneo; musk from China; cane-sugar from Arabia and Persia; indigo, sandal-wood, and aloes-wood from India; and alum from Asia Minor.

The East was not only a treasure-house of spices, jewels, and medicaments, but a factory of marvelously delicate goods which the West could not then rival—glass, porcelain, silks, satins, rugs, tapestries, and metal-work. The tradition of Asiatic supremacy in these manufactures has been preserved to our own day in such familiar names as damask linen, china-ware, japanned ware, Persian rugs, and cashmere shawls.

In exchange for the manifold products of the East, Europe had woolen cloth, iron, quicksilver, tin, copper, and lead to give. But a balance usually existed for the European merchant to pay in gold or silver, with the result that gold and silver coins grew scarce in the West. It is hard to say what would have happened had not a new supply of the precious metals been discovered in America. But we are anticipating our story.

It is a long way from western Europe to eastern Asia, and before the advent of steamship, railway, and airplane, the journey was very slow and hazardous. In the year 1500 the assembling of Asiatic commodities for export to Europe was made principally by Arabs and other Moslem traders [1] on the coasts of the Black Sea and the eastern Mediterranean, and their transportation thence was mainly in the hands of the Italian city states, especially Venice, Genoa, Pisa, and Florence, although the French town of Marseilles and the Spanish town of Barcelona had a share. From Italy trade routes led through the passes of the Alps to all parts of Europe.

Within Europe, commerce still encountered considerable difficulties in the year 1500. Roads were so poor that wares often had to be carried on pack-horses instead of in wagons. Frequently the merchant had to risk spoiling his bales of silk in fording a stream, for bridges were few and usually in urgent need of repair.

[1] In general, the journey from the Far East to the ports on the Black Sea and the eastern Mediterranean was made by caravans which traveled overland or by sailing vessels which skirted the coasts of the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. It was made most often by Moslems, but some of the more enterprising Italian merchants pushed eastward from their settlements, or *fondachi,* in frontier ports like Cairo and Trebizond, and established *fondachi* in inland cities of Asia Minor, Persia, and Russia.

Travel was expensive and fraught with hardship. Landowners exacted tolls from the traveler on road, bridge, or river within their estates, and so heavy was the burden of tolls on commerce that transportation from Nantes to Orléans, a short distance up the River Loire, doubled the price of goods. In addition to the tolls, the merchant had to pay tariffs and special market fees and was further handicapped by regulations against "foreigners" and by unfamiliar weights, measures, and coinage. Besides, robbers beset the roads and pirates infested the seas. Needy knights did not scruple to turn highwaymen, while the black flag of piracy flew over whole fleets in the Mediterranean and in the Baltic, and the amateur pirate, if less formidable, was no less common, for many a vessel carrying brass cannon, ostensibly for protection, found it convenient to use them against merchantmen and more often "took" a cargo than purchased one.

Yet, in spite of obstacles, commerce was notably expanding within Europe. Its leaders at the opening of the sixteenth century were the Italian city states, preeminently Venice; the league of German cities—the so-called Hanse, or Hanseatic League—including Lübeck, Hamburg, Bremen, Danzig, Königsberg, and Cologne; and the cities of the Netherlands, especially Bruges and Antwerp. Venice was the outstanding distributing center for Asiatic wares. The Hanseatic trading post at Venice received metals, furs, leather goods, and woolen cloth from northern and western Europe, and sent back spices, silks, and other commodities of the Orient, together with glassware, fine textiles, weapons, and paper of Venetian manufacture. Baltic and Venetian trade routes crossed in the Netherlands, and on the eve of the sixteenth century Bruges was the trade metropolis of western Europe, where met the raw wool from England and Spain, the manufactured woolen cloth of Flanders, claret wine from France, sherry and port wines from the Iberian peninsula, pitch from Sweden, tallow from Norway, grain from France and Germany, and tin from England, not to mention Asiatic luxuries, Venetian manufactures, and the cunning carved-work of south-German artificers.

**Role of City States**

By the year 1500, these urban centers were beginning to show themselves unequal to the demands of expanding European trade. Venice and the other Italian city states were too much given to strife with one another to assure the needful protection of com-

mon commercial interests abroad, and the privileged position of Venice in the Mediterranean and the Near East was threatened by the advance of the Ottoman Turks. Simultaneously the Hanseatic League was weakened by internal dissensions, by disorder within the Holy Roman Empire, and by the rise of hostile Slavic states in eastern Europe. The towns of the Netherlands alone displayed enduring commercial vitality, and it was clear, as they became consolidated under the dukes of Burgundy in the fifteenth century and under the princes of the Habsburg family in the sixteenth century, that the center of gravity in European trade and industry was gradually shifting from the Mediterranean and Baltic to the Atlantic seaboard.

This shift was accompanied and undoubtedly hastened by the development of strong national monarchies in western Europe. The national monarchies along the Atlantic were repressing feudalism and favoring the middle class, and by virtue of territorial expansion and centralized government they were in a better position than the isolated city states of Italy or the disintegrating Holy Roman Empire to protect and expand the commerce of their citizens—to punish pirates or highwaymen, to improve roads, and to check the exactions of toll collectors. The national states gave promise of supplanting the city states as the guarantors and promoters of modern trade and industry.

### 3. CONQUEST OF THE ATLANTIC

Throughout all recorded history down to modern times, people who lived in one part of the world knew comparatively little about people in other parts of the world. Ancient Egyptians, Greeks, and Romans were not very familiar with China or Japan and were totally ignorant of America. Ancient Chinese had only the vaguest knowledge of Europeans, and for the medieval inhabitants of America the Old World did not exist.

**Separated Civilizations**

In time, different parts of the world had become seats of separate and peculiar civilizations. (1) Europe, the so-called "West," became the home of Christian civilization, that is, "Christendom." (2) Northern Africa and western Asia, including the "Near East" and "Middle East," became the region of Moslem civilization, that is, "Islam." (3) Eastern Asia, the so-called "Far East," became the area of Confucian-Buddhist Chinese civilization. (4) India, cut off by mountain

ranges and deserts from the Far East and the Middle East, evolved a distinctive Hindu civilization. (5) America, the "Far West," isolated by trackless oceans, became the seat of several cultures, ranging from that of the highly developed Mayas, Aztecs, and Incas to that of the backward Caribs and various pastoral and hunting tribes. (6) Central Asia, with its Mongol nomads, and (7) central and southern Africa, with its Negro groups, and (8) the numerous islands of the Pacific, with their brown-skinned natives, remained apart and in primitive but different conditions.

Between some of these areas, particularly the first four, there had long been some contact and mutual knowledge. In ancient times Greek armies of Alexander the Great and Greek traders had penetrated into India, and Roman merchants had imported silk from China. Subsequently the expansion of Islam had carried Moslem conquerors into India and brought India into closer commercial relations with the Middle East and Near East. India had also had significant contacts with China: Buddhism had spread from India to China, and traders had frequently traveled between these two countries. Between the area of Islam and that of Christendom, there had been an even closer contact, which the medieval crusades quickened rather than stopped.

Nevertheless, prior to the sixteenth century, the peoples of each major cultural area were essentially self-centered and exclusive. Each branch of the human race lived primarily to itself, more or less in ignorance of the others.

It is a curious and impressive fact that all parts of the world have been brought into close contact with one another only since the sixteenth century. It is even more curious and impressive that the great explorations and discoveries which made such wide contacts possible should have been undertaken and achieved in modern times, not by Chinese or Hindus or Moslems or Aztecs, but by Europeans. It has been European civilization, rather than any other, which has spread overseas and gone far to knit the world together.

**Expansion of European Civilization**

Why did Europeans explore and discover? Why has the modern world been so largely Europeanized, instead of being Asiaticized? No simple answers to such fundamental questions can be entirely satisfactory, but perhaps two major considerations will help to explain why the modern age of world-wide explora-

tions and discoveries originated in Europe. One reason is economic, and the other is religious.

**Economic Motives**

In the first place, Europeans went in search of other parts of the earth because, for economic purposes, they had greater need of the rest of the world than the rest of the world had of Europe. Europe is the smallest of the five great continents and has usually been dependent upon other continents for products of one kind or another. Its fertile farmlands, to be sure, have long produced enough grain, fruit, vegetables, cattle, sheep, and poultry to feed a large population, besides flax and wool for clothing, although at present part of the food supply is imported, as it was in the days of ancient Greece and Rome. Europe, moreover, has timber and stone for building materials, and valuable mines of coal, iron, copper, silver, and tin. But for some commodities Europe has depended on other continents from very early times. Many articles are not produced in Europe at all—for instance, spices, certain drugs, certain woods, and cotton; and others are not produced in sufficient quantity—silk, gold, silver, and precious stones. In early times Europe had obtained such commodities chiefly from Asia. By the fifteenth century the demand for them was outstripping the supply.

The supply was a bit uncertain, for it depended first on the Italians, then on the Moslems, and finally on a slow, dangerous, and expensive transit by boat and caravan from the Far East. With the advance of the Ottoman Turks and their conquest of the Near East, the Italian cities lost many of their commercial outposts, the Moslems did more fighting than trading, and the long transit by caravan and boat became doubly hazardous. As the supply of Far Eastern wares grew more uncertain and unsatisfactory, the mounting demand for them set many Europeans, especially western Europeans—Portuguese and Spaniards and Netherlanders and Frenchmen and Englishmen—to thinking how they might go direct to places where gold, spices, and silk abounded, without being obliged to employ Italians and Moslems as middlemen.

Now it so happened that these thoughts were taking shape in the minds of merchants and receiving encouragement from ambitious national monarchs of western Europe at a time when Christian priests and monks were ready and anxious to extend their

missionary activity outside of Europe. This brings us to the second, the religious, reason why Europe discovered the world.

**Religious Motives**

Christianity has always been an intensely missionary religion. In its first four hundred years it had converted the Græco-Roman Empire and transformed the civilization of southern Europe. During the next eight centuries its missionaries had converted and civilized all the barbarians in central and northern Europe and carried the gospel to Iceland and Greenland. From the twelfth to the fifteenth century thousands of peaceful monks as well as thousands of warlike crusaders had striven to wrest the Near East from Islam.

By the fifteenth century Christian missionaries had traversed all Europe and were turning more and more toward Asia and Africa. It was the very time when merchants were doing likewise. The result was that merchants and missionaries went out from Europe together, and together they traveled to the uttermost parts of the world.

The demands of trade and the demands of religion, then, go far to explain why a revolutionary expansion of Europe occurred in the sixteenth century. But the necessary explorations and discoveries required considerable knowledge of geography and navigation. Such knowledge Europeans had been acquiring during the later middle ages, partly from practical experience and partly from Arab instruction. Christian embassies had been dispatched by Pope or French King to the Mongol Khan of central Asia in the thirteenth century. Three members of a Venetian family, Polo by name, had traveled to China, and one of them, the famous Marco Polo, had sojourned there some seventeen years. A zealous monk, John of Monte Corvino, after laboring among Mongols in Persia and founding Christian missions near Madras in India, had sailed to China and settled in Peking; in 1307 the Pope had appointed him archbishop of the Chinese capital and supplied him with missionary assistants; and several Italian traders had speedily followed him to the Far East. All these undertakings of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries had proved temporary, but they had produced several attractive travel-books, such as the narrative of Marco Polo which was read with unfailing interest by many later Europeans, including Christopher Columbus. In this way was spread among the peoples of Europe some fascinating information about China

**European Knowledge of Outside World**

(which was then called "Cathay") and also about the "Indies," and it aroused a desire, on the part of the more venturesome, to visit in person those strange far-off lands and to share in their fabulous wealth. If Europeans could no longer travel thither by land in safety, then they must find new water routes to the Indies and to Cathay.

Earlier popular notions that the waters of the tropics boiled, that sea-monsters awaited explorers to the westward, and that the Earth was a great flat disk, were not now entertained by the educated. On the contrary, learned men were asserting that the Earth was spherical in shape and were calculating its circumference. It was asserted that the Indies formed the western coast of the Atlantic Ocean, and that eastern Asia might consequently be reached by sailing from Europe due west, though it was usually maintained that shorter sea routes to the Indies and Cathay might be found northeast of Europe, or southward around Africa.

European sailors of the fifteenth century had learned a good deal about navigation. The compass had been used by Italian navigators in the thirteenth century and mounted on the compass card in the fourteenth. Latitude was determined with the aid of the astrolabe, a device for measuring the elevation of the pole star above the horizon. Sailing charts and maps *(portolani)* were now available. With all these aids, seamen could lose sight of land and still feel confident of their whereabouts. Yet it undoubtedly took courage, as well as the lure of fame and fortune, for captains of that age to steer their frail sailing vessels either down the unexplored African coast of the Atlantic or across the uncharted Ocean.

On the eve of the sixteenth century Europe had at last the twofold incentive of trade and religion and also the practical knowledge and instruments—and resolution—for undertaking distant explorations and discoveries, with such permanent and astounding results as had never before been witnessed or imagined in the whole history of the world. And though it was experienced Italian sailors who were the most conspicuous agents, it was the newer national states of western Europe, rather than the older city states of Italy, which sponsored the revolutionary exploits.

First and foremost among the sponsors of Europe's expansion was Portugal. The Portuguese, in the extreme southwestern corner of Europe, had an ambitious national monarchy. They were

already crossing the straits of Gibraltar and fighting the Moslem Moors and conquering the Atlantic seaboard of Africa southward.

**Portuguese Discoveries**

Why should they not continue farther south and by water? They did not know much about the continent of Africa as a whole; they imagined it was big and dangerous; and yet they dreamed that by sailing some distance south along its western coast they could presently round its southernmost point and thence proceed eastward by an all-water route to India and China. The dream, if realized, would free them from economic subservience to Italian cities and Moslem caravans.

To carry this dream into effect was the life ambition of a prince of the Portuguese royal family—Prince Henry, commonly styled Henry the Navigator (1394–1460). Prince Henry was not really a navigator himself, but he set his heart upon systematic testing of current geographical theories, in the hope that thereby the Christian religion might be spread and that his nation might enlarge its territories and increase its resources. He established a school for navigators in Portugal. To it he attracted the most skillful Italian sailors and the most learned geographers of the day; and from it he sent out year after year naval expeditions of fighting men and merchants and missionaries who rediscovered and colonized the Madeira and Azores Islands and crept farther and farther southward along the coast of the African continent. The continent proved to be much bigger than Prince Henry had guessed, and when he died in 1460 the Portuguese had explored only the northern half of the west coast. But the impulse given by Prince Henry produced significant results after his death.

In the year 1488 a Portuguese captain, Bartholomew Diaz, reached Africa's southernmost point, which he appropriately named the "Cape of Storms." When Diaz returned and reported his discovery, King John II of Portugal rechristened it, with even superior appropriateness, the "Cape of Good Hope." For, following in the wake of Diaz, another Portuguese captain, Vasco da Gama, rounded the Cape in 1497, and, continuing on his way, sailed north along the eastern coast to Malindi, where he found an Arab pilot who guided his course across the Indian Ocean to India. In India, at Calicut, Gama landed in May 1498 and erected a marble pillar as a memorial of his discovery of a new route from Europe to the Far East. Incidentally, it should be remarked that this Portuguese captain sailed back from Calicut to Lisbon in

1499 with a cargo of goods worth sixty times the cost of his expedition.

From the beginning of the sixteenth century Portuguese ships sailed regularly to the Far East by way of the Cape of Good Hope and returned laden with spices, silks, and precious stones. With Portuguese merchants went out Christian missionaries, who established themselves in India, particularly at the town of Goa. Under the auspices of a royal governor, or viceroy, whom the King of Portugal dispatched to India to look after the trading posts and interests of the Portuguese, both merchants and missionaries speedily extended their explorations and secured additional footholds in the Far East.

Portuguese merchants established posts in Ceylon, Sumatra, Java, and the Spice Islands; in 1517 they arrived at Canton, in China; and in 1542 they entered Japan. A celebrated missionary, Francis Xavier, followed them, preaching Christianity with considerable success in India and Japan, so that by the close of the sixteenth century there were 200,000 Christians in Japan and more in India. Though these gains to Christianity were not entirely permanent, and though Portuguese commercial supremacy proved only temporary, nevertheless since the sixteenth century contact between Europe and the Far East has been direct and unbroken.

Under the patronage of Portuguese monarchs one new and profitable route had been found to the "Indies." Under the patronage of Spanish monarchs another such route was sought. In this case, the idea was developed and pressed by an Italian captain, Christopher Columbus (1446?–1506).

**Columbus and Spanish Discoveries**

Columbus, a native of the city state of Genoa, was a sailor all his life and was greatly interested in the science as well as in the art of navigation, and likewise in geographical lore. He shared the conviction of learned men of his day that the world was a sphere and that Asia lay to the west of Europe. Fairly early he became obsessed with the idea that he would find a new route to India and China by sailing westward across the Atlantic. After gaining much maritime experience in the Mediterranean and in the waters around the British Isles, he entered the service of King John II of Portugal and besought this monarch to finance him in his trans-Atlantic venture. But the Portuguese were too absorbed in their rival route around

Africa, and Columbus then turned to Spain for financial assistance. Here, after vexatious delays and discouragements and after preparations to present his scheme to the King of France or the King of England, he finally obtained the aid of Queen Isabella of Castile, who at this very time, with her husband, Ferdinand of Aragon, was creating the united Spanish monarchy and subjugating Granada, the last stronghold of the Moslems in Spain (January 1492).

In August 1492, Columbus sailed from the Spanish port of Palos with eighty-seven men in three small ships (the largest of which weighed only a hundred tons) and with a letter of introduction to the "Great Khan of Cathay." Week after week he sailed westward; his men lost faith and grew mutinous; but he still persevered. At length, on October 12, 1492, land was discovered. Columbus disembarked, gave thanks to God, and claimed the land for the crown of Castile. Had he been told that he was discovering America, a new and hitherto unknown world, he would have been vastly astonished. Little did he dream that the land on which he had disembarked was one of the Bahamas,[1] many thousands of miles from India and China. He believed he had reached an island just off the coast of Asia. After cruising about among other islands (which we now know were the Caribbean islands) and finding that they were inhabited by a strange people, he returned to Spain in 1493 and reported to Ferdinand and Isabella that he had discovered the Indies.

Three times Columbus went back to the scene of his discoveries, carrying merchants and missionaries, adventurers and colonists, and searching ever for the realm of Japan, the empire of China, the wealth of India, and the islands where spices grow. But he found little gold and no spices or silks, and the coasts he explored were the Caribbean shores of America, rather than the eastern shores of Asia and the real Indies. The strange people whom he encountered and made friends with were primitive Caribs and not the civilized inhabitants of China and India. Yet Columbus called them "Indians," and the name "Indian" has stuck to the natives of the American continents ever since.

Columbus may not have been the first European to cross the

[1] The island on which he first landed he named San Salvador. It is generally identified with the island in the Bahamas now known as Watling Island.

Atlantic Ocean,[1] but he deserves full credit as the discoverer, if not of a new route to the Indies, at least of a new world. For, from the time of his first voyage, on the eve of the sixteenth century, contact between Europe and America has been constant and intimate.

Columbus's first voyage of discovery was quickly followed by famous voyages of other explorers. In 1497, for instance, John Cabot, another Italian sailor from Genoa, was commissioned by King Henry VII of England "to seek out, discover, and find whatsoever isles, countries, regions, or provinces of the heathen and infidels, which before this time have been unknown to all Christians." Cabot crossed the Atlantic from Bristol to Cape Breton Island and reported back in the same year that he too had reached the country of the "Great Khan."

In 1500, to mention another instance, a Portuguese fleet, captained by Pedro Cabral and bound for India by way of the Cape of Good Hope, was driven westward by strong winds and currents across the narrowest stretch of the Atlantic to the easternmost part of South America. Cabral landed, named the region "Brazil," and proclaimed it a dependency of Portugal.

Gradually the truth dawned upon the peoples of Europe that the lands across the Atlantic were not Asia but a new world. In 1503 an Italian adventurer named Amerigo (in Latin, Americus) Vespucci, who was then sojourning in Spain and Portugal as an agent of the Florentine banking house of the Medici, wrote a widely read "letter" in which he claimed to have discovered the "new world." Four years later a German professor in a geographical treatise suggested that the newly discovered "fourth part of the world" should be called "America, because Americus discovered it." The suggestion was acted upon; and thus the trans-Atlantic lands, already mistakenly peopled with "Indians," were permanently saddled with the name

**New World: "America"**

[1] Scandinavians, back in the tenth and eleventh centuries, had sailed westward and had discovered and planted colonies in Greenland and in a region which they called Vinland. Vinland was almost certainly in North America, but the mass of Europeans knew nothing about it; the early Scandinavian settlement soon disappeared, and its memory was retained only in some sagas. There were medieval legends, moreover, to the effect that an Irish expedition had sailed westward and discovered a certain St. Brendan's Isle and that the ancients had known of an "Atlantis" or an "Antillia" in the western Atlantic; with these legends Columbus was familiar.

"America," derived from a pretended rather than from the true discoverer.

For some time it was imagined that "America" was not far from Asia. In 1513 a Spanish explorer, Balboa, hearing from natives of Central America that a huge body of water lay to the westward, crossed the Isthmus of Panama and discovered what he called the "Great South Sea," which we know as the Pacific Ocean. In 1519 a Portuguese captain, Ferdinand Magellan, taking service under the King of Spain, left Seville with a fleet of five vessels to explore the whole western route, not only from Europe to America, but from America to Asia. Magellan crossed the Atlantic and sailed around South America and through the straits which still bear his name. Thence he ploughed a weary way across the vast expanse of the ocean to which he gave the flattering title of "Pacific," taking ninety-eight days from Tierra del Fuego to the island of Guam and another seven days to an archipelago which he named St. Lazarus but which was subsequently christened the Philippines. Magellan was killed in the Philippines, but one of his vessels, following the Portuguese trade route across the Indian Ocean and around Africa, arrived finally at Seville in 1522 with the tale of the marvelous voyage. It was the first circumnavigation of the globe.

During the first half of the sixteenth century, the Atlantic Ocean became a main highway for Europe. While the Portuguese were utilizing it for their newly found eastern sea route to India and China and the Spice Islands, explorations and discoveries went on apace across it in America. Spanish fortune-hunters, captains, and missionaries did most; they explored the Caribbean Islands, Florida, Mexico, Central America, and the greater part of South America. But Frenchmen soon participated. In 1524 King Francis I of France sponsored an expedition of an Italian captain, John Verrazano, who explored the coasts of Nova Scotia and New England and may have discovered New York harbor; and ten years later the same French King sent out one of his own countrymen, Jacques Cartier, to continue the work of Verrazano and to find, if possible, a "northwest passage" to Asia around the northern shore of America. Cartier discovered no such passage, but he explored the St. Lawrence River as far as the site of Montreal.

**Importance of Atlantic**

By the middle of the sixteenth century Europeans had consider-

able knowledge of the size and shape of the world, of the general location of the oceans and major continents, and of two great new trade routes by sea, the eastern route around Africa to Asia and the western route to America. European commerce was undergoing a veritable revolution. The Atlantic was taking the place of the Mediterranean as the great inland sea of Western civilization.

### 4. OVERSEA COLONIAL EMPIRES

The sponsors of the oversea expansion of Europe were national monarchies, and foremost among these, in the second half of the fifteenth century and the first half of the sixteenth, were Portugal and Spain. As early as 1480 the Pope as arbiter of Christendom had granted to Portugal a monopoly of trade, colonization, and political dominion in "heathen lands" from the western coast of Africa to the East Indies. Then, in 1493, immediately after Columbus's first voyage, another Pope, while confirming Portugal's rights east of a "line of demarcation" drawn from the north pole to the south pole, one hundred leagues west of the Azores, had conferred upon Spain a similar monopoly west of the line.[1] Thus, in a general way, Africa and Asia and the eastern part of South America (Brazil) were handed over to Portugal, and North America and most of South America to Spain.

**Portuguese Overseas Empire**

The overseas empire which the Portuguese proceeded to establish within their hemisphere was more commercial than colonial. In 1505 the King of Portugal named a "viceroy" to govern the Indies, and one of the most famous of the Portuguese viceroys, Alphonso Albuquerque, taking advantage of conflicts among the natives of India, obtained and built up the city of Goa as the capital of the Portuguese empire in the East (1510). Albuquerque also appropriated Cochin and other coast towns in India and captured the strategic port of Ormuz in the Persian Gulf. Under him and his successors, a considerable number of colonists came out from Portugal, settled at Goa and along the Malabar coast of India, intermarried with the natives, and introduced Portuguese speech and customs in the Far East. Under the patronage of the viceroys, moreover, Portuguese priests and monks gained some converts to Christianity, and incidentally

[1] Portugal protested, and in 1494, by mutual agreement between Portugal and Spain, the papal line of demarcation was shifted two hundred and seventy leagues farther west, thus including Brazil in Portugal's sphere.

opened doors to Portuguese merchants, in China, Japan, and the Malay archipelago, as well as in India. In the main, however, Portugal was not able to colonize Asia or to transform its civilization.

Asia was too large and too populous and too tenacious of its own cultures. Portugal was too small and its resources in men and money were limited. The Moslems in western Asia and India were consistently hostile to the Portuguese, and the size and solidity of the states in eastern Asia safeguarded them against military conquest by the Portuguese. In China, the Portuguese, arriving at Canton in 1517, were content to trade peacefully; and beyond colonizing the island of Macao, near Canton, they did not encroach upon the territory or independence of the Chinese Empire. Similarly, in Japan, the Portuguese established a trading post in 1542 and patronized the preaching of Christianity by Francis Xavier and his associates, but they did not seriously attempt the political subjugation of the island empire. It was likewise in the Malay archipelago: the Portuguese traded with the natives of Sumatra, Java, and the Spice Islands, but did not conquer or dispossess them.

During the sixteenth century the Portuguese were very active in Asia, if not in colonizing endeavor, at least in commercial enterprise. They reaped rich financial profits from their Eastern trade, and for a time Lisbon became the commercial capital of Europe. But the Portuguese had to contend not only with latent hostility of Asiatics but also with mounting jealousy and rival ambition of other European nations. For other Europeans, envious of the wealth which was accumulating to Portugal from its monopoly of Asiatic trade, refused to respect the papal decision which had conferred that monopoly upon it. Particularly the Netherlanders began to send out to Asia expeditions which openly attacked Portuguese merchantmen and warships and which intrigued with native rulers to undermine Portuguese influence and prestige. Spain did not adhere strictly to the terms of its treaty with Portugal but appropriated the Philippine Islands, which actually lay within the Portuguese hemisphere.


In the meantime, the Portuguese were establishing posts on the African coast, notably at Mozambique in 1520 and at São Paulo de Loanda in 1576, and a protectorate over the inland Christian kingdom of Abyssinia. The shore posts they used as


stopping and replenishing stations on their voyages between Europe and Asia and also as centers for local traffic in gold, ivory, and especially Negro slaves. The Portuguese did not penetrate very far inland; and their holdings on the coast were gradually contracted by the conquests of Moslems and of rival Europeans. They were expelled from Abyssinia in 1663.

Only across the Atlantic, in Brazil, did the Portuguese succeed in erecting a permanent colonial empire. Here they easily overcame the resistance of primitive Indian tribes and managed to frustrate rival colonizing schemes of Frenchmen, Dutchmen, and Spaniards. Portuguese colonists came in considerable numbers under "captains" appointed by the King and endowed by him with grants of land and large powers. Settlements were made in the first half of the sixteenth century, including São Paulo, in the south, and Pernambuco and Bahia, in the north. With the settlers came Christian missionaries, and the first bishop of Brazil arrived in 1552. In 1549 the "captains" were subjected to a governor-general who, from the capital city of Bahia, administered the whole country in the name of the King of Portugal. Rio de Janeiro, the site of which had been discovered and named by a Portuguese explorer in 1531, was settled first by a French expedition in 1558 but was conquered in 1567 by the Portuguese and incorporated in their Brazilian empire.

Indeed, the success of Portugal's efforts in Brazil illustrated the superiority of America over Asia as a field of European colonization. And most of America lay, in the sixteenth century, in the hemisphere which had been opened up by Spain and allotted to it by the Pope. Consequently, while Portugal's overseas empire was predominantly commercial, Spain's was essentially colonial.

In the time of Columbus the greater part of America was sparsely inhabited by primitive tribes of "redmen" or "Indians" who were not very different in customs and manners from the primitive European tribes of an earlier day who had invaded the ancient Roman Empire and been converted to Christianity. These Indian tribes received the European discoverers and explorers sometimes with friendliness and sometimes with hostility. Some of them were easily tamed by the more civilized invaders and immigrants, and others were warred against and subdued with mutual cruelty. But the


St. Augustine
FLORIDA
BAHAMA ISLANDS
SAN SALVADOR
COLUMBUS' FIRST VOYAGE, 1492-1493
CUBA
SANTO DOMINGO
YUCATAN
HAITI
PUERTO RICO
JAMAICA
GUADALUPE
HONDURAS
NICARAGUA
CARIBBEAN SEA
COLUMBUS' FOURTH VOYAGE, 1502-1503
TRINIDAD
Darien
COSTA RICA
Panama
SPANISH MAIN
ICELAND
LABRADOR
ST. LAWRENCE R.
NEWFOUNDLAND
CABOT'S VOYAGE, 1497
Bristol
Antwerp
Genoa
AZORES
PORTUGAL
Lisbon
SPAIN
Palos
COLUMBUS' 1ST VOYAGE, 1492
MADEIRA
Ceuta
BERMUDA
FLORIDA
CANARY IS.
TROPIC OF CANCER
GULF OF MEXICO
BAHAMA IS.
CUBA
NEW SPAIN
CAPE BOJADOR
RIO DE ORO DESERT
CAPE BLANCO
SENEGAL R.
CORTEZ, 1519
Vera Cruz
Mexico
Acapulco
COLUMBUS' 4TH VOYAGE, 1502-1503
CAPE VERDE IS.
CAPE VERDE
GAMBIA R.
TRINIDAD
COLOMBIA
ORINOCO R.
GUINEA
IVORY COAST
GOLD COAST
CAPE SIERRA LEONE
Bogotá
NEW GRANADA
MAGELLAN, 1519-1522
EQUATOR
CAPE PALMAS
FERNANDO PO
CAPE LOPEZ
Guayaquil
Quito
AMAZON R.
MAGELLAN'S SHIP, 1522
PIZARRO, 1529
CAPE SAN ROQUE
Lima
Cuzco
Pernambuco
VASCO DA GAMA, 1497
PERU
Bahia
MAGELLAN
BRAZIL
Potosí
Asuncion
Rio de Janeiro
TROPIC OF CAPRICORN
PARAGUAY
São Paulo
CHILE
Santiago
Buenos Aires
RIO DE LA PLATA
ARGENTINA
TRISTAN DE CUNHA
STRAIT OF MAGELLAN, 1520
TIERRA DEL FUEGO
SPAIN AND SPANISH DISCOVERIES
PORTUGAL AND PORTUGUESE DISCOVERIES




# EUROPEAN OVERSEAS EXPANSION
## IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY

outstanding fact about the contact of Europe with America was that discovery and exploration were quickly followed by conquest of the Indians and colonization by Europeans.

**Spanish Overseas Empire**

The first Spanish colony in the New World was on the island of San Domingo, called Hispaniola ("Spanish Isle"), and thence Spanish conquest and colonization were rapidly extended over the other Caribbean islands and the adjacent mainland from Florida to Venezuela. In Mexico and Peru the Spaniards encountered native states and peoples in a relatively high stage of civilization; but these, like the more primitive Caribs, were quickly subjugated.

The story of the conquest of the Mexican empire of the Aztec Indians by Cortez, for example, reads like a romance. Hernando Cortez was still a young man when he landed on the coast of Mexico in 1519 with an expedition of ten ships, six or seven hundred Spanish soldiers, eighteen horses, and a few pieces of cannon —an expedition absurdly inadequate, we might suppose, for the conquest of an extensive and seemingly powerful empire. But the natives whom Cortez first met were astounded and overawed by sound of cannon and sight of horses and ocean-going ships, all new objects to them; they thought Cortez was a god and they offered little or no resistance to him. He proved courageous and quite unscrupulous. He seized land and laid the foundations for the city of Vera Cruz; and then, having burned his ships in order to cut off the possibility of retreat, he marched his little army into the interior. He was aided by the internal condition of the Aztec empire, which was already in decline. The native Emperor, Montezuma, was harassed by rebellious chieftains (called "caciques") who defied his authority and some of whom gave assistance to the Spaniards. After some fighting, Cortez, with his handful of Spaniards and with 6,000 native allies, reached Mexico City and was received by Montezuma with pomp and outward show of friendship. Soon, however, Montezuma ordered the killing of a few obstreperous Spaniards at Vera Cruz, and then Cortez struck. He seized and imprisoned the hapless Emperor and extorted from him the recognition of the sovereignty of Spain and the payment of 600,000 marks of pure gold and a prodigious quantity of precious stones. Mexicans rose in revolt, killed Montezuma as the dupe of the Spaniards, chose a new Emperor, and gave battle to Cortez in the plain of Otumba. Here the fate of the Aztec realm was

sealed (1520). Cortez won an overwhelming victory, which he followed up by retaking Mexico City and establishing Spanish authority throughout the country.

What Cortez achieved in Mexico was paralleled in Peru by Francisco Pizarro, another Spanish soldier of fortune. Pizarro had accompanied Balboa in the discovery of the Pacific Ocean and had been fascinated by the tales he heard of the empire of the Indian Incas in Peru. In 1531 he set out from Panama with three ships, 180 men, and twenty-seven horses for the conquest and looting of the Inca country. And, thanks to his valor and cunning, the magnificent native town of Cuzco was captured, and the Indians were subjugated. It was Pizarro who founded the city of Lima in 1535 as the capital of the Spanish empire in South America. In Peru, as in Mexico, the conquerors enriched themselves with gold and silver, with rich mines and vast estates.

The easily acquired wealth from Peru acted as an immediate lure to Spanish adventurers and colonists, who were soon appropriating other parts of South America. A nobleman, Pedro de Mendoza, obtaining from the King of Spain a grant of land on the southeastern coast of South America, laid the foundations of the future states of Argentina and Paraguay; he founded Buenos Aires in 1535, and Asuncion in 1536. A lieutenant of Pizarro seized the Chilean coast and in 1541 founded Santiago de Chile. Another lieutenant carved out the province of Ecuador and in 1535 founded the town of Guayaquil on the finest harbor of the Pacific coast. In 1538 the mountainous interior of northwestern South America—the country of Colombia—was penetrated, and on a lofty and picturesque site the city of Bogotá was founded. Wherever the Spaniards settled, they established their language and religion, and engaged in mining, trade, cattle ranching, and extensive production of sugar and grain.

By 1575 the Spanish population in the New World was 32,000 families, or approximately 175,000 persons, of whom about five-eighths were settled in the West Indies and Mexico and about three-eighths in South America. Some five million Indians, 40,000 Negro slaves, and a considerable number of mulattoes and half-breeds were subject to them. By this time the whole Spanish colonial empire was divided, for administrative purposes, into two viceroyalties, New Spain and Peru. The viceroy of New Spain supervised Mexico, the West Indies, Central America, northern South

America, and the Philippines; the viceroy of Peru superintended Peru, Chile, Ecuador, and Argentina. By this time, too, the empire was divided for ecclesiastical purposes into dioceses, and bands of priests and monks, under official patronage, and with marked success, were preaching Christianity to the natives. Universities, after the European fashion, were established in 1551 at Lima and Mexico City. America was being Europeanized under Spanish auspices.

It was under Spanish auspices, moreover, that an archipelago off the southeast coast of Asia—that of the Philippines—was permanently Christianized and Europeanized. These islands, as we have seen, were visited by Magellan in 1521. In 1542 they were formally annexed to Spain and named the Philippine Islands in honor of the crown-prince who later became King Philip II. In 1571 the city of Manila was founded as the capital. The native Filipinos were not so numerous or so civilized as the Hindus, Chinese, and Japanese; they submitted to Spanish governors, learned the Spanish language, and were converted to Christianity. The Christian Filipinos of the present day stand unique as the only Asiatic nationality who have been thoroughly Europeanized.

In 1580, on the death of the last direct male heir of the Portuguese royal family, King Philip II of Spain, next in descent through a female line, became King of Portugal and joined with the colonial empire of the Spaniards the commercial empire of the Portuguese. Thenceforth, for sixty years, Spain had a nominal monopoly of European trade and colonization in the non-European world.

In practice, however, the union of Spain and Portugal and their overseas dominions weakened, rather than strengthened, the monopoly. The Netherlanders, theoretically subject to the Spanish crown, were now in revolt against it, and their sailors and merchants, intent upon particular objects, while the Spanish King was endeavoring to police the whole world, were able to dispossess the Portuguese in Asia and secure for themselves the bulk of the Eastern trade. It was not long before the Netherlanders, the Frenchmen and Englishmen also, were poaching on Spanish preserves and planting colonies in the New World. Thus it transpired that the expansion of Europe and the establishment of overseas colonial empires under Portuguese and Spanish auspices in the sixteenth century gave rise in the seventeenth century to acute

rivalry on the part of the nations of western Europe for colonial and commercial supremacy throughout the world.[1]

### 5. DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITALISM

A most significant effect of the expansion of Europe in the sixteenth century was the stimulus it gave to the development of capitalism in Europe. For capitalism has been the preeminent economic characteristic of modern times.

**Capitalism**

"Capitalism" has been defined "as the organization of business upon a large scale by an employer or company of employers possessing an accumulated stock of wealth wherewith to acquire raw materials and tools, and hire labor, so as to produce an increased quantity of wealth which shall constitute profit." [2] Capitalism had existed in ancient times among Greeks and Romans, but it had declined with the disruption of the Roman Empire, and during the early middle ages the economy of Europe was hardly capitalistic. Each community was relatively self-sufficient. There was no large-scale production of goods. What was produced was consumed and not accumulated or "saved." Agriculture, through the manorial system, and industry and trade, through the guild system, were cooperative. "Profit" was frowned upon, and the taking of "interest" for the use of capital was condemned by the Christian Church as "usury." Economic circumstances were fortified by moral scruples, and the resulting situation was unfavorable to the rise of capitalism.

**Growth in Later Middle Ages**

Yet, in the later middle ages, a gradual and almost imperceptible change took place. The crusades, the growth and extension of commerce, the development of cities, the consolidation of national monarchy, all these, and doubtless other factors, contributed to the change. By the opening of the sixteenth century, as we have already observed, both the manorial system and the guild system were in decay. Landlords, instead of exacting personal services and payments in kind from their serfs and tenants, were receiving money rents from free tenants and hiring agricultural laborers. The merchant guilds were becoming exclusive and aristocratic. The craft guilds were facing competition from manufacturers outside of the guilds, and many a journeyman, instead of rising to the status of master

[1] Concerning these later developments, see below, pp. 330–342.

[2] J. A. Hobson, *Evolution of Modern Capitalism*, p. 1.

craftsman, was sinking into the position of hired laborer. Above all, the desire for extending financial profits was emerging with telling effect. Not only Jews were lending money at interest—they had long done so on a small scale—but Christians were beginning to do likewise, and Christian theologians were arguing whether the faithful were not justified in charging interest (as distinguished from usury) on loans for profitable enterprises and for monarchical and papal needs.

It was in the towns that the new capitalistic spirit was most in evidence. Certain guildsmen managed to accumulate personal wealth by rendering their guilds more exclusive, by exploiting their journeymen and apprentices, and by catering to a wider market. To the towns, moreover, came persons who were not connected with the traditional guilds and who utilized their independence to amass private fortunes. Such were members of the landed nobility, who, with the growth of a softer, more luxurious habit of life, settled in the towns, bringing with them their manorial rent-rolls and buying city lands and participating in commercial enterprises. Such, too, were officials of state or church —chancellors, marshals, collectors and "farmers" of taxes, managers of lay or ecclesiastical estates—who occupied lucrative posts and invested their surplus in urban undertakings. All these groups put "savings," that is, "capital," in the extension of trade, and as trade extended, the cities grew. And as the cities grew, the value of city land increased, and its owners could add an "unearned increment" to their capital.

The Italian cities, as we have noticed, profited most from the expansion of commerce during and immediately following the crusades, and it was in the Italian cities that a great agency of modern capitalism, banking, was first fashioned. Especially in Florence, certain families made a regular practice of caring for the savings of their fellow-townsmen and enriching themselves as well as their clients by loaning portions of the accumulation at good interest to kings and popes for the upkeep of armies, for the execution of public works, or for mere ostentation, and by lending other portions to Venetian or Genoese merchants for more solid but hardly less costly commercial ventures. The most celebrated of the Florentine banking families was the Medici, springing from an obscure fourteenth-century guildsman, and becoming in the fifteenth century wealthy and very influential. The Medici typified

in the year 1500 the new capitalist class, the banking magnates who treated money as a commodity like wool or wine, who were anxiously waited upon alike by investors and borrowers, who were sought after by all manner of potentates, who patronized art and learning, and who "bossed" their communities. Florentine banking houses established branches in other parts of Europe, and independent banking developed in Venice, Genoa, and elsewhere. But the coat of arms of the Medici—red balls on a field of gold—became the general insignia of money-lenders, the badge of the new capitalism.

Nevertheless, capitalism of the Medicean variety of 1500 could hardly have developed as it subsequently did if its basis had remained exclusively European. Europe supplied no adequate output of gold or silver. The agricultural population of Europe afforded no increase of production in the form of rents large enough to furnish a great stream of accumulating wealth. The towns of Europe had few mechanical devices for speeding up the manufacture of commodities. Europe possessed no numerous landless population exposed to the free exploitation of profit-seeking masters. In a word, Europe in 1500 lacked the factory labor-class, the industrial machinery, the natural resources, and the monetary treasures which were to be required for the later development of capitalism.

**Speeded by Overseas Expansion**

To a marked extent Europe gained from its new sixteenth-century contacts with the rest of the world what it lacked at home. Its new relationship with Asia, Africa, and America, speeded and accentuated its capitalistic development. The only factor in modern capitalism which Europe lacked at the end of the sixteenth century, and which it did not derive from the other continents, was industrial machinery for quick mass production of commodities: this, however, was a natural outcome of other factors and was destined to develop in due course. Meanwhile Europe gained important natural resources and a wealth of precious metals from Asia and America. These materials of capitalism were obtained in a variety of ways: by military plunder, as in the cases of Mexico and Peru and the East Indies; by forced and unequal trade, whether conducted by Portuguese with civilized peoples in India, China, and Japan, or by Spaniards with primitive tribesmen in the New World; and by imposition of taxes and tribute and trade restrictions on

both natives and colonists overseas. The profits which flowed to Europe from these sources were supplemented by the utilization, especially in America, of a labor system quite different from the traditional system of labor within Europe. The new overseas labor basis of rising European capitalism was slavery.

Slavery had long ago disappeared from Europe, and even the serfdom which had supplanted it was declining by the year 1500.

**Slavery**

The mass of Europeans were poor, but all of them had acknowledged rights of personal liberty, and a considerable part of their work was for themselves and voluntary; their exploitation was limited. When, however, the Portuguese and Spaniards explored Asia, Africa, and America, they came in contact with peoples among whom slavery was still a recognized institution, and they soon found that they could profitably utilize the institution for the operation of mines and large plantations in the New World. Portuguese and Spanish colonists in America were dispersed over vast areas; they had extensive tracts of land to bring under cultivation, dense forests to cut down, deep mine shafts to sink, buildings to rear, and highways to construct across lofty mountains and mighty rivers; they were too few to do all these things themselves, and the free agricultural labor with which they were familiar at home seemed quite unsuited to the enormous tasks confronting them abroad. Besides, in the tropics they had to face a debilitating climate to which they were unaccustomed. They obviously needed a cheap, abundant, acclimated labor supply which they could command and exploit at will. They needed non-European slaves.

In the circumstances, Spaniards and Portuguese practically enslaved the native Indians of the West Indies, Mexico, Peru, and Brazil, forced them to hard labor in field and mine, and treated them sometimes with cruelty. In the West Indies, the Caribs were so terribly exploited by the early Spanish colonists that they were all but exterminated. Then, when the national monarchs, pressed by humanitarian priests and monks, sought to protect the Indians and to promote their Christianization rather than their extermination, the colonists sought Negroes as slaves. In 1517, a famous missionary bishop, Bartolomé de las Casas, a friend and advocate of the Indians, suggested to the King of Spain that Negroes from tropical Africa were better adapted than native Americans to forced labor in the West Indies. The suggestion was adopted.

Already, since the middle of the fifteenth century the Portuguese had been learning from the Moslem Moors that African Negroes could be bought or captured and utilized as slaves, and they had begun to employ their African stations, especially those on the Guinea coast, as centers for the slave-trade. They believed that by enslaving Negroes they could Christianize them and at the same time provide their empire with cheap labor able to endure exertions that were impossible to Europeans in a torrid climate. The Portuguese transported many Negro slaves from Africa to the East Indies and to Brazil.

In 1517 the King of Spain granted a patent to one of his subjects in the Netherlands, authorizing him to supply 4,000 Negroes annually to the West Indies. The subject sold his patent to some Genoese merchants for 25,000 ducats; these merchants bought the slaves from the Portuguese; and thus was first systematized the slave-trade between Portuguese Africa and Spanish America. Negro slavery, once legitimized and proven profitable, grew rapidly, and slave-catching in Africa became an indispensable adjunct to plantation-growing in America and part of capitalistic business. Europeans were enriched by forced labor abroad as they could not have been enriched by free labor at home.

**Financial Profits**

At first thought, it might appear as if Spain and Portugal, as the pioneers in overseas exploration, colonization, trade, and slavery, would amass enormous stores of capital and emerge as the financial dictators of all Europe. Such was not actually the case. Though the monarchs of Portugal and Spain and some of their individual subjects drew riches from abroad, and though Lisbon and Seville supplanted Venice and Genoa as the leading commercial entrepôts for Europe, the chief profits from overseas did not remain in Spain or Portugal or accrue permanently to the whole population of the peninsula. As a matter of fact, it was only a small minority of Portuguese and Spaniards, and these principally from the bourgeoisie, who concerned themselves directly with distant commercial or colonial undertakings. The masses of these nations, including noblemen and peasants, continued to devote themselves to agriculture and particularly to wool-growing. Hence, these nations produced at home hardly enough to feed and clothe themselves, and certainly not enough to supply the many needs of their colonies or to exchange for oriental luxuries. Hence, the monarchs and prospectors

of Spain and Portugal had recourse to foreign bankers for the capital investment in overseas enterprises, and the ultimate returns from such investment went less to Portuguese and Spaniards than to foreigners.

Italian bankers financed, just as Italian sailors manned, some of the early expeditions from Lisbon and Seville; and we have already noted the presence of Amerigo Vespucci in Spain at the opening of the sixteenth century as the representative of the Medici. But as the century advanced, banking preeminence passed from Italians to Germans and Netherlanders, and it was capitalists in these latter nations who became the chief brokers of the economic expansion of Europe. Italian imports from the East fell off because of the hostility and conquests of the Ottoman Turks and because of the successful competition of the new trade routes of the Portuguese and Spaniards. Other European merchants went for goods to Lisbon and Seville, rather than to Venice or Genoa. With the setback to Venetian trade Venetian manufacturing suffered a decline. And thus Italian banking was deprived of adequate resources wherewith to take advantage of the rapidly augmenting opportunities for investment in oversea undertakings.

On the other hand, bankers of Germany and the Netherlands were in a position to supply the needful capital and to reap the rich rewards. The merchants of these lands were not disadvantaged by the advance of the Ottoman Turks. They could develop freely their traditional trade with Russia and Scandinavia, with England and the North Sea fisheries. They had at their disposal mineral stores of iron and copper which enabled them to improve and extend their manufactures. Nor were they rivals of the Portuguese and Spaniards; they had no trade routes of their own to the Far East; they could help themselves by taking their manufactured goods to Lisbon and Seville, as formerly they had taken them to Venice, and exchanging them there for oriental luxuries, which, in turn, they could now distribute throughout the greater part of Europe without serious competition from Italians. In other words, the Italians were being left out in the cold. And while the Portuguese and Spaniards were supplanting them as importers of oversea commodities, Germans and Netherlanders were superseding them as the foremost manufacturers, traders, and bankers.

Political ties, moreover, were strengthening the economic bonds between the Spanish peninsula and Germany. The grandson of

Ferdinand and Isabella was not only King of Spain but also lord of the Netherlands and Holy Roman Emperor over all the German states; while promoting Spanish colonization and commerce overseas, he favored the industrial and banking interests of his German and Netherlandish subjects.

The attendant growth of capitalism in Germany is illustrated by the fortunes of the Fugger family. This family was descended from a weaver of Augsburg, who became a leader of the merchant guild of the city, as well as of his craft guild, and who on his death in 1408 left savings of some three thousand gulden. During the fifteenth century the family extended their financial operations. Under the lead of Jacob Fugger, who had been trained for business in Venice, the family exploited silver mines in the Tyrol and copper mines in Hungary and traded in spices, silk, and wool in almost all countries of Europe, while their wealth enabled them to make large loans to the Holy Roman Emperor and to the Pope. By 1500 the Fuggers of Augsburg had a capital of two hundred thousand gulden and were accounted the richest bankers in Europe. They began to invest money in quicksilver mines in Spain, and soon they were advancing funds for Spanish expeditions overseas and for the election of the King of Spain as Holy Roman Emperor. They were said to have made more than fifty per cent profit on their investments in Spanish shipping and colonization. In 1527 their capital amounted to two million gulden, and in 1546 to four million.[1]

**Capitalism in Germany**

In the meantime, the shrewd Fuggers, aware of the shift of the commercial center of gravity from the Mediterranean and central Europe to the Atlantic seaboard, had established a branch of their banking business at the port of Antwerp in the Netherlands. Thither flocked other bankers and merchants,[2] attracted by its favorable location at the crossroads of the old and new trade routes. By the middle of the sixteenth century, more than a thousand foreign merchants—German, Spanish, Portuguese, English, Danish, and Italian—were residing at Antwerp. Every week, two thousand wagons came into

**In Netherlands**

[1] The two million gulden of 1527 represent a purchasing power of some thirty-five million dollars in American money of 1950.

[2] Including representatives of the Welser family, originally from Augsburg, and hardly less famous than the Fuggers as investors in overseas trade and colonization.

the city to exchange wares with the four hundred ships which daily entered its harbor. A Venetian ambassador of the time declared that as much business was done at Antwerp in a fortnight as at Venice in a year.

At Antwerp developed many institutions of modern capitalism. The first "stock exchange," or "bourse," was established here in 1531; it marketed capital, as well as commodities, so that princes or promoters who desired to borrow money, and who formerly would have applied to individual financiers like the Medici or the Fuggers, now turned to the exchange of Antwerp. At Antwerp, too, grew up the practice of "betting on the exchange," and here lotteries flourished. Life insurance came into use, limited mainly to fixed periods, such as the duration of a journey by land or sea. Insurance of ships and cargoes, already experimented with by the Italians, developed to such an extent at Antwerp that in 1564 six hundred of its inhabitants were making out of it what one writer calls a "fat living."

If major capitalistic profits of the economic expansion of Europe in the sixteenth century passed at once from Spain and Portugal to Germany and the Netherlands, a not inconsiderable share was soon dispersed, by means of such exchanges as that of Antwerp, among merchants, manufacturers, and money-lenders of France, England, Scandinavia, and other countries, who were not slow to catch the "capitalistic spirit" and to embody it in action. By the end of the sixteenth century, capitalism was deeply rooted in European economy.

This was aided and confirmed by a noteworthy rise in prices, consequent upon a remarkable increase of money. Until the middle of the sixteenth century, prices of goods and labor in terms of silver and gold had been relatively stable. Afterwards, however, most of Europe experienced the unsettling effects of the importation of large quantities of silver from America into Spain and their gradual export thence to other countries. Altogether, the amount of available money at least tripled in Europe between 1500 and 1650; and in the same century and a half, the prices of goods and wages also tripled.

**Financial Inflation**

The price rise started in Spain and moved out from that center, affecting first the nearer and then the farther lands, as these secured some of the Spanish silver. Wages usually tended to rise more slowly than prices, and this enabled manufacturers to get

more for their products while paying relatively less in wages. Indeed, for more than a century the cards were stacked in favor of the industrialist; and the one who could make the most goods made the most money. In addition, rising prices favored the merchant, for the goods he had in storage or on ships tended to rise in price while he held them. In short, the striking price rise favored the capitalistic business man and helped to fix the capitalist system on western and central Europe. The increased supply of the precious metals speeded the transition to a money economy, facilitated the accumulation of money-wealth, and stimulated the use of credit devices based on money in banking and trade, and in industry and agriculture.

The development of capitalism had profound effects on the traditional social conditions and institutions of Europe. Already, prior to 1500, it had been gradually altering the medieval pattern of society. But what was merely evolutionary at the opening of the sixteenth century reached well-nigh revolutionary proportions at the close of the century. **Social Effects**

Capitalism dealt a body blow at medieval agriculture and the manorial system. Nobles, seeking to make their estates more profitable to themselves, tended to become "absentee landlords," that is, to take up residence in towns and to engage in commercial enterprise. In order to have ready cash, they transmuted the customary services and payments in kind of their peasants into money-rents; and over their manors and tenants they placed hired agents, with instructions to obtain as high rents as possible. Usually such an arrangement was unfavorable to the peasants, because many of them were forced from a partially independent position as tenants into a wholly dependent position as agricultural laborers, and because the "absentee landlord" seldom saw with his own eyes the distress caused by his new capitalistic methods. It was the new capitalism which contributed to the "enclosure" movement in England and to similar movements in other countries, all of which were directed toward an increased production of manufacturing staples, mostly wool, for distant markets, and simultaneously toward a decreased employment of skilled farm labor.

Capitalism revolutionized European industry. The medieval guilds, already in decline, now largely succumbed. They were too local and too narrow to cope with the world-supply of raw mate-

rials and the world-demand for manufactured commodities. Outside the guilds appeared a new form of productive and distributing organization—the so-called "domestic" or "putting out" system of industry—by which a capitalist "middleman" bought raw material, put it out to artisans to be worked up in their homes for wages, and sold the finished product for as much as it would fetch. Under this organization, the middleman or employer tended to spread manufacturing over a fairly wide area and to utilize relatively cheap labor of dispossessed serfs and wives of agricultural wage-workers. He was not handicapped, like the guildsman, by the necessity of confining production to trained workmen under one roof. Furthermore, he was soon able, by his supply of capital, to accumulate a larger stock and to buy and sell at better advantage. The new system was not without detriment to the employees: it differentiated more sharply between capital and labor, debasing the latter, and it tended to substitute for the close tie between master and apprentice an impersonal relationship.

Confronted with the new capitalist system of industry, the old guilds were compelled to alter their status or to yield to destructive competition. In the main they adopted one of two alternatives. They admitted capitalists to membership and under the leadership of these transformed themselves into corporations which adopted the "domestic" system. Or, remaining purely local entities, they accepted employment from capitalist middlemen and became little cogs in the great wheel of world commerce.

As the line became more clearly marked between capital and labor, both in industry and in agriculture, and as the commercial centers of Europe shifted from the city states of the Mediterranean and Baltic seas to the national states of the Atlantic seaboard, the "wealth of nations" became increasingly an object of solicitude on the part of the monarchs of western Europe. Capitalists and laborers alike looked more and more to their respective national governments, rather than to a city or province, for protection and support, and monarchs were soon applying to national domains the mercantile policies which had long been pursued on an urban basis by the Italian city states. In other words, the expansion of trade and the rise of capitalism quickened national consciousness and led to the adoption of national mercantilism.

"Mercantilism" is a modern word signifying governmental regulation of economic affairs, especially trade and industry. The

thing itself was no novelty in the sixteenth century, for city governments for hundreds of years had supervised and directed the economic activities of their citizens; traditionally, the merchant guild and the craft guild were agencies of urban mercantilism, the former for commerce, and the latter for manufacturing. The novelty in sixteenth-century mercantilism was its extension from city to nation and the transfer of its chief agency from local guild to national monarch. Not the city of Lisbon but the King of Portugal tried to monopolize the trade of the Far East, and this not exclusively for the benefit of the citizens of Lisbon but for the greater prosperity and security of the whole Portuguese nation. It was not the city of Seville but the King of Spain who attempted to monopolize the New World, and in such a way as to strengthen the Spanish monarchy. It was because other national monarchs had similar ambitions and similar convictions that they encouraged their seamen and merchants to break the monopolies of Portuguese and Spaniards and to establish monopolies of their own.

**Mercantilism**

Under mercantilism, it was a central aim of national states to attract and keep as much gold and silver as possible, both in their royal treasuries and in the hands of private subjects. Gold and silver were believed to constitute the basic wealth of a nation: they were essential to coinage and indispensable for the maintenance of armies and warships; they guaranteed national prestige and power. Hence, Portugal and Spain forbade alien exportation of the precious metals from mother country and colonial empire. Hence, too, other nations, notably the Netherlands, France, and England, resorted to smuggling, raiding, and piracy, in order to obtain a share of the precious metals.

It followed, under mercantilist practice, that national states began closely to regulate the manufacturing and commerce of their citizens with a view toward supplying themselves with an adequate stock of precious metals and making proper provision for military and naval power. Thus, heavy tariff, and sometimes complete prohibition, was imposed on the importation of manufactured articles from foreign countries, and export duties were levied on commodities deemed necessary for national defense. The shipping of one's own nation was favored, while that of foreign nations was penalized. It followed, also, that, just as Spain and Portugal endeavored to hold as large colonial empires as possible

and to exclude alien colonists and merchants from them, so the Netherlands, France, and England sought to establish overseas colonies and trading posts which they might monopolize for their economic and political advantage.

Capitalism, with the results already mentioned, was promoted by the economic expansion of Europe in the sixteenth century, and, in turn, this expansion was speeded and magnified by the rise of capitalism. The rise of capitalism enabled kings and corporations to promote distant exploration on a large scale, to make many overseas settlements, and to revolutionize commerce in direction and quantity. It meant that the chief trade changed from the south and east of Europe to the west, from city states to national states, from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic. It meant that the vessels which sailed the Atlantic (and Pacific) at the end of the sixteenth century were larger, stronger, and far more numerous than the fragile caravels and galleys which a century before had borne Da Gama to India or Columbus to America. It meant likewise that the cargoes of the later vessels were heavier and more varied.

**Commercial Change and Expansion**

Under capitalistic auspices, Asiatic luxuries were poured into Europe—spices, drugs, cottons, silks, ivory, indigo, sugar, precious gems, ebony and sandal-wood, coffee and tea, carpets and rugs, wall-paper, porcelains. From America came large stores of silver and gold and certain strictly indigenous products, such as tobacco, cocoa, quinine, maize (Indian corn), potatoes, lima beans, tapioca, mahogany. Into America, European colonists and investors introduced horses and cattle, donkeys, swine, sheep, poultry, garden vegetables, lemons and oranges, bananas, vines, olives, flax, grains, and sugar-cane; and in due course there was surplus of these things to ship back to Europe.[1] Over against these imports from overseas, Europe exported wheat, woolen and cotton cloth, hardware, gunpowder, and a profusion of manufactured articles, including various trinkets which were found useful in trade with "backward" peoples.

In the midst of such a novel world-market and of such a sudden

[1] Conspicuous among such things was rum, which was distilled from fermented sugar-cane. Rum-making was a major industry of the West Indies, and rum-shipping an important item of commerce, both to Europe, where rum speedily became a popular beverage, and to Africa, where its potency lured many Negroes into captivity and nerved them for their dreadful voyage across the Atlantic and for their forced labor in raising sugar and making more rum!

rise of capitalism, Europe experienced extraordinary social strains and stresses. The gulf between rich and poor widened; the rich became richer, and the poor poorer. There was an epidemic of peasant revolts against greedy landlords, and the towns suffered growing pains. National consciousness and national competition increased; international war assumed a deadlier and costlier character. Kings intensified their absolutism and, in union with the middle classes, overawed both nobility and clergy.


Particularly noteworthy was the rise of well-to-do townsmen, the capitalistic bourgeoisie, to hitherto unprecedented influence and distinction. The new bourgeois, the new capitalists, were at the elbows of kings and dukes and prelates. Many an impecunious nobleman, who needed money as well as a wife, sought the hand of some wealthy merchant's daughter. Some members of the bourgeoisie obtained admission to the ranks of the nobility by rendering capitalistic service to the monarch. And members of the nobility found it more and more profitable, if still a bit undignified, to make investments in manufacturing and trade. Capitalistic agriculture was allying itself with capitalistic commerce and industry. The basis was already laid, in the sixteenth-century expansion of Europe, for the modern supremacy of the middle class.

**Capitalist Middle Class**



# CHAPTER III

## INTELLECTUAL QUICKENING



UITE as important as the rise of national states and royal absolutism in the realm of politics, and hardly less significant than the expansion of Europe and the development of capitalism in the economic sphere, was the intellectual quickening which occurred in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and which has had profound effect on modern society and civilization. This quickening was evidenced in: (1) the invention of printing and a resulting wider diffusion of knowledge; (2) a renewed appreciation of Greek and Roman antiquity, and the ensuing vogue of classicism and humanism; (3) the cultivation of renaissance art; (4) the flowering of national literatures; and (5) the development of natural science and historical criticism.

### I. INVENTION OF PRINTING

The present day is notably distinguished by the prevalence of enormous numbers of printed books, periodicals, and newspapers. Yet this very printing, which seems so commonplace to us now, has had but a comparatively brief existence. From the earliest recorded history up to five hundred years ago every book in Europe [1] was laboriously written by hand,[2] and, although copyists acquired a surprising swiftness in reproducing books, libraries of any size were the property exclusively of rich institutions or wealthy individuals. It was at the beginning of modern times that the invention of printing first provided a potent means of disseminating information and opinion.

[1] For an account of early printing in China, see the authoritative work by T. F. Carter, *The Invention of Printing in China and its Spread Westward* (1924).

[2] It is interesting to note the meaning of our present word "manuscript," which is derived from the Latin—*manu scriptum* ("written by hand").

Printing is a complicated process. Among its most essential elements are *movable type*, with which the impression is made, and *paper*, on which it is made. The development of paper took a long time.

**Development of Paper**

For their manuscripts the ancient Greeks and Romans had used papyrus, the prepared fiber of a tough reed which grew in the valley of the Nile River. This papyrus was expensive and heavy, and not at all suitable for printing. Parchment, the dressed skins of certain animals, especially sheep, which became the standard material for the handwritten documents of the middle ages, was durable, but, like papyrus, it was costly, unwieldy, and ill adapted to printing.

The forerunner of modern European paper was probably that which the Chinese made from silk as early as the second century B.C. For silk the Moslems at Damascus in the middle of the eighth century appear to have substituted cotton, and this so-called Damascus paper was later imported into southern Europe. In Spain the native-grown hemp and flax were again substituted for cotton, and the resulting linen paper was used in Castile in the thirteenth century and thence penetrated across the Pyrenees into France and gradually all over western and central Europe. Parchment, however, for a long time kept its preeminence over silk, cotton, or linen paper, because of its greater firmness and durability, and notaries were long forbidden to use any other substance in their official writings. Not until the second half of the fifteenth century was assured the triumph of modern paper,[1] as distinct from papyrus or parchment, when printing, then on the threshold of its career, demanded a substance of moderate price which would easily receive the impression of movable type.

**Movable Type**

The idea of movable type was derived from an older practice of carving reverse letters or even whole inscriptions upon blocks of wood, which were inked and applied to writing material. Medieval kings and princes frequently had their signatures cut on these blocks of wood or metal in order to impress them on charters, and a kind of engraving was employed to reproduce pictures or written pages as early as the twelfth century.

It was a natural but slow evolution from block-impressing to the practice of casting individual letters in separate little pieces

[1] The word "paper" is derived from the ancient "papyrus."

of metal, all of the same height, and then arranging them in any desired sequence for printing. The great advantage of movable type over the blocks was the infinite variety of work which could be done by simply setting and resetting the type.

The history of the transition from blocks to movable type—the real invention of modern printing—is unknown. It has been maintained that the first European to make and use movable type was a certain Lourens Coster, a native of the town of Haarlem in the Netherlands. All we positively know, however, is that about the year 1450 a man by the name of John Gutenberg was employing movable type in a printing-shop in the German city of Mainz, and that the earliest known products of the new art were papal "letters of indulgence" and a version of the Bible, both printed at Mainz by Gutenberg in 1454.

After the middle of the fifteenth century, the marvelous art spread with almost lightning rapidity from Mainz throughout Germany, the Italian states, France, and England, in fact, throughout all Christendom. It was welcomed by scholars and applauded by popes. Printing presses were erected at Rome in 1466, and book-publishing speedily became an honorable and lucrative business in every large city. Thus, at the opening of the sixteenth century, the scholarly Aldus Manutius was operating in Venice the famous Aldine press, whose beautiful editions of the Greek and Latin classics are still esteemed as masterpieces of the printer's art. The first printing press in the New World was set up at Mexico City by the Spaniards in 1536.

**Rapid Spread of Printing**

The early printers fashioned the characters of their type after the letters which the scribes had used in longhand writing. Different kinds of common handwriting gave rise, therefore, to such varieties of type as the heavy black-faced "Gothic" that prevailed in Germany or the several adaptations of the clear, neat Roman characters which predominated in southern Europe and in England. The compressed "italic" type was devised in the Aldine press in Venice to enable the printer to crowd more words upon a page.

A steady development of the new art characterized the sixteenth century, and at least four remarkable results soon became evident. (1) The supply of books materially increased. Under earlier conditions, a skilled and conscientious copyist might, by prodigious toil, produce two books in a year.

**Results**

Now, in a single year of the sixteenth century, some 24,000 copies of one of Erasmus's books were struck off by one printing press.

(2) By lessening the expense of books and enabling members of the middle class, as well as nobles and princes, to possess private libraries, printing diffused knowledge, broadened education, and increased the demand for books.

(3) A greater degree of accuracy was guaranteed by printing than by manual copying. Before the invention of printing, it was well-nigh impossible to secure two copies of any work that would be exactly alike. Now, the constant proofreading and the fact that an entire edition was printed from the same type helped to correct the anciently recurring faults of forgery or of error.

(4) Printing made it possible and profitable to cater to the tastes and whims of the common people. Cheap pamphlets and ephemeral publications, including many controversial tracts, began to appear in large quantities, stimulating a general desire for literacy and at the same time considerable intellectual unrest.

### 2. VOGUE OF CLASSICISM AND HUMANISM

Printing was a novel and useful agency for expressing the ideas of the sixteenth century. Many of these ideas centered in an intellectual movement which is called "classicism," and which was derived from a renewed appreciation of the classical civilizations of ancient Greece and Rome, just as the contemporaneous expansion of Europe was an outcome of the discovery of the disparate civilizations of far-away Asia and America. European life of the sixteenth century was enriched, not only by new contacts with distant places, but also by renewed contacts with distant times.

**Classical Tradition**

Of course, Europeans always had retained some intellectual and cultural contact with the classical civilization of ancient Greece and Rome, just as they had always had some commercial intercourse with Asia. They never ceased to regard the Greeks and Romans as their predecessors and forebears and as the first peoples who had been converted to Christianity. The ancient classical languages continued to be used in church services—Latin in the West, and Greek in the East. Ancient architecture continued to serve as a model for early church buildings. Many a written word continued to survive and many a monument of stone continued to stand as constant reminders to

medieval Europeans of "the glory that was Greece and the grandeur that was Rome."

It is true that during the middle ages, under Christian auspices, much of the spirit of classical civilization was altered, and certain novel features were added to European culture. For example, such medieval achievements as Gothic architecture, rhymed poetry, "romances," morality plays, stained glass, symbolic painting of great spiritual power, "Gregorian" music, and fantastic humor in sculpture, were radically different from anything in pagan Græco-Roman civilization. But all the distinctive achievements of the middle ages were in addition to the classical heritage which continued to exist and to influence Europe.

Certain classical writers were widely known and cherished throughout the middle ages—notably Virgil, Caesar, and Cicero. Moreover, both a revived study of Aristotle and a renewed study of the Roman law occupied important positions in the medieval universities and helped to produce the philosophy, the theology, and the canon law which were most characteristic of the learning and higher education of Christendom. Aristotle was revered by monks and popes, almost as if he had been a Christian saint instead of a pagan philosopher. Then, too, most of the medieval ideas of astronomy, medicine, and chemistry were derived, directly or indirectly, from classical sources; and from classical sources, at least indirectly and in part, were drawn many of the medieval notions of history. The most popular "general histories" of the middle ages represented combinations of data of the Hebrew scriptures with data of ancient Greek and Roman authors. In fine, medieval Europeans were indebted in many ways to earlier classical civilization, and they were aware of their debt.

Yet, during the centuries of transition from middle ages to modern times—the centuries from the fourteenth to the seventeenth—classical Græco-Roman civilization inspired Europeans in new ways and with far-reaching consequences. Previously the inhabitants of the West had known something about classical literature, art, philosophy, and science, but they had applied their knowledge to practical purposes and had infused it with the spirit of Christianity. They had revered Virgil mainly because he was supposed in his Æneid to prefigure the Christian Church and to inculcate moral truths. They had adapted Græco-Roman architecture to the requirements of church-building. They had em-

ployed Aristotle for the construction of their own scholastic theology and philosophy. They had found in ancient Greek and Roman writers many "scientific" speculations which confirmed their own notions about the universe or which appeared to be of practical value to themselves. Now, however, by the sixteenth century, inhabitants of Christendom were reading the classics, not because they possessed religious or ethical significance and not always because they supplied useful information, but rather because they were inherently interesting and enjoyable and because their content was provocative and their form delightful.

**The New "Classicism"**

This is what is meant by the "rediscovery of ancient civilization," or (as it is variously termed) the "classical revival" or the "renaissance." [1] It was basically the sympathetic study of the masterpieces, the "classics," of ancient Latin and Greek literature. It was also an appreciation, amounting at times to blind veneration, of all forms of ancient civilization, and a conscious effort to refashion fine arts and ways of life according to classical models, coupled with a pronounced reaction against what was deemed "medieval."

The new appreciation of ancient civilization had begun in an important way in the fourteenth century with an Italian, Francesco Petrarca (1304–1374), or, as he is known to us, Petrarch. After spending his boyhood in Tuscany and his young manhood in papal service, Petrarch devoted himself exclusively to a life of scholarship and the pursuit of literature. As an avocation he wrote some popular poems in Italian, but his

**Petrarch**

[1] The word "renaissance," meaning "rebirth," has frequently but unfortunately been employed to describe the whole period of transition from middle ages to modern times. There was, during this period, a "rebirth" of classical art and learning, with significant effects on the politics, the economics, and even the scientific speculations of early modern Europe. But many of the most characteristic events of the period from the fourteenth to the seventeenth century proceeded from no "rebirth"; they were new-born and strictly native to the period. There was no model or inspiration in ancient Greece or Rome for the crusades, the establishment of Islam at Constantinople, the rise of national states, the discovery of America, the commercial and missionary activities of Europeans in southern Africa and the Far East, the invention of gunpowder, the mariner's compass, and printing. Indeed, "renaissance" implies a retrograde and "reactionary" movement, which, if true in certain respects of the period of transition from the fourteenth to the seventeenth century, grossly underestimates or utterly obscures the vitally "progressive" and novel developments of the time. Hence, while the word "renaissance" may properly be employed within rather strict limitations, it should not be used to denote all the beginnings of our modern civilization.

vocation was the sympathetic and enthusiastic study of the Latin classics. He admired them, and in a multitude of polished Latin epistles and in numerous Latin poems of his own he strove to imitate the form and re-express the content of his cherished models. By daily example and precept he urged his contemporaries to study the classics and to perfect their Latin style. Petrarch took himself very seriously, and so, in time, did others, with the result that he exerted tremendous influence. He became famous as "the scholar." The Pope supplied him with funds. Kings vied with one another in heaping benefits upon him. The Venetian senate gave him the freedom of the town. The university of Paris and the city of Rome alike crowned him with laurel.

Petrarch's enthusiasm for ancient Latin literature was fully shared by his fellow countryman, Boccaccio; and during the next century, the fifteenth, most scholars in central and western Europe, first in Italy, and later in other countries, followed in the footsteps of Boccaccio and Petrarch. Petrarch himself had been a serious Latin student, but he had no profound knowledge of Greek. About the year 1400, however, as a consequence of Moslem Turkish pressure against the Byzantine Empire, Greek scholars and teachers in considerable numbers left Constantinople, crossed the Adriatic, and settled in Italy. One of these, a certain Chrysoloras, founded a famous school of classical Greek studies at Florence and gave lectures on Homer to crowds of students.

The zeal for Greek and Latin classics reached its highest pitch in Italy in the fifteenth century and the first half of the sixteenth, and it was gradually communicated to other countries. Greek was first taught in England and in France about the middle of the fifteenth century. By the sixteenth century the study of pagan classics, both Greek and Latin, was being prosecuted throughout Christendom. The "new learning," in contradistinction to the medieval scholastic learning, was in the ascendant and was already producing important results.

**The New Learning**

First of all, the "new learning" inaugurated the vogue of "classicism," the fashion of regarding the classical civilization of ancient Greece and Rome as the greatest which the world had ever known or ever could know. It was a vogue which was to endure until the nineteenth century and which in the meantime was to be the chief factor in determining the styles of literature, architecture, and most other arts prevalent in Europe. Not only was

every educated European expected to know the classical tongues of Greece and Rome, but, if one aspired to write in a vernacular language, one must conform to the classical unities, employ classical names, insert classical references and quotations, and imitate the pompous phrases and elaborate metaphors of Homer or Demosthenes or Virgil or Cicero. Or, if one undertook to rear an edifice, one must construct it according to classical models, fronting it with Greek columns and pediment, topping it with Roman dome, and adorning it with sculptured or painted representations of nude Apollos and Aphrodites.

Secondly, the "new learning" was attended by "humanism," the belief that the charm of the classics resides essentially in their humanness, their humanity, and that anyone who would recapture and hold the greatest charm in life must not prize the supernatural, the theological, or the ascetical above the natural, the human, and the sensual. Satisfaction is better than sacrifice, and self-gratification, than self-denial. One should not look to the gods more than to one's self and one's fellows. Indeed, one should strive sympathetically to enter into the life and enjoyment of one's contemporaries and, perhaps above all, into the life and enjoyment of ancient Greeks and Romans. Such studies as might promote these ends were to be encouraged as "humane letters" (*litterœ humaniores*) or "humanities"; others were to be discouraged. The exponents of humanism—the so-called humanists—recognized the classical languages and literatures and profane (as distinct from sacred) history as the outstanding "humanities." By the sixteenth century, Latin, already utilized as the medium of instruction in European universities, became a formal subject of instruction, with emphasis shifted from the language to its pagan literature. Greek, and profane history also, were introduced into the curricula of the universities. Outside the universities, the "humanities" were especially fostered by a new institution, the academy, a voluntary association which arose in a particular city or locality in imitation of the ancient academy of Plato and which patronized the pursuit and publication of scholarly, literary, and, finally, scientific studies.

**Humanism**

Thirdly, the "new learning" stimulated intellectual curiosity and criticism, the passion of the "collector," and what is known as "scholarly research." In order to find out as much as possible about the vaunted ancients, scholars sought forgotten or neg-

lected manuscripts of classical writers, and by ransacking monasteries and old libraries they managed to discover such supposedly "lost" classics as Quintilian's treatise on oratory, Cicero's oration on Cæcina, the histories of Tacitus, Livy, and Ammianus Marcellinus, the mathematical work of Firmicus, the architectural writings of Vitruvius, and the agricultural essays of Columella, to say nothing of a profusion of manuscripts of classics already well known. The collecting of classical manuscripts became a profession or a fad, and many a rising commercial capitalist gathered together a classical library as greedily as he amassed a store of precious metals. With collecting, went buying, selling, copying, and publishing of the old manuscripts. And for purposes of publication, scholars compared variant manuscripts, applied textual criticism to them, and collated them. Whence arose a firmer grasp on history and historical method, a clearer perception of the copyist's errors which might be expected in old manuscripts, and certain rules which could be used in determining what was probably true and what was certainly false in a given document. One of the Italian humanists of the fifteenth century, Lorenzo Valla, by means of acute historical criticism, proved that the so-called "Donation of Constantine," a document which pretended to be a grant of temporal sovereignty over Rome from the Emperor Constantine to the Pope and which during the middle ages had generally been accepted as authentic, was in reality a rather clumsy forgery.

**Classical Scholarship**

Fourthly, the "new learning," so given to classical scholarship and to enthusiastic appreciation of antiquity, tended to be contemptuous and even denunciatory of the culture of the intervening centuries between Cicero and Petrarch. Classicists and humanists began to bestow on these centuries the opprobrious term "middle ages" [1] and to describe them collectively as "dark." The lofty architecture of these ages, with its pointed arches and flying buttresses, was styled "Gothic," a synonym for "barbarous." [2] Scholasticism was

**Depreciation of Middle Ages**

[1] One of the first inventors of the term "middle ages" was a Roman humanist and historian of the fifteenth century in papal employ, Flavio Biondo, whose *Decades* represented an attempt to outline the "gloomy" history of Europe during the thousand years from 410 to 1410.

[2] This use of the term "Gothic" was popularized by Giorgio Vasari, a pupil of Michelangelo and author of the famous *Lives of Painters, Sculptors, and Archi-*

that in all respects modern times have given greater prominence to the individual than the middle ages gave. Medieval feudalism was notoriously individualistic; the basis of the medieval state was personal, rather than territorial or national; medieval armies were composed of individual fighters rather than of a disciplined soldiery; and it is recent times, not the middle ages, which have witnessed the subordination of the individual to mass-production, mass-education, and mass-action.

The new appreciation of classical civilization was a major element in the beginning of modern Europe. It gave a different emphasis and a somewhat different content to European thought from what had prevailed during the middle ages. Its immediate and most obvious fruits were primarily antiquarian, and in the long run it was to prove less revolutionary than its sixteenth-century proponents anticipated. Eventually, classical antiquity would lose its hold on men's interest; even scholars would cease to know much Greek or Latin; scientific history would supplant humanist history; and, for proper background to modern development, a more just view of the middle ages would be incorporated in a much vaster panorama of human history. Yet such an outcome was still in the distant future and was not suspected by the classicists and humanists of the sixteenth century. Nor should it blind our eyes to the historical fact that the new absorption in classical civilization, with all its shortcomings and limitations, emphasized certain habits of thought and behavior which have been abiding characteristics of modern civilization, even after the decline of the classicism which first formed them.

**Vogue of the New Learning**

In the meantime, especially in the sixteenth century, classicism and humanism were very much in fashion with educated Europeans. A host of scholars pursued the "new learning" individually and in academies and universities, and if some of the older universities still conservatively frowned upon it in defense of medieval scholasticism, new universities were established for its special patronage at Louvain (in the Netherlands), St. Andrews (in Scotland), Upsala (in Sweden), Freiburg, Tübingen, and Wittenberg (in Germany), and elsewhere. Merchant princes and wealthy bankers gave lavish financial support to it, and prelates and kings encouraged it, by pensions and services. The head of the banking family of the Medici, Lorenzo the Magnificent, subsidized humanists and

renaissance artists and founded the Florentine library of Greek and Roman classics. The French King Francis I (1515–1547) attracted Italian classical scholars and artists to his court, created the Collège de France to train Frenchmen in the "new learning," and otherwise stimulated its vogue in France. Other European monarchs, contemporary with Francis, performed similar service for the "new learning" in their respective countries—Henry VIII of England, Charles V of Germany and Spain, Christian II of Denmark, Sigismund I of Poland. Even among the common people it became the fashion for parents to name their children, not after Christian saints, but after pagan celebrities—Cæsar, Virgil, Æneas, Plutarch, Homer, Solon, Pericles, Diana, Julia, Augusta, Lucretia, etc.

**Christianity and the New Learning**

It may appear strange that there was not serious and sustained opposition to the "new learning" on the part of sincere Christians and ecclesiastical authorities. At first, it is true, the study of the pagan classics aroused misgiving and even hostility among some clergymen, who feared lest paganism should be revived and the moral and dogmatic teachings of Christianity should be obscured and neglected. Gradually, however, the "new learning" came to be tolerated, and then accepted, and finally patronized with liberality and ardor, not only by princes, bishops, and abbots, but also by Popes. Pope Nicholas V (1447–1455) was himself a conspicuous classical scholar and a munificent patron of others; he hired hundreds of persons to copy old manuscripts; he awarded a handsome prize for a metrical translation of Homer; and he collected at the Vatican a large classical library. Pius II (1458–~~1464~~) acquired before his election to the papacy a European reputation, under the classical pen-name of Æneas Silvius, as a Latinist and a collector of manuscripts. Papal patronage of the "new learning" reached its zenith early in the sixteenth century with the son of Lorenzo de' Medici, Leo X (1513–1521), who combined a prodigal expenditure in aid of classicism with a lively personal enjoyment of its tastes and pleasures. Leo X was fond of the masterpieces of the ancients and the creations of humanistic contemporaries. He appreciated music and the theater, art and poetry, the formal and the witty, suppers reminiscent of Lucullus, and pageants worthy of Pompey.

Many Europeans could see nothing incompatible between practice of the Christian religion and the pursuit of classical studies;

and it was maintained, quite plausibly, that Christian civilization was being deepened and uplifted by the "rediscovery" of pagan civilization. Yet there can be little doubt that the new enthusiasm for classicism and humanism was subversive of certain historical traditions and usages of the Christian religion. It was inimical to the Christian traditions of self-sacrifice and self-denial, critical of the long-established Christian institution of monasticism, and scornful of the long-esteemed Christian concern with theology. In certain instances, it prompted an indifference in religious matters, and a marked lessening, among intellectuals, of Christian conviction and devotion.

**Leading Intellectuals of 16th Century**

Certain prominent exponents of the "new learning" in Europe in the first part of the sixteenth century should be noted. There were two Germans: John Reuchlin, tutor to young princes and nobles, profound student of Greek literature, and pioneer in Hebrew grammar and philology; and his nephew, Philip Melanchthon, professor of Greek at the newly founded university of Wittenberg and close associate of Martin Luther. There were two Englishmen: John Colet, dean of the cathedral of St. Paul in London, famed teacher and preacher; and Sir Thomas More, chancellor of the realm under Henry VIII and author of *Utopia,* a celebrated modern description of an ideal state and society such as had anciently been portrayed by Plato. There was a Dane, Povl Helgesen, professor at the university of Copenhagen, historian, grammarian, and controversialist. There was a Frenchman, William Budé, expert writer of both classical Greek and classical Latin and principal agent under Francis I in the establishment of the Collège de France and likewise of the library which later became famous as the Bibliothèque Nationale.

**Erasmus**

Towering above all his contemporaries was Desiderius Erasmus (1466–1536), the foremost humanist and the intellectual arbiter of the early sixteenth century. Erasmus was a native of Rotterdam in the Netherlands, but he passed most of his long and studious life in other countries—in Germany, France, England, Italy, and Switzerland. He became a priest and a doctor of sacred theology, but it was as a lover of books, a prolific writer, and a sociable being among fellow humanists that he earned his chief title to fame. Erasmus, to an even greater degree than Petrarch, might be called *the* scholar of Europe. He corresponded

with almost every first-rate writer of his generation and was on terms of personal friendship with Aldus Manutius, the noted publisher of Venice, with John Colet and Budé and Sir Thomas More, with Pope Leo X, with the Holy Roman Emperor, and with the Kings of England and France. For a time he presided over the new Collège de France.

Erasmus was a professed Christian and never questioned the ultimate authority of church or pope. But, good humanist that he was, he made light of practices which he deemed superstitious, poked fun at theologians, monks, and bigots, and was a bitter foe of credulity and ignorance. His scholarly Greek text of the New Testament, with its Latin translation, was accompanied by a commentary which ridiculed many a theologian. In his *Praise of Folly* he directed his wit and sarcasm against both theologians and monks, complaining that the foolish people identified religion only with pilgrimages, the invocation of saints, and the veneration of relics. In his satirical dialogues, the *Adages* and the *Colloquies,* he assailed ignorance and superstition with quip and jest. He laughed at everyone, himself included. "Literary people," said he, "resemble the great figured tapestries of Flanders, which produce effect only when seen from a distance."

If the humanists were critical of the church and of Christianity as popularly practiced in Europe at the beginning of the sixteenth century, many of them felt little or no sympathy with the religious upheaval which, later in the century, produced Protestantism and promoted intolerance and fanaticism. Only Melanchthon, of the leading humanists already mentioned, actually seceded from the Catholic Church, and he was a peculiarly mild and compromising Protestant. The others, typified by Erasmus, seem to have felt that the theological tempest which Martin Luther aroused all over Europe would destroy fair-minded scholarship—the very essence of humanism; they desired simply a moral internal reform of the existing church, conducted not by ill-informed bigots, but by an enlightened and well-educated clergy. Reuchlin died in the habit of an Augustinian monk; Erasmus directed his last shafts against Luther; Helgesen wrote his last treatise in defense of the papacy; and Sir Thomas More is now honored as a martyr and saint of the Catholic Church.

Tolerant, half-sceptical humanism suffered eclipse, at least temporarily, in the second half of the sixteenth century. But classicism.

the first fruit of the rediscovery of ancient civilization, continued to be cultivated by European intellectuals throughout the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. It went on inspiring the form and much of the content of literature and art and influencing the formulation of some important doctrines of modern science. To these important by-products of the interest in ancient civilization, we may now turn.

### 3. RENAISSANCE ART

It was artists as well as scholars who, from the fourteenth to the sixteenth century, developed a growing interest in classical civilization and derived models from it for masterpieces of their own and subsequent generations. The chief art of the middle ages has been essentially Christian. It sprang from the doctrine and devotions of the church and was inextricably bound up with Christian life. The graceful Gothic cathedrals, pointing their roofs and airy spires in heavenly aspiration, the fantastic and mysterious carvings of wood or stone, the imaginative portraiture of saintly heroes and heroines as well as of the sublime story of the fall and redemption of the human race, the richly stained glass, and the solemn organ music—all betokened the supreme thought of medieval Christendom. But humanism recalled to men's mind the existence of an earlier art, simpler and more restrained, if less deeply spiritual in its appeal. The resulting "classicism" meant esteem for pagan culture in all its aspects.

Under classicist influence, European art underwent a transformation in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. While much of the distinctively medieval culture remained, European civilization was enriched by a renaissance of classical art-forms. The painters, the sculptors, and the architects now sought models not so much in their own Christian past as in the more distant past of pagan Greece and Rome. Gradually the two lines of development were brought together, and the consequent union—the adaptation of classical art-forms to Christian uses—was marked by an outburst of artistic energy. Classicism became the fashion in all the arts—in architecture, sculpture, painting, engraving, and music.

In architecture, the straight and severely plain line of the ancient Greek temple or the elegant gentle curve of the Roman dome was substituted for the fanciful lofty Gothic. A rounded arch replaced the pointed. Flying buttresses were discarded.

And the ancient Greek orders—Doric, Ionic, and Corinthian—were dragged from oblivion to embellish sedate symmetrical structures. The resulting "classical" or "renaissance" architecture was used for all manner of buildings, reaching perhaps its most ambitious expression in the vast basilica of St. Peter, which was erected at Rome in the sixteenth century under the direction of such artists as Bramante, Raphael, Michelangelo, and Palladio.[1]

**Architecture**

The revival of Greek and Roman architecture, like the revival of Greek and Latin literature, had its origin in Italy; and in the cities of the peninsula, under the patronage of wealthy princes and noble families, it attained its most general acceptance. And, like literary humanism, it spread to other countries, which in turn it deeply affected. The chronic wars in which the petty Italian states were engaged throughout the sixteenth century, were attended by chronic foreign interference. But Italy, vanquished in politics, and eventually also in oriental trade, became the victor in art. While its towns surrendered to foreign armies, and its shippers and bankers suffered from the competition of western Europeans, its architects and builders subdued Christendom and brought it for a time under Italy's artistic sway. More and more, throughout western Europe, Gothic architecture was looked upon as barbarous, and newer buildings were erected in the renaissance style.

In France, the national monarchs, especially Francis I, who led armies into Italy, took back home with them not only a great admiration for the new architecture but also a number of its Italian designers and craftsmen. Before long the renaissance style appeared in many public structures in France, among which were numerous chateaux in the valley of the Loire, and the rebuilt palace of the Louvre at Paris, begun in the last year of the reign of Francis I (1546) and today the home of one of the world's largest art collections.

Renaissance architecture similarly entered Spain and received

[1] Palladio, a close student of ancient models, was exclusively an architect and perhaps the most influential in the subsequent "classical" development of his art. In addition to his work as consultant to Pope Paul III on St. Peter's at Rome, he built the church of St. George Major at Venice and numerous palaces and villas in northern Italy. Palladio's scholarly treatise, *Four Books of Architecture,* was translated into almost every European language and exerted commanding influence on the so-called "baroque" type of seventeenth-century architecture in Italy and throughout Europe. See below, pp. 380–381.

encouragement from Philip II, who employed it for his vast new structure of the Escorial. About the same time it manifested itself, in lesser degree, in the Netherlands and in Germany. In England, its appearance was delayed until the seventeenth century.

**Sculpture**

Sculpture is usually an attendant of architecture, and it is not surprising, therefore, that transformation of the one should be connected with change in the other. The new movement showed itself in Italian sculpture as early as the fourteenth century, owing to the influence of the ancient monuments which still abounded throughout the peninsula and to which the humanists attracted attention. In the fifteenth century archæological discoveries were made and a special interest fostered by the Florentine family of the Medici, who not only became enthusiastic collectors of ancient works of art but promoted the scientific study of sculpture. Sculptors followed ever more closely the Greek and Roman traditions in form and often in subject as well. The plastic art of Italy in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries was strikingly akin to that of Athens in the fifth and fourth centuries before Christ.

The first great apostle of renaissance sculpture in the fifteenth century was Lorenzo Ghiberti, whose marvelous doors on the baptistry at Florence elicited the comment of Michelangelo that they were "worthy of being placed at the entrance of paradise." Slightly younger than Ghiberti was Donatello, who, among other triumphs, fashioned the realistic statue of St. Mark in Venice. Luca della Robbia, famed for his classic purity and simplicity of style, founded a school of sculptors in glazed terra-cotta. Elaborate tomb-monuments, the construction of which started in the fifteenth century, reached their highest magnificence in the gorgeous sixteenth-century tomb of the founder of the princely family of Visconti in Milan. Michelangelo himself was as celebrated for his sculpture as for his architecture or his painting; the heroic head of his "David" at Florence is a masterpiece of classical dignity. The form of the new sculpture was frankly borrowed from the classical, and its subjects were increasingly inspired by pagan literature. Monuments were erected to illustrious men of ancient Rome, and Greek mythology was once more carved in stone.

The extension of renaissance sculpture beyond Italy was even more rapid than the spread of renaissance architecture. Italian

sculptors were invited to England by Henry VII, and to France by Francis I. In Spain the tomb of Ferdinand and Isabella was chiseled in classical style. In Germany renaissance sculpture was prized before Luther appeared on the scene. Indeed, it was to be found throughout western Europe in the sixteenth century.

Painting underwent an even more significant development than sculpture. Prior to the sixteenth century, most pictures were painted directly upon the plaster walls of churches or dwellings and were called frescoes, although some pictures were executed on wooden panels. In the sixteenth century, however, easel painting—that is, detached pictures on canvas, wood, or other material—became common, and the use of oils was mastered. With these new methods, the art of painting was perfected.

**Painting**

In painting, progress was not so much the result of an imitation of classical models as was the case with sculpture and architecture, for the reason that painting, being one of the most perishable of the arts, had preserved few of its ancient Greek or Roman examples. But the artists who were interested in architecture and sculpture were naturally interested also in painting; and painting, bound by fewer antique traditions, remained more distinctively Christian and reached a higher degree of perfection in the sixteenth century than did any of the allied arts.

In Italy, in the sixteenth century, flourished a galaxy of masters of renaissance painting, of whom four are especially noteworthy—Leonardo da Vinci, Michelangelo, Raphael, and Titian. Two of these acquired as great fame in architecture and in sculpture as in painting; the other two were primarily painters.

Leonardo da Vinci, a Florentine by birth and training, was patronized in turn by the Sforza family of Milan, by the Medici of Florence, and by the French royal house. His most famous paintings, the *Last Supper* and *Mona Lisa* (also called *La Gioconda*), were masterful in art of composition and in science of light and shade and color. Leonardo, in fact, was a scientific painter; he carefully studied human anatomy and the problems of perspective. He was also a remarkable sculptor, as is testified by his admirable horses in relief. As an engineer, he built a canal in northern Italy and constructed fortifications about Milan. He was a musician and a philosopher as well. This many-sided

man liked to toy with mechanical devices. One day when the French King visited Milan, he was met by a large mechanical lion which roared and then reared itself upon its haunches, displaying upon its breast the coat-of-arms of France; it was the work of Leonardo da Vinci. Leonardo influenced his age perhaps more than any other artist. He wrote extensively. He gathered about himself a large group of disciples. And in his last years, which he spent in France as a pensioner of Francis I, he encouraged painting in that country as in Italy.

Michelangelo, a Florentine like Leonardo, was probably the foremost of all these artists because of his triumphs in a vast variety of endeavors. It might almost be said of him that "jack of all trades, he was master of all." He was a painter of the first rank, an incomparable sculptor, a great architect, an eminent engineer, a charming poet, and a profound student of anatomy and physiology. Dividing his time between Florence and Rome, he served the Medici family and a succession of art-loving Popes. With his other qualities of genius he combined austerity in morals, uprightness of character, a lively patriotism for his native city and people, a shrewd business-sense, and a proud independence. To give any idea of his achievements is impossible here. The colossal statue of David in Florence is an example of his sculpture; the basilica of St. Peter, which he practically completed, is his most enduring monument; the ceiling frescoes in the Sistine chapel in the papal palace of the Vatican, telling on a grandiose scale the Biblical story from Creation to the Flood, are marvels of his design and execution; and his grand fresco of the *Last Judgment* is probably the most famous painting in the world.

Younger than Michelangelo and living only about half as long, Raphael, nevertheless, surpassed him in the harmonious beauty of painting. For sheer charm, the "divine" Raphael stands without a peer. Raphael lived the better part of his life at Rome in the service of Popes Julius II and Leo X and spent several years in decorating the Vatican. Although he was, for a time, architect of St. Peter's basilica, and although he displayed some aptitude for sculpture and for the scholarly study of archaeology, it is as the greatest of sixteenth-century painters that he earned his fame.

Titian was the typical representative of the Venetian school of painting, which acquired distinction in luminous coloring. Offi-

cial painter for the city of Venice and patronized both by the Emperor Charles V and by Philip II of Spain, he secured considerable wealth and fame. He was not a man of universal genius like Leonardo da Vinci or Michelangelo; his one great achievement was in oil painting.

From Italy as a center, renaissance painting became the heritage of all western Europe. Italian painters were brought to France by Francis I, and French painters were paid to learn from them and to imitate them. Philip II of Spain subsidized renaissance painting throughout his dominions, including the work of Theotocopuli, a Greek, commonly called "El Greco." El Greco, after sojourning in Italy and coming under the influence of Titian, settled at Toledo in Spain and produced a large number of religious paintings in somber settings and with curious effects of tumult and agony.[1] In Germany appeared two eminent painters, Albrecht Dürer and Hans Holbein (the "Younger").

Dürer, a native of Nuremberg, retained in his art many qualities which were markedly medieval, but he was influenced to some extent by contemporary Italians and received support and encouragement from patrons of the "new learning." The Holy Roman Emperor and Erasmus alike aided him, and he lived in fortune and honor. Though his paintings were strikingly beautiful, he earned an even greater reputation as an engraver and wood carver. His most famous engravings, such as *The Knight and Death* and *St. Jerome in His Study,* set a high standard for following generations.

Holbein, who came of a famous family of painters at Augsburg, made his headquarters for some time at Basel and spent his last years in England as a pensioner of King Henry VIII. He tempered the traditional art of Germany and the Netherlands with the spirit of Italian humanism and was one of the first northern artists to make a great reputation exclusively as a portrait painter. He painted several portraits of Erasmus and rendered unforgettable the features of Melanchthon, Sir Thomas More, and Henry VIII (and several of his wives).

What we call modern music, as well as modern painting, dates from the sixteenth century. But the new music, even more than

[1] "El Greco" founded the so-called "Spanish" school of painting, and though not popular in his own day he acquired new distinction in the latter part of the nineteenth century as an inspirer of "modernistic" art.

the new painting, did not represent so much a revival of ancient Greek and Latin forms as a sudden germinating of seeds which had been planted during the later middle ages. Of course, music, like painting, was affected and stimulated by the quickened art appreciation which attended the classical renaissance, but very little antique music could be "rediscovered," and consequently, just as medieval Christian music had originally been evolved from the music of ancient Greeks, Romans, and Hebrews, so the "classical" music of the sixteenth century was an outgrowth of medieval music.

**Music**

It was in the sixteenth century that several important developments occurred in music. Earlier "modes" were systematized into our "major" and "minor." Counterpoint, the accompanying of one melody with another, and polyphony, the combining of several independent voice parts in simultaneous and harmonizing union, were perfected and became fashionable. Harmony, rhythm, and symmetry were stressed.

At the same time, musical instruments were much improved, and "instrumental" music, as distinct from vocal, began its career. The simple stringed rebec, to whose strains the medieval rustic had danced, was gradually transformed, by the addition of strings and certain changes of design, into the violin.

The medieval clavichord, by increase and strengthening of its strings and by the extension of its keyboard to four octaves, was converted into the spinet (virginal) or harpsichord, precursors of the modern piano. The organ was improved and so were other wind instruments.

With better instruments and new forms and ideas, musical composition flourished. Particularly popular were vocal quartets and quintets, religious hymns and motets, and secular songs (chansons and madrigals). Composers of these types were to be found in the sixteenth century throughout Europe. They predominated perhaps in Italy and the Netherlands, though they were numerous in France and Spain. They were represented in Germany by the authors of the celebrated collection of hymns published under the auspices of Martin Luther, and in England by a notable group of musicians at the royal court, including William Byrd and John Bull.[1]

[1] John Bull was the author of the tune to which were later set the patriotic words of "God save the King" and "My country, 'tis of Thee."

In Italy appeared the greatest musician of the century, Palestrina, papal organist and choir-master, who provided the purest and most perfect models of modern ecclesiastical music. In Italy, simultaneously, developed beautiful choral renditions of religious scenes and stories, called "oratorios" from the fact that they were first given under the auspices of the monastic community of the Oratory, founded by St. Philip Neri in 1575. Italy, too, soon became the center of the best instrumental music. Giovanni Gabrieli, organist at St. Mark's cathedral at Venice, was one of the founders of modern orchestration, and, by combining different voices with a variety of instruments, pointed the way to the opera. Already, in 1501, the first shop for the printing of music had been established at Venice.

### 4. FLOWERING OF NATIONAL LITERATURE

During the middle ages, while the vernacular national languages of Europe were taking form, some notable literature had been written in Italian, Provençal, Castilian, Portuguese, German, English, and Slavic. But progress in that direction appeared to be halted in the fifteenth century by the new enthusiasm for the literature of ancient Greece and Rome. A rapidly increasing number of scholars and literary men neglected their own national language and devoted themselves almost exclusively to composition of classical Latin and Greek. Petrarch wrote fine sonnets in Italian, but he was ashamed of them; his Latin letters were the writings on which he prided himself and for which he was chiefly esteemed by contemporary scholars. Petrarch's immediate successors spent their lives searching for ancient manuscripts, editing the classics, or inditing Latin epistles, orations, and epics in imitation of Horace, Cicero, or Virgil. They thought that classical Latin and Greek were the only respectable vehicles for literary expression and they consequently despised the vernaculars as uncouth and vulgar. At the beginning of the sixteenth century Erasmus was writing his major works in one or the other of the classical languages.

This situation could hardly endure. The sixteenth century was too full of national rivalries, far-off discoveries, capitalistic activities, and social and religious unrest. There were too many commoners, as well as upper-class persons, who wished to tell or to be told something about these things and yet who knew the classics

imperfectly or not at all. The sixteenth century witnessed a rapidly widening demand for national literature in the vernacular languages, and at a time when financial profits were eagerly sought from whatever source, the supply soon corresponded with the demand.

In the sixteenth century, the newly invented printing press was of incalculable service in meeting the increased demand for national literature as well as in supplying numerous modern copies of the ancient classics. Moreover, the contemporary study of classical grammar aroused in some persons a curiosity about the construction of vernacular language, and grammars and dictionaries began to be published in profusion. Dictionaries appeared, in the sixteenth century, for Netherlandish, Italian, and German, and, just after the close of the century, for French, Spanish, and English.

In 1553 a German humanist and scientist, Konrad von Gesner, published in Latin an account of more than a hundred spoken languages, with examples of the Lord's Prayer in twenty-two tongues; it was the first step toward comparative philology. Dictionaries and grammars, together with the printing press, helped to establish norms of literary usage for the several vernacular languages and to give truly national vogue to them.

The content of sixteenth-century national literatures was very diversified. It comprised, for the edification of the common people, many religious treatises, devotional works, prayer-books, and biblical translations. Some of these, such as Martin Luther's German translation of the Bible, Cranmer's *Book of Common Prayer* for the Church of England, the French version of Calvin's *Institutes of the Christian Religion,* and the Spanish autobiography of St. Teresa, not only met immediate needs but also constituted enduring monuments in the national literatures of Germany, England, France, and Spain. Then, too, the general religious upheaval of the sixteenth century—the rise of Protestantism and the reformation of the Catholic Church—induced the publication of a vast amount of controversial literature in the vernaculars, in order to influence or inflame the common people for or against the medieval church and its practices. Although most of this writing was without high merit and quite ephemeral, it served to widen the reading public and to augment the demand for other works in the popular tongues.

**Variety of National Literature**

A good deal of national literature was produced during the century in the fields of politics, history, and travel, much of which was intensely patriotic, and some of which was great literature. To this category belonged, for instance, in Italian, the *Prince* and the *Florentine History* by Machiavelli, the *History of Italy* by Guicciardini, and the *Lives of Italian Artists* by Vasari; in English, the *Utopia* by Sir Thomas More,[1] and the *Principall Navigations, Voiages, and Discoveries of the English Nation* by Richard Hakluyt; in Spanish, the *History of the Indies* by Bartolomé de las Casas, and the *History of Spain* by Mariana; and in French, the masterful exposition of political philosophy by Jean Bodin.

Certain vernacular writings of the sixteenth century were conceived in the spirit of the pagan renaissance and were born of classical humanism. Some of them were masterpieces of wit and sarcasm or of unblushing pride in exploits of virility and venery. Notable among such authors were two Frenchmen: the erudite, good-humored, clever Rabelais, whose *Gargantua and Pantagruel* was a gigantic burlesque of all manner of things, political, social, and religious; and the self-centered, gently mocking Montaigne, whose *Essays* were picturesque sermons on the text that nothing counts but one's self. There was also the brilliant Spaniard, Cervantes, whose *Don Quixote* was a rollicking satire on medieval chivalry and on faith in race and noble blood. As a mild example of the pornography with which the century teemed in imitation of Boccaccio and Catullus, mention may be made of the racy, spicy autobiography of the egotistical Italian goldsmith, Benvenuto Cellini. Here, amid pages of his passions and amours, we read of the devout complacency with which Cellini could contemplate a satisfactorily achieved homicide, and of the legion of devils which he and a conjuror evoked in the Colosseum after one of his mistresses had been spirited away from him by her mother.

Perhaps the most famous class of literary masterpieces in the sixteenth century was that of epics and dramas. Works of this class showed clearly the influence of classicism and humanism. Their forms and plots were often borrowed from the ancients; their characters frequently bore classical names; and their scenes were sometimes laid in classical surroundings. If they did not

[1] Reference is here made, of course, to the English translation, which appeared in 1551. More's *Utopia*, as first published in 1516, was in Latin.

derive from the ancient Greeks and Romans, they were apt to draw on contemporary Italy, the original seat and still the home of humanism and renaissance art. Yet in almost every instance they evinced, in large degree, a lively national patriotism.

In Italy itself, the *Orlando Furioso* of Ariosto represented a fusion of chivalrous romance with the style and models of classicism; and the *Jerusalem Delivered* of Tasso was a bulky epic in which the manner of the pagan Virgil was adapted to a Christian crusading theme. In Portugal, the *Lusiad* of Camoëns was a patriotic epic dealing with Vasco da Gama's sensational voyage to India and, as in Virgil's *Æneid,* bringing in the pagan gods as directors of the voyage. In Spain, the innumerable dramas of Lope de Vega dealt with almost every national and patriotic subject in the history of the country and with a wide range of manners and customs of his own day. In England, the *Faërie Queene* of Edmund Spenser, utilizing the model of Ariosto, the theme of Tasso, and fancied ideals of Aristotle, was a pageant of colorful poetry, not the least part of whose content was the glorification of the national monarch. The plays of William Shakespeare, at once individualist and nationalist, medieval and modern, Italian and classical and, above all, English, constituted the most perfect summary of the life and thought of the sixteenth century, the dawn of our modern age.

### 5. SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS

Comparable in modern significance with the discovery of new sea routes and distant continents and with the rediscovery of far-off times and classical civilization was the contemporaneous exploration of the heavens and the whole universe of matter. Indeed, sixteenth-century Europe was distinguished for its scientists as well as for its artists and humanists. Its scientists revolutionized astronomy and made important contributions to mathematics, physics, medicine, biology, and the social studies.

**Astronomy**

During the middle ages, astronomers (and astrologers) had clung to the theory of a Greek philosopher of the second century A.D., named Ptolemy, that the Earth is the fixed and appointed center of the universe, and that the Sun and the Moon and all the planets and all the stars are turned around the Earth with amazing velocity every twenty-four hours. This so-called "Ptolemaic system" of astronomy seemed to be

in harmony with the cosmology of the Bible and to confirm everyday popular observations that the heavenly bodies rise and set while the Earth remains stationary. For centuries, prior to the sixteenth, the Ptolemaic theory had been accepted by all Christendom as fundamental and sacred.

Nevertheless, Ptolemy's was not the only "system" which had been propounded by ancient Greek astronomers. Against the idea that the Earth is the center of the universe (the geocentric theory), the Pythagoreans had urged the heliocentric theory, that the Sun is the center. With the rediscovery of classical civilization and the revival of Greek studies in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the "system" of the Pythagoreans was brought out of obscurity and ably championed. Its foremost advocate, the true founder of modern astronomy, was Copernicus.

**Copernicus**

Copernicus was a Polish priest, who divided his time between ecclesiastical labor and private research in the classics, mathematics, and astronomy. It was during a ten-year sojourn in Italy at the beginning of the sixteenth century, while studying canon law and medicine, and familiarizing himself, through humanistic teachers, with ancient Greek astronomers, that he began to question the Ptolemaic system and to seek a mathematically sounder substitute. For many years he reflected and computed and made such observations of the heavens as his poor eyesight and few instruments permitted. In the year of his death (1543) the results were published in Latin to the learned world. His book—*On the Revolutions of the Celestial Bodies*—was dedicated to Pope Paul III and fortified with elaborate mathematical calculations. It undertook to demonstrate the truth of the hypothesis that the Earth is not the center of the universe but simply one of a number of planets which revolve around the Sun. In the "Copernican system," the Earth was assigned a much less important place than in the "Ptolemaic system," and man's supreme position among created things appeared to be threatened at the very time when European man was puffed up with the "new learning," the "New World," and the "new wealth." No wonder that the book of Copernicus excited lively curiosity and livelier opposition.

For purposes of combating, as well as confirming, the revolutionary hypothesis of Copernicus, European astronomers in the second half of the sixteenth century diligently applied them-

selves to observation and to the improvement of physical instruments and mathematical computations which might be helpful to observation. One of the most interesting of these new scientific astronomers was Tycho Brahe, a Dane, who, with the encouragement and financial assistance of his national monarch, King Frederick II, established on an island in the Baltic, midway between Denmark and Sweden, a remarkable laboratory—he called it Uraniborg, or "Castle of the Heavens"—comprising several observatories, a library, shops for making instruments, a paper mill, a printing press, and living quarters for the numerous staff and workmen. Here, for twenty-one years, Tycho systematically collected materials for the testing of astronomical theories. He was conservative and vain. He hoped to effect a compromise between Ptolemaic and Copernican systems, whereby the Earth might retain an honored central position in the heavens. His arrogance eventually cost him the patronage of the Danish King, and the last year of his life he spent at Prague in the employ of the Holy Roman Emperor.

So effective were the astronomical researches of the sixteenth century that just after its close two scientists were enabled to give decisive support to the Copernican hypothesis and to make it the cornerstone of modern astronomy. One was Kepler, a German; the other was Galileo, an Italian.

Kepler, after teaching astronomy in a German university and becoming associated at Prague with Tycho Brahe, fell heir to Tycho's instruments and records and succeeded him as official astronomer to the Holy Roman Emperor. Kepler was perhaps not so good an observer as Tycho, but he was a better mathematician and possessed superior philosophic insight. He entertained, it is true, many fantastic theories concerning "the harmony of the spheres," and he was willing, with tongue in his cheek, to cater to the prejudices and superstitions of the day by casting horoscopes for the Emperor and other eminent gentlemen. Yet by applying his mathematical genius to Tycho's and his own observations, he was able to confirm the general credibility of the Copernican system and to establish several detailed conclusions, such as those regarding the form and magnitude of the planetary orbits. Kepler made it clear that the Earth and the other planets revolve about the Sun in elliptical rather than circular paths.

Galileo was a distinguished scientist in several fields, in mathematics, mechanics, and optics, as well as in astronomy; he was also a learned classical scholar, a good musician, and a gifted writer. His principal contribution to astronomy was his painstaking demonstration and brilliant defense of the Copernican hypothesis. His lectures at the university of Padua, where he taught from 1592 to 1610, were so largely attended that a hall seating two thousand had to be provided. In 1609 he perfected a telescope, which, although hardly more powerful than a present-day opera glass, showed unmistakably that the Sun was turning on its axis, that Jupiter was attended by revolving moons, and that, by analogy, the essential truth of the Copernican system was proved. Unfortunately for Galileo, his enthusiastic desire to convert the church immediately to the new astronomy got him into trouble with the ecclesiastical court of the Inquisition. This court in 1616 characterized the proposition that the Sun is the center of the universe as "absurd in philosophy, and formally heretical, because expressly contrary to Holy Scripture," and the proposition that the Earth rotates every day on its axis as "open to the same censure in philosophy, and at least erroneous as to faith"; and in 1632 Galileo was tried by the court for espousing the condemned propositions and found guilty. Galileo, during the last years of his life, was kept under close ecclesiastical surveillance, but had he lived another hundred years he would have rejoiced that all learned men—Popes included—accepted the astronomical revolution and were "Copernicans." [1]

**Galileo**

It is noteworthy that the increasing astronomical knowledge of the sixteenth century made it possible for Pope Gregory XIII in 1582 to reform the so-called Julian calendar, which had been used by Christendom since ancient Roman times. In order to maintain the exact solar year, Gregory decreed that the calendar should be moved back by ten days and that the extra leap-year day should be omitted from all centenary years (such as 1700) except those which are

**Gregorian Calendar**

[1] The condemnation of the Copernican system by the court of the Inquisition was never confirmed by the Pope and was virtually repealed in 1757 under Pope Benedict XIV. It should be borne in mind that in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries many clergymen, Protestant as well as Catholic, were hostile to the Copernican system and many intellectual laymen, including Bodin, Montaigne, Shakespeare, Francis Bacon, Pascal, and Milton, assailed or disbelieved it.

multiples of 400. This reformed, or "Gregorian," calendar was at once adopted by Catholic countries and subsequently by Protestant and other nations. England, for example, accepted it in 1751, and Russia in 1922.

The "new astronomy" of the sixteenth century was inspired by the rediscovery of classical civilization. Copernicus was to astronomy what Columbus was to geography, and Copernicus was peculiarly indebted to the ancient Greeks. On other scientific advances of the time, however, the influence of classicism and humanism was not so marked. Indeed, the intellectual quickening of Europe in the sixteenth century was less a novel product of classical studies than a continuous and natural development and extension of medieval science. This received very practical stimulus from contemporary happenings in geography, warfare, and finance.

This was especially true of the almost revolutionary progress of mathematics. Mathematicians of the middle ages had inherited the arithmetic and geometry of ancient Greeks and Romans and had learned from the Moslems the elements of algebra and the use of Arabic numerals. On such knowledge, mathematicians of the sixteenth century built magnificently, but they built not with old blocks quarried out of antiquity but with new materials piled up by their own era. To prove the truth or falsity of the current Copernican hypothesis, to satisfy the current demand for calendar-reform, to compute the range of fire of the new artillery, to secure the greatest effectiveness and at the same time the greatest economy of the new national fortifications and warships, and to simplify and expedite the accounts of the new bankers, merchants, and capitalists, were ends which mathematics could serve in the sixteenth century much more naturally than at any earlier time. And toward these ends, mathematicians labored quite realistically, and with amazing success, from the date of the invention of printing in the fifteenth century to the date of the invention of logarithms early in the seventeenth century.

**Mathematics**

In Italy, Tartaglia and Cardan vied with each other in solving cubic equations. Tartaglia, who suffered throughout life from mutilation which he received as a boy at the hands of French military invaders, wrote scientific treatises on the mathematics of gunnery and fortification, the latter of which he dedicated to

Henry VIII of England. Cardan, a physician by vocation and something of a rogue by nature, helped the Pope and the King of Denmark with practical mathematical advice, cast horoscopes for a Scottish archbishop and an English monarch, and reckoned the calculus of possibilities as a support to his own propensity for gambling.

In the Netherlands, Stevinus, at first a merchant's clerk and later a traveling commercial agent and advisor to the Prince of Orange, wrote a classic on decimal fractions, advocated a decimal system of coinage, weights, and measures, and prepared useful studies of military science. His practical advice on ways and means of keeping detailed impersonal accounts had considerable effect on the bookkeeping of the national governments of the Netherlands and France.

Simultaneously, in various European countries, mathematicians were working out a compact and adequate symbolism for arithmetical and algebraic calculations, including such signs as $+$, $\div$, $\times$, $-$, $=$, $( )$, and $\surd$, and the modern devices for indicating fractions and exponents. In geometry, they were carrying the computation of $\pi$ to many decimals. They were also foreshadowing the integral calculus and reckoning trigonometric tables. In Scotland, John Napier invented logarithms and was the first to use the decimal point.

Similar utilitarian aims actuated remarkable sixteenth-century progress in mechanics and physics. An Italian, Porta, devised a "magic lantern" and interspersed some acute reflections with a good deal of nonsense in his encyclopedic physical work, *On the Miracles of Nature and Natural Magic*. A Netherlander, Jansen, made probably the first compound microscope in 1590, and telescopes appeared shortly afterwards in Italy, the Netherlands, and England.[1] An Englishman, William Gilbert, experimented with magnetic bodies and noticed and named certain phenomena as "electric."[2] But the foremost physicist of the age was the famous Italian astronomer, Galileo.

**Physics**

[1] Galileo has often been credited with the invention of the telescope. He certainly was the first to make practical use of it. But it appears to have been invented in the Netherlands about the year 1600, and, independently, a little earlier, by Leonard Digges in England. Its principle was known to Roger Bacon in the thirteenth century, and its theory was explained by Kepler in 1611.

[2] Gilbert's volume on magnetism was published in 1600. The word "electricity" first appeared in Sir Thomas Browne's *Pseudodoxia*, published in 1646.

Galileo invented the air thermometer and the hydrostatic balance and constructed an astronomical clock. He studied the phenomena of motion and sound. He recognized that sound is an undulation in the air and that its tone is due to the different lengths of the several waves. He demonstrated the falsity of the Aristotelian notion that heavy bodies fall with velocities proportional to their weights. In his celebrated *Discourses and Mathematical Demonstrations concerning Two New Sciences* he summed up his achievements and speculations and laid firm foundations for the modern development of mechanics, "the science dealing with the resistance which solid bodies offer to fracture," and dynamics, "the science treating of motion."

**Metallurgy**

The impetus which the contemporary rise of capitalism gave to practical, large-scale mining served likewise to give rise to the science of metallurgy. Here the pioneer was a German known best by his latinized name of Agricola. As a youthful prodigy, he threw himself into pursuit of the "new learning" and at the age of twenty was teaching Greek and writing on philology. But as he grew older, he found less satisfaction in ancient classics than in modern medicine, physics, and chemistry; and, after taking a medical degree in Italy, he settled in mining communities, first in Bavaria and subsequently in Bohemia. He earned his money by the practice of medicine and spent it on researches in metallurgy. In his epochal *Twelve Books on Metals* he outlined and systematized his observations, indicated methods of estimating the amount of metal in particular kinds of ore, and first described the production of steel by the puddling process.

**Medicine**

In medicine, there was relatively less progress during the sixteenth century, probably in part because there had been relatively greater progress during the middle ages, and probably in part because the "new learning" appealed particularly to physicians and tended to make them rely too much on what ancient Greek doctors, especially Hippocrates and Galen, had said. The revived study of Galen led to some interesting observations and developments. Two Italian professors, Eustachio and Falloppio, added certain details to anatomical knowledge and bequeathed their names to modern physiology. A Spaniard, Servetus, noted and described the pulmonary circulation of the blood. An Italian, Frascatoro, advanced the theory, then incapable of demonstration without the microscope and long afterwards of

little effect, that diseases are caused by living organisms endowed with the power of propagating themselves. Another Italian, Santorio, shortly after the close of the sixteenth century adapted Galileo's thermometer to measuring temperature of the body.

Special fame attaches to certain medical men of the sixteenth century who reacted against contemporary classicism and repudiated the "authority" of ancient Greek physicians. One curious example of this kind was Theophrastus Bombast von Hohenheim, who wrote under the name of Paracelsus ("greater than Celsus"), and who wrote so pompously that his middle name "Bombast" has found its way into all modern languages as a synonym for pomposity in expression. Paracelsus was a Swiss German, the son of a poor country physician and of a hospital-superintendent. He had just enough university education to be convinced that full-fledged doctors leaned too heavily on Galen and were inferior to himself; and during an extended sojourn in the Tyrol mines owned by the Fugger family, he learned to study first-hand the diseases which attacked the miners and to gather a mass of useful and miscellaneous information. He was literally bombastic in his attacks on Galen; he was quarrelsome, superstitious, and much given to visionary philosophy; and he was denounced by the leading practitioners of the age as a "quack." But he constantly held up the ideal of medicine as an experimental science, and he emphasized the close relationship between medicine and chemistry. He believed that the operations in the body are of a chemical character and that when disordered they are to be put right by counter operations of the same kind. He had an idea of the medicinal utility of metals and mineral springs.

Another and more esteemed medical innovator was Vesalius, a Netherlander, who studied medicine at the universities of Louvain, Paris, and Padua. Appointed professor at Padua, he began his teaching as a disciple of Galen, but when he came to practice dissection he noted errors in Galen's writings and decided that henceforth he would rely less upon them than upon his own observations. He denounced the time-honored custom of leaving surgery to barbers [1] and emphasized the need for the thorough

[1] Yet barber-surgeons of the sixteenth century made some significant contributions of their own to modern surgical art. For example, Ambroise Paré, gaining much practical experience from attending soldiers in the French army, invented ingenious artificial limbs and improved the method of treating gunshot wounds.

study of anatomy as the basis for the scientific training of both surgeons and physicians. His own treatise on anatomy, published in the same year as Copernicus's work on astronomy, was a significant monument in the history of medical science. It treated, in seven books, of the skeleton, cartilage and muscles, veins and arteries, digestive and reproductive systems, lungs, brain and head. Vesalius was appointed court physician to the Emperor Charles V and died on a pilgrimage to the Holy Land.

Toward the close of the sixteenth century appeared an English physician, William Harvey, who was to make a prime contribution to medical science. Harvey was educated in England at the university of Cambridge, and in Italy, under the guidance of a disciple of Falloppio, at the university of Padua, whence he took his medical degree in 1602. Returning to England, he became a professor in the London College of Physicians and Surgeons and attending physician in a London hospital. He was particularly interested in studies of the heart and the blood, and in 1628 he made known to the learned world his discovery of the circulation of the blood from the heart to the arteries and thence to the veins and back to the heart.[1]

**Chemistry**

Contemporary with Harvey was a physician of the Netherlands, J. B. van Helmont, who made some important contributions to the science of chemistry. He was the first to understand that there are gases distinct in kind from atmospheric air. He invented the word "gas." He distinguished carbon dioxide, which he called "gas sylvestre." He dimly recognized the principle of the indestructibility of matter. Following critically in the footsteps of Paracelsus, he held that undue acidity may be corrected by alkalies, and *vice versa*.

**Biology**

Several physicians of the sixteenth century became interested in comparative anatomy and laid the foundations for the modern sciences of botany and zoology. The greatest was a Swiss German, Konrad von Gesner, whose name has already been noted in connection with the beginnings of comparative philology. Gesner obtained a medical degree from a French university and spent most of his life in Switzerland, practicing his profession but lecturing on physics and devoting himself chiefly to the observation and classification of local flora and fauna. His

[1] Harvey did not know of the capillary channels by which the blood passes from the arteries to the veins. This gap in his information was supplied in 1661 by an Italian physician, Malpighi. See below, p. 374.

*Catalogue of Plants* was a valuable contribution to scientific botany, and the four volumes of his *History of Animals* were the starting-point for modern progress in zoology.

It was not alone in the natural sciences that the sixteenth century was important. Scientific development was manifest likewise in those intellectual pursuits which nowadays we term the "social sciences." "Scientific" history began, as we have already pointed out, with the collecting, criticizing, and editing of manuscripts and source-materials, on which the classical revival put a premium. "Scientific" politics was exemplified by such incisive writings as those of Machiavelli and Bodin. "Scientific" philology was foreshadowed by Konrad von Gesner. At the very end of the century there was a quickening interest in the theory of national wealth, a faint dawn of "scientific" economics.

**"Social" Science**

Of all the social sciences, it was natural, in view of the century's overwhelming interest in overseas exploration and commerce, that geography should receive chief attention and make the greatest strides. And of numerous "scientific" geographers of the sixteenth century, undoubtedly the foremost was Gerhard Kremer, a Netherlander and best known by his Latin name of Mercator. Mercator studied at the university of Louvain and founded there a celebrated geographical laboratory and drafting establishment. He was patronized successively by the Emperor Charles V and various German princes, for whose military campaigns he prepared maps and sketches. But his main contributions to geographical science were the freeing of Europeans from the preconceptions of ancient Greek and Roman geographers, especially from Ptolemy; the manufacture of instruments and detailed maps of fine quality; and the invention of the so-called "Mercator's projection," the representation of the globe, or parts of it, on rectangular paper by drawing the parallels and meridians at right angles.

**Geography**

The whole intellectual quickening of the sixteenth century involved much intellectual ferment, and in the midst of this ferment, complicated as it was by the simultaneous religious upheaval in Europe, emerged new philosophies whose exponents put special emphasis on "modern" science. One preacher of peculiarly "modern" philosophy was Giordano Bruno, an intemperate, provocative Italian. Beginning his stormy career as a Dominican monk but speedily

**"Modern" Philosophy: Bruno**

falling under the spell of whatever seemed novel and revolutionary in current hypothesis and criticism, Bruno fled from Rome and monastic life and sought refuge in foreign countries and intellectual radicalism. He espoused the Copernican astronomy with ardor. He assailed any kind of anthropomorphic religion. He put the Hebrew scriptures on a level with pagan myths. He jeered at miracles as nothing but magical tricks. On the other hand, he conceived of nature as embodying and expressing the divine, and the whole universe as controlled by immutable laws which are divine because they are natural.

Such an attempt to combine "modern science" with a new religion of pantheism could hardly be popular in the sixteenth century, and Bruno led a fugitive and harassed existence. For a brief time he enjoyed the favor of the French King and lectured on astronomy at Toulouse and on philosophy at Paris, and through the good offices of the French ambassador in London he was enabled to spend two years in England. But he was always restless, and both ardent Protestants and zealous Catholics made him more so. He was repelled from Geneva by the Calvinists, and the Lutherans were inhospitable to him at Wittenberg. Venturing to return to Italy, he was arrested by the Catholic Inquisition, imprisoned for seven years, and finally burned at the stake in Rome.

Another less revolutionary effort to philosophize about natural science was made by a distinguished Englishman, Francis Bacon,

**Francis Bacon**

son of a country gentleman, student at the university of Cambridge, lawyer, and lord chancellor of the realm under King James I. While studying at the university, he developed an absorbing interest in the physical sciences and learned to despise the Aristotelian philosophy. This, in his opinion, was serviceable only for debate, and a substitute must be found which would forward natural science and real knowledge. Thenceforth, through a busy, ambitious life of self-seeking for fame, wealth, and public office, Bacon found time to produce a series of philosophic works, including the *Essays,* the *Advancement of Learning,* the *Novum Organum,* and the *New Atlantis,* the last-named a description of an ideal commonwealth in which the principles of the "new philosophy" are carried out by political machinery and under state guidance. The "new philosophy," according to Bacon, must be inductive, experimental, and utilitarian. It must be based on natural science, which, as he said in the

*Novum Organum,* will "extend more widely the limits of the power and greatness of man."

It must not be supposed that the scientific development of the sixteenth century was as revolutionary as Bacon and Bruno imagined or that it controlled all the thoughts and actions of its devotees, to say nothing of the thoughts and actions of the masses. A Bruno and a Bacon, and most of the humanistically inclined scientists of the sixteenth century, were too scornful of the middle ages to do justice to the slow gradual evolution of man's knowledge of the material universe which had been going on pretty continuously ever since the ancient days of Greece, and they jumped to conclusions—typically "modern" conclusions—that their own ideas had never previously been entertained, that their own age was far in advance of all earlier ages, and that what is latest is truest and best.

**Science and Superstition**

At the same time many of these new scientists were almost if not quite as "superstitious" as any of their predecessors, or, at any rate, they were quite as willing to exploit popular superstitions for their own financial profit. Tycho Brahe was something of a charlatan. Kepler made money by practicing magic and casting horoscopes. Most of the others were credulous as well as inquisitive.

On the fringe of scientific development there continued to flourish in the sixteenth century, among kings and princes and commoners, the traditional arts of astrology and alchemy. It was still popularly believed that the baser metals could be magically transmuted into gold and that the course of human events could be directed by precious stones, and many a sixteenth-century explorer risked life and limb in search of Eldorado and the fountain of perpetual youth.[1] It was still widely held that the stars exert direct and arbitrary influence upon human character and events and that no one should engage in an important undertaking without consulting a star-gazer.[2] Charles V and Francis I, rivals in

[1] A French potter and geologist, Bernard Palissy, denied the possibility of the transmutation of the metals in a work which he published in 1580, and the English dramatist Ben Jonson poked fun at alchemists in a play first acted in 1610.

[2] Pope Sixtus V in 1586 condemned the casting of horoscopes and directed the court of the Inquisition to proceed against anyone who should practice incantations or divinations or foretell the future. A French law of 1628 forbade the insertion in almanacs of all predictions except those relating to the weather, the phases of the moon, and eclipses. For some time, these measures were honored more in the breach than in the observance.

war, bid against each other for the services of the most eminent astrologers. Henry VIII, Queen Elizabeth, the Kings of Denmark and Spain, Catherine de' Medici, and wealthy merchants and bold sea-captains seemed never to tire of reading horoscopes.

Besides, it was during the second half of the sixteenth century and the first half of the seventeenth, an era of scientific development, that witchcraft flourished as never before in the world's history and the hunt for witches became endemic in Europe and the New World. Even such an enlightened lawyer and philosopher as Jean Bodin argued at length for the reality of witchcraft and for the burning of witches.

After making full allowance, however, for the gullibility of human beings in the sixteenth century and throughout all our modern times, it appears to be incontestable that science has latterly been both more objective and more practical than in antiquity or in the middle ages. To this outcome the scientific development of the sixteenth century contributed, and it deserves, therefore, an honorable place among the other factors which prompted the intellectual quickening of Europe—the invention of printing, the appreciation of classical civilization, the development of renaissance art and national literatures.



# CHAPTER IV

## RELIGIOUS UPHEAVAL

### I. CHRISTIANITY AT THE BEGINNING OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY



HEN printing was invented, America discovered, and Copernicus born, the vast mass of Europeans were Christians, and those who lived in central and western Europe were members of the Catholic Church.[1] It was then generally held, just as it had been held in earlier centuries, that a common religious faith and a common moral code were essential to society.

**Catholic Church**

For centuries prior to the sixteenth, the Catholic Church had occupied a position in most European countries which no religious organization holds to-day. (1) Every child of Christian parents was born into the Church almost as literally as he is now born into a state; every professed Christian was expected to conform, at least outwardly, to the doctrine and observances of the Church. (2) The Church was official and public, not private and purely voluntary.—(3) Each state undertook to enforce obedience on the part of its subjects to the Church; a person attacking the authority of the Church was liable to punishment by the state.

Catholic Christianity embraced a definite faith in Jesus Christ as the Man-God, an acceptance of certain standards of personal and social behavior which had been derived from the teach-

[1] Those who lived in Russia and the majority of the inhabitants of Greece and the Balkan peninsula were members of the Orthodox Church, which, though resembling the Catholic Church in most respects, rejected the headship of the Pope. Latterly, with the invasions and conquests of the Ottoman Turks, Moslems had become an influential minority in southeastern Europe, and a Moslem minority still persisted in southwestern Europe, that is, in Spain and Portugal. In these regions, and elsewhere in Europe, especially in Poland and Germany, dwelt sizable groups of Jews.

of Jesus, and a recognition of the divine origin and character of the Catholic Church. The Church, it was believed, had been founded by Jesus Christ in order to teach and interpret, till the end of time, His religion and morals. By means of the Church, man would know best how to order his life in this world and how to prepare his soul for happiness in the world to come.

Hence the Church was conceived of as a vast human society, resting on divine foundation and sanction, and conducting a mission greater and more lofty than that of any other society. It was a "perfect" society, whose members and officers, for its own purposes, were deemed independent of any political power. The members of the Church were the sum-total of all persons who had been baptized—almost the whole population of western and central Europe—and its officers constituted a universally governing hierarchy.

**Organization of Church**

At the head of the hierarchy was the bishop of Rome, styled the Pope or Sovereign Pontiff or Vicar of Christ, who for centuries had been regarded as the successor of St. Peter, the prince of the apostles. The bishop of Rome was elected for life by a group of clergymen, called cardinals, who originally had been in direct charge of certain churches in the city of Rome but who latterly were selected by the Pope from various countries because they were distinguished churchmen. Some of the cardinals, especially Italian cardinals, took up their residence at Rome and, in conjunction with numerous clerks, lawyers, and other officials, comprised the *curia,* or papal court, which assisted the Pope in the conduct of church business.

For the local administration of church affairs, the Catholic world was divided into several territorial subdivisions. (1) The *provinces* were under archbishops or metropolitans, who had their sees[1] in the most important cities. (2) The *diocese,* the most essential unit of local administration, was a subdivision of the province, commonly a town, with a certain amount of surroundng country, under the immediate supervision of a bishop.[2] (3)

[1] "See," so-called from the Latin *sedes,* refers to the seat or chair of office. Similarly our word "cathedral" is derived from the Latin *cathedra,* the official chair which the bishop occupies in his own church.

[2] The occupant of the oldest diocese or province in a given country usually bore the honorary title of "primate," and his see was called the "primatial see" of that country. Thus, Canterbury was the primatial see of England; Arles, of France; Armagh, of Ireland; Toledo, of Spain, etc.

Smaller divisions, particularly *parishes,* were to be found in every diocese, embracing a village or a section of a town, and each parish had its church building and its priest. Thus the Catholic Church possessed a staff of officials from Pope and cardinals down through archbishops and bishops to the parish priests and their assistants, the curates and deacons. This hierarchy, because it labored in the world (*sæcula*), was called the "secular clergy."

Another variety of clergy—the "regulars"—supplemented the work of the seculars. The regulars were monks,[1] that is, Christians who lived by a special rule (*regula*), renounced the world, took vows of chastity, poverty, and obedience, and strove to imitate the life of Christ as literally as possible. The regular clergy were organized under their own abbots or generals, being usually exempt from secular jurisdiction, except the Pope's. They were the principal missionaries of the Church, and most charitable and educational institutions were in their hands.

Bishops, priests, and deacons constituted, in Catholic belief, the divinely established clergy of the Church. The legislative authority in the Church belonged to Pope and to General Council, neither of which, however, might set aside a law of God, as affirmed in the gospels, or establish a doctrine at variance with the tradition of the early Christian fathers. A General Council was an assembly of bishops of the Catholic world; and an effort had been made in the first half of the fifteenth century to render such councils superior to the Pope and a regular source of supreme legislation for the Church. By the year 1500, however, the so-called "conciliar movement" had evaporated, and the peoples of western and central Europe generally recognized that the government of the Church was essentially papal and monarchical.

So far we have concerned ourselves with the organization of the Catholic Church—its membership, its officers, the clergy, secular and regular, all culminating in the Pope, the bishop of Rome. But why did this great institution exist? Why had it long been venerated and well served? The purpose of the Church, according to its own teaching, was to follow the instructions of its divine founder, Jesus Christ, in saving souls.

**Purpose and Theology**

This salvation of souls involved a theology and a sacramental

[1] The word "monk" is applied, of course, only to men; women who followed similar rules are commonly styled nuns. All are sometimes referred to as "religious."

system. Theology was the study of God. It sought to explain how and why man was created, what were his actual and desirable relations with God, what would be the fate of man in a future life. The most famous theologians of the Catholic Church had studied the teachings of Christ, the Bible, the early Christian fathers, the decrees of Popes and Councils, and had derived from them explanations of Christian theology—the faith and morals of the Catholic Church.

A central vital part of Catholic theology was the sacramental system. The sacraments were defined as "outward signs instituted by Christ to give grace." The number generally accepted was seven: baptism, confirmation, holy eucharist, penance, extreme unction, holy orders, and matrimony. By means of the sacraments the Church accompanied its members through life. (1) Baptism cleansed the child from original sin and from all previous actual sins, and made him a Christian, a child of God, and an heir of heaven. The priest was the ordinary minister of baptism, but in case of necessity any Christian who had the use of reason might baptize. (2) Confirmation gave young persons the Holy Ghost to render them strong and perfect Christians and soldiers of Jesus Christ. (3) Penance forgave sins committed after baptism. To receive it worthily, the penitent must (a) examine his conscience, (b) have sorrow for his sins, (c) make a firm resolution never more to offend God, (d) confess his mortal sins orally to a priest, (e) receive absolution from the priest, and (f) accept the particular penance—visitation of churches, saying of certain prayers, or almsgiving—which the priest might enjoin. These particular penances were termed "good works."

**Sacraments**

(4) The holy eucharist was the sacrament of the Lord's Supper, the consecration of bread and wine by priest or bishop, its miraculous transformation (transubstantiation) at his word into the very Body and Blood of Christ, and its reception by the faithful. It was around the eucharist that the elaborate ritual and ceremonies of the Mass had developed, that fine vestments and candles and incense were used, and that magnificent cathedrals were erected. (5) Extreme unction was the anointing of the Christian who was in immediate danger of death, in order to give health and strength to the soul and sometimes to the body. (6) Holy orders—the special imposition of hands on the part of a bishop—

ordained priests, bishops, and other ministers of the Church and conferred upon them the power and grace to perform their sacred duties. (7) Matrimony was the sacrament, held to be indissoluble by human power, by which man and woman were united in lawful Christian marriage.

For the administration of the sacramental system, the priesthood was indispensable. It was the priest that absolved penitents from their sins, wrought the great daily miracle of transubstantiation, and offered to God the holy sacrifice of the Mass.

Neither the theology nor the organization of the Catholic Church, as they existed in the year 1500, had been precisely the same in detail throughout the whole Christian era. While the Church insisted that Christ was the original source of all faith and practice, it recognized that external changes and adaptations of institutions to varying conditions had taken place. Moreover, the eminence to which the Catholic Church had attained by the year 1500 had not been won easily nor was it at that time readily maintained. Throughout Christian history there had been repeated objections to new definitions of dogma, and there had likewise been a good deal of opposition to the temporal claims of the Church and much friction between clergy and lay rulers. In fact, it had often transpired that kings who rivaled one another in recognizing the spiritual and religious headship of the Pope and in prosecuting heretics who denied doctrines of the Church, were apt to quarrel with the Pope concerning the latter's civil jurisdiction and to direct harsh laws against its exercise.

Yet, despite debates about doctrine and conflicts about politics, the Church appeared at the beginning of the sixteenth century to hold supreme and enduring sway over all Western Christendom. The masses accepted it as a matter of course. Martin Luther on a pilgrimage to Rome early in the century entertained no doubt concerning it. Even those who were then most critical of abuses in it could hardly think of its destruction. To the bulk of Europeans it seemed essential, not only for every individual's eternal salvation, but also for the general welfare of society at large.

All this seemed logical, and at the beginning of the sixteenth century no monarch or nobleman or clergyman or commoner was planning any breach with the Catholic Church. Nevertheless, before the century was far advanced a religious upheaval was occurring and actual rebellion broke out

Church. The explanation lies in the paradoxical situation that religious unrest of many different sorts was as widespread in Europe in the early part of the sixteenth century as belief in religious unity, and it proved more potent.

**Religious Devotion**

On the one hand, among many Christians, was a quickened religious consciousness and devotion, which found expression in the multiplication of pious writings and practices. Only a little while before the opening of the century an Augustinian monk, Thomas à Kempis, had written the *Imitation of Christ*, one of the most beautifully devotional works in the history of Christianity and second only to the Bible in popularity. Many a monk and nun, many a parish priest, many a humble layman strove earnestly for personal holiness and eternal salvation.

**Religious Indifference**

On the other hand, among many professed Christians there was an equally apparent indifference, even repugnance, to the spirit, if not to the form, of Christianity. The pursuit of the "new learning," the absorption in classical studies, the admiration for ancient paganism tended to create dissatisfaction with purely Christian achievement and to foster ideals of pleasure and luxury radically at variance with Christian precept. Simultaneously the sudden geographical expansion of Europe, the daring discoveries, the forceful subjugation of overseas peoples, and especially the rapid rise of capitalism afforded to some Europeans the opportunity, and to others the eager desire, to amass riches of this world; and the ensuing worship of mammon obscured the worship of Christ. It was only natural that in such circumstances some scepticism and a good deal of hypocrisy should appear.

It was not only kings and merchant-princes who at the opening of the sixteenth century were actuated by un-Christian ambition for money and power, ostentation and pleasure, but also numerous bishops and abbots and other clergymen. Many of these seemed to be more bent on patronizing the new learning and erecting magnificent architectural monuments in the renaissance manner than on promoting Christian piety; and the gulf between their public faith and their private morals was frequently abysmal.

Grave scandals were associated with the papal court at Rome toward the close of the fifteenth century and in the early part of the sixteenth. Pope Alexander VI (1492–1503) was grossly im-

moral and concerned chiefly with securing estates and social position for his worthless children. Julius II (1503–1513) was better, but he was primarily a military man, devoted to the task of making the papal state a compact Italian principality. Leo X (1513–1521), a son of the banker Lorenzo de' Medici, was absorbed in the "new learning" and the "new art," in architecture and the theater. To obtain money for the rebuilding of St. Peter's basilica at Rome and for other objects of his munificence, he resorted to the most questionable financial expedients. He created new church offices and shamelessly sold them. He increased the revenue from indulgences, jubilees, and regular taxation.

**Scandals in Church**

The immorality and worldliness prevailing at Rome were reflected throughout Christendom in the lives of many lesser churchmen as well as in the lives of upper-class laymen. Numerous bishops and abbots woefully neglected their ecclesiastical duties—in some instances not going near their dioceses or monasteries—and became famous, or infamous, as scheming politicians, as oppressive money-getters and wasteful spenders, or as sensual epicures. Already in the fifteenth century a critical cardinal reported to the Pope that the disorders, consequent upon the evil lives of high-placed clergymen, "excite the hatred of the people against all ecclesiastical order; if they are not corrected, it is to be feared that the laity will attack the clergy. . . . For they will say that the clergy are incorrigible and are unwilling to apply any remedy."

**Criticism of Church**

The very fact that there was a quickened religious consciousness at the beginning of the sixteenth century made many Christians peculiarly critical of shortcomings of clergymen and anxious to effect a reformation "in head and members." Conspicuous humanist scholars of the age, including Erasmus and More, wrote eloquently and wittily in behalf of the simplicity of the original Christian gospel and against the evil lives of contemporary clergymen, their ignorance and credulity; and the criticisms of these scholars were conveyed to the masses, in plainer and coarser language, by a host of pamphleteers.

For a long time every clergyman, whether bishop, abbot, or priest, had usually been supported by a "benefice," that is, by the revenue of a parcel of land or an endowment attached to his

post. And it had long been customary for a clergyman, when he took possession of his benefice, to pay a part of its first-year's proceeds—its "annates," as they were called—to his ecclesiastical superior, to his bishop or to the Pope as the case might be. Now, with the growth of greed for money and of desire for ostentation, many a clergyman accumulated a number of benefices; bishops treated certain benefices in their dioceses as sinecures and awarded them to relatives and favorites, while demanding larger returns for themselves from other benefices; and the Popes extended the practice of "reserving" in all parts of Western Christendom particular benefices and of appointing to them Italians who drew revenues from them but remained in their own country. Thus it transpired that the common people often supported absentee prelates in luxury and sometimes paid a second time in order to maintain resident clergymen.

All over central and western Europe sincere and thoughtful Christians were demanding reform of these financial abuses. They were demanding, however, a reformation within the Catholic Church and not a rebellion against it. They recalled how in earlier centuries—the eleventh, for example—a group of reforming Popes and energetic laymen had cleared away grave abuses and ended sorry disorders among prelates and monks, and they imagined that in due course history would repeat itself.

That history did not exactly repeat itself but that, on the contrary, reformation became confused with rebellion, was due to certain novel circumstances affecting the position of Christianity at the beginning of the sixteenth century. The new circumstances were (1) political and (2) economic.

**Political Circumstances**

Preliminary to an understanding of the new political circumstances, it must be emphasized that the Catholic Church during many centuries prior to the sixteenth had been not only a religious body, like a present-day Church, but also a political power which readily found sources of friction with other political states. The Catholic Church, as we have seen, had its own organization in every country of central and western Europe. Its officials—Pope, bishops, priests, and monks—claimed to be independent of civil governments. It owned extensive lands, which normally were exempt from taxation by civil governments. It levied taxes directly on all its members without let or hindrance by civil governments. In its own law-courts it tried cases involving

clergymen and certain kinds of cases involving laymen. Such political jurisdiction of the Church had been needful and fairly satisfactory in feudal times—from the fifth to the fourteenth century, let us say—when civil governments were weak and the Church found itself the chief unifying force in Europe.

By the sixteenth century the situation was altered. Civil rulers were repressing feudalism. Political ambition was increasing among laymen. Local pride was being expanded into national patriotism. Strong national states were emerging in western Europe, and elsewhere the popular demand for national states was growing. National monarchs and would-be national monarchs were reading authors like Machiavelli and were aspiring to an absolutism for which the middle ages furnished no precedent. National sovereignty was rapidly being established in fact as well as in theory, and the one thing still needed to complete it was to bring religion under national control. National monarchs were anxious to enlist the wealth and influence of the Church in their behalf; they coveted its land, taxes, and courts. Patriots in countries which still lacked national states were apt to perceive in the political power of the Church the principal obstacle to the attainment of their national desires.

In these circumstances kings and princes and patriots of the sixteenth century were not likely to resist encroachments on the historic rights of the Church. A goodly number of them, like many prelates of the age, were really hostile to any religious reformation which might radically purify the Church and gravely restrict their personal pleasures and political ambitions; and yet, with an unscrupulousness never surpassed, they stood ready to put themselves at the head of movements for ecclesiastical reform, or even rebellion, if thereby they could serve their own ends.

**Economic Circumstances**

Economic circumstances of the time were similar. The same capitalistic spirit, the same eagerness for money and profits, which was aggravating the financial abuses in the Church, particularly among the higher clergy, was possessing the minds of innumerable laymen. Manufacturers, merchants, and landlords were becoming capitalistic and were coveting the accumulated wealth and large landed estates of ostentatious bishops and abbots. They were arguing that the riches of the Church should be put to profitable uses, and many of them, with a fine show of disinterested sympathy for religious reform,

were quite willing to cooperate with kings and princes in confiscating Church property, provided, of course, that they got a liberal share of it for themselves. In this way, men of means contributed to the religious and social unrest which characterized the beginning of the sixteenth century and to the eventual upheaval which brought forth religious rebellion and something of a social revolution. It was at once a result and a cause of the rise of modern capitalism.

In such a setting of ambitious capitalists, lay princes, and national monarchs, the criticisms of ecclesiastical abuses by humanist scholars and the complaints of artisans and peasants were far more threatening to historic Christianity than the religious unrest of any earlier century. There had always been critics of the Church, and preachers who drew painful contrasts between its public tenets and the scandalous conduct of some of its ministers and disciples. There had been, on occasion, movements for reform, and sometimes open rebellions had occurred. Heresy, the holding of beliefs at variance with those of the Catholic Church, and schism, the rejection of its authority and discipline, were no novelties in the sixteenth century.

Within the confines of Catholic Christendom, as they were in the year 1500, there had been spasmodic schism and heresy during the middle ages. On the one hand, disputes between Kings and Popes had produced schisms of greater or less intensity and duration. On the other hand, the rejection of certain doctrines of the Church by particular clergymen or laymen had given rise to such heresies as those of John Hus (in Bohemia) and Wycliffe (in England). But schism and heresy had seldom been joined in the middle ages. The schisms had been pretty strictly political or economic; they had involved no basic dogmatic difference; and they had proved temporary. Some of the heresies had been more stubborn and had secured fairly large popular followings, but, as a rule, they had been frowned upon and combated as zealously by Kings as by Popes. Holy Roman Emperors had led crusades against the Hussites, and an English King had extirpated Wycliffe's disciples.

By the sixteenth century the ground was prepared for a different outcome. Schism and heresy were now definitely to be linked, with results fatal to the medieval unity of Catholic Christendom.

form certain "good works." Luther, on the other hand, entertained the idea that man was so depraved and corrupt, in the sight of God, as to be incapable of any good works and that he could be saved only by faith in God's mercy. In other words, he was developing a doctrine of "justification by faith" in opposition to the Catholic doctrine of "justification by sacraments and works."

So far, Luther certainly had no thought of rebellion against the Church of which he was a clergyman and a monk. He visited Rome in 1511 as a pious pilgrim rather than a carping critic. But a significant event in the year 1517 made clear the discrepancy between what he was teaching and what his Church taught. In that year several agents of Pope Leo X were sent out to dispose of indulgences with a view to obtaining money for the rebuilding of the basilica of St. Peter's at Rome, and one of these agents, Tetzel by name, discharged his mission in the German archbishopric of Mainz in a manner which would be recognized today as that of high-pressure salesmanship. Luther at once protested against what he believed was a corruption of Christian doctrine and a swindling of the poorer and more ignorant people. The form which his protest took was the posting, on the church-door at Wittenberg, of ninety-five "theses" concerning indulgences, accompanied by a challenge to anyone to debate them with him.

**Luther's Theses on Indulgences**

To understand the significance of Luther's protest, it is important to know what the Church meant by "indulgences." An "indulgence" was not a forgiving of sin, and it was never a permission to sin. It was (and is still in the Catholic Church) a promise of remission, in whole or in part, of the punishment to be meted out to a person after his death for sins for which he had been sincerely sorry and had done penance. The Pope claimed the right to grant indulgences by virtue of the authority conferred by Christ upon Peter to hold and use the "keys of the kingdom of Heaven" and "to bind and loose" upon earth, but the grant of an indulgence was held to be without effect unless the person receiving it was in a "state of grace," that is, sorry for his sins and resolved not to sin again. To obtain an indulgence, the penitent had to say certain prayers or visit certain churches or do certain other "good works," and conspicuous among the "good works" in the time of Tetzel and Luther was the payment of money for papal purposes.

It was not simply against the money-payments for indulgences

or the objectionable methods of Tetzel that Luther protested, though these were assailed. The primary significance of Luther's theses was that they questioned the whole theory of "good works," of which the doctrine of indulgences was only a detail. "The Christian who has true repentance," wrote Luther, "has already received pardon from God altogether apart from an indulgence, and does not need one."

Luther's ninety-five theses were originally written in Latin, but they were speedily translated into German and circulated widely in the country. They provoked spirited discussion and aroused great excitement. Pope Leo X, who at first dismissed the matter as a mere squabble among the monks, eventually summoned Luther to Rome to answer for the theses, but the Elector of Saxony prevailed upon the Pope not to press the summons.

**Luther's Break with Catholic Church**

It was only a step from questioning the doctrine of "good works" to questioning the authority of the Church, and this step Luther took in 1519. In that year at Leipzig, in the course of a debate on the theses with a Catholic theologian, John Eck by name, Luther admitted that his views concerning man's direct relation with God, without the mediation of the Church, were the same as those which John Hus had held a century earlier and which had been condemned as heretical by the General Council of Constance. Thereby Luther acknowledged that a General Council as well as a Pope might err. For him, the divine authority of the Catholic Church ceased to be.

Separation from the traditional Church was the only course now open to Luther, and this was consummated in the year 1520. In a series of three bold pamphlets, he vigorously attacked the position of the Church. In the first—*An Address to the Nobility of the German Nation*—Luther stated that there was nothing peculiarly sacred about the Christian priesthood and that the clergy should be deprived of their special privileges; he urged the German princes to free their country from foreign control and shrewdly called their attention to the wealth of the Church which they might justly appropriate to themselves. In the second—*On the Babylonian Captivity of the Church of God*—he assailed the papacy and the whole sacramental system. The third—*On the Freedom of a Christian Man*—contained the essence of Luther's new theology that salvation was not a *progress* toward a goal by

means of sacraments and good works, but a *condition* "in which man found himself so soon as he despaired absolutely of his own efforts and threw himself on God's assurances."

In the midst of these attacks upon the Church, the Pope excommunicated Luther, and in the following year (1521) the Diet of the Holy Roman Empire, assembled at Worms, pronounced him an outlaw. But he calmly burned the papal bull and from the imperial ban he was protected by the Elector of Saxony. He at once devoted himself to making a new German translation of the Bible, which became very popular and is still prized as a monument in the history of German literature.[1]

**Spread of Lutheranism**

Within the next few years the Lutheran teachings carried everything before them throughout central and northern Germany. Nor is it difficult, in the light of what has already been said about the social and religious unrest of the time, to understand why Luther could successfully defy both Pope and Emperor and why his new theology was quickly and widely accepted in Germany. His rebellion was essentially popular and national. It appealed to pious persons who were shocked by abuses in the Church. It also appealed to more worldly persons who wished to enrich themselves by appropriating ecclesiastical lands and revenues. It likewise appealed to German patriots who perceived in it an opportunity to put an end to the exactions of an Italian and Roman *curia*. Luther was tireless in flooding the country with pamphlets, letters, and inflammatory diatribes, tactful in keeping his party together, and always courageous. Princes, burghers, artisans, peasants, and many clergymen joined hands in espousing the new cause. They rebelled against the Catholic Church, confiscated its lands and revenues, and abolished Catholic worship.

But the peasants espoused the new cause in a manner altogether too logical and violent to suit Luther or the princes and landlords. For at least a century several causes had contributed to worsen the lot of the peasants. While their taxes and other burdens were increasing, the ability of the Emperor to protect them was decreasing. They were exploited by every other class, including the higher clergy. Repeatedly, during the latter part of

[1] The first edition of the Bible in German had been printed as early as 1466. At least eighteen editions in German (including four Low German versions) had appeared before Luther issued his German New Testament in 1522.

the fifteenth century, they had revolted against economic oppression. And now, in the sixteenth century, when Luther urged the German princes to assail ecclesiastics, to seize Church lands, and to put an end to financial abuses, the peasants naturally listened to his words and applied his advice in their own way.

Spurred on by fanatics, whom the religious ferment of the time produced in large numbers, the peasants rose in rebellion, demanding abolition of serfdom, free right of fishing and hunting, payment in wages for services rendered, and abolition of arbitrary punishment. So long as their efforts were directed against Catholic bishops, priests, and monks, Luther expressed sympathy with the peasants, but when the revolt, which broke out in 1524, became general all over central and southern Germany and was directed not only against the Catholic clergy but against the lay lords, many of whom were now Lutheran, the religious leader foresaw a grave danger to his new religion in a split between peasants and nobles. He was shocked by the excesses of the insurrection. Insisting upon toleration for his own revolt, he furiously begged the princes to put down the peasants' revolt. "Whoever can, should smite, strangle, or stab, secretly or publicly."

**Peasants' Revolt**

The peasants' revolt was crushed in 1525 with the slaughter of probably fifty thousand persons. One result was that the power of the lay lords became greater than ever, although in a few cases, particularly in the Tyrol and in Baden, the condition of the peasants was slightly improved. Elsewhere, however, this was not the case; and the German peasants were condemned for over two centuries to a lot worse than that of almost any people in Western Christendom. Another result was the decline of Luther's influence among the peasantry in southern Germany. They turned from one who, they believed, had betrayed them. On the other hand, many Catholic princes, who had been wavering in their religious support, now had before their eyes what they thought was an object lesson of the results of Luther's appeal to revolution, and so they cast their lot decisively with the ancient Church. The peasants' revolt checked the spread of Lutheranism in Germany.

The Diet of the Holy Roman Empire which assembled at Speyer in 1526 saw the German princes divided into a Lutheran and a Catholic party, but left the legal status of the new faith

still in doubt, contenting itself with the vague declaration that "each prince should so conduct himself as he could answer for his behavior to God and to the Emperor." But at the next Diet, held at the same place in 1529, the Emperor Charles V, who stuck to the Catholic Church, directed that the laws against heretics should be enforced and that the customary ecclesiastical revenues should not be used for the new worship. The Lutheran princes drafted a legal protest, in which they declared that they meant to abide by the law of 1526. From this protest came the name *Protestant.*

**Lutheranism in Germany**

Philip Melanchthon, a prominent German humanist and a colleague of Luther's at the university of Wittenberg, attempted to conciliate the two religious parties. He prepared an orderly statement of Christian doctrine, which, while distinctly Lutheran in character, was more conservative in tone than some of Luther's preaching. Melanchthon called it the "reformed confession" and presented it to the Diet of Augsburg in 1530. The Diet did not adopt it, but it became the recognized creed of the Lutheran churches.

The Emperor, unmoved by the Confession of Augsburg, announced his intention of suppressing Luther's heresy by force of arms. In this predicament, the Lutheran princes formed a league at Schmalkald for mutual protection (1531); and from 1546 to 1555 a desultory civil war was waged. The Protestants received some assistance from the French King, who, for political reasons, was bent on humiliating the Emperor. The end of the religious conflict appeared to have been reached by the peace of Augsburg (1555), which contained the following provisions: (1) each prince was to be free to dictate the religion of his subjects; [1] (2) all Church property appropriated by the Protestants before 1552 was to remain in their hands; (3) no form of Protestantism except Lutheranism was to be tolerated; (4) Lutheran subjects of ecclesiastical states were not to be obliged to renounce their faith; (5) by an "ecclesiastical reservation" any ecclesiastical prince on becoming a Protestant was to give up his see.

Thus, between 1520 and 1555, Martin Luther had preached his new theology at variance with the Catholic and had found general acceptance for it throughout the northern half of Ger-

[1] On the principle, stated in Latin, of *cuius regio eius religio.*

many. Its creed had been defined in 1530, and its official toleration had been recognized in 1555.

Lutheranism failed to conquer all Germany, but it became triumphant in the Scandinavian countries. When Martin Luther broke with the Catholic Church, Christian II (1513–1523) was reigning as elected King over Denmark and Norway and had recently repressed a revolt in Sweden. Though the King encountered political difficulties with the Church, he maintained Catholic worship and doctrine and formally recognized the spiritual supremacy of the Pope. But Christian II had trouble with most of his subjects, especially the Swedes, who were conscious of separate nationality and desirous of political independence; and the King eventually lost his throne in a general uprising. The definite separation of Sweden from Denmark and Norway followed immediately. The Swedes chose Gustavus Vasa as their King (1523–1560), while the Danish and Norwegian crowns passed to an uncle of Christian II, who assumed the title of Frederick I (1523–1533). **In Scandinavia**

In Denmark, King Frederick was desirous of increasing the royal power, and the subservient ecclesiastical organization which Martin Luther was advocating seemed to him preferable to the ancient self-willed Church. But Frederick realized that the Catholic Church was deeply rooted in the affections of his people and that changes would have to be made slowly and cautiously. He therefore collected around him Lutheran teachers from Germany and made his court the center of propaganda for the new doctrine, and so well was the work of the new teachers done that the King was able in 1527 to put the two religions on an equal footing before the law. Upon Frederick's death in 1533, the Catholics made a determined effort to prevent the accession of his son, Christian III, who was not only an avowed Lutheran but an absolutist in government.

The popular protest against royal despotism failed in Denmark, and the triumph of Christian III in 1536 sealed the fate of Catholicism in that country and in Norway. It was promptly enacted that the Catholic bishops should forfeit their temporal and spiritual authority and that their property should be transferred to the crown "for the good of the commonwealth." After discussions with Luther the new religion was definitely organized and declared the state religion in 1537. It might be added that

Catholicism died with difficulty in Denmark. Many peasants as well as high churchmen resented the changes, and Helgesen, the foremost Scandinavian scholar and humanist of the time, protested vigorously against the new order. But the crown was growing powerful, and the crown prevailed. The increase of royal revenue, consequent upon the confiscation of Church property, enabled the King to make Denmark the leading Scandinavian country throughout the second half of the sixteenth century and the first quarter of the seventeenth. In time national patriotism came to be intertwined with Lutheranism. And the change in religion was promptly extended, of course, from Denmark to its dependency of Iceland.

In Sweden the success of the new religion was due to the crown quite as much as in Denmark and Norway. Gustavus Vasa had obtained the Swedish throne through the efforts of a nationalist party, but there was still a hostile faction, headed by the chief churchman, the archbishop of Upsala, who favored the maintenance of the union with Denmark. In order to deprive the unionists of their leader, Gustavus begged the Pope to remove the rebellious archbishop and to appoint one in sympathy with the nationalist cause. This the Pope refused to do, and a breach with Rome began.

At first Gustavus maintained Catholic worship and doctrines, contenting himself with the suppression of the monasteries, the seizure of two thirds of the church taxes, and the circulation of a popular Swedish translation of the New Testament. In 1527 all ecclesiastical property was transferred to the crown and two Catholic bishops were put to death; in 1531 a Protestant was appointed archbishop of Upsala. Gustavus's immediate successors exemplified the halting character of religious change in Sweden. Eric XIV (1560–1569) fostered the spread of Protestantism. John III (1569–1592) inclined toward Catholicism, and his son Sigismund (1592) was a convinced Catholic who might have reestablished the old Church if he had not accepted the kingship of Poland and devoted his energies to that country. Then, under the latter's uncle, Charles IX, who usurped the throne, Lutheranism finally triumphed in Sweden. The Confession of Augsburg was adopted as the creed of the Swedish Church in 1593, and in 1604 Catholics were deprived of offices and estates and banished from the realm.

## (b) CALVINISM

A second type of Protestantism which appeared in the sixteenth century was the forerunner of modern Presbyterian and Reformed Churches and at one time or another considerably affected the theology of other Protestant bodies. Taken as a group, it is usually called Calvinism. Of its rise and spread, some idea may be gained from brief accounts of the lives of two of its apostles, Calvin and Knox. But first it will be necessary to say a few words concerning an older reformer, Zwingli by name, who prepared the way for Calvin's work in the Swiss cantons.

Switzerland comprised in the sixteenth century some thirteen cantons. All were technically under the suzerainty of the Holy Roman Empire, but they constituted in practice so many independent republics, bound together only by a number of defensive treaties. To the town of Einsiedeln in the canton of Schwyz came Huldreich Zwingli in the year 1516 as a Catholic priest. Slightly younger than Luther, he was well born, had received an excellent education at Vienna and Basel, and had now been in holy orders about ten years. For some time a pensioner of the Pope, he had showed more interest in humanism than in theology. **Zwingli**

Zwingli seems to have begun his opposition to the Catholic Church on political grounds. He assailed the practice of hiring out Swiss troops to foreign rulers and attacked the Church for its share in this traffic. Thence he grew critical of other abuses, but it was not until he was installed in 1518 as preacher in the cathedral at Zürich that he repudiated the papacy and proclaimed the Bible the sole guide of faith and morals. He proceeded to denounce fasting, the veneration of saints, and the celibacy of the clergy; and his disciples put his teachings into practice. Church edifices were profaned, statues demolished, windows smashed, relics burned. Zwingli himself took a wife.

In 1523 a papal appeal to Zürich to abandon Zwingli was answered by the canton's declaration of independence from the Catholic Church. Rapidly the revolt spread throughout Switzerland, except in the five forest cantons, the very heart of the country, where the old religion was deeply entrenched. Serious efforts were made to join the followers of Zwingli with those of Luther and thus to present a united front to the common

enemy, but there seemed to be irreconcilable differences between Lutheranism and the doctrines of Zwingli. The latter, which were succinctly expressed in sixty-seven theses published at Zürich in 1523, insisted more firmly than the former on the supreme authority of the Bible and broke more radically with Catholic traditions. Zwingli aimed at a reformation of government as well as theology and entertained a notion of an ideal state in which human activities, whether political or religious, would be ordered democratically. Zwingli differed essentially from Luther in never distrusting "the people." Perhaps the most distinctive mark of the Swiss reformer's theology was his doctrine that the Lord's Supper is not a miracle but simply a memorial.

In 1531 Zwingli urged his Swiss followers to convert the five forest cantons by force of arms. Civil war ensued, but the Catholic mountaineers won a victory and the reformer was killed. A truce was then arranged, the provisions of which foreshadowed the religious settlement in Germany—each canton was to be free to determine its own religion. Switzerland has remained to this day part Catholic and part Protestant.

By the sudden death of Zwingli, Swiss Protestantism was left without a leader, but not for long, because the more celebrated Calvin took up his residence at Geneva in 1536. From that time until his death in 1564 Calvin was the center of a movement which, starting from these Zwinglian beginnings among the Swiss mountains, speedily spread over more countries and affected more people than did Lutheranism.

**John Calvin**

John Calvin, who, next to Martin Luther, was the most conspicuous Protestant leader of the sixteenth century, was a Frenchman. Born of middle-class parents at Noyon in the province of Picardy in 1509, he was intended from an early age for an ecclesiastical career. He studied at Paris, where he displayed an aptitude for theology and literature. When he was nineteen years of age, however, his father advised him to become a lawyer, instead of a priest, and so young Calvin spent several years studying law.

In 1529 Calvin experienced a sudden "conversion." Although as yet there had been no organized revolt in France against the Catholic Church, that country, like many others, was teeming with religious critics. Thousands of Frenchmen were in sympathy with any attempt to improve the Church by education, by purer

morals, and by better preaching. Lutheranism was winning a few converts, and various other sects were appealing in divers places. It was still doubtful whether reform would be sought within the traditional Church or by rebellion against it. Calvin believed that his conversion was a divine call to forsake Catholicism and to become the apostle of a purer Christianity. His heart, he said, was "so subdued and reduced to docility that in comparison with his zeal for true piety he regarded all other studies with indifference, though not entirely abandoning them. Though himself a beginner, many flocked to him to learn the pure doctrine, and he began to seek some hiding-place and means of withdrawal from people."

His search for a hiding-place was quickened by the announced determination of the French King Francis I to put an end to religious dissent among his subjects. Calvin abruptly left France and found an asylum in the Swiss town of Basel, where he wrote an account of his "reformed" beliefs. This exposition, *The Institutes of the Christian Religion,* which was published in 1536, was dedicated to Francis I and was intended to influence him against Catholicism.

Although the book failed of its immediate purpose, it speedily won a deservedly great reputation. It was an orderly and concise synthesis of Protestant theology. For some time it promised to provide a common religious rule and guide for all Christians who rebelled against Rome. But Calvin, in mind and nature, was quite different from Luther. The latter was impetuous and emotional; the former was calm and severely logical. Then, too, Luther was quite willing to leave in the Church many practices which were not directly prohibited by Scripture; Calvin insisted that nothing should remain in the Church which was not expressly authorized by Scripture. The *Institutes* had a tremendous influence upon Protestantism but did not unite the followers of Calvin and Luther.

**Calvinist Geneva**

In 1536 Calvin went to Geneva, where the townsfolk were freeing themselves from the feudal suzerainty of the Duke of Savoy and banishing the Catholic Church, whose cause the Duke championed. Calvin aided in the work and was rewarded by an appointment as chief pastor and preacher in the city. This position he continued to hold, except for a brief period when he was exiled, until his death in 1564. It proved to be a commanding position for ordering the affairs of the town

and giving form to an important branch of Protestant Christianity.

The government of Geneva under Calvin's leadership was a curious theocracy of which Calvin himself was both religious and political dictator. The minister of the reformed faith became God's mouthpiece upon earth and inculcated an unbending puritanism in daily life. "No more festivals, no more jovial reunions, no more theaters or society; the rigid monotony of an austere rule weighed upon life. A poet was decapitated because of his verses; Calvin wished adultery to be punished by death like heresy, and he had Michael Servetus burned for not entertaining the same opinions as himself upon the mystery of the Trinity."

Under Calvin's theocratic dictatorship, Geneva became famous throughout Europe as the central source of Protestant propaganda. Calvin, who set the example of stern simplicity and relentless activity, was sometimes styled the "Protestant Pope." He not only preached every day, wrote numerous theological treatises, and issued a French translation of the Bible, but he established important Protestant schools, including the university of Geneva, which attracted students from distant lands, and he conducted a correspondence with his disciples and with would-be reformers in all parts of Europe.

Such activities account for the wide diffusion of Calvinism. Frenchmen, Netherlanders, Germans, Magyars, Scots, and Englishmen flocked to Geneva to hear Calvin or to attend his schools, and when they returned to their own countries they were likely to be so many glowing sparks ready to start big conflagrations.

**Calvinism on the Continent**

Calvinism was known by various names in the different countries which it entered. On the Continent of Europe it was described as the Reformed faith. In France its followers were styled Huguenots. In Scotland and England it was called Presbyterianism. Its essential characteristics were the same wherever it took root.

We have already noticed how Switzerland, except for the five forest cantons, had been converted to Protestantism by the preaching of Zwingli. Calvin was Zwingli's theological successor, and the majority of the Swiss, especially those in the urban cantons of Zürich and Bern as well as in Geneva, adopted Calvinism.

Calvinism also made converts in France. Its founder was a

Frenchman, and its teachings and logic appealed to a small but influential body of his fellow countrymen. It had political as well as religious significance. It represented among the lesser nobility an awakening of the aristocratic spirit and among the middle class a reaction against the growing power of the King, who adhered to the Catholic Church. The financial and moneyed interests of the country were largely attracted to French Calvinism. The Huguenots, as the French Calvinists were called, were particularly strong in the law courts and in the Estates General, and these had been the main checks upon royal authority.

The Huguenots were involved in sanguinary civil and religious wars which raged in France throughout the greater part of the sixteenth century. Only in 1598 did they receive a definite guarantee of religious toleration.[1]

The Netherlands were too closely associated with Germany not to be affected by the Lutheran revolt against the Catholic Church. They soon became saturated with Lutheranism and also with the doctrines of various radical sects that from time to time were expelled from the German states. Their ruler, the Emperor Charles V, tried to stamp out heresy, but he succeeded only in changing its name and nature. Lutheranism disappeared from the Netherlands; but in its place came Calvinism, descending from Geneva through Alsace down the Rhine, or entering from Britain by the broad commercial channels between those countries. While the southern provinces of the Netherlands were eventually recovered for Catholicism, the protracted political and economic conflict which the northern provinces waged against the Catholic King of Spain served to establish Calvinism as the national religion of a majority of Dutchmen. Calvinism in the Netherlands was known as the Dutch Reformed religion.

We have already noted that southern Germany had rejected Lutheranism, partially at least because of Luther's bitter words to the peasants. Catholicism, however, was not destined to have complete sway in that region, for Calvinism permeated Württemberg, Baden, and the Rhenish provinces and the Reformed doctrines gained numerous converts there, especially among the middle class. The growth of Calvinism in Germany was handicapped seriously by the religious settlement of Augsburg in 1555 which tolerated officially only Catholicism and Lutheranism. It was not

[1] See below, pp. 178–179.

until after the close of the direful Thirty Years' War in the seventeenth century that German Calvinists obtained formal recognition.

Both in Hungary and in Poland, Calvinism spread, especially among nobles and middle class. In Hungary, by the close of the century, only a hundred clergymen and not more than half a dozen noble families still clung to Catholicism, while in Poland the majority of the great landlords were quitting Catholicism and adhering to Calvinism. In Poland and Hungary, however, these gains of Calvinism were not permanent.

**Calvinism in Scotland**

Scotland, like every other European country in the early part of the sixteenth century, had been the scene of protests against moral and financial abuses in the Catholic Church. To political causes, however, must primarily be attributed the expression of that unrest in ecclesiastical rebellion. The kingdom had long been a prey to the rivalry of clannish noble families, and the premature death of James V (1542), who left the throne to his infant daughter, Mary Stuart, gave free rein to a feudal reaction against the crown. In general, the Catholic clergy sided with the royal cause, while the religious reformers prevailed upon the nobles to champion Protestantism in order to deal an effective blow against the throne. Thus Cardinal Beaton, primate of the Catholic Church in Scotland, ordered numerous executions on the score of protecting religion and the authority of the Queen-Regent; on the other hand several noblemen, professing the new theology, assassinated the Cardinal (1546). Such was the general situation in Scotland when John Knox appeared upon the scene.

**John Knox**

Born of peasant parents, John Knox (1515–1572) had become a Catholic priest, albeit in sympathy with many of the revolutionary ideas which were entering Scotland from the Continent and from England. In 1546 he openly rejected the authority of the Church and preached "the Gospel" and a stern puritanical morality. "Others snipped the branches," he said, "he struck at the root." But the Catholic court banished him from Scotland. After romantic imprisonment in France, he spent a few years in England, holding a chaplaincy under Edward VI (1547–1553), and exerting his influence to ensure an indelibly Protestant character to the Anglican Church. Then upon the accession to the English throne of the Catholic Mary Tudor, Knox betook himself to Geneva where he made the

acquaintance of Calvin and found himself in essential agreement with the teachings of the French reformer.

After a stay of some five years on the Continent, Knox returned to Scotland and became the organizer and director of the "Lords of the Congregation," a league of the chief Protestant noblemen for purposes of religious propaganda and political power. In 1560 he drew up the creed and discipline of the Presbyterian Church after the model of Calvin's Church at Geneva; and in the same year, with the support of the "Lords of the Congregation" and the troops of Queen Elizabeth of England, he effected a revolution in Scotland. The Queen-Regent was imprisoned, and the subservient parliament decreed the abolition of papal supremacy and enacted the death penalty against anyone who should attend Catholic worship.

Queen Mary Stuart, during her brief stay in Scotland (1561–1567), tried in vain to stem the tide. The nobles would brook no increase of royal authority. The austere Knox hounded the young Queen in public sermons and flayed her character. The Queen's downfall and subsequent long imprisonment in England finally decided the ecclesiastical future of Scotland. Except in a few fastnesses in the northern highlands, where Catholicism survived among the clansmen, the country was committed to Calvinism.

Calvinism was not without influence in England. Introduced toward the close of the reign of Henry VIII, it inspired the theology, if not the organization, of a number of small sects which troubled the King's Anglican Church almost as much as did the Catholics. Under Edward VI it influenced considerably the theology of the Anglican Church, but the moderate policies of Elizabeth (1558–1603) tended to fix a gulf between Anglicans and Calvinists.

### (c) ANGLICANISM

Anglicanism designates that form of Protestantism which was adopted for the State Church of England in the sixteenth century and which is now represented by the Episcopal Churches in the United States and elsewhere. The Methodist Churches are comparatively late off-shoots from Anglicanism.

The separation of England from the papacy was a more gradual and halting process than were the contemporary revo-

lutions on the Continent, except in Sweden. The new Anglicanism was more conservative than Lutheranism or Calvinism.

At the opening of the sixteenth century, the word "Catholic" meant the same in England as in every other country of western or central Europe—belief in the seven sacraments, the sacrifice of the Mass, and the veneration of saints; acceptance of papal supremacy, and support of monasticism and other institutions and practices of the medieval church. During several centuries it had been customary in legal documents to refer to the Catholic Church in England as the *Ecclesia Anglicana,* or Anglican Church, just as the Popes in their letters repeatedly referred to the "Gallican Church," the "Spanish Church," etc. But such phraseology did not imply a separation of any one national church from the common Catholic communion, and for nearly a thousand years—ever since there had been an *Ecclesia Anglicana*—the English had recognized the bishop of Rome as the center of Christian unity.

In the course of the sixteenth century, however, the majority of Englishmen changed their conception of the *Ecclesia Anglicana,* so that, while it continued to exist as the "Church of England," it did so on a strictly national basis, in communion neither with the Pope nor with the Orthodox Church of the East, and with certain beliefs and customs which were distinctively Protestant. This new conception of the Anglican Church—resulting from the religious upheaval of the sixteenth century—is what is meant by Anglicanism as a form of Protestantism. It took shape in the eventful years between 1520 and 1570.

**"Church of England"**

In order to understand how this change was effected, we should remember that there was considerable religious unrest in England at the time. In the first place, the Lutheran teachings were infiltrating into the country. As early as 1521 a small group at Cambridge became interested in the new German theology, and thence the sect spread to Oxford, London, and other intellectual centers. It found its early converts chiefly among the lower clergy and the merchants of the large towns, but for several years it was not numerous.

In the second place, there was the same feeling in England as throughout all Western Christendom that reforms were needed in the Church. This feeling was shared by a large proportion of the leading men who accounted themselves loyal members of the

Catholic Church. Such humanists as Colet and More were insistent on urging reform, and the writings of Erasmus had notable vogue in England.

A third source of unrest was political objection to the papacy. On one hand, national patriotism was growing in England, and it was at variance with the older cosmopolitan character of Catholicism. On the other hand, royal power was increasing, particularly after the accession of the Tudor family in 1485. Henry VII (1485–1509) had subordinated to the crown both the nobility and the Parliament,[1] and he had secured the patriotic support of the middle class. When his son, Henry VIII (1509–1547), came to the throne, the only serious obstacle which appeared to be left in the way of royal absolutism was the privileged independence of the Catholic Church. **Henry VIII**

Yet a number of years passed before Henry VIII laid violent hands upon the Church. Meanwhile, he proved himself a devoted Catholic. In 1521 he assailed the new Lutheran doctrines in a book which he entitled *The Defence of the Seven Sacraments*, and which he dedicated to the Pope. For this he received from the Pope the title of *Fidei Defensor*, or "Defender of the Faith," a title which he jealously bore until his death, and which his successors, the sovereigns of Great Britain, have continued to bear ever since. Henry VIII allied himself on several occasions with Leo X in the game of European politics; and the King's chief minister and adviser for many years was Thomas Wolsey, Archbishop of York and a Cardinal of the Roman Church.

In the circumstances it is difficult to see how the Anglican Church would have immediately broken away from Catholic unity had it not been for the peculiar marital troubles of Henry VIII. The King had been married eighteen years to Catherine of Aragon,[2] and had been presented by her with six children (of whom only one daughter, the Princess Mary, had survived), when one day he informed her that their union was not true marriage. The Queen could hardly be expected to agree, and there ensued a legal suit between the royal pair.

To Henry VIII the matter was simple. He wanted an annulment of the marriage, for he knew that Catherine could bear him no more children and he ardently desired a male heir. He was

[1] See above, pp. 27–28.

[2] See above, p. 29, and below, pp. 204–205.

ready smitten by the brilliant black eyes of a certain Anne oleyn, a maid-in-waiting at the court, who, if he were free to arry her, might produce the desired heir. He had, he thought, ood grounds for obtaining papal annulment of his marriage with atherine. She had previously been his elder brother's wife, and s such had no right, by church law, to marry him. To be sure, a apal dispensation had been obtained from Pope Julius II authoring the marriage, but now a revocation of that dispensation ight be obtained from the reigning Pope, Clement VII.

Clement VII might have acceded to Henry's wishes, had it not een for two considerations. One was the dangerous precedent of Pope's reversing another Pope's decision. The second, still orse, was the threatening attitude of Queen Catherine's nephew, ie Emperor Charles V. The Pope, complaining truthfully that he as between the anvil and the hammer, procrastinated.

The protracted delay was irritating to the impulsive English ing, who was now much in love with Anne Boleyn. Gradually his rmer effusive loyalty to Rome gave way to a settled conviction f the tyranny of the papal power, and he recalled efforts of earlier nglish rulers to restrict that power. A few salutary enactments gainst the Church might compel a favorable decision from the ope.

Henry VIII opened his campaign against the Roman Church 1 1531, when he frightened the English clergy into paying a fine f over half a million dollars for violating an obsolete statute that ad forbidden reception of papal legates without royal sanction, nd in the same year he forced the clergy to recognize himself as upreme head of the church "as far as that is permitted by the law f Christ." His subservient Parliament then empowered him to op the payment of taxes to the Pope and to appoint bishops in ngland without consulting the papacy. Without waiting longer or the decision from Rome, he had Cranmer, whom he had just amed archbishop of Canterbury, declare his marriage with atherine null and void and his union with Anne Boleyn legal. ope Clement VII thereupon handed down his long-delayed deision, which was favorable to Queen Catherine, and excommuniated Henry VIII.

The formal breach between England and Rome occurred in 534. Parliament passed a series of laws, one of which declared ie King to be the "only supreme head in earth of the Church

of England," and others cut off all communication with the Pope and inflicted the penalty of treason upon anyone who should deny the King's ecclesiastical supremacy.

One step in the transition of the Church of England had now been taken. For centuries its members had recognized the Pope as their ecclesiastical head; henceforth they were to own the ecclesiastical headship of their King. From the Catholic standpoint, this was schism, but it was not necessarily heresy. Yet Henry VIII encountered considerable opposition from the higher clergy, from the monks, and from many intellectual leaders, as well as from large numbers of the lower classes. A popular uprising—the Pilgrimage of Grace—was sternly suppressed, and such men as the brilliant Sir Thomas More and John Fisher, the aged and saintly bishop of Rochester, were beheaded because they retained their former belief in papal supremacy.

**Separation from Rome**

The breach with Rome encouraged Lutheran and other reformers to think that England was on the point of becoming Protestant, but nothing was farther from the King's mind. The assailant of Luther remained at least partially consistent. While separating England from the papacy, Henry was resolved to maintain every other tenet of the Catholic faith as he had received it; and his Parliament obligingly enacted a law of the "six articles" (1539), reaffirming the chief points in Catholic doctrine and practice. This middle-of-the-road policy was enforced with much bloodshed. The Catholic who denied the royal supremacy was beheaded; the Protestant who denied transubstantiation was burned! It has been estimated that during the reign of Henry VIII the number of capital condemnations for politico-religious offenses ran into the thousands.

During the reign of Henry VIII the important institution of monasticism was forcefully uprooted from England. There were abuses and scandals in some of the monasteries which dotted the country, and a good deal of popular sentiment had been aroused against them. The monks, moreover, had generally opposed the royal pretensions to religious supremacy and remained loyal to the Pope. But the deciding factor in the suppression of the monasteries was undoubtedly economic. Henry, always in need of funds, appropriated part of the confiscated property for the benefit of the crown, and the rest he astutely distributed as bribes to the

pper classes of the laity. The nobles who accepted the monastic roperty were thereby committed to the new anti-papal settlement in England.

The Church of England, separated from the papacy under Henry VIII, became Protestant under Edward VI (1547–1553).

**Protestant Church**


The young King's guardian tolerated all manner of reforming propaganda, and Calvinists as well as Lutherans preached their doctrines freely. Official articles of eligion, which were drawn up for the Anglican Church, showed nmistakably Protestant influence. The Latin service books of he Catholic Church were translated into English, under Cranmer's auspices, and the edition of the *Book of Common Prayer*, ublished in 1552 made clear that the eucharist was no longer to e regarded as a propitiatory sacrifice; the names "Holy Communion" and "Lord's Supper" were substituted for "Mass," while he word "altar" was replaced by "table." The old places of Catholic worship were changed to suit a new order: altars and images vere taken down, the former service books destroyed, and stained-lass windows broken. Several peasant uprisings signified that the ation was not completely united upon a policy of religious hange, but the reformers had their way, and Protestantism advanced.

A temporary setback to the progress of the new Anglicanism vas afforded by the reign of Mary Tudor (1553–1558), the daughter of Catherine of Aragon, and a devout Catholic. She reinstated the bishops who had refused to take the oath of royal supremacy and punished those who had taken it. She prevailed upon Parliament to epeal the ecclesiastical legislation of both her father's and her rother's reigns and to reconcile England once more with the Bishop of Rome. As an additional support to her policy of restoring the Catholic Church in England, Queen Mary married er cousin, Philip II of Spain, the outstanding champion of Catholicism upon the Continent.

**Attempted Catholic Restoration**

But events proved that despite outward appearances even the eign of Mary registered an advance of Protestantism. The new doctrines were propagated by an ever growing number of itinerant exhorters. The Spanish alliance was disastrous to English fortunes abroad and distasteful to patriotic Englishmen at home. And finally, the violent means which the Queen took to stamp out

heresy gave her the unenviable title of "Bloody" and reacted in behalf of the views for which the victims sacrificed their lives. During her reign nearly three hundred reformers perished, many of them, including Archbishop Cranmer, by fire. The work of the Queen was in vain. No heir was born to Philip and Mary, and the crown passed to Elizabeth, the Protestant daughter of Anne Boleyn.




In the reign of Elizabeth (1558–1603) the Church of England assumed definitely the doctrines and practises which we now connect with the word "Anglicanism." By act of Parliament, the English Church was again separated from the papacy and placed under royal authority, Elizabeth assuming the title of "supreme governor." The worship of the state Church was to be in conformity with a slightly altered version of Cranmer's *Book of Common Prayer*. A uniform doctrine was likewise imposed by Parliament in the form of thirty-nine articles, which set a distinctively Protestant mark upon the Anglican Church in its appeal to the Scriptures as the sole rule of faith, its insistence on justification by faith alone, its repudiation of the sacrifice of the Mass, and its definition of the Church. All the bishops who had been appointed under Mary, with one exception, refused to accept the changes, and were therefore deposed and imprisoned, but new bishops, Elizabeth's own appointees,

**Elizabethan Settlement**

were consecrated and a "succession of bishops" thereby maintained. Outwardly, the Church of England appeared to retain a corporate continuity throughout the sixteenth century. Inwardly, a revolution had changed it from Catholic to Protestant.

Harsh laws sought to oblige all Englishmen to conform to Elizabeth's religious settlement. Liberty of public worship was denied to any dissenter from Anglicanism. To be a "papist" or "hear Mass" was punishable by death as high treason. A special ecclesiastical court, the Court of High Commission, was established to search out heresy and to enforce uniformity; it served as a kind of Protestant Inquisition.

While the large majority of the English nation gradually conformed to the official Anglican Church, a considerable number refused their allegiance. On one hand were a number of Catholics, who still maintained the doctrine of papal supremacy and were derisively styled "papists," and on the other hand were various radical sects, such as Presbyterians and Independents, who went by the name of "dissenters" or "non-conformists." For a time, the number of Catholics tended to diminish, largely because, for political reasons, Protestantism in England became almost synonymous with English patriotism. On the other hand, the radical sects tended to increase their numbers, so that in the seventeenth century they were able to wage a political and ecclesiastical conflict with Anglicanism.

### (d) RADICAL PROTESTANTISM

Calvinism, Anglicanism, and Lutheranism were the chief but not the only forms which rebellion against Catholic Christianity took in the sixteenth century. In the midst of the religious ferment of the time, individuals and groups, far more radical than Luther and Cranmer, and even more radical than Calvin, gained followings here and there throughout western Christendom. It was not only against the Pope and the Catholic Church that these Radical Protestants inveighed. They assailed also the efforts of reformers to establish authoritarian Protestant Churches. In most instances they were hostile to any ecclesiastical organization of religion, and Christianity to them meant less a creed vouched for by theologians in a Church (Catholic or Protestant) than a way of life revealed to individuals by an "inner light." As a rule they sympathized with the contention of Luther and Calvin that the

Bible is the sole basis of Christian faith and morals, but they seemed to repose less confidence in the ability of educated persons like Calvin and Luther to interpret the Bible than in the infallibility of the common man.

This anarchistic character of Radical Protestantism rendered it in the sixteenth century repugnant alike to other Protestants and to Catholics; and because some of its apostles preached social revolution and the overthrow of existing governments, it was especially persecuted by kings and princes. Incidentally, it should be remarked that Radical Protestantism, on account of its anarchistic nature, cannot be treated, like Catholicism or any major form of Protestantism, as a single movement. It gave rise to "sects," rather than to "churches."

Of the great variety of Radical Protestant preachers who appeared throughout western Christendom in the sixteenth century, space permits us to mention only a few. These may serve, however, as exemplars of one or another set of radical principles which have had gradually increasing influence on the modern evolution of Protestant Christianity. The principles are those of Evangelicalism, Congregationalism, and Unitarianism.

"Evangelicalism" signifies the emphasizing of the emotional, at the expense of the rational, elements in Christianity. Its sixteenth-century exponents, so-called Evangelical Christians, while distrusting historic tradition and theology, accepted the divine inspiration of the Bible and believed that the way of salvation for each individual lay simply in feeling Christ, in experiencing a "conviction of sin" and a spiritual illumination or revival, which was reckoned as "conversion" and which made one a saint.

An early exemplar of this Evangelical Protestantism was Thomas Münzer (1489–1525), a German, who had received a university education and was serving as a Catholic priest at Zwickau (in Saxony) when Martin Luther rebelled against the Church. Under the excitement of the time, Münzer, with a number of fellow clergymen, experienced conversion, feeling the direct indwelling of the Holy Spirit, and in 1521 he hurried to Wittenberg as a "prophet" to convince Luther that the latter should be more radical. Denounced by Luther and expelled from Wittenberg, Münzer wandered for four years in Bohemia and Switzerland, preaching with rude eloquence and obvious sincerity not only a

complete religious revolution but also the overthrow of existing governments and the establishment of communism. Münzer participated prominently in the peasants' revolt of 1525 and, after its forceful suppression, was put to death by the Lutheran prince of Hesse. Among the tenets which Münzer deduced from his reading of the Bible was the belief that baptism should not be administered to infants, but only to adults after conversion. Hence arose the term Anabaptists—"re-baptizers"—to denote the followers of Münzer and similar sects.

**Anabaptists**

The reputation of the Anabaptists suffered from their association with the peasants' revolt, and even more so from the spectacular career of one of their number, a Netherlandish tailor, commonly known as John of Leiden (1510–1536). John read the Bible in his own way and became a prophet. He claimed to receive daily revelations from Heaven and to be entitled to both royal and divine honors. He sanctioned polygamy and himself took four wives. He attracted fanatical disciples and managed to seize the city of Münster and to hold it for a year as the Zion of the new dispensation. Eventually in 1536 Münster was recaptured by the Catholic bishop, and John of Leiden was executed.

It must not be supposed that John of Leiden was a fair sample of all the Anabaptists or other evangelical sects. As evangelicalism spread in the Netherlands and Germany, it appealed to many good quiet people, chiefly among the lower classes but to some extent among university-trained persons, who piously tried to lead a simple and pure life in conformity with what they believed were the precepts of primitive Christianity. Such a person, for example, was Menno Simons (1492–1559), a Netherlander who renounced the Catholic Church in 1536 to become an Anabaptist exhorter. Menno set no value on learning or on dogmas; he preached the "new life" and religious simplicity; he condemned as un-Christian the waging of war, the taking of oaths, the union of Church and state, and the baptizing of infants. From him sprang a special sect, known as Mennonites, which obtained adherents in the Netherlands, northwestern Germany, and Switzerland, and which has persisted to the present day.

**Mennonites**

Another type of Radical Protestant was Robert Browne (1550–1633), an Englishman and a graduate of the university of Cambridge. He was licensed to preach as a clergyman of the Anglican

Church, but, being dissatisfied with the organization and compromising spirit of Anglicanism, he formed a "congregation" of his personal disciples, under a "covenant" which refused "all godlie communion with wicked persons." In a volume which he published in 1582, Browne contended that Christianity should be organized, not under Pope or bishops or priests or secular princes, but in separate and independent congregations of lay Christians, who must be both believers and saints. Each such congregation should democratically draw up a covenant, or rule, governing the faith and discipline of its members, and should freely choose its own pastor. Browne was repeatedly jailed on complaint of Anglican clergymen, and in his later life he conformed, at least outwardly, to Anglicanism. But he had already contributed to the rise of the English radical sects known variously as Independents, Separatists, or Congregationalists.

**Congregationalists**

Congregationalism was an ecclesiastical polity which appealed particularly to groups of Radical Protestants, and there was a marked tendency for Anabaptists (who in time were designated more simply as Baptists) and other Evangelical sects to adopt Congregationalism. It was a church organization sufficiently loose to admit of many varieties of religious experience and actually to foster the multiplication of sects.

Not all Radical Protestants of the sixteenth century were "evangelical" as we have defined this word above. Some, in fact, were highly suspicious of mysticism in religion and were quite devoted to reason. These, in reading and interpreting the Bible, sought to divest it of miraculous elements and to establish a "pure" Christianity which should be "reasonable." The result was the emergence of Unitarian sects which denied the divinity of Christ and the doctrine of the Trinity and thereby departed most radically from the teachings of the Catholic Church and also of most Protestant bodies.

A celebrated Unitarian of the sixteenth century was a Spaniard, Miguel Serveto (1511–1553), commonly designated by his latinized name of Servetus. He came of a middle-class family of lawyers, and being of a curious turn of mind, he rambled for many years among various universities, taking courses in law at Toulouse, in medicine at Paris and Montpellier, and in theology at Louvain. For a while he lectured at Paris on

**Unitarians**

geometry and astronomy, endorsing the Copernican system and at the same time apologizing for astrology. For a while he practiced medicine at Avignon, and during the last twelve years of his life he was physician to the Catholic archbishop of Vienne (in southern France). In public Servetus conformed to the Catholic Church but privately he accepted the Bible as the sole guide to Christian faith and wrote out a theological treatise in defense of most Anabaptist principles though in criticism of the generally accepted ideas of the Trinity and Christ's divinity. In an attempt to convert the foremost Protestant leader of the time to his own views, Servetus corresponded with John Calvin and sent him the manuscript of the treatise. Despite the fact that Calvin was shocked and let Servetus know that he was shocked, the Unitarian physician, upon the discovery of his radical heresy by the Catholic authorities at Vienne in 1553, fled to Geneva and sought the protection of Calvin. Calvin promptly had him tried for heresy and burned at the stake.

Of more enduring significance for the development of Unitarianism was an Italian merchant, Fausto Sozzini (1539–1604), who is usually cited by his latinized name of Socinus, and whose principles are generally termed "Socinian." At first he outwardly conformed to Catholic Christianity; but gradually he came to disbelieve in the divinity of Christ and in personal immortality, and in 1575 he finally broke with the Church. After a sojourn at Basel, then a center of theological debates, he took up his residence in Poland, under the patronage of an Italian physician at the royal court. He wrote and preached a good deal, and it was in large part through his efforts that Unitarian sects sprang up and flourished in Poland and also in Hungary.[1] Socinus put rationalist interpretations on the Bible and was one of the forerunners of the modern "higher critics" of Christianity.[2]

[1] Unitarianism had first been preached in eastern Hungary (Transylvania) by Francis David (1510–1579), who was successively a Catholic, a Lutheran, a Calvinist, and a Unitarian. David finally condemned all worship of Christ and died in prison. Socinus then undertook a mission to Hungary, where he moderated David's views by teaching that Unitarianism did not preclude the paying of special honor and even "worship" to Christ. On the Socinian basis, a Unitarian Church, under "bishops," has had a continuous existence in Transylvania since the sixteenth century.

[2] Another forerunner of modern "liberal" Protestantism was Jacob Hermansen (1560–1609), a Netherlander, commonly known by his latinized name of Arminius. He protested against the tendency of his fellow Calvinists to stress dogma and

Radical Protestantism, whether of the emotional Evangelical kind or of the rationalist Unitarian sort, was relatively insignificant in the sixteenth century. Its devotees were denounced and persecuted not only by Catholics but by the major groups of Protestants—Lutherans, Calvinists, and Anglicans. Subsequently, however, the principles of Radical Protestantism exerted growing influence on Protestantism as a whole. They seemed the logical and natural outcome of the right of private judgment preached by Luther and of the dependence on Scriptural literalness emphasized by Calvin. On the one hand, Evangelical principles in time cleft Calvinism asunder, gave rise to Pietism among Lutherans and to Puritanism and Methodism among Anglicans, and provided the basis for the modern popularity of "fundamentalism" among a variety of sects—Methodists, Baptists, Congregationalists, etc. On the other hand, Unitarian principles in time contributed to the development of Deism and a critical attitude toward religious authority, including that of the Bible, and paved the way for the "liberal Christianity" which is nowadays widespread among Protestant bodies and which is very far removed from the Christianity advocated by most sixteenth-century reformers.

### 3. REFORM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH

We have now traced the Protestant revolt of the sixteenth century and noted how three major forms of Protestantism, together with a variety of radical sects, triumphed in almost half of the traditionally Catholic nations of Europe. The story of how, during that critical century, the other half retained their loyalty to the Catholic Church remains to be told.

It must not be supposed that critics of ecclesiastical abuses were confined to Protestants. There were many persons who demanded religious reform, yet believed that whatever change was desirable could best be achieved by means of a reformation within the Catholic Church—that is, without disturbing the unity of its organization or denying the validity of its dogmas. Even in countries which subsequently became Protestant, some of the foremost

argued against Calvin's doctrine of strict predestination. His disciples were persecuted and for a time banished by the severely Calvinist government of the Dutch Netherlands but gradually Arminian principles became influential in Holland, England, and elsewhere.

scholars of the period desired a moral reformation within Catholicism rather than a dogmatic rebellion against it.

Thus, while the religious energy of part of Europe went into the revolutionary creation of Protestant churches and sects, that of another part fashioned a reformation of the Catholic system. And this Catholic reformation, on its religious side, was brought to a successful issue by means of the improved condition in the papal court, the labors of a great Church Council, and the activity of new religious orders.

Emphasis has been put on abuses in the papacy in the fifteenth century, and on the Italian and family interests which obscured to the Medici Pope, Leo X (1513–1521), the significance of the Lutheran movement. And Leo's nephew, who became Clement VII (1523–1534), continued to act too much as an Italian prince and too little as the moral and religious leader of Catholicism in the contest which under him was joined with Zwinglians and Anglicans as well as with Lutherans. But under Paul III (1534–1549) was inaugurated the policy of appointing to high Church offices men renowned for their virtue and learning rather than for family position or financial profit. This policy was maintained by a series of upright Popes during the second half of the sixteenth century,[1] so that by the year 1600 a remarkable reformation had gradually been wrought in the papacy, among the cardinals, down through the prelates, to the parish priests and monks.

The reforming zeal of individual Popes was stimulated and reinforced by the work of the Council of Trent (1545–1565).

**Council of Trent**

The idea of effecting a "reformation in head and members" by means of a General Council of the Catholic Church had been invoked several times during the century that preceded the Protestant Revolt, but, before Luther, little had been accomplished.

With the upsurge of Protestantism, what had formerly been desirable became imperative. It seemed to pious Catholics that every effort should be made to reconcile differences and to restore the unity of the Church. It was argued that the errors of the manifold new theologies might be refuted by a clear statement

[1] Especially Paul IV (1555–1559), a strict disciplinarian; Pius IV (1559–1565), the uncle of St. Charles Borromeo; Pius V (1566–1575), who was canonized as a saint; Gregory XIII (1572–1585); and Sixtus V (1585–1590).

of Catholic doctrine, and a reformation of discipline and morals would deprive the innovators of one of their most telling weapons against the Church.

It was no easy task, in the troublous times, to hold a General Council. There was mutual hostility between Catholics and Protestants. There was uncertainty as to the relative powers of Council and Pope. There were national rivalries, especially between Italians and Germans. There was actual warfare between the chief Catholic ruling families—the Habsburgs of Germany and Spain and the royal house of France.

Yet despite these difficulties, which postponed its convocation and repeatedly interrupted its labors, the Council of Trent[1] effected a great reform in the Church and contributed materially to the preservation of the Catholic faith. The Protestants, whom the Pope invited to participate, absented themselves; yet such was the number and renown of the Catholic bishops who responded to the summons that the Council of Trent easily ranked with the eighteen General Councils which had preceded it.[2] The work of the Council was twofold—dogmatic and reformatory.

Dogmatically, the fathers at Trent offered no compromise to the Protestants. They confirmed the main points in Catholic theology which had been expounded in the thirteenth century by Saint Thomas Aquinas and which before the appearance of Protestantism had been accepted everywhere in western Christendom. They declared that historic tradition as well as the Bible should be taken as the basis of the Christian religion, and that the interpretation of the Holy Scriptures belonged to the Church. The Protestant teachings about grace and justification by faith were condemned, and the seven sacraments were pronounced indispensable. The miraculous and sacrificial character of the Lord's Supper (Mass) was reaffirmed. Belief in the invocation of saints, in the veneration of images and of relics, in purgatory and indulgences was explicitly stated, but precautions were taken to eliminate pernicious practices which at times had been connected with them. The spiritual authority of the Roman See was con-

[1] Trent, in the Tyrol, was selected largely by reason of its geographical location, being situated on the boundary between the German-speaking and Italian-speaking peoples.

[2] Its decrees were signed at its close (1563) by 4 cardinal legates, 2 cardinals, 3 patriarchs, 25 archbishops, 167 bishops, 7 abbots, 7 generals of orders, and 19 proxies for 33 absent prelates.

firmed; the Pope was recognized as supreme interpreter of the canons and chief of bishops.

A volume of disciplinary statutes constituted the second achievement of the Council of Trent. The sale of Church offices was forbidden. Bishops and other prelates were ordered to reside in their respective dioceses, abandon worldly pursuits, and give themselves entirely to spiritual labors. Seminaries were to be established for the proper education and training of priests. While Latin was retained as the official and liturgical language, frequent sermons were to be preached in the vernacular. Indulgences were not to be issued for money, and no charge should be made for conferring the sacraments.

The seed sown by the Council bore abundant fruit during several succeeding pontificates. The central government was reorganized. A uniform catechism was prepared at Rome, and by means of it laymen were instructed in the tenets and obligations of their religion. Revisions were made in the Church service books, and a new standard edition of the Latin Bible, the Vulgate, was issued. A list, called the Index, was prepared of dangerous and heretical books, which Catholics were prohibited from reading. By these methods, discipline was confirmed, morals purified, and the scandal of the riches and worldly life of the clergy restrained. From a strict law of faith and conduct, lapses were to be punishable by the medieval ecclesiastical court of the Inquisition, which now redoubled its activity, especially in Italy and Spain.

A very important factor in the Catholic revival, not only in preserving all southern Europe to the Church but also in preventing a complete triumph of Protestantism in the North, was the formation of several new religious orders, which sought to deepen the spiritual life of the people and to buttress the position of the Church. The most celebrated of these orders, both for its labors in the sixteenth century and for its subsequent history, is the Society of Jesus, whose members are known commonly as Jesuits. The society was founded by Ignatius Loyola in 1534 and its constitution was formally approved by the Pope six years later.[1]

**Ignatius Loyola and the Jesuits**

In his earlier years, Ignatius followed the profession of arms and as a patriotic Spaniard fought valiantly in the armies of the

[1] Another new order was that of the Oratory, founded in 1575 by St. Philip Neri. See above, p. 113.

Emperor Charles V against the French. But while he was in a hospital, suffering from a wound, he chanced to read a life of Christ and biographies of several saints, which, he tells us, worked a profound change within him. From being a soldier of an earthly king, he would become a knight of Christ and of the Church. Instead of fighting for the glory of Spain and himself, he would strive for the greater glory of God. Thus, in the same year in which the German monk, Martin Luther, became the leading adversary of the Catholic Church, this Spanish soldier began the career which made him Catholicism's chief champion.

After a few years' trial of his new life and several rather footless efforts to serve the Church, Ignatius determined, at the age of thirty-three, to perfect his scanty education. It was while he was studying the classics, philosophy, and theology at the university of Paris that he made the acquaintance of the group of men who became the first members of the Society of Jesus. Intended at first primarily for missionary labors among the Moslems, the Society was speedily turned to other ends.

The organization of the Jesuits showed the military instincts of their founder. To the three usual vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience was added a fourth vow of special allegiance to the Pope. The members were to be carefully trained during a long novitiate and were to be under the personal direction of a general, resident in Rome. Authority and obedience were stressed by the Society. Appreciating that the Church of the age was confronted with conditions of war rather than of peace, the Jesuits did not content themselves with prayer and works of peace, with charity and local benevolence, but adapted themselves to new circumstances and strove in a multiplicity of ways to restore all things in the Catholic Church.

Thus it happened that the Jesuits, from the very year of their establishment, rushed to the front in the religious conflict of the sixteenth century. They sought to educate the young, and as schoolmasters they had no equals in Europe for many years. No less a scholar than Francis Bacon said of the Jesuit teaching that "nothing better has been put in practice." Again, by their wide learning, no less than by the purity of their lives, they restored respect for the Catholic clergy. As preachers, too, they earned a high esteem by the clearness and simplicity of their sermons and instruction.

It was in the mission field, however, that the Jesuits achieved their most significant results. They were mainly responsible for the recovery of Poland after that country had been seemingly lost to Calvinism. They similarly conserved the Catholic faith in Bavaria and in the southern Netherlands. They aided considerably in maintaining Catholicism in Ireland. At the hourly risk of their lives, they ministered to their fellow Catholics in England under Queen Elizabeth. In the midst of the greatest dangers and privations, they conducted missions among the teeming millions in India and China, among the Huron and Iroquois tribes of North America, and among the aborigines of Brazil and Paraguay. No means of influence, no source of power, was neglected that would win men to religion and to the authority of the Pope. Politics and agriculture were utilized, and likewise literature and science. The Jesuits were confessors of kings in Europe and apostles of the faith in Asia and America.

**Political Considerations**

It has been pointed out already that the rapid diffusion of Protestantism was due to economic and political as well as to religious causes. It may be said with equal truth that political and economic causes cooperated with the religious developments that we have just noted to maintain the supremacy of the Catholic Church in at least half the countries over which it had exercised sway in 1500.

In France, a treaty—or concordat—of 1516 between Pope and King had peacefully secured for the French monarch appointment of bishops and control of benefices within his country, powers which the German princes and the English sovereigns secured by revolutionary change. Moreover, French Protestantism, by its political activities in behalf of effective checks upon the royal authority, drove the King into Catholic arms. The cause of strong government in France became the cause of Catholicism, and the latter was bound up with French patriotism to much the same extent as English patriotism became linked with the fortunes of Anglicanism.

In Spain and Portugal, the monarchs obtained concessions from the Pope like those accorded the French sovereigns. They gained a large measure of control over the Catholic Church within their countries and found it a most valuable ally in forwarding their political policies. Moreover, the centuries-long struggle with Islam had endeared Catholic Christianity alike to Spaniards and to

Portuguese and rendered it an integral part of their national life. Spain and Portugal remained strongly Catholic.

Somewhat similar was the case of Austria. Fear of the advancing Moslem Turk, joined with the political exigencies of the Habsburg rulers, threw that duchy with most of its dependencies into the hands of the Pope. If the bishop of Rome, by favoring the Habsburgs, lost England, he at least saved Austria and most of central Europe.


Ireland and Poland (with Lithuania)—those extreme outposts of Catholic Christendom—in course of time found in the Catholic faith an effectual safeguard of nationality, a useful weapon against aggression or assimilation by powerful neighbors.

### 4. DIVIDED CHRISTENDOM AND RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE

Long before the sixteenth century Christendom had been divided into two unequal parts, the smaller adhering to the Orthodox Church and comprising eastern Europe—Greece, the Balkan peninsula, Rumania, and Russia—and the larger part embracing central and western Europe and professing allegiance to the Catholic Church. In the course of the sixteenth century, as a result of the upheaval which we have been describing, the Catholic part of Christendom was sundered by the rise of Protestantism. By the close of the century, there were three, instead of two, divisions of Christendom: Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant.

**Major Christian Divisions**

To Catholic Christendom now remained Italy, Spain, Portugal, France, the southern Netherlands, the forest cantons of Switzerland, southern Germany (including the Rhineland, Westphalia, Bavaria, and Austria), Ireland, Poland, Lithuania, Bohemia, northern Yugoslavia (Croatia), most of Hungary, and recent oveaseas conquests in the West Indies, South and Central America, Mexico, and the Philippine Islands. With Protestant Christendom were now ranged northern and central Germany, Scandinavia, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, the northern Netherlands, Scotland, England, and most of Switzerland. In some of the areas of central and western Europe there was a good deal of overlapping. Protestant minorities existed in France, Ireland, the Rhineland, Bohemia, and Hungary. Catholic minorities survived in Great Britain, the northern Netherlands, and the states along the eastern shore


RELIGIOUS DIVISIONS
IN EUROPE
ABOUT 1600
CATHOLIC CHRISTIANITY
LUTHERANISM
CALVINISM
ANGLICANISM
PROTESTANT CHRISTIANITY
ORTHODOX CHRISTIANITY
NOTE: IN SEVERAL COUNTRIES, AS THE TEXT POINTS OUT, THERE WERE IMPORTANT RELIGIOUS MINORITIES. THESE ARE NOT SHOWN ON THIS MAP.
SCOTLAND
St. Andrews
IRELAND
ENGLAND
Oxford
London
NETHER-LANDS
DENMARK
Upsala
SWEDEN
Moscow
RUSSIA
Munster
Wittenberg
POLAND
Ghent
Noyon
GERMANY
Worms
Speyer
Paris
BOHEMIA
AUSTRIA
Nantes
FRANCE
Augsburg
Zürich
Geneva
Trent
HUNGARY
Vienna
Loyola
OTTOMAN
EMPIRE
Constantinople
ITALY
Rome
SPAIN
PORTUGAL
TRM

constituted Protestant Christendom, while it was southern Europe which remained within the orbit of Catholic Christendom.

Catholic and Orthodox Christendoms had each been cultural units for a very long time, enshrining for centuries, under Christian auspices, the respective heritages of ancient Rome and ancient Greece. And in their interpretation of Christianity they had always had much in common. Both accepted the basic idea of an authoritative ecclesiastical organization, consisting of a divinely ordained clergy of bishops, priests, and deacons, interpreting the Bible and tradition, dispensing the seven sacraments, effecting the miracle of transubstantiation, adoring the Trinity, believing in the divinity of Christ, honoring saints, venerating relics, and employing elaborate rituals. There were minor differences of usage and theology between Catholic and Orthodox but the really significant contrasts were two: the Orthodox denied the divine right of the Pope to govern the whole Christian Church; and the Catholic Church reprobated the dependence of the Orthodox upon secular governments.

**Eastern Orthodox Church**

At the time when the Catholic Church was losing its hold on northern Europe, the Orthodox Church of eastern Europe was experiencing a grave crisis and an internal readjustment. For centuries the Orthodox Church had centered in the patriarch of Constantinople and had been mainly an ecclesiastical adjunct to the Byzantine (Greek) Empire. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, however, with the capture of Constantinople by the Moslem Turks and the expansion of the Ottoman Empire, the local patriarch became a political agent of the Sultan, as well as the official representative of the Sultan's Christian subjects.[1] One of the results was a demand on the part of Orthodox Christians outside the Ottoman Empire for ecclesiastical independence. After protracted negotiation, the Russian Tsar obtained the consent of the patriarch to a reorganization of the Orthodox Church in Russia, and in 1582 Moscow became the seat of an independent Russian patriarchate. Thenceforth, the Orthodox Church, while remaining doctrinally one, was divided administratively into the two national Churches of Russians and Greeks, under the patriarchs of Moscow and Constantinople respectively, the former dominated by the Rus-

sian Tsar and the latter by the Turkish Sultan. Into Orthodox Christendom, Protestantism did not penetrate.

**Differences between Catholics and Protestants**

The religious divergence between Catholic and Protestant was deeper than between Catholic and Orthodox, for Protestantism was essentially a revolt against the central idea of the Church as held by Catholic and Orthodox alike. Yet at the close of the sixteenth century all three divisions of Christendom still held to a large part of common Christianity. They could still be viewed as a unit when contrasted in social customs and institutions with the cultural areas of Islam and Buddhism. All Christians still revered Jesus as their common founder and inspirer. All cherished the Bible and the memory of early apostles and martyrs. Moreover, the vast majority of Protestants retained a large part of the theology of the Catholic and Orthodox Churches, including the dogmas of the Trinity, the divinity of Jesus, the fall of man and his redemption through the sacrifice of the cross, and the future life of rewards and punishments.

Protestants as a whole were in agreement with the Orthodox against the Catholics on one doctrinal point, and that was the denial of the claims of the bishop of Rome and the consequent rejection of the papal government and authority. But on two fundamental points Protestants were as far removed from Orthodox as from Catholic Christians. (1) In their anxiety to purify Christianity and to restore it to its primitive character, they repudiated tradition and with it certain doctrines and practices which had gradually grown up, such as those connected with purgatory, indulgences, invocation of saints, veneration of relics, etc., and they introduced various changes in the traditional sacraments. (2) They made the Bible the supreme authority for Christianity and proclaimed the right and ability of each person to derive from the Bible, without help of Church or clergyman, the means of salvation. Thus to the Protestant, at least theoretically, authority resided in the infallibility of every individual, while to Catholic and Orthodox it rested with an infallible Church.

Relatively few Protestants of the sixteenth century grasped the full significance of their theory of authority. They preached it and their leaders frequently invoked it in their own behalf, but few of them were willing, in practice, to allow as many interpre-

tations of the Christian religion as there were individual Christians. To most of them it seemed as though all good Christians must find, under divine guidance, the same truth in the same Bible and that therefore their principle of individual infallibility would produce a single kind of reformed and pure Christianity. Luther was sure that he read his Bible diligently and piously and that his form of Protestantism must therefore be the true religion. But Calvin was quite as sure that he read his Bible with the utmost piety and diligence and that consequently his type of Protestantism must be devoid of error. Henry VIII seemed to regard himself as infallible, and a like attitude was apparent in many of the sectarians whom he or Calvin or Luther banned or put to death.

In the circumstances, though not intentionally, Protestantism was no such unit of faith as Catholicism or Orthodoxy. Despite conferences and debates among Protestant theologians and the employment of compulsion on the part of Protestant kings and princes, it was obvious before the close of the sixteenth century that not only was Protestant Christendom divided into three major parts, but that each part was tending toward ever increasing subdivision and that all parts were being increasingly influenced by radical sects.

**Mutual Intolerance**

The split in western Christendom between Protestants and Catholics was accompanied by an outburst of religious intolerance such as the world has seldom experienced. Catholic leaders felt that they were defending traditional Christian civilization against anarchical forces of rebellion and greed. Protestant leaders felt quite as sincerely that they were restoring the pure Gospel and safeguarding it against despotism, superstition, and corruption. To the former, Luther and Calvin and all the so-called "reformers" were possessed of devils; to the latter, the Pope was the beast, the "anti-Christ." From Sweden to Spain and from England to Hungary, men grew passionate about religion, and invective became fashionable in speech and writing.

The bitterness of debate about matters of faith was rendered more bitter by the attendant scramble of ambitious lords, burghers, and princes to profit financially from the religious upheaval. Kings and princes, intent upon creating national states and strengthening monarchical authority, could hardly view with

equanimity the existence of bitterly quarrelsome religious factions among their subjects, some of whom were only too willing to put loyalty to Pope or Bible above loyalty to temporal sovereign. It was but natural, therefore, that the rulers of every state in central and western Europe, whether they were Catholic or Protestant, should seek to give full force to the old idea that political unity depended upon religious unity and that consequently each state should employ its power to compel all its Christian citizens to conform to one official kind of Christianity. Naturally, too, Catholics applauded the King who forced his subjects to be Catholic, and Protestants praised the prince who compelled his subjects to be Protestant.

From the time when Leo X was faced with the Lutheran revolt, he and succeeding Popes of the sixteenth century banned Protestants and begged secular rulers to suppress heresy by force. The more upright a Pope was in private life, the more intolerant he was likely to be. On the other hand, Luther not only damned Popes and urged secular rulers to use force against Catholics but also cursed Anabaptists and other Radical sects and invoked against them the arms of temporal princes. Nor was Calvin an apostle of religious toleration; he would permit neither Catholic nor dissenting Protestant to reside at Geneva, and he burned the Unitarian Servetus at the stake.

Monarchs in Spain, Portugal, and Italy remained Catholic, and sought by every means to keep Protestantism out of their countries. They employed the Inquisition, the Index, spies, and police to get rid of religious dissent and make all their subjects conform to Catholicism. Comparatively few professed Protestants were actually put to death in these countries, not because of any tenderness for Protestantism, but because it never obtained any serious foothold in southern Europe. The several thousand victims of the Inquisition in Spain were chiefly persons of Moorish or Hebrew descent who had been converted to Catholicism and were suspected of relapsing into Islam or Judaism, or they were professed Catholics who were thought to be too mystical or too tolerant. Such a famous Catholic as Saint Ignatius Loyola was twice imprisoned by the Inquisition.

In the Holy Roman Empire the Emperor and a majority of the Electors remained Catholic, but many princes became Lutheran or Calvinist. Protestant princes persecuted Catholic

princes in Germany against the Catholic Emperor, they were intolerant of Protestantism within France. Despite persecution, however, Protestantism (especially Calvinism) spread in France and gave rise to a series of three-cornered civil wars among a faction of Huguenots who aspired to dominate the realm, a faction of militant Catholics who wished to destroy the Huguenots, and a faction of "political" Catholics who were less interested in the complete triumph of any particular religion than in the preservation of national unity. Sometimes the King cooperated with one faction and sometimes with another; it was while under the temporary influence of the militant Catholic faction that the youthful King Charles IX consented in 1572 to the massacre of St. Bartholomew's Day, in which several thousand Huguenots were cruelly butchered. At length, the leader of the Huguenot faction, with the support of political Catholics, became King as Henry IV and consolidated his position by two conciliatory measures: first, he conciliated the French Catholics by abjuring Protestantism and becoming a Catholic; second, he conciliated the French Huguenots by granting them a large degree of religious freedom.

**Edict of Nantes**

This grant, the edict of Nantes (1598), was highly significant in the modern story of the slow painful growth of religious liberty. It contained the following provisions: (1) private worship and liberty of conscience were allowed to Protestants throughout France; (2) public worship was permitted to Protestants in two hundred enumerated towns and in some three thousand castles; (3) financial support was promised by the government to Protestant schools; (4) the publication of Protestant books was legalized; (5) Protestants were accorded full civil and political rights; (6) Protestants might freely assemble and exercise certain judicial functions among themselves; and (7), as a special guarantee that the foregoing privileges would be respected, Protestants were to hold two hundred fortified towns for eight years.

It has sometimes been argued that the principle of religious liberty was one of the outstanding results of the upheaval of the sixteenth century, particularly of the rise of Protestantism. Perhaps it was so, in the long run and incidentally. But almost every sincere Christian at the time of the upheaval, whether he was Catholic or Protestant, was fanatically attached to the main-

tenance and spread of his own ideas of Christianity and entertained no real devotion to abstract principles of general religious freedom.

The exceptional edict of Nantes was dictated less by deep religious conviction than by pressing political need After a half-century of civil war in France, Protestants appeared too strong to be exterminated and not strong enough to exterminate Catholics, and it was obvious to a statesman like Henry IV that if France was to survive as a great power, Frenchmen must be restrained from fighting one another about religion.

**Slow Growth of Religious Toleration**

It was likewise with the first experiments in religious toleration outside of France. They were not made in countries solidly Catholic or Protestant, nor at the behest of leaders of the majority religion, but in countries whose citizens were divided in religion and usually on the initiative of a politic monarch. In Poland, King Sigismund II (1548–1572), a Catholic who had married a Calvinist princess, pursued a tortuous but on the whole conciliatory course in dealing with religious divisions—Catholic, Lutheran, Calvinist, and Unitarian—with such success that the Polish parliament in the year following his death, while confirming the privileged position of the Catholic Church, granted religious liberty to all non-Catholics. In Hungary, the invading Moslem Turks found it convenient to accord religious freedom to all kinds of Christians, and in Transylvania a Unitarian prince deemed it safer to tolerate Catholics and Calvinists than to attempt their destruction.

In fact, while the religious upheaval of the sixteenth century was immediately productive of unprecedented intolerance and bloodshed, it served to create a situation which, in the long run, was favorable to religious toleration. In the first place, it was gradually discovered in countries where political considerations dictated some accommodation among rival faiths that the toleration of religious differences was not necessarily destructive of national unity, that a state or a national monarchy might be strengthened, rather than weakened, by extending its protection to religious minorities.

Secondly, sincere Christians, especially if they were of a minority group in a given country, were anxious to secure toleration for themselves and could be counted upon to second the efforts of conciliatory statesmen. In Protestant countries the Catholic

minority espoused the principle of religious liberty, while in Catholic countries Protestants were natural advocates of freedom.

### 5. OTHER EFFECTS OF THE RELIGIOUS UPHEAVAL

So far, we have discussed two outstanding effects of the religious upheaval of the sixteenth century. One was the creation of a Protestant division of Christendom, differing widely from the earlier ones (Catholic and Orthodox). The other was the immediate stimulation of religious intolerance and inter-Christian war on an unprecedented scale.

There were other important effects. In the first place, the upheaval gave a marked impetus to a stressing of morals. Not only were many minds turned temporarily from other intellectual pursuits to theological controversy, but the individual Christian, whether Catholic or Protestant, was expected to prove by external conduct that his particular religion inculcated a higher moral standard than any other. Protestant clergymen had to be models of deportment for their flocks, and Catholics looked askance, as never before, at scandalous behavior of bishops and priests.

**Morals**

In this environment of moral earnestness, Puritanism arose and flourished. It involved devotion to a straight-laced code of morals and a high degree of intolerance of persons who contravened any provision of such a code, especially of persons who appeared to get enjoyment from "worldly" pleasures. Puritanism appeared among Catholics, Lutherans, and Anglicans, but it flourished most luxuriantly among Calvinists and Radical Protestants. It was exemplified in campaigns against blasphemy, bull-fights, dancing, theatrical productions, immoral books, and profanation of the Lord's Day.

The religious upheaval also had significant effects on art. For centuries, a distinctive Christian art had flourished, and the best European art had been employed in the service of the Church. As we have seen, the Popes at the beginning of the sixteenth century were patrons of architecture, sculpture, painting, and music.[1] After the upheaval, Popes continued to patronize art, and much the same art-forms continued to be cherished in Catholic countries. But the situation was different in Protestant countries. Protestants, by abolishing the Mass, de-

**Art**

[1] See above, pp. 107–110

crying ritual, and emphasizing the sermon, halted cathedral-building; and their repugnance to what they deemed superstitious or idolatrous in Catholicism led them to discountenance ecclesiastical sculpture and painting and to cause the more puritanical among them to go about smashing religious images and pictures, altars and organs, crucifixes and stained-glass windows.[1] Only in hymnology and certain forms of music did the Protestant churches make any original contribution to art. Of course, the pictorial and plastic arts continued to develop in Protestant countries, but outside the churches rather than within them and dealing with secular, rather than with religious, subjects.

**Witchcraft**

The Protestant revolt, while attacking "superstition," was attended by a notable access of the peculiarly unfortunate superstition of witchcraft. Witches had been denounced by a Pope in the latter part of the fifteenth century, and for a time Catholic officials had been zealous in hunting and punishing witches. From the middle of the sixteenth century, however, the persecution of witchcraft rapidly abated in most Catholic countries; the Inquisition exercised a humane and restraining influence on it, particularly in Italy and Spain; and in 1623 Pope Gregory XV finally forbade the infliction of the death-penalty upon any person who was accused of witchcraft unless he had actually committed murder. Only in France, among Catholic countries, was the hunt for witches seriously continued.

But at the very time when the witchcraft superstition was losing its hold in most Catholic countries, it was being eagerly accepted and widely spread in Protestant countries. Both Luther and Calvin believed in witchcraft, and Protestants generally, in their attachment to the Bible, felt themselves divinely commissioned to enforce such an Old Testament injunction as "Thou shalt not suffer a witch to live." Trials and torturings and killings of alleged witches were most numerous in Germany, but the contagion of the superstition was soon caught by other Protestant countries. The English Parliament enacted in 1563 a statute "against conjurations, inchantments, and witchcrafts"; and during

[1] One such iconoclast recorded with no little pride: "We went . . . with officers and souldiers and . . . we pulled down two mighty great angells with wings, and divers other angells, and the four evangelists and Peter with his Keies over the chappel door, and about a hundred Cherubims and angells and divers superstitious letters in gold."

the reign of Queen Elizabeth there were more than a hundred trials for witchcraft in England and about fifty executions. And during the greater part of the seventeenth century, the craze, instead of abating, became more intense in Germany and England, and also developed alarmingly in Scotland and Scandinavia. Lutherans and Anglicans and Calvinists seemed to be equally obsessed, and perhaps the climax was reached by Radical Protestants—Puritans and Congregationalists.

**Education**

The religious upheaval of the sixteenth century did not immediately promote learning and popular education any more than it got rid of superstitition. Our present-day systems of universal schooling did not spring directly out of sixteenth-century Protestantism or Catholicism.

It is true that Protestant leaders of that time usually favored education. Luther and Melanchthon talked a good deal about the need of schools. Calvin made Geneva an important educational center. In Scotland John Knox set forth the ideal of "an elementary school for every parish, a grammar school for every market town, and a university for every city." It is likewise true that contemporary Catholic leaders favored education. Reforming Popes and the Council of Trent urged the multiplication of schools, and the Jesuits founded numerous educational institutions of considerable repute. Yet the religious upheaval tended, on the whole, to interrupt and retard popular education. The confiscation of Church property served to destroy or reduce endowments of previously existing schools, so that in Germany and England, and other Protestant countries, the majority of grammar schools either disappeared or continued a starved existence with diminished funds; and the doctrine of salvation by faith alone and of the futility of "good works" dried up the source from which such endowments had flowed. The new schools which Protestant reformers or governments established were fewer than the old schools which decayed or were destroyed. The result was that formal education was confined more exclusively to the upper classes during the century following the religious upheaval than ever before, while the masses "sank into deeper and deeper ignorance."

The universities suffered particularly. They were frequently attacked by Protestant leaders as strongholds of the hated scholastic theology and philosophy, and such of them as escaped

this charge tended to sacrifice depth of learning to the superficialities of humanism, and breadth of scholarship to narrowness of sectarian argument. Attendance at universities lessened, and hostility to them increased. Catholic authorities forbade the faithful to study at Protestant universities and exercised a rigorous supervision of what was taught in Catholic universities. In Protestant lands universities declined, and some Evangelical Protestants, convinced of the worthlessness of "carnal knowledge," sought to abolish them altogether.

The religious upheaval had profound effects on politics and society, though only remotely in a democratic direction. The upheaval was caused in large part, as we have pointed out, by political and social developments which had reached virtually revolutionary proportions at the beginning of the sixteenth century, and it was in speeding up these developments, in completing a revolution already well under way, that the upheaval produced its major political and social effects.

First, a rising consciousness of nationality contributed to the religious upheaval, and the upheaval, in turn, promoted nationalism. The Christian religion was now largely nationalized. Protestantism everywhere involved a protest against the "foreign" and the "cosmopolitan"; it appealed to national feeling; and it adopted distinctively national forms and organizations. Lutheranism became a national Christianity for many Germans and for the Scandinavian peoples; Calvinism, for the Dutch and the Scots; Anglicanism, for the English. At the same time, Catholicism underwent a partially nationalizing evolution: greater emphasis was put upon the national character of the Church in France, Spain, Portugal, Poland, Ireland, and elsewhere; and larger concessions were made to national sovereigns. The result of all this has been that continuously since the sixteenth century all the major divisions of Christianity—Protestantism and Orthodoxy preeminently, and Catholicism to some extent—have tended to reinforce the linguistic differences and the national rivalries which have pushed the idea of Christendom into the background and rendered divisive nationalism a distinguishing mark of modern civilization.

**Nationalism**

Secondly, the spirit of capitalism, the yearning for quick and big financial profits, was steadily growing in the sixteenth century. It helped to produce the religious upheaval, and the

upheaval accelerated its growth. Princes and landlords, eager to acquire new sources of wealth, were happy to learn from Luther, Henry VIII, and other reformers that extensive landed estates of the Catholic Church might be confiscated. Bankers, manufacturers, and traders, intent upon the profitable conduct of their business, heard with joy the considered judgment of Calvin that the charging of interest (usury) had been unjustly condemned by the Catholic Church, that its prohibition in the Old Testament was not to be interpreted literally, and that its morality was exclusively a matter of individual conscience.[1]

**Capitalism**

As the new capitalism was already highly developed in Germany, the Netherlands, France, and England, it is not surprising that Calvinism found interested supporters among the middle classes of these countries. Nor is it surprising that wherever Lutheranism or Anglicanism was adopted, the nobility increased its wealth and strengthened its social position. In northern Germany, Scandinavia, and England, titled lords shared with their sovereigns in the confiscation of Church lands and thereby assured the economic and social supremacy of landed aristocracy in those countries for the next three centuries.

Then, thirdly, the absolutist ambitions of princes and national monarchs, already much in evidence at the opening of the sixteenth century, were forwarded by the religious upheaval. By confiscation of Church lands, by appropriation of powers hitherto exercised by the Pope, and by establishment of effective control over the local clergy, the Tudor sovereigns in England, the Kings in Scandinavia, and the German princes were enriched in purse and freed from being hampered by an independent ecclesiastical organization. In Catholic countries, also, as we have seen, the monarchs took advantage of the Pope's difficulties to wring from him such concessions as resulted in shackling the Church to the crown. As the divine right of the Popes was denied or flouted, the divine right of Kings was asserted and insisted upon. For two centuries after the sixteenth, the absolutism of kings and princes was a very real fact in the political history of most countries of Europe.

**Royal Absolutism**

[1] In England, prior to Calvin's judgment, a law was enacted under Edward VI forbidding usury "as a vice most odious and detestable" and "by the word of God prohibited." Afterwards, in 1571, under Elizabeth, this law was repealed as having operated to "the utter undoing of many gentlemen, merchants, occupiers, and others," and usury up to ten per cent was pronounced not sinful but legal.

Democracy

It has been held by some writers that modern political democracy is a result of the rise of Protestantism in the sixteenth century. This is true only partially and indirectly. Protestantism did emphasize, at least in theory, the individualism which is a basic element in modern democratic doctrine; and some of the Radical Protestants, notably the Congregationalists, adopted from the outset democratic methods of Church government. But these Radical Protestants were disliked and denounced almost as bitterly by the majority of sixteenth-century Protestants as by contemporary Catholics, and the original major forms of Protestantism—Lutheran, Anglican, and even Calvinist—were aristocratic, rather than democratic, in actual operation and influence. True it is that religious minorities were inclined to resist the authority of a monarch or a class that sought to impose another faith upon them; and inasmuch as Calvinists constituted just such minorities in the Spanish Netherlands, in France, in Hungary, and in England, they got the reputation, from their political agitations and revolts, of standing for the principle of democracy against that of autocracy. They did take a stand against autocracy, but whenever they succeeded in overthrowing a monarch, as in the Netherlands and Scotland (and later in England), they substituted for his regime a class government which would not nowadays be deemed democratic.

It should also be borne in mind that prior to the religious upheaval national states had evolved institutions of representative government, and some of the very monastic orders which Protestants suppressed in the sixteenth century were still managing their own affairs as democratically as were contemporary Congregationalists. Besides, the opposition to monarchical absolutism was no monopoly of Calvinists. It was voiced by several eminent Catholics of the time, including two Spanish Jesuits: Mariana (1536–1624), who contended that it was lawful to overthrow a tyrant; and Suarez (1548–1617), who argued against the divine right of kings on the ground that God has made all men equal and has entrusted them jointly with supreme political power.

In time there would be a widespread revolt throughout Europe against royal absolutism; and Protestants, especially those of Calvinist and Radical antecedents, would play an important role in precipitating it in Scotland, England, and America. But in Europe the first large-scale experimentation with

what we now think of as political democracy would be made in France.

An important caution must be observed in ascribing all the "effects" which have here been indicated to the religious upheaval of the sixteenth century. Religious upheaval was only one phenomenon of the century. It was preceded and accompanied by revolutionary exploration of oceans, discovery of distant lands, expansion of commerce, rise of capitalism, development of national consciousness and national monarchy, revival of classical learning and paganism, advance of natural science. All these phenomena, though we have considered them separately in this book, were inextricably interwoven with the ecclesiastical revolution of the sixteenth century, and we should be well aware that what, for purposes of convenience, have been described as effects of the religious upheaval, might be described as effects of the whole synthesis of sixteenth-century thought and action.

Finally, there remains to be noted one effect of the religious upheaval of the sixteenth century which, in political and social significance to our modern age, outweighs all the others. It is the impetus which the upheaval gave to "secularization," that is, to the process of transferring to lay states the direction and control of numerous activities which had previously been under the almost exclusive jurisdiction of the Church. Specifically, "secularization" began to be applied in the sixteenth century, particularly in Protestant countries, not only to Church lands and taxes but also in the domains of charity and education.

**Secularization**

In Catholic countries there was less secularization. The Church here retained for at least two centuries longer the management of schools and charitable institutions. Even in Protestant countries secularization did not immediately imply a lessening of emphasis upon religion as a subject of instruction in schools or as a professed principle in the guidance of charitable institutions. Protestant states uniformly insisted, for at least two hundred years after the religious upheaval of the sixteenth century, that all teachers should be "pious and godly" communicants of their respective national Churches and that the teaching of the Bible was a basic function of all education.

Yet secularization had begun and was to continue on a scale ever more intensive and extensive. The state was increasingly


determine social, economic, and educational policies, at first in Protestant lands and eventually in Catholic lands. The wide realms of human activity lying between purely personal religion on the one hand and politics, sociology, economics, and science on the other—realms which, though often disputed by Church and state, had usually been ruled ultimately by the former—were now, in modern times, to be gradually lost to the Church and appropriated by the state. For weal or for woe, the way was paved for state supremacy.



# PART II

## DYNASTIC AND ECONOMIC STATECRAFT

V. PREDOMINANCE OF SPAIN AND THE HABSBURGS
VI. PREDOMINANCE OF FRANCE AND THE BOURBONS
VII. CONFLICT IN GERMANY AND EXPANSION OF RUSSIA
VIII. BRITISH EXPANSION


EUROPEAN DYNASTIC EMPIRE OF CHARLES V, 1526
FROM MAXIMILIAN OF AUSTRIA
FROM MARY OF BURGUNDY
FROM FERDINAND OF ARAGON
FROM ISABELLA OF CASTILE
THE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE (NOT OTHERWISE MARKED)
ACQUISITIONS OF CHARLES V'S BROTHER, FERDINAND
NOTE—THE GREATER PART OF HUNGARY, INCLUDING TRANSYLVANIA, WAS IN CONTINUAL DISPUTE WITH THE TURKS. THE RELATION OF THE HABSBURG AND OTTOMAN EMPIRES IS HERE SHOWN AS IT STOOD IN 1547.
ENGLAND
Amsterdam
London
Ghent
Antwerp
Paris
FRANCE
LITHUANIA
Warsaw
POLAND
RUSSIA
Prague
Vienna
Budapest
Trent
Milan
VENICE
Venice
SAVOY
Pavia
Genoa
PAPAL STATES
Florence
Marseilles
OTTOMAN EMPIRE
Constantinople
PORTUGAL
Lisbon
Toledo
Barcelona
Rome
Naples
Seville
Granada
Cadiz
Palermo
400 MILES
TRM

# CHAPTER V

## PREDOMINANCE OF SPAIN AND THE HABSBURGS

### I. EMPEROR CHARLES V



ECULIAR circumstances conspired to make Spain the leading power in Europe during the sixteenth century. First, the Spanish army, as organized by Ferdinand and Isabella, was a most effective fighting force. It won renown by its sensational conquest of Moslem Granada (1492), shortly after the Moslem capture of Constantinople; and for a hundred and fifty years afterwards the Spanish infantry was deemed wellnigh invincible. During most of the sixteenth century, Spain also possessed the largest and strongest navy.

Second, Spain reaped the rich first fruits of the discovery of America, the exploitation of the West Indies, and the conquest of Mexico and Peru. Spain itself was largely an arid country and not so agriculturally productive as France or England; and its growing religious and political intolerance of Moslems and Jews handicapped the capitalistic development of its cities by depriving them of their most experienced manufacturers and businessmen. But these internal economic weaknesses of Spain were offset or obscured for at least a century by the influx of precious metals and priceless cargoes from overseas. Spanish ports soon excelled Venice and Genoa in business and bustle; and although the new wealth did not accrue permanently to Spain, temporarily it enabled the Spanish grandees and court to play in Europe a military and political role of extraordinary brilliance and variety.

**Factors in Spanish Predominance**

Third, the ruling family of Spain vied with ruling families of other (and somewhat older) national states in the pursuit of the Machiavellian statecraft of the age—the employment of every

means, military, financial, diplomatic, and marital, to enhance the size and prestige of the state and to exercise monarchical absolutism within it. And the Spanish royal family was remarkably successful and easily first in its marital statecraft. Through matrimony Spain became the political hub of Europe in the sixteenth century.

The royal family of Spain was descended from a Visigothic chieftain of the early middle ages, and various of its branches, much intermarried, reigned in the fifteenth century over the independent peninsular kingdoms of Castile, Aragon, and Portugal. In the latter part of this century, the marriage of Isabella of Castile with her kinsman, Ferdinand of Aragon, led to the creation of the united monarchy of Spain.[1]

Ferdinand and Isabella, the conquerors of Granada and the sponsors of the discovery of America, had three daughters for whom they arranged marriages calculated to extend Spanish influence far and wide. One was married to Emmanuel I, King of Portugal (1495–1521); thereby, it was hoped, the remaining independent state in the peninsula might some day be united with Spain and the resources of the Far East be joined with the riches of the Far West. Another daughter, Catherine, was married to Henry VIII, King of England (1509–1547).

**Dynastic Ties**

The eldest daughter, Joanna, the direct heiress of Castile and Aragon, was a bit odd and is known in history as Joanna the Mad. She was married to a strikingly handsome and wealthy young prince, Philip of Habsburg. His father was Maximilian I (1493–1519), Archduke of Austria and Holy Roman Emperor, and his mother was Mary of Burgundy, heiress of the populous and industrious Netherlands.

Philip succeeded his mother as nominal sovereign of the Netherlands in 1482—he was only four years of age at the time—and to the Netherlands he later brought his bride, Joanna. There, in the city of Ghent, in the year 1500 was ushered into the world Charles, the first-born son of Philip and Joanna, who was destined to impress the first half of the sixteenth century with his name and fame.

In 1504, on the death of Isabella of Castile, Joanna became

[1] See above, pp. 32–33.

titular co-sovereign of Spain with her father Ferdinand, but she was now so irresponsible that her husband reigned in her stead as Philip I of Castile and the Netherlands. But Philip was short-lived, and on his death in 1506 the crowns of the Netherlands and Castile passed to his six-year-old son, Charles. On this boy crowns seemed to rain. When he was sixteen the death of Grandfather Ferdinand showered upon him the whole Spanish inheritance. When he was nineteen the death of Grandfather Maximilian brought to him all the hereditary dominions of the Habsburgs. Thus under the youthful Charles I of Spain were fortuitously grouped in 1519 wider lands and greater populations than any Christian king had ever ruled. Seville, Madrid, Barcelona, Antwerp, Amsterdam, Brussels, Vienna, Naples, Mexico City, Lima, all owed him allegiance. His titles alone would fill several pages.

**Charles of Habsburg**

One more title Charles coveted, that of Holy Roman Emperor, which his grandfather Maximilian had borne. But this title was also coveted by the French King, Francis I (1515–1547), who feared lest the election of the master of Spain, Italy, and the Netherlands to the imperial dignity in Germany would upset the "balance of power," endanger the independence of France, and thwart his own ambitions. Both Charles and Francis (and Henry VIII of England, who entered the contest also) resorted to prodigal bribery of the Electors, but Charles's additional appeal to the fact that he was a Habsburg and in the best strategic position to protect Germany against the Moslem Turks at length carried the day and won him election as Holy Roman Emperor. He was crowned at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1520, and became the Emperor Charles V.

Never have greater difficulties confronted a sovereign than those which Charles V was obliged to face throughout his reign; never did monarch lead a more strenuous life. He was the central figure in a very critical period of history. His own character and the painstaking education he had received in the Netherlands gave him a lively appreciation of his position and a dogged pertinacity in discharging its obligations. His failures were due not to want of ability but to the multiplicity of conflicting interests among his subjects.

At the outset, we must recall the peculiar nature of the dominions of Charles V. They were a "dynastic empire." That is,

they did not constitute a single centralized state, like the earlier Roman Empire or the later Russian Empire, but a congeries of states and sovereignties which had been grouped together by fortunes of marriage under a particular family—in this case, the Habsburg family—and which were united only in the sense that they all had a common personal sovereign. Charles had no "imperial" government and no common administration for all his dominions. There was the form of an "imperial" government for his German lands—the "Holy Roman Empire"—but there was not even such a form for his Netherlandish, Spanish, and Italian territories. Each of these retained its peculiar institutions, with the result that Charles V was a "pluralist" rather than a unitary ruler. He had to function in as many different capacities, and in accordance with as many different customs, as there were distinct sovereignties in his heterogeneous dynastic empire.

**Charles's Dynastic Empire**

Each province of the Netherlands—the wealthiest part of Charles's domain and the part of which he was proudest—was a distinct political unit, for there existed among the seventeen provinces only the rudiments of a central administration and a common representative system, while the affiliated county of Burgundy (Franche Comté) had a separate political organization.

The crown of Castile brought with it the recently conquered kingdom of Granada, together with the new colonies in America and scattered posts in northern Africa. The crown of Aragon comprised the four distinct states of Aragon, Valencia, Catalonia, and Navarre,[1] and, in addition, the kingdoms of Naples, Sicily, and Sardinia, each with its own local government and usages. At least eight separate cortes or parliaments existed in this Spanish-Italian group, adding greatly to the intricacy of administration.

Much the same was true of the hereditary Habsburg group of states—Austria, Styria, Carniola, Carinthia, the Tyrol, etc.—but Charles soon freed himself from immediate responsibility for their government by entrusting them (1521) to his younger brother, Ferdinand, who by marriage and elections added the kingdoms of Bohemia and Hungary (1526) to the Habsburg dominions. The Holy Roman Empire afforded additional problems: it made serious demands upon the time, money, and energies of its ruler; in return, it gave little but glamor.

[1] The part south of the Pyrenees.

In all the diverse regions of his "dynastic empire" Charles had to do with financial, judicial, and ecclesiastical matters. He had to reconcile conflicting interests, and to appeal for popularity to many varied peoples. More than once during his reign he had to repress rebellion. In Germany, he was face to face with rising Protestantism which seemed to him to blaspheme his altar and assail his throne.

The Emperor's administrative difficulties were complicated at every turn by foreign politics. In the first place, Charles was obliged to wage war with France throughout the greater part of his reign; he had inherited a long-standing quarrel with the French Kings, to which the rivalry of Francis I for the Holy Roman Empire gave a personal aspect. **Warfare with France**

In the second place, and even more formidable, was the advance of the Ottoman Turks up the Danube and the increase of Moslem naval power in the Mediterranean. Against Protestant Germany a Catholic monarch might hope to rely on papal assistance, and English support might conceivably be enlisted against France. But the Popes, who disliked the Emperor's Italian policy, were not of great aid to him elsewhere; and the English sovereigns had domestic reasons for developing hostility to Charles. A brief sketch of the foreign affairs of Charles may clarify the situation.

Six years older than Charles, Francis I had succeeded to the French throne in 1515. The gradual enclosure of France by a string of Habsburg territories, to say nothing of the remarkable contrast between the mercurial character of Francis and that of the persevering Charles, invited armed conflict, and definite pretexts were not lacking for an early outbreak of hostilities between them. **Francis I**

(1) Francis revived the claims of the French crown to Naples, although his predecessor, Louis XII, had renounced them in 1504. (2) Francis, bent on regaining Milan, which Louis XII had lost in 1512, invaded the duchy and, after winning a brilliant victory at Marignano in the first year of his reign, occupied the city of Milan. Charles subsequently insisted that the duchy was a fief of the Holy Roman Empire and that he was sworn to recover it. (3) Francis asserted the claims of a kinsman to the little kingdom of Navarre, the greater part of which had recently been forcibly annexed to Spain. (4) Francis desired to extend his sway into the rich provinces of the Netherlands, while Charles was determined to prevent

further aggressions and to recover the duchy of Burgundy of which his grandmother had been deprived by Louis XI. (5) The outcome of the contest for the crown of the Holy Roman Empire in 1519 virtually completed the breach between the two rivals. War broke out in 1522, and with a few interruptions it outlasted both Francis and Charles.

Italy was the main theater of hostilities. In the first stage, the imperial forces, with the aid of a papal army, speedily drove the French garrison out of Milan. The Sforza family was duly invested with the duchy as a fief of the Holy Roman Empire, and the Pope was compensated by the addition of Parma and Piacenza to the states of the Church. The victorious Imperialists then pressed across the Alps and besieged Marseilles. Francis, who had been detained by domestic troubles in France,[1] now succeeded in raising the siege and pursued the retreating enemy to Milan. But, instead of following up his advantage by promptly attacking the main army of the Imperialists, the French King dispatched a part of his force to Naples and with the remainder turned aside to blockade the city of Pavia. This blunder enabled the Imperialists to reform their ranks and to march toward Pavia in order to join the besieged. Here in February 1525, on the Emperor's twenty-fifth birthday, the army of Charles won an overwhelming victory. Eight thousand French soldiers fell on the field that day, and Francis, who had been in the thick of the fight, was compelled to surrender. "Nothing in the world is left me save my honor and my life," he wrote his mother. Everything seemed auspicious for the cause of Charles. Francis, after a brief captivity in Spain, was released on condition that he would surrender all claims to Burgundy, the Netherlands, and Italy, and would marry the Emperor's sister.

Francis swore upon the Gospels and upon his knightly word that he would fulfill these conditions, but in his own and contemporary opinion the compulsion exercised upon him absolved him from his oath. No sooner was he back in France than he declared the treaty null and void and proceeded to form alliances with the Italian states that had become alarmed by the sudden strengthening of the Emperor's position in the peninsula—Rome,

[1] These troubles related to the disposition of the important landed estates of the Bourbon family. The Duke of Bourbon, who was constable of France, felt himself injured by the King and accordingly deserted to the Emperor.

Venice, Florence, and even Milan of the Sforzas, who owed everything to Charles. Upon the resumption of hostilities, the league displayed the same want of agreement and energy which characterized every coalition of Italian states; and soon the Imperialists were able to repossess themselves of much of the country.

In 1527 occurred a famous episode, the sack of Rome. Although Charles cannot be held altogether responsible for what befell, it was not displeasing to him that the Pope should be punished for giving aid to France. His army in Italy, composed largely of Spaniards and Germans, being short of food and money, and without orders, mutinied and marched upon the Eternal City, which was soon at their mercy. About four thousand people perished in the capture. Convents were violated, altars stripped, tombs profaned, the library of the Vatican sacked, and works of art torn down as monuments of idolatry. The pillage lasted nine months and was then halted only by a pestilence which decimated the invaders.

**Sack of Rome**

The sack of Rome aroused bitter feelings throughout Catholic Europe, and Henry VIII of England, at that time still loyal to the Pope, ostentatiously sent aid to Francis. The French King, however, on account of strategic blunders and the disunion of the league, was unable to maintain a sure foothold in Italy. The peace of Cambrai (1529) provided that Francis should abandon Naples, Milan, and the Netherlands, but the cession of Burgundy was no longer insisted upon. Francis proceeded to celebrate his marriage with the Emperor's sister.

Eight years of warfare left Charles V and the Habsburg family masters of Italy. Naples was under Charles's direct government. For Milan he received the homage of Sforza. The Medici Pope Clement VII, whose family Charles had restored in Florence, was now his ally. Charles visited Italy in 1529 to view his territories and at Bologna (1530) received from the Pope's hands the ancient iron crown of Lombard Italy and the imperial crown of Rome. It was the last papal coronation of a ruler of the Holy Roman Empire.

The peace of Cambrai proved but a truce, and war between Charles and Francis repeatedly blazed forth. In order to create all possible trouble for the Emperor, Francis made alliances with Scotland, Sweden, Denmark, the Ottoman Turks, even the re-

bellious Protestant princes within the Holy Roman Empire. There were spasmodic campaigns between 1536 and 1538 and between 1542 and 1544, and after the death of Francis and the abdication of Charles, the former's son, Henry II (1547–1559), continued the conflict, newly begun in 1552, until the conclusion of the treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis in 1559. By this treaty the Habsburgs retained their hold upon Italy, while France, by the occupation of the important bishoprics of Metz, Toul, and Verdun, extended its northeastern frontier, at the expense of the Empire, toward the Rhine River.

Indirectly, the long wars between Charles and Francis had other results than Habsburg predominance in Italy and French expansion towards the Rhine. They preserved a "balance of power" and prevented the incorporation of the French monarchy into the dynastic empire of the Habsburgs. At the same time, they facilitated the rise of the Ottoman power in eastern Europe; and French alliance with the Turks gave French trade and enterprise an advantage in the Levant. They also permitted the comparatively free growth of Protestantism in Germany.

More perilous to Charles V than his wars with the French was the advance of the Moslem Turks. Their greatest Sultan, Suleiman II the Magnificent (1520–1566), a contemporary of Charles, was rapidly extending Turkish sway, sometimes in alliance with the French King, sometimes upon his own initiative—and with almost unbroken success. In 1521 he declared war against the King of Hungary on the pretext that the latter had not congratulated him on his accession to the Ottoman throne. He besieged and captured Belgrade, and in 1526 on the field of Mohács his forces met and overwhelmed the Hungarians. The battle of Mohács marked the extinction of an independent and united Hungarian state. Ferdinand of Habsburg, brother of Charles V, claimed the kingdom; Suleiman was in actual possession of fully a third of it. The Sultan's army carried the war into Austria and in 1529 invested and bombarded Vienna, but so valiant was the resistance offered that after three weeks the siege was abandoned. Twelve years later the greater part of Hungary, including the city of Budapest, became a Turkish province, and in many places churches were turned into mosques. In 1547 Charles V and Ferdinand were compelled to recognize the Turkish conquests in Hungary, and the latter agreed

**Warfare with Ottoman Empire**

to pay the Sultan an annual tribute of 30,000 ducats. Suleiman not only thwarted every attempt of his rivals to recover the Hungarian territories, but remained throughout his life a constant menace to the security of the hereditary Austrian dominions of the Habsburgs.

While Charles V was struggling with the French and the Turks, he had to cope with a most difficult situation within the Holy Roman Empire. Had he been able to devote all his talent and energy to the domestic affairs of the Empire, he might possibly have transformed it into a compact German state. It should be borne in mind that when he became Emperor in 1520 the Holy Roman Empire was virtually restricted to German-speaking peoples,[1] and that the national unifications of England, France, and Spain, already far advanced, pointed the path to a similar political evolution for Germany.

**Difficulties in Germany**

National patriotism was not altogether lacking among Germans of the sixteenth century. They were conscious of a common language which was already becoming a vehicle of literary expression. They were conscious of a common tradition and a common nationality. They recognized, in many cases, the antiquated character of their political institutions and the need of reform. In fact, the difficulty was not so much a lack of thought about political reform as the actual conflicts between various groups concerning the method and goal of reform. Many Germans despised the Holy Roman Empire, much as Frenchmen abhorred the memory of feudal society; but there were fewer Germans than Frenchmen who advocated the establishment of strong national monarchy. In Germany were princes, free cities, and knights—all nationalistic after a fashion, but all quarreling with one another and with their nominal sovereign.

The Emperors themselves were the only sincere and consistent champions of centralized monarchical power, but they were probably less nationalistic than anyone else in the Holy Roman Empire. Charles V would never abandon his pretensions to dynastic world power in order to become a strong monarch over a single nation. Early in his reign he declared that "no monarchy was comparable with the Roman Empire. This the whole world had once obeyed, and Christ Himself had paid it honor and obedience.

[1] Except for the Czechs in Bohemia.

Unfortunately it was only a shadow of what it had been, but he hoped, with the help of those powerful countries and alliances which God had granted him, to raise it to its ancient glory." Charles V labored for an increase of personal power in Germany, in the Netherlands, in Spain, and in Italy; and with the vast imperial ambition of Charles, the ideal of creating a national monarchy on a strictly German basis was in sharp conflict. Charles V could not, certainly would not, pose simply as a German King, a merely national leader.

In these circumstances the several German princes, by defying the Emperor's authority and promoting disruptive tendencies in the Holy Roman Empire, were enabled to put the blame on their unpatriotic sovereign and thereby to arouse in their behalf a good deal of German national sentiment. In choosing Charles V to be their Emperor, the princely Electors in 1519 had demanded that imperial offices should be open only to Germans, that the various princes should not be subject to any foreign political jurisdiction, that no foreign troops should serve in imperial wars without the approval of the Diet, and that Charles should confirm the sovereign rights of all the princes and should appoint from their number a Council of Regency to share in his government.

In accordance with an agreement reached by the Diet held at Worms in 1521, the Council of Regency was created. Most of its twenty-three members were named by, and represented the interests of, the German princes. Here might be the starting-point toward a closer political union of the German-speaking people, if only a certain amount of financial independence could be secured to the Council. The proposal on this score was a most promising one; it was to finance the new imperial administration, not, as formerly, by levying more or less voluntary contributions on the various states, but by establishing a kind of customs-union *(Zollverein)* and imposing on foreign importations a tariff for revenue.

This time the German burghers raised angry protests; the merchants and traders of the Hanseatic towns complained that the proposed financial burden would fall on them and destroy their business; and their protests were potent enough to bring to nought the princes' plan. The government was forced again to resort to the levy of special financial contributions—an expedient

which usually put the Emperor and the Council of Regency at the mercy of the most selfish and least patriotic of the German princes.

More truly patriotic as a class than German princes or German burghers were the German knights, those gentlemen of the hill-top and of the road, who, usually poor in pocket though stout of heart, looked down from their high-perched castles with thinly disguised contempt upon the vulgar tradesmen of the town or jealously beheld the encroachments of neighboring princes, lay and ecclesiastical, more wealthy and powerful than themselves. Especially against the princes the knights contended, sometimes under the form of law, more often by force and violence. Some of the knights were well educated and some had literary and scholarly abilities; hardly any was a friend of public order. Yet the knights as a class were intensely proud of their German nationality. It was the knights, who, under the leadership of such patriots as Ulrich von Hutten and Franz von Sickingen, had forcefully contributed in 1519 to the imperial election of Charles V, a German Habsburg, in preference to non-German candidates such as Francis I of France or Henry VIII of England. For a brief period Charles V leaned heavily upon the German knights for support in his struggle with princes and burghers; and at one time it looked as if the knights in union with the Emperor would succeed in curbing the power of the princes and in laying the foundations of a national German monarchy.

But at the critical moment Protestantism arose in Germany, making a cleavage between the knightly leaders and the Emperor. To knights like Hutten and Sickingen the final break in 1520 between Martin Luther and the Pope seemed to assure a separation of Germany from Italy and the erection of a peculiar form of German Christianity about which a national state could be built. As a class the knights applauded Luther and rejoiced at the rapid spread of his teachings throughout Germany. On the other hand, Charles V remained a Catholic. Not only was he loyally attached to the religion of his fathers through personal training and belief, but he felt that the maintenance of what political authority he possessed depended on the maintenance of the universal authority of the old Church, and he needed papal assistance for his many foreign projects. The same reasons that led many German princes to accept the Luth-

**Religious Conflict**

eran doctrines as a means of lessening imperial control induced Charles V to reject them. At the same Diet at Worms (1521), at which the Council of Regency had been created, Charles V prevailed upon the Germans present to condemn and outlaw Luther; and this action alienated the knights from the Emperor.

Franz von Sickingen, a Rhenish knight and the ablest of his class, took advantage of the Emperor's absence from Germany in 1522 to precipitate a Knights' War. In command of an army of fellow knights, he attacked the landed estates of the Catholic prince-bishop of Trier. At this point, the German princes, lay and ecclesiastical, forgetting their religious predilections and mindful only of their common dislike of the knights, rushed to the defense of the bishop of Trier and drove off Sickingen, who, in May 1523, died fighting before his own castle of Ebernburg. Ulrich von Hutten fled to Switzerland and perished miserably shortly afterwards. The knights' cause collapsed, and princes and burghers remained triumphant.[1] It was the end of serious efforts in the sixteenth century to create a national German state.

The Council of Regency lasted until 1531, though its inability to preserve domestic peace discredited it, and in its later years it enjoyed little authority. Left to themselves, many of the princes espoused Protestantism. In vain Charles V combated the new religious movement. In vain he proscribed it in several Diets after that of Worms. In vain he assailed its upholders in several military campaigns, such as those against the Schmalkaldic League.[2] But the long absences of Charles V from Germany and his absorption in a multitude of other cares, to say nothing of the aid which the Catholic King of France gave to the Protestants in Germany, contributed to at least the partial triumph of Lutheranism. In the last year of Charles's rule (1555), the German princes were formally accorded the privilege of choosing whether they would be Catholic or Lutheran.[3]

Protestantism in Germany proved to be a disintegrating, rather than a unifying, factor of national life. It might not have been so, if it had been accepted or rejected by the Emperor and all the princes. In either of these cases, civil war would probably have

[1] The Knights' War was soon followed by the Peasants' Revolt, a social rather than a political movement. See above, p. 143.

[2] See above, p. 144.

[3] By the religious peace of Augsburg. See above, p. 144, and below, p. 227.

been prevented, religion would have been wholly or partially nationalized, and the central government might have been strengthened. Actually, however, princes and people in Germany were about equally divided between Catholicism and Protestantism, and the princes used religion as a cloak for opposing the Catholic Emperor, for reasserting localism, and for paralyzing every movement for national unity.

The Holy Roman Empire, then, was falling mortally ill during the reign of one of its greatest Emperors. But, by a curious irony of history, it was during the reign of this same Emperor Charles V that England was becoming more nationalist and was beginning to play a significant part in international politics. At first, Charles had regarded as a poor relation the English King Henry VIII (1509–1547), whose wife, Catherine of Aragon, was Charles's aunt. But before long, he had to take him more seriously. Henry VIII had, for several years, a very ambitious minister in the person of Thomas Wolsey. A self-made man and a priest of the Catholic Church, greedy of power and wealth and capable of a vast deal of hard work, Wolsey had rapidly advanced himself in the favor of ecclesiastical and temporal superiors. By 1515 he had become the mentor of Henry VIII, the director of his country's domestic and foreign policies, and a Cardinal of the Roman Church. He aspired to be Pope.

**England and the "Balance of Power"**

While strengthening the royal (and his own) authority in England by repressing the nobility, corrupting Parliament, and establishing the arbitrary court of Star Chamber, Cardinal Wolsey perceived in the conflict between the Emperor Charles V and the French King Francis I a golden opportunity to put England (and himself) in the forefront of Continental politics. There were Englishmen at the time who thought that their country should avoid entangling alliances and distant enterprises and should go its own way as a small, second-rate nation. But Wolsey thought differently, and with the support of the impetuous young Henry VIII he overbore them. He would have England hold the "balance of power" between Charles and Francis, taking part now with the one and now with the other. Such a policy would enhance English prestige abroad and English pride at home and would make Wolsey an arbiter of Europe.

Wolsey was more inclined to side with Charles V than with

Francis I. The former was Henry VIII's nephew by marriage; he was the ruler of the Netherlands, with which the economic interests of England required close and friendly contact; and he was in a better position to forward Wolsey's personal ambitions at Rome. Yet Wolsey for a time made a show of friendship for the French King, particularly in connection with the spectacular meeting of Henry VIII and Francis I on the "field of the cloth of gold" in 1520, with the result that Charles V felt obliged to exert special efforts (including the payment of liberal sums of money to Wolsey) to induce Henry VIII to support the Empire actively against France. Henry and Wolsey did send military forces to the Continent to help Charles V, but they were not very effective and on one occasion, after the sack of Rome in 1527, they were suddenly transferred from the side of the Emperor to that of the French King.

The marital difficulties of Henry VIII complicated the situation. The English monarch's determination to get rid of Queen Catherine [1] was bound to strain friendly relations between him and Charles V. The Emperor, as champion of his aunt, besought the Pope to deny Henry VIII's suit for annulment of the marriage. On the other hand, Cardinal Wolsey favored the suit because he imagined that his master, if free from the Spanish alliance, could be married to a French princess and that such a rearrangement of matrimonial alliances would better assure England's position as holder of the "balance of power." But Henry VIII had a mind of his own about women. He was moved neither by the tears of his Spanish wife nor by the diplomatic advantages of any French princess. He was resolved to wed Anne Boleyn, an English woman. The result was that Henry married Anne, Wolsey died in disgrace, Francis I was disappointed, Charles V scandalized, the Pope flouted, and England deprived temporarily of a leading role in international politics.

Toward the close of the reign of Henry VIII, when Anne Boleyn had been executed for adultery and the hapless Catherine had expired and a third wife was dead, a fourth divorced, and a fifth beheaded, and when the English King was threatening with death anyone who should discuss his matrimonial tribulations and was solacing himself with a sixth (and very discreet) wife, his relations with Charles V perceptibly improved. Eventually, when

[1] See above, pp. 155–156.

Mary Tudor ascended the English throne in 1553, really close and cordial relations were restored between the sovereigns of England and Spain. Mary was the daughter of Henry VIII by his first wife, Catherine, and was a cousin of Charles V. To Mary, Charles V married his son and successor, Philip II.

At length exhausted by his manifold labors, Charles V decided to divide his extensive dominions between his brother Ferdinand and his son Philip. In the Hall of the Golden Fleece at Brussels in October 1555, he formally abdicated the sovereignty of his beloved Netherlands. Turning to the assembled representatives of the people, he said: "Gentlemen, you must not be astonished if, old and feeble as I am in all my members, and also from the love I bear you, I shed some tears." At least in the Netherlands the love was reciprocal.

**Abdication of Charles V**

In 1556 Charles V resigned to Philip the Spanish and Italian crowns and to Ferdinand the Austrian domain and imperial authority,[1] and withdrew into a monastery in Spain to prepare himself for another world. He died in 1558.

Personally, Charles V had a prominent lower jaw and a thin pale face, relieved by a wide forehead and bright flashing eyes. In character he was slow and at times both irresolute and obstinate, but he had a high sense of duty, honest intentions, good soldierly qualities, and a large amount of cold common sense. In culture he was a product of his age. He was a Catholic Christian, conscientious in the practice of his religion and anxious to promote conservative reform within the Church. He was also a humanist, well read in the classics, and a discriminating patron of renaissance art, especially painting and music. He had some appreciation of scientific developments, though, like most of his contemporaries, he was a devotee of astrology. It was Charles V, moreover, who by his economic policies enriched the great banking family of the Fuggers and contributed materially to the rise of capitalism in Germany and the Netherlands. He directed the overseas expansion of Spain and authorized the first code of laws for European settlers in the New World.

**Charles the Man**

## 2. ERA OF PHILIP II

Philip II was the son of Charles V. Born in 1527, he reached maturity in the second half of the sixteenth century. And this

[1] Charles V retained the title of Emperor until his death.

part of the century may justly be characterized as the "Age of Philip II," just as the first half of the century may be said to constitute the "Age of Charles V."

Philip II did not inherit the entire territorial domain of his father. His uncle Ferdinand, who by marriage had already become King of Bohemia and of that part of Hungary not occupied by the Turks, obtained the archduchy of Austria with its traditional dependencies; and Ferdinand was chosen to succeed Charles V as Holy Roman Emperor. Philip received the remainder of the family inheritance, and an impressive remainder it was. It embraced Spain, the Netherlands, Franche Comté, Milan, Naples, Sicily, and the Spanish colonies in the West Indies, America, and the Philippines. Moreover, Philip was ever tightening the family tie between himself in Spain and his uncle and cousins in Austria. Ferdinand's son married Philip's sister; Philip's son married Ferdinand's granddaughter.

**Philip II**

Few characters in history have elicited more widely contradictory estimates than Philip II. Represented by many English writers as a despot and bigot, he has been extolled by patriotic Spaniards as Philip the Great, champion of civilization. These conflicting opinions are derived from divergent views of Philip's policies and methods, but of what those policies and methods were there can be no doubt.

In the first place, Philip II, in marked contrast with Charles V, prized Spain as his native country and his main possession. He had been born in Spain and he resided there during almost all of his life. He was patriotically devoted to the task of making Spain the greatest country in the world.

Second, Philip II was devoutly attached to Catholicism. He abhorred Protestantism as a blasphemous revolt against the Church and a grave menace to Christian civilization. He set his heart upon the universal triumph of his faith. If, by any chance, a question should arise between the advantage of Spain and the best interests of the Church (as he conceived them), the former must be sacrificed relentlessly to the latter.

Not only was Philip a man of principles and ideals, but he was possessed of a boundless capacity for work and an indomitable will. He preferred diplomacy to war, though he was quite willing to fight if the cause, in his opinion, was right. He was personally less accustomed to the sword than to the pen, and no clerk ever

toiled more industriously at his papers than did this King. From early morning until far into the night he bent over reports and other memoranda of kingcraft. Naturally cautious and reserved, he was dignified and princely in public. In his private life, he was orderly and extremely affectionate to his family and servants. Loyalty was Philip's best attribute.

There was a less happy side to the character of Philip II. He was suspicious and deceitful. He was too meticulous about details and minutiæ of administration to grasp the larger problems of statesmanship. He was so hostile to dissent in state and church that in a highly intolerant age he earned the reputation of being most intolerant.

In his efforts to make Spain the greatest power in the world and to restore the unity of Christendom, Philip II was doomed to failure. The chief reason for the failure is simple—it was the number and variety of the problems and projects with which he was concerned. It was a case of the King's putting a finger in too many pies—he was cruelly burned. If Philip II could have attended to one thing at a time, he might conceivably have had greater success, but he had to divide his attention between supervising the complex administration of his already wide dominions and annexing in addition the monarchy and empire of Portugal; between promoting a vigorous commercial and colonial policy and suppressing a stubborn revolt in the Netherlands; between championing Catholicism in both England and France and protecting Christendom against victorious Moslems. It was this multiplicity of interests, together with financial difficulties, that paralyzed the might of the Spanish monarch, yet each one of his foreign activities was epochal in the history of the country affected.

Philip II inherited a number of states which had separate political institutions and customs. He believed in national unification, at least for Spain. National unification implied uniformity, and uniformity implied greater power of the crown. So Philip sought to further the work of his great-grandparents, Ferdinand and Isabella. Politically Philip made no pretense of consulting the Cortes on legislation, and, although he convoked them to vote new taxes, he established the rule that the old taxes were to be considered as granted in perpetuity and as constituting the ordinary revenue of the crown. He treated the nobles as ornamental rather than useful, retiring them from royal offices in favor

of lawyers and other members of the middle class. In contrast with Charles V, Philip II had a "court" conception of government, that everything was to be directed by him from his court and through his secretaries. All affairs of state were thus conducted by correspondence and with a final reference to the King, and the natural result was red tape and delay and eventually a paralyzing of local initiative and efficient central government.

**"Court Government"**

A major concern of Philip II throughout his reign was the colonization and development of Spain's extensive possessions in America. By 1600 there were some 150,000 Spanish settlers in the New World, and they had founded more than 200 towns and cities. The colonial empire was ruled by viceroys and governors who were directly responsible to a Council of the Indies, which had its seat at Seville and was firmly controlled by the King. The King likewise kept the Church in the colonies subordinate to the crown and made it an instrument of political management as well as religious instruction. By the close of his reign, there were in Spanish America four archbishoprics, twenty-four bishoprics, and some 360 monasteries and convents, besides numerous schools and two flourishing universities.

**American Colonial Empire**

To meet his many financial needs, Philip II systematically exploited the rich silver deposits in his American colonies. The opening of the Potosi deposit in Peru in 1545 and of Zacatecas in Mexico a year later had shown that the wealth to be obtained from looting the old Indian empires was trifling compared to what could be gotten by mining. Other mines were discovered and developed. As a result, silver imports into Spain rose rapidly, until they reached a peak in the last decade of Philip's reign, when they amounted to more than 1,230,000 pounds. This figure is not very large in terms of present-day world production. But in the sixteenth century it was epoch-making.

In the early part of the century, Charles V had let German and Dutch bankers, who were his subjects, play an important part in developing Spanish America. Under Philip II, trade and emigration were restricted to Spaniards, and, in theory at least, to Castilians. Moreover, all merchandise (including silver) was carried by royal ships, though on behalf of private merchants. Commerce with the colonies had to go in and out of a single port

in Spain and a few specified ports in America. For protection the ships usually crossed the ocean in large fleets, two fleets going each way every year. Both set out with sealed instructions, and the routes were varied each time to thwart foreign prowlers and pirates.

The American trade and especially the silver imports, of which a fifth went to the crown as a tax, were carefully supervised by a *Casa de Contratación* (House of Trade), aided by a merchants' court called the *Consullado,* which settled disputes and tried commercial cases. Stringent regulations were made and enforced by heavy penalties to prevent the smuggling of silver.

On paper, Spain under Philip II had a perfect monopoly of trade with America and of its silver resources. But this required constant vigilance against inroads and depredations by covetous Dutch, English, and French. In fact, these foreigners obtained a gradually increasing share of the wealth which otherwise accrued to Spain from America. They obtained it in a variety of ways: legally, by selling to Spain goods which it did not produce but which were needed for the colonies; illegally, by bribing Spanish merchants to ship goods for them or themselves smuggling goods in and out of the colonies; and forcefully, by attacking and plundering Spanish treasure ships on the high seas.

**Financial Difficulties**

Even the very considerable wealth which Spain actually derived from America during the reign of Philip II proved troublesome and inadequate. It raised prices so much in the home market that Spanish products could not meet foreign competition and suffered decline. The more that silver flowed into Spain, the more it flowed out again to buy goods and support the King's far-flung military efforts. And meanwhile Philip II did little to encourage industry within Spain. The ten per cent sales tax, called the *alcabala,* which was collected on each transaction, hampered trade and slowed production. The sheep-herding corporation, the *Mesta,* won the King's support at the expense of other kinds of agriculture. The religious persecution of persons of Jewish and Moorish ancestry was a serious blow to a particularly industrious part of Spain's population.

Nor was Philip II able to secure any compensatory financial aid. Castile was the poorest part of his dominions in natural resources, and the taxes he could get from it were strictly limited.

In Aragon, the Cortes (or parliament) was peculiarly jealous of its rights and would grant him little. His Italian possessions barely paid expenses. And the income from the rich Netherlands, at first large, was stopped by rebellion and war. If Philip II could have solved Spain's financial problems, he might have been more successful in his many European endeavors.

**Annexation of Portugal**

A major addition to Spain's difficulties came in 1580, when Philip II, eager to complete the political union of the Iberian peninsula, laid claim to the throne of Portugal, whose King had just died without direct male heirs. Philip bought off the Duke of Braganza, whose right to the Portuguese crown was better than his own, and sent in Spanish troops to take over the country. Despite Philip's efforts to placate the Portuguese by recognition of their constitutional rights, Spanish rule was unpopular in Portugal. Spain, moreover, had now the responsibility of trying to defend Portugal and its extensive overseas empire, without receiving from that country much financial or military support.

Signs of the opposition to Philip II's policies in Spain itself were the revolts he faced at home. When he attempted to stamp out heresy among the Moriscos, the Christianized descendants of the Moors in southern Spain, they rebelled in 1568 and were suppressed only after two years of bitter fighting. A rebellion in Aragon in 1591 had to be put down by a Castilian army, and as a result the traditional privileges of that kingdom were reduced.

**Revolt of Netherlands**

Of the manifold difficulties which Philip II faced abroad, the most serious and protracted was the revolt of the rich and populous Netherlands, which began about 1566 and was still in progress at his death in 1598. The causes of this revolt were fourfold. (1) *Financial.* The taxes which Charles V had laid upon the country were increased by Philip II and often applied to defray the expenses of other parts of the Spanish possessions; and the restrictions which Philip imposed upon Dutch commerce in the interest of Spain threatened to lessen the wonted economic prosperity of the Netherlands. (2) *Political.* Philip II, seeking to centralize authority in the Netherlands, deprived the cities and nobles of many of their traditional privileges. He never visited the country in person after 1559, and he entrusted its government largely to Spaniards rather than to native leaders. The scions of the old noble families of the

Netherlands naturally resented being supplanted in lucrative and honorable public offices by foreigners. (3) *Religious.* Despite the rapid spread of Calvinistic Protestantism throughout the northern provinces, Philip tried to force Catholicism upon all of his subjects. He increased the number of bishoprics, decreed acts of uniformity, and utilized the Spanish Inquisition to carry his policy into effect. (4) *Personal.* The Netherlanders loved Charles V because he had been born and reared among them and always considered their country his native land. Philip II was born and brought up in Spain. He spoke a language alien to the Netherlands, and by their inhabitants he was thought of as a stranger.

At first the opposition in the Netherlands was directed chiefly against the Inquisition and the presence of Spanish garrisons in the towns. The Regent, Margaret of Parma, Philip's half-sister, endeavored to banish public discontent by a few concessions. The Spanish troops were withdrawn and certain unpopular officials were dismissed. But influential noblemen and burghers banded themselves together early in 1566 and presented to the Regent a petition, in which, while protesting their loyalty, they expressed fear of a general revolt and begged that a special embassy be sent to Philip to urge upon him the necessity of abolishing the Inquisition and redressing their other grievances. The Regent, at first disquieted by the petitioners, was reassured by one of her advisers, who exclaimed, "What, Madam, is your Highness afraid of these beggars?" Henceforth the chief opponents of Philip's policies in the Netherlands humorously labeled themselves "Beggars" and assumed the emblems of common begging, the wallet and the bowl. In accordance with the Beggars' petition, an embassy was despatched to Spain to lay their grievances before Philip II.

Philip II at first promised to abolish the Inquisition in the Netherlands, but soon repented of his promise. For meanwhile, mobs of radical Protestants, far more revoluntionary than the respectable "Beggars," rushed to arms, broke into Catholic churches, wrecked altars, smashed images, and profaned monasteries. In August 1566, this sacrilegious iconoclasm reached its climax in the ruin of the magnificent cathedral at Antwerp. Philip replied by sending (1567) his most famous general, the Duke of Alba, into the Netherlands with an army and instructions to cow the people into submission.

One of Alba's first acts was the creation of a "Council of Troubles," an arbitrary tribunal which tried cases of treason with such severity as to merit its popular appellation of the "Council of Blood." During the Duke's stay of six years, some eight thousand persons were executed. Moreover, Alba levied a heavy sales tax, which, together with the lawless confusion throughout the country, was a serious blow to the economic prosperity of the Netherlands. It was quite natural, therefore, that the burgesses of the southern Netherlands, Catholic though most of them were, should unite with the nobles and with the Protestants in the north in rebellion against Spanish rule.

**William of Orange**

One of the principal noblemen of the Netherlands was a German, William of Nassau, Prince of Orange.[1] He had been governing the provinces of Holland and Zeeland when Alba arrived, but as he was already at the point of accepting Protestantism he had prudently retired into Germany, leaving his estates to be confiscated by the Spanish governor. Certain trifling successes of the insurgents now called William back to head the popular movement. For many years he bore the brunt of the war and proved himself a resourceful general, an able diplomat, and a whole-souled patriot.

The first armed forces of William of Orange were easily routed by Alba, but in 1569 a more menacing situation was presented. In that year William began to charter corsairs and privateers to prey upon Spanish shipping. These "Sea Beggars," as they were called, stopped at nothing in their hatred of Catholics and Spaniards. While laying the foundation of Dutch maritime power, they proved a constant torment to Alba. They made frequent incursions into the numerous waterways of the Netherlands and perpetually fanned the embers of revolt on land. Gradually William collected new recruits, who fought Alba with increasing success.

In 1573 Alba was recalled to Spain and replaced in the Dutch regency by the more politic Requesens, who continued the struggle with even less success than Alba. Requesens died in 1576, and shortly afterwards the Spanish army in the Netherlands, left without pay or food, mutinied and pillaged several cities, notably

[1] William (1533–1584), now commonly called "the Silent." There appears to be no contemporaneous justification of the adjective "Silent" as applied to him. He was really quite talkative, but the misnomer, once adopted by later writers, has insistently clung to him.

Antwerp, with a savagery which has been described as the "Spanish Fury." Deputies of most of the provinces at once concluded an agreement, termed "the pacification of Ghent" (1576), by which they mutually promised resistance to the Spaniards until the King should abolish the Inquisition and restore their old-time liberties.

Then Philip II tried a policy of concession, but the new governor, his half-brother, the dashing Don John of Austria, fresh from a great naval victory over the Turks, soon discovered that it was too late to reconcile the Protestants. William the Silent was wary of the Spanish offers, and Don John died in 1578 without having pacified the Netherlands.

But Philip was not without some success in the Netherlands. He was fortunate in having an able and tactful governor in the country from 1578 to 1592 in the person of Alexander Farnese, Duke of Parma. Skillfully mingling war and diplomacy, Farnese succeeded in sowing discord between the northern and southern provinces: the former were largely Calvinist and commercial; the latter were Catholic and industrial, and partially French. The ten southern provinces might eventually have more to fear from the northern provinces than from continued union with Spain. Their representatives, therefore, signed a defensive league at Arras in 1579 for the protection of the Catholic religion and with the avowed purpose of effecting a reconciliation with Philip II. In the same year the northern provinces agreed to the union of Utrecht, binding themselves together "as if they were one province" to maintain their rights and liberties "with life-blood and goods" against Spain and to grant freedom of worship throughout the confederation.

**Division of Netherlands**

In this way the "pacification of Ghent" was nullified and the Netherlands were split into two parts, each going its own way, each developing its own history. The southern portion was to remain in Habsburg hands for over two centuries, being successively termed "Spanish Netherlands" and "Austrian Netherlands"; roughly speaking, it is what today we call Belgium. The northern portion was to become free and independent, and, as the "United Provinces" or simply "Holland," to take its place among the nations of the world. For a considerable period of time Holland was more prosperous than Belgium. The latter suffered more grievously than the former from the actual hos-

tilities; and the Dutch,[1] by closing the River Scheldt and dominating the adjacent seas, dealt a blow at the industrial and commercial supremacy of Antwerp and transferred the chief trade and business of the Netherlands to their own city of Amsterdam.

For many years the struggle dragged on in the Netherlands. At times it seemed probable that Farnese and the Spaniards would overcome the North by force as they had obtained the South by diplomacy. But a variety of reasons explain the ultimate success of the Dutch. The nature of the country rendered ordinary campaigning very difficult; the network of canals constituted natural lines of defense and the cutting of the dikes could easily imperil an invading army. Again, the seafaring propensities of the Dutch enabled them to fit out an increasing number of privateers which preyed upon Spanish and Portuguese commerce, as a result of which Amsterdam became one of the principal cities of the world, and Holland assumed a prominent place among commercial and colonial nations.[2] Thirdly, the employment of foreign mercenaries in the army of defense enabled the native population to devote more time to peaceful pursuits, and, despite the persistence of war, the Dutch provinces increased steadily in wealth and prosperity. Fourthly, the cautious policy of William the Silent prevented the Dutch from staking heavily upon battles in the open field. Fifthly, the Dutch received assistance from Protestants of Germany, England, and France. Finally, Philip II pursued too many great projects at once to be able to bring a single one to a satisfactory conclusion; his war with Queen Elizabeth of England and his interference in the affairs of France handicapped his efforts in the Netherlands.

**Independence of Dutch Netherlands**

In 1581 Philip II published a ban against William of Orange, proclaiming him a traitor and offering a reward to anyone who would take him dead or alive. William replied by a famous *Apology* to the charges against him; but his practical answer to the King was the Act of Abjuration, by which at his persuasion the representatives of the northern provinces, assembled at The

[1] "Dutch" is really synonymous with "Netherlandish," but in modern times it has been commonly used to designate the people (and language) of the northern Netherlands, that is, of Holland. The people of the southern (Belgian) Netherlands who speak Netherlandish are called Flemings, and those who speak French are called Walloons.

[2] See below, pp. 336–339.

Hague, solemnly proclaimed their separation from the crown of Spain, broke the royal seal of Philip II, and declared the King deprived of all authority over them. We should call this Act of 1581 the Dutch Declaration of Independence.

Although William the Silent was assassinated by an agent of Spain (1584), and Antwerp was captured from the Protestants in 1585, the ability and genius of Farnese did not avail to make further headway against the United Provinces. But Philip II, stubborn to the end, refused to recognize Dutch independence. In 1609 his son and successor, Philip III, consented to a twelve years' truce with the northern Netherlands. In the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648) the Dutch and Spaniards again became embroiled, and the freedom of the republic was not recognized officially by Spain until the general peace of Westphalia in 1648.

The seven provinces, which waged such long war with Spain, constituted, by mutual agreement, a confederacy, each preserving a distinct local government, but all subject to a general parliament (the States General). Besides, several provinces usually had the same Stadholder (or governor), an office which became hereditary in the Orange family. Between the States General and the Stadholder, a constitutional conflict was carried on throughout the greater part of the seventeenth century. The former, supported by the well-to-do burghers, favored the loose federal oligarchy, while the latter, upheld by most of the poorer classes, labored for the development of monarchical institutions under the Orange family.

Not only his efforts in the Netherlands but many other projects of Philip II were frustrated by remarkable parallel developments in the two national monarchies of England and France. Both these countries were fearful of an undue expansion of Spain, which might upset the balance of power. Both states, from their geographical locations, would normally be inimical to Philip II. England would desire, from its island position, to destroy the monopoly which Spain claimed of the carrying trade of the seas. France, still encircled by Habsburg possessions in Spain, Italy, and the Netherlands, would adhere to its traditional policy of allying itself with every foe of the Spanish King. Then, too, the papal authority had been rejected in England and seriously questioned in France: Philip's crusading zeal made him the champion of the Church in those countries. For ecclesiastical as well as for

economic and political purposes it seemed necessary to the Spanish King that he should bring France and England under his direct influence. On their side, patriotic Frenchmen and Englishmen resented such foreign interest in their domestic affairs, and the eventual failure of Philip registered a noteworthy growth of national feeling among the peoples who opposed him.

At the outset of his reign, Philip II was in alliance with England through his marriage with Queen Mary Tudor (1553–1558). She had temporarily restored the English Church to communion with the papacy, and was conducting her foreign policy in harmony with Philip's; because of her husband she lost to the French the town of Calais, the last English possession on the Continent (1558). Likewise, as has been said, Philip II concluded with France in 1559 the advantageous treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis.[1] But during the ensuing thirty years the tables were turned.

Mary Tudor died unhappy and childless in 1558, and the succession of her half-sister Queen Elizabeth, daughter of Henry VIII and Anne Boleyn, altered the relations between the English and Spanish courts. Elizabeth (1558–1603) was possessed of an imperious, energetic character; she had remarkable intelligence and an absorbing patriotism. She inspired such confidence in her advisers and respect among her people that she was commonly called "Good Queen Bess" despite the fact that her habits of deceit and double-dealing gave color to the French King's remark that she was the greatest liar in Christendom. This was the woman with whom Philip II had to deal. He tried many tactics in order to gain his ends. All of them were hopelessly unsuccessful.

**Conflict with England**

Philip first proposed matrimony, but Elizabeth was careful not to give herself, or England, such a master. Then when the Queen declared herself a Protestant and showed no inclination to assist Philip in any of his enterprises, and especially when she patronized raids on his overseas commerce and rebellion of his Dutch subjects, the Spanish King sought her dethronement. He encouraged sedition in England and Ireland and plots looking to Elizabeth's assassination. Many conspiracies against the English Queen centered in the person of the ill-starred Mary Stuart, Queen of Scotland, who was next in line of succession to the English throne and a Catholic.

[1] See above, p. 198.

Descended from the Stuart Kings of Scotland and from Henry VII of England, related to the powerful family of Guise in France, Mary had been brought up at the French court and married to the short-lived French King Francis II. Upon the death of the latter she returned in 1561 to Scotland, a young woman of but eighteen years, only to find that the government had fallen victim to the prevalent factional fights among the Scottish nobles and that in the preceding year the parliament had adopted a Calvinistic form of Protestantism. By means of tact and mildness, however, Mary won the respect of the nobles and the admiration of the people, until a series of marital troubles and blunders—her marriage with a worthless cousin, Henry Darnley, and then her scandalous marriage with Darnley's profligate murderer, the Earl of Bothwell—alienated the people and drove her into exile. She abdicated the throne of Scotland in favor of her infant son, James VI, and threw herself upon the mercy of Elizabeth (1568). She thought she would find in England a haven of refuge; instead she found a prison.

**Mary of Scotland**

For the score of years during which she remained Elizabeth's prisoner, Mary Stuart was the object of many plots against the existing governments of both Scotland and England. In every such scheme were to be found the machinations and money of the Spanish King. In fact, as time went on, it seemed to a growing section of the English people that the cause of Elizabeth was bound up with Protestantism and national independence, and that the success of Mary would lead to the triumph of Catholicism and the supremacy of Spain. Under these circumstances Mary's fate was sealed. Because of a political situation over which she had slight control the ex-Queen of Scotland was beheaded by Elizabeth's orders in 1587.

Philip II had now tried and failed in every expedient but one—the employment of sheer force. Even this he attempted in order to avenge the death of Mary Stuart and to bring England, politically, religiously, and commercially, into harmony with his Spanish policies. It has often been said that the underlying cause of the conflict between England and Spain was religious—that it was part of an epic struggle between Protestantism and Catholicism. Actually, however, there were very important economic motives. From the beginning of Elizabeth's reign, English sailors and freebooters, such as Hawkins and Drake, took the

offensive against Spanish trade and commerce; and many ships, laden with silver and goods from the New World and bound for Cadiz, were seized and towed into English harbors. The Queen herself frequently received a share of the booty and tended to encourage the practice. For nearly thirty years Philip put up with the capture of his treasure ships, the raiding of his colonies, and the open assistance rendered to his rebellious subjects. Only when he reached the conclusion that Spain's position would never be secure in the Netherlands or in America did he dispatch the armada.

The story of the preparation and fate of the "Invincible Armada" is almost too well known to require repetition. In 1588 there issued from the mouth of the Tagus River the most formidable fleet which Christendom had ever beheld—130 ships, 8,000 seamen, 19,000 soldiers. From the Netherlands it was to be joined by Alexander Farnese with 33,000 veteran troops. But in one important respect Philip had underestimated his enemy; he had counted upon a divided country. Now the attack upon England was primarily national, rather than religious, and Catholics vied with Protestants in offering aid to the Queen; it was a united rather than a divided nation which Philip faced. The English fleet, composed of comparatively small and easily maneuvered vessels, worked havoc upon the slow-moving Spanish galleons, and the wreck of the armada was completed by a furious gale which tossed ship after ship upon the rocks of northern Scotland. Less than a third of the original expedition ever returned to Spain.

**The Armada**

Philip II thus failed in his herculean effort against England. He continued in small ways to annoy Elizabeth. He tried, without serious result, to incite the Catholics of Ireland against the Queen. He exhausted his arsenals and his treasure in determined attempts to equip a second and even a third armada. But he was doomed to bitterest disappointment, for two years before his death an English fleet sacked his own great port of Cadiz. The defeat of Philip's armada was England's first title to naval and commercial supremacy.

Before we can appreciate the motives and results of the interference of Philip II in French affairs, a few words must be said about what had happened in France since Francis I (1515–1547) and his son, Henry II (1547–1559), exalted the royal power in

their country, preserved French independence of the surrounding empire of Charles V, and increased French prestige by means of an aggressive policy in Italy and by the extension of frontiers toward the Rhine. Henry II had married a member of the famous Florentine family of the Medici —Catherine de' Medici—a large and ugly woman, but ambitious, resourceful, and capable. By means of trickery and deceit she took an active part in French politics from the death of her husband, throughout the reigns of her feeble sons, Francis II (1559–1560), Charles IX (1560–1574), and Henry III (1574–1589). Catherine found her position and that of her royal children continually threatened by (1) the Protestants (Huguenots), (2) the great nobles, and (3) Philip II of Spain.

**Troubled French Politics**

French Protestantism had grown steadily during the first half of the sixteenth century until it was estimated that nearly a tenth of the nation was Protestant. The influence of the advocates of the new faith was, however, much greater than their number. The Huguenots, as they were called, were recruited mainly from the prosperous, intelligent middle class, the bourgeoisie, who had been entrusted by preceding French Kings with many important offices. The Huguenots represented an important social class, and one that opposed the increase of royal power. They demanded, not only religious toleration for themselves, but also regular meetings of the Estates General and control by the nation's representatives of financial matters. The Kings, on their part, felt that political solidarity and their personal rule depended upon the maintenance of religious uniformity in the nation and the consequent defeat of the pretensions of the Huguenots. Francis I and Henry II had persecuted the Protestants spasmodically and with considerable bitterness. Then, shortly after the death of Henry II, armed insurrections of Huguenots brought on a series of so-called religious wars which embroiled the whole country.

French politics were further complicated during the second half of the sixteenth century by a recrudescence of the power of the nobles. The so-called religious wars were quite as much political as religious; they resulted from efforts of this or that faction of noblemen to dictate to a weak King. Two noble families particularly vied with each other for power—the Bourbons and the Guises—and the unqualified triumph of either would

be certain to bring calamity to the sons of Catherine de' Medici. The Bourbons bore the proud title of "princes of the blood" because they were direct descendants of a French King. Their descent, to be sure, was from Saint Louis, King in the thirteenth century, and they were now only distant cousins of the reigning Kings, but as the latter died off, one after another, leaving no direct successors, the Bourbons by the French law of strict male succession became heirs to the royal family. The head of the Bourbons, a certain Anthony, had married the Queen of Navarre and had thereby become King of Navarre, although the greater part of that country, the region south of the Pyrenees, had been annexed to Spain in 1512. Anthony's brother Louis, Prince of Condé, had a reputation for bravery, loyalty, and ability. Both Condé and the King of Navarre were Protestants.

The Guise family was descended from a Duke of Lorraine who had attached himself to the court of Francis I. Lorraine was then a dependency of the Holy Roman Empire, but its Duke was French in sympathy, and he had aided the French King in securing Metz from the Emperor Charles V and in capturing Calais from the English, with a result that the Guises were popular with a goodly part of the French nation. The Duke of Guise remained a staunch Catholic, and his brother, the Cardinal of Lorraine, was head of as many as twelve bishoprics, which provided him with a large revenue and made him the most conspicuous churchman in France. During the reign of Henry II (1547–1559) the Guises were especially influential. They fought valiantly in foreign wars. They spurred on the King to persecution of the Huguenots. They increased their own landed estates. And they married one of their relatives, Mary, Queen of Scots, to the heir to the throne. But after the brief reign of Mary's husband, Francis II (1559–1560), the Guise family encountered not only the active opposition of their chief noble rivals, the Bourbons, with their Huguenot allies, but likewise the jealousy and crafty intrigues of Catherine de' Medici.

Catherine feared both the ambition of the powerful Guise family and the disruptive tendencies of Protestantism. The result was a long series of confused civil wars between the ardent followers, respectively Catholic and Protestant, of the Guise and Bourbon families, in which the Queen-Mother gave support first to one side and then to the other. There were no fewer than eight

of these sanguinary conflicts, each one ending with the grant of slight concessions to the Huguenots and the maintenance of the weak Kings upon the throne. The massacre of Saint Bartholomew's Day (1572) was a horrible incident of Catherine's policy of trimming. Fearing the undue influence over the King of Admiral de Coligny, a respected and able Huguenot leader, the Queen-Mother, with the aid of the Guises, prevailed upon the impressionable Charles IX to authorize a wholesale assassination of Protestants. The signal was given by the ringing of a Parisian church-bell at two o'clock in the morning of August 24, 1572, and the slaughter went on throughout the day in the capital and for several weeks in the provinces. Coligny was murdered, and several thousand other persons lost their lives.

The massacre of Saint Bartholomew's Day did not destroy French Protestantism or render the Huguenot leaders more timid in asserting their claims. On the other hand, it brought into clear light a noteworthy division within the ranks of their Catholic opponents in France. On one side were the rigorous followers of the Guise family, who complained only that the massacre had not been sufficiently comprehensive, and on the other side were a group of moderate Catholics, usually styled the *Politiques,* who, while continuing to adhere to the Roman Church and to support the crown, were opposed to the employment of force or violence in matters of religion. The *Politiques* were patriotic, and they blamed the religious wars and the intolerant policy of the Guises for the seeming weakness of the French monarchy. They thought the massacre of Saint Bartholomew's Day a blunder as well as a crime.

The emergence of the *Politiques* did not immediately make for peace. Rather, it substituted a three-sided for a two-sided conflict.

After many years of disorder, it became apparent that the children of Catherine de' Medici would have no direct male heirs and that the crown would devolve legally upon the son of Anthony of Bourbon—Henry of Bourbon, King of Navarre and a Protestant. Such an outcome was distasteful to the Guises and abhorrent to Philip II of Spain. In 1585 a league was formed between Henry, Duke of Guise, and the Spanish King, whereby the latter undertook by military force to aid the former's family in seizing the throne. French politics in that event would be

controlled by Spain, and Philip would secure valuable assistance in crushing the Netherlands and conquering England.[1] The immediate outcome of the agreement was the "War of the Three Henries"—Henry III, son of Catherine de' Medici and King of France; Henry, Duke of Bourbon, King of Navarre, and heir to the French throne; and Henry, Duke of Guise, with the foreign support of Philip II of Spain. Henry of Guise represented the extreme Catholic party; Henry of Navarre, the Protestant faction; and Henry of France, the Catholic moderates, the *Politiques*, who wanted peace and were willing to grant a measure of religious toleration. Henry of Navarre and Henry of France were upholders of French independence against the encroachments of Spain.

**War of the Three Henries**

The King was speedily gotten into the power of the Guises. But little headway was made by the extreme Catholics against Henry of Navarre, who received domestic aid from the *Politiques* and foreign assistance from Queen Elizabeth of England, and who benefited by the continued misfortunes of Philip II. At no time was the Spanish King able to devote his whole attention and energy to the French war. At length in 1588 Henry III caused Henry of Guise to be assassinated. But the King never had a real chance to prove whether he could become a national leader by expelling the foreigners and putting an end to civil war, for he too was assassinated (1589). With his dying breath he designated the King of Navarre as his successor.

Henry of Navarre, the first of the Bourbon family upon the throne of France, took the title of Henry IV (1589–1610).[2] For four years after his accession, he was obliged to continue the civil war, but his abjuration of Protestantism and his acceptance of Catholicism in 1593 removed the chief source of opposition to him within France, and the rebellion soon collapsed. With the Spanish King, however, the struggle dragged on until the treaty of Vervins, which in the last year of Philip's life (1598) practically confirmed the peace of Cateau-Cambrésis.[3]

Thus Philip II had failed to conquer or to dismember France. He had been unable to harmonize French policies with those of

[1] At this very time, Mary, Queen of Scots, cousin of Henry, Duke of Guise, was held a prisoner in England by Queen Elizabeth.

[2] It is a curious fact that Henry of Navarre, like Henry of Guise and Henry of France, died by the hand of an assassin.

[3] See above, p. 198.

his own in the Netherlands or in England. Despite his endeavors, the French crown was now on the head of one of his enemies, who, if something of a renegade Protestant, had nevertheless granted qualified toleration to heretics.[1] Nor were these failures of Philip's political and religious policies mere negative results to France. The unsuccessful interference of the Spanish King contributed to the assurance of French independence, patriotism, and solidarity. France, not Spain, was to be the center of European politics during the succeeding century.

In concluding this account of the career of Philip II, a large part of which has dealt with his manifold failures, a word should be added about one exploit that brought glory to the Spanish monarch. It was he who administered the first effective check to the advancing Ottoman Turks.

After the death of Suleiman the Magnificent (1566), the Turks continued to strengthen their hold upon Hungary and to fit out piratical expeditions in the Mediterranean. The latter repeatedly ravaged portions of Sicily, southern Italy, and even the Balearic islands, and in 1570 an Ottoman fleet captured Cyprus from the Venetians. Malta and Crete remained as the only Christian outposts in the Mediterranean. In this extremity, a league was formed to save Italy. Its inspirer and preacher was Pope Pius V, but Genoa and Venice furnished the bulk of the fleet, while Philip II supplied the necessary additional ships and the commander-in-chief in the person of his half-brother, Don John of Austria. The expedition, which comprised 208 vessels, met the Ottoman fleet of 273 ships in the Gulf of Lepanto, off the coast of Greece, in October 1571, and inflicted upon it a crushing defeat. The Turkish warships were almost all sunk or driven ashore; it is estimated that 8,000 Turks lost their lives.

**Turkish Defeat at Lepanto**

The battle of Lepanto gave the naval power of the Moslems a blow from which it never recovered and ended their aggressive warfare in the Mediterranean. It was, in reality, a crusade. Philip II was in his most becoming role as champion of Church and Pope. Hardly a noble family in Spain or Italy was not represented in the battle, and volunteers came from all parts of Christendom. The victory at Lepanto relieved western Europe of any threat of Turkish conquest.

[1] By the edict of Nantes. See above, pp. 178–179.

### 3. THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR

For more than a half century after the death of Philip II, Spain was presided over in turn by his son and his grandson, Philip III (1598–1621) and Philip IV (1621–1665). During the greater part of this period, Spain retained the reputation of being the predominant power in Europe.

Philip II, it is true, had failed to bring Holland, England, or France under Spanish control, but his failures, so far as Spain was concerned, were negative rather than positive; they had no immediate repercussion against the dominions or prestige of Spain and its Habsburg dynasty. Indeed, under Philip III, the international situation seemed highly favorable to continued Spanish predominance. In England, the death of Queen Elizabeth (1603) and the accession of James I (who was the son of Mary Stuart and had been King of Scotland since 1567) led to a marked change toward Spain. James I was peace-loving and much impressed by Spain; he not only made formal peace with Philip III in 1604 but used his authority to restrain English pirates and freebooters from raiding Spanish colonies and robbing Spanish treasure-ships; [1] he even attempted to negotiate a marriage between a daughter of Philip III and his own son and heir. In France, the assassination of Henry IV (1610) and succeeding internal troubles during the minority of Louis XIII promised the permanence of the treaty of Vervins and a surcease of the Bourbon feud with Spain. In the meantime, the Dutch agreed (1609) to a truce with Philip III, whereby, though Holland was at least temporarily lost to Spain, Spain was relieved of Dutch attacks upon its colonies and shipping and was afforded an opportunity to husband its resources for an eventual reconquest of Holland.

**An Interlude of Peace**

In the circumstances, the future seemed rosy for Spain. It was at peace. It was still receiving precious metals from America, and its port of Cadiz now shared with Lisbon the chief carrying trade of the Portuguese East Indies. Its grandees were living in luxury, and its captains and adventurers and the sur-

[1] Sir Walter Raleigh, conspicuous for his anti-Spanish words and deeds in the time of Elizabeth, was imprisoned from 1603 to 1616, and, for a new attack on Spaniards in Venezuela, was executed in 1618.

plus of its common people were finding outlet for their energies in the steady development of Spain's dependencies overseas.

Spain retained, moreover, during the first half of the seventeenth century a leading position in European culture and art. The royal palace of the Escorial which, with its magnificent renaissance church, Philip II had reared some thirty miles from Madrid, was richly embellished by Philip III and Philip IV. Under these Kings, too, flourished such notable painters as Velasquez, Murillo, and Rubens,[1] such a gifted historian as the Jesuit, Mariana, and such noteworthy poets and dramatists as Lope de Vega and Calderon. All the fine arts—literature, painting, sculpture, architecture, and music—continued to be prized and patronized by Spanish monarchs, Spanish grandees, and Spanish churchmen.

**Gradual Weakening of Spain**

Yet, despite all its art, despite all its seeming wealth and power, the Spanish monarchy in the seventeenth century lost its predominance in Europe. For this, the responsibility lay chiefly with the limited capacity of the Spanish Kings and their dynastic involvement in the Thirty Years' War.

The Spanish monarchy, we must emphasize, was not a centralized national state; it was rather a dynastic empire. Philip III, for example, was sovereign of several kingdoms and principalities —Castile, Aragon, Portugal, Sicily, Naples, Milan, Sardinia, the Belgian Netherlands, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, the Indies —which were differently administered and which were united only in personal allegiance to him as head of the Habsburg dynasty. To operate such a variegated and far-flung empire required of the dynast extraordinary wit and industry, the very qualities which the Spanish successors of Philip II notably lacked. Philip III was extremely virtuous and pious, but he was temperamentally a procrastinator and mentally a sluggard. Philip IV was a fine horseman, a keen hunter, and a discriminating patron of art and letters, but he was pleasure-loving and weak of will. While insisting on rigorous court etiquette, both of these Spanish Habsburgs left the conduct of public affairs largely to fawning courtiers and unworthy favorites.

[1] Rubens was Flemish rather than Spanish, but he was a subject of the Spanish monarchy and was honored and pensioned by successive governors of the Spanish Netherlands.

The most consistent and absorbing interest of Philip III and Philip IV was the Habsburg family. They thought of their Spanish inheritance as so many family possessions, all redounding to the glory of the Habsburgs. And they thought of Austria and its dependencies, not as foreign countries, but as lands owned by their cousins, the Austrian Habsburgs, and objects therefore of common family solicitude.

**Habsburg Tie of Spain with Austria**

In fact, the ties between Spanish and Austrian Habsburgs were extremely intimate. Charles of Spain and Ferdinand of Austria had been brothers. Their successors, Philip II and Maximilian II, had been first cousins; Maximilian had married Philip's sister, and Philip had married Maximilian's daughter. Hence Philip III was a grandson of Maximilian II of Austria, as well as a son of Philip II of Spain, and he married a niece of Maximilian. Even more intertwined was Philip IV with his Habsburg kinsmen in Austria; his sister married Ferdinand III, and he married Ferdinand's daughter.

In view of these close family relationships, it was but natural that the Spanish sovereigns should take a lively interest in whatever befell the Austrian sovereigns. Something very serious befell them in the seventeenth century. It caused the Spanish Habsburgs to put forth their utmost efforts in behalf of Austria, and it resulted in the decisive defeat of Spain. It was the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648).

The Austrian Habsburgs, it will be recalled, ruled over the archduchy of Austria, the kingdoms of Bohemia and Hungary, and the Holy Roman Empire. To these territories and dignities had succeeded, after the death of Ferdinand I in 1564, his son, Maximilian II, and then, in turn, the latter's sons (uncles of Philip III of Spain), Rudolph II (1576–1612), an art-loving but unbalanced recluse, and Matthias (1612–1619), an impressionable prince whose capacity was not equal to his ambition. Under the weak rule of Rudolph and Matthias, a situation developed in Germany—religious, economic, and political—which led eventually to civil war and foreign intervention.

**Austrian Habsburgs and Religious Conflict in Germany**

The peace of Augsburg (1555) had been expected to settle the religious question in the Holy Roman Empire,[1] but it failed in two respects. In the first place, the provision forbidding further

[1] See above, pp. 144, 177.

secularization of Church property (the "ecclesiastical reservation") was not obeyed; Protestant princes continued to confiscate Catholic estates, and some Catholic ecclesiastics, becoming Protestant, continued to convert their church lands into private holdings. Secondly, the peace had recognized only Catholics and Lutherans, but Calvinists had afterwards come into prominence in southern and central Germany and in Bohemia and now demanded equal rights.

In order to revise the treaty of Augsburg and to extort the needful concessions from the Catholic Habsburg Emperor, a union of German Protestant princes was formed in 1608, under the leadership of the zealous young Calvinist prince of the Palatinate, Frederick, commonly called the Elector Palatine of the Rhine. On the other hand, German Catholics were in an equally belligerent frame of mind. Not only were they determined to resist further secularization of church property, but, emboldened by the progress of the Catholic reformation during the second half of the sixteenth century,[1] they were anxious to revise the earlier religious settlement in their own interest and to recover for the Church the lands it had lost. In 1609, a league of Catholic princes was formed under the guidance of the able Duke Maximilian of Bavaria. Religion, coupled with economic greed and political ambition, was obviously dividing Germany into two warlike camps and threatening the Holy Roman Empire with renewed civil war. The Catholic league would back the Habsburg Emperor against the Protestant union, but Catholic princes were hardly more anxious than Protestant princes to strengthen imperial authority at their own expense.

**Thirty Years' War: 1. Bohemian Revolt, 1618–20**

The signal for the outbreak of hostilities in the Holy Roman Empire was a rebellion against the Austrian Habsburgs in their own kingdom of Bohemia. As the Emperor Matthias was childless, the next in succession to all his lands and titles was his cousin, Ferdinand of Styria, a man of blameless life and resolute character, devoted to the cause of absolutism and fanatically loyal to the Catholic Church. Little opposition to the prospective accession of Ferdinand was encountered in Austria or Hungary. In Bohemia, however, the Czech nobles, many of whom were Calvinists, feared that Ferdinand would deprive them of their special privileges and impede,

[1] See above, pp. 170–171.

if not forbid, the exercise of the Protestant religion on their estates. Already there had been encroachments on their political autonomy and religious liberty.

One day in 1618, a group of Czech (Bohemian) noblemen broke into the room where imperial officials were conferring and hurled them out of a window into a castle moat some sixty feet below. This so-called "defenestration" of Ferdinand's representatives was followed by a proclamation of his dethronement and the election of Frederick, the Calvinistic Elector Palatine, as King of Bohemia. Frederick accepted the crown at Prague and prepared to defend his new title.

At this juncture, the Emperor Matthias died, and Ferdinand of Styria, becoming Ferdinand II (1619–1637), took energetic steps to expel Frederick from Bohemia. He arranged with Philip III, his Spanish cousin, for the invasion of the Palatinate by a Spanish army, and with Maximilian of Bavaria for the invasion of Bohemia by joint forces of Austria and the Catholic league under the command of a famous Bavarian general, Count Tilly. King Frederick had expected support from his father-in-law, James I of England, and from the Lutheran princes of northern Germany, but in both respects he was disappointed. What with parliamentary quarrels at home and a curious desire not to offend Spain, James confined his assistance to pompous advice. At the same time, most of the Lutheran princes, led by the tactful John George, Elector of Saxony, hoped by remaining neutral to obtain special concessions from the Emperor.

In 1620 Tilly won a decisive victory at White Hill in Bohemia. Frederick fled, and within a very short time the whole country was subdued and Ferdinand II installed as King. Many rebellious Czech nobles lost their property and lives, and the practice of the Protestant religion was again forbidden in Bohemia. Nor was this all. The fugitive Frederick, now derisively dubbed the "winter king," was driven by Spanish and Bavarian troops out of his original wealthy possessions on the Rhine into miserable exile, an outcast without land or money. The conquered Palatinate was turned over to Maximilian of Bavaria, who was further rewarded for his services by being recognized as an Elector of the Holy Roman Empire in place of the deposed Frederick.

The first period of the war was thus favorable to the Habsburg and Catholic causes. Between 1618 and 1620, revolt had been

suppressed in Bohemia, and in Germany an influential Rhenish electorate had been transferred from Calvinist to Catholic hands. Moreover, the Spanish as well as the Austrian Habsburgs had gained new prestige.

When Philip IV ascended the throne of Spain in 1621, he felt that the recent success of Spanish arms in the Palatinate augured well for the reconquest of Holland, and accordingly he promptly renewed the Dutch war. Both France and England espoused the cause of Holland, and the Dutch fitted out an expedition against Brazil. But the French conducted their campaign badly; the Dutch were expelled from Brazil; an English attack on Cadiz was repulsed in 1625. In this same year came the climax of Spanish military exploits in the capture, after a long siege, of the Dutch town of Breda, a climax which has been immortalized by the painting of Velasquez.

**Renewed War in Netherlands**

A special effect of the cumulative successes of Catholicism and the Habsburgs of Spain and Austria was to create grave alarm among the Protestant princes of northern Germany. If these had viewed with composure the failure of Frederick's efforts in Bohemia, they beheld with dismay the expansion of Bavaria and the destruction of the balance of power between Catholic and Protestant in the Holy Roman Empire, in the Netherlands, and in Europe at large. And so long as the ill-disciplined remnants of Frederick's armies were behaving like highwaymen, pillaging and burning throughout Germany, Ferdinand II declined to grant any concessions to his Protestant vassals.

At this crisis, while the German Protestant princes were wavering between obedience and rebellion, Christian IV of Denmark intervened and inaugurated the second period of the Thirty Years' War within Germany. Christian IV (1588–1648) was impulsive and ambitious. As Duke of Holstein he was a prince of the Holy Roman Empire and opposed to Habsburg domination. As King of Denmark and Norway he was anxious to extend his influence over the North Sea ports. As a Lutheran, he sought to champion the rights of his German co-religionists and to help them retain the lands which they had expropriated from the Catholic Church. In 1625 Christian invaded Germany, supported by liberal grants of money from England and by the troops of many of the German princes, both Calvinist and Lutheran.

**2. Danish Intervention, 1625–9**

Against the Danish invasion, Tilly unaided might have had difficulty to stand, but fortune seemed to have raised up a co-defender of the Habsburg cause in the person of an extraordinary adventurer, Wallenstein. This man had enriched himself out of recently confiscated estates of rebellious Czechs, and, in order to benefit himself still further, he secured permission from Ferdinand II to raise an independent army of his own to restore order in the Empire and to expel the Danes. By liberal promises of pay and plunder, the soldier of fortune soon recruited an army of 50,000 men, and what a motley collection it was! Italian, Swiss, Spaniard, German, Pole, Englishman, and Scot—Protestant was welcomed as heartily as Catholic—anyone who loved adventure and hoped for gain, all united by the single tie of loyalty and devotion to Wallenstein. It proved an effective fighting force, but its habitual plundering of the countryside was very disturbing and destructive and a constant source of reproach to its commander and to the imperial cause.

The campaigning of the second period of the war took place in northern Germany. At Lutter (1626) King Christian IV was defeated by the combined forces of Tilly and Wallenstein, and the Lutheran states were left at the mercy of the Catholic league. Brandenburg espoused the Habsburg cause and aided Ferdinand's generals to expel the Danish King from German soil. Only the lack of naval control of the Baltic and North Seas prevented the victors from seizing Denmark. The desperation of King Christian and the growingly suspicious activity of Sweden resulted in the peace of Lübeck (1629), by which the King of Denmark was left in possession of Jutland, Schleswig, and Holstein, but deprived of the German bishoprics which various members of his family had taken from the Catholic Church.

Following up its successes, the Catholic league prevailed upon the Emperor Ferdinand II in the same year (1629) to sign an edict of Restitution, restoring to the Church all the property that had been secularized in violation of the peace of Augsburg of 1555. The edict was to be executed by imperial commissioners, all of whom were Catholics, and so well did they do their work that, within three years of the promulgation of the edict, Catholicism in Germany recovered five bishoprics, thirty Hanse towns, and nearly a hundred monasteries, to say nothing of numerous parish churches.

So far, within Germany, the religious and economic grievances against the Austrian Habsburgs had been confined mainly to Calvinists, but now the Lutheran princes were alarmed. The enforcement of the edict of Restitution against all Protestants alike was the signal for an emphatic protest from Lutherans as well as from Calvinists. A favorable opportunity for intervention seemed to present itself to the foremost Lutheran power, Sweden. Not only were many Protestant princes in Germany in a mood to welcome foreign assistance against the Catholics, but the Emperor was less able to resist invasion, since in 1630, yielding to the urgent entreaties of the Catholic league, he dismissed from his service the plundering and ambitious Wallenstein.

**3. Swedish Intervention, 1630–5**

The King of Sweden at this time was Gustavus Adolphus (1611–1632), the grandson of that Gustavus Vasa who had established both the independence and the Lutheranism of his country.[1] Gustavus Adolphus was one of the most attractive figures of his age—in the prime of life, tall, fair, and blue-eyed, well educated and versed in seven languages, fond of music and poetry, skilled and daring in war, impetuous and versatile. A rare combination of the idealist and the practical man of affairs, Gustavus Adolphus had dreamed of making Protestant Sweden the leading power in northern Europe and had vigorously set to work to achieve his ends. His determination to encircle the whole Baltic with his own territories—making it literally a Swedish lake—had brought him into conflict with Russia. Not only were Finland and Estonia confirmed to Sweden, but by a treaty of 1617 Russia was deprived of Ingria. Next a stubborn conflict with Poland (1621–1629) had secured for Sweden the province of Livonia and the mouth of the Vistula River. Gustavus then directed his attention to the Baltic coast of northern Germany, at the very time when the edict of Restitution promised him aggrieved allies in that quarter.

It was likewise when Cardinal Richelieu, the chief minister of Louis XIII of France, was seeking some effective means of prolonging the war in Germany to the end that the Bourbon family which he served might profit from a decisive defeat of the Habsburgs of Spain and Austria. Richelieu entered into definite alliance with Gustavus Adolphus and supplied him with arms and

[1] See above, p. 146.




**SWEDISH DOMINIONS IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY**

money, for the time asking only that the Protestant champion accord the liberty of Catholic worship in conquered districts.[1]

Gustavus Adolphus landed in Pomerania in 1630, occupied the chief northern fortresses, and sought alliances with the Protestant Electors of Brandenburg and Saxony. While Gustavus tarried at Potsdam, in protracted negotiation with the Elector of Brandenburg, Tilly and the Imperialists succeeded, after a long siege, in capturing the Lutheran stronghold of Magdeburg (May 1631). The fall of the city was attended by a mad massacre of the garrison, and of armed and unarmed citizens, in streets, houses, and churches. At least 20,000 perished, and wholesale plundering and a general conflagration completed the havoc. This sack of Magdeburg evoked the greatest indignation from the Lutherans. Gustavus Adolphus, now joined by the Electors of Brandenburg and Saxony and by other Protestant princes of northern Germany, advanced into Saxony, where, in September 1631, he avenged the destruction of Magdeburg by defeating the smaller army of Tilly on the Breitenfeld, near Leipzig. Then Gustavus turned southwestward, making for the Rhine valley, with the idea of forming a union with the Calvinist princes. Only the prompt protest of his powerful ally, Richelieu, prevented the archbishoprics of Cologne, Trier, and Mainz from passing immediately under Swedish control. Whereupon, Gustavus Adolphus turned east and invaded Bavaria. Tilly, who had reassembled his forces, failed to check the invasion and lost his life in a battle on the Lech (April 1632). The victorious Swedish King then made ready to carry the war into the hereditary dominions of the Austrian Habsburgs. To save them, the Emperor reinvoked the military alliance with Spain and recalled Wallenstein and his free-lance army.

The memorable contest between Gustavus Adolphus and Wallenstein was brought to a tragic close in the late autumn of 1632 on the fateful field of Lützen. Wallenstein was defeated, but Gustavus was killed. Although the Swedes continued the struggle, they possessed no such general as their fallen King. On the other side, rumors circulated that Wallenstein was secretly negotiating with the Protestants to make peace on his own terms; he was assassinated in his camp by a band of Imperialists (1634).

The tragic removal of both Wallenstein and Gustavus Adolphus, the economic exhaustion of the Empire, and the desire on

[1] On the policy of Cardinal Richelieu, see below, pp. 250–251.

the part of many Protestant princes, as well as on the part of the Catholic Emperor, to rid Germany of foreign soldiers and foreign influence—all these developments seemed to point to the possibility of concluding the third, or Swedish, period of the war, not perhaps as advantageously for the imperial cause as the Bohemian revolt or the Danish intervention had ended, but at any rate in a spirit of reasonable compromise. In fact, in May 1635, a treaty was signed at Prague between the Emperor and such princes as were then willing to lay down their arms, whereby all the military forces in the Empire were henceforth to be under the direct control of the Emperor (with the exception of a contingent under the special command of the Lutheran Elector of Saxony); all princely leagues within the Empire were to be dissolved; mutual restoration of captured territory was to be made; and, as to the fundamental question of the ownership of ecclesiastical lands, it was settled that any such lands actually held in the year 1627, whether acquired before or after the religious peace of Augsburg of 1555, should continue so to be held for forty years or until in each case an amicable arrangement could be reached.

What wrecked the peace of Prague was not so much the disinclination of the Protestant princes of Germany to accept its terms as the policy of Cardinal Richelieu of France. Richelieu was convinced more than ever that French greatness depended upon Habsburg defeat; he would not suffer the princes to make peace with the Emperor until the latter was soundly trounced. Instead of supplying the Swedes and the German Protestants with assistance from behind the scenes, he would have France openly fight both the Emperor and the Spanish King.

**4. French Intervention, 1635–48**

The final, or French, period of the Thirty Years' War lasted from 1635 to 1648, almost as long as the other three periods put together. Richelieu wished to humble the Austrian Habsburgs and to wrest Alsace from the Holy Roman Empire, but his major designs were against Austria's close ally, Philip IV of Spain. The French Cardinal could count upon the Swedes and many of the German princes to keep up the fighting in Germany against the Habsburg Emperor, while French armies attacked the encircling dominions of the Habsburg King of Spain.

Thus, from 1635 onward, Philip IV had to wage a very different kind of war from what he had previously waged. Prior to 1635

he had supported his Austrian kinsman and conducted an offensive against Holland. After 1635 he was confronted with such violent attacks by the French in the Belgian Netherlands, in Franche Comté, in northern Italy, and in Spain itself that he had to abandon the offensive against Holland and also against the German Protestants.

At first, the Spanish armies seemed to be superior to the French. The former were composed mainly of veterans and commanded by several able generals, including Prince Piccolomini, an Italian who had served under Wallenstein and had participated in his assassination. The French armies, totaling some 200,000 men, lacked proper training and competent commanders. In 1636 a large Spanish force invaded northern France and almost captured Paris, and in 1637 another Spanish force crossed the Pyrenees and invaded southern France.

Gradually the balance shifted. Spanish armies made less and less headway against the French, and as the latter acquired experience and more capable generals, they began to press the Spaniards back in the Netherlands, in the Rhineland, in northern Italy, and in southern France. By 1640 Philip IV was threatened with the disintegration of his dynastic empire. In that year, not only were the Dutch cooperating with the French to end his rule in the Netherlands, but an assembly of Portuguese nobles at Lisbon proclaimed his deposition as King of Portugal and the accession of John IV, the head of the native noble family of Braganza and a relative of the King whom Philip II had succeeded in 1580 when he annexed Portugal to Spain. And shortly after 1640, revolts against Philip IV broke out in Naples and in Catalonia (Aragon). Valiantly, but hopelessly, the Spanish monarch struggled on. The Catalans were repressed, and so were the Neapolitans; Milan was successfully defended and the Belgian Netherlands were grimly held. But these defensive endeavors quite exhausted the resources of Philip IV; he was unable to recover Portugal or to make headway against Holland or France. In 1643 the prestige of the Spanish infantry was shattered by a great French victory at Rocroy.

Meanwhile, the fortunes of war had been fluctuating in Germany. For a time the Habsburg Emperor, with the aid of Maximilian of Bavaria and other Catholic princes, more than held his own against Protestant Germans and Swedes, but the waning


strength of Spain presently enabled the French to send larger forces into Germany against the Emperor, with decisive results. Negotiations for a general peace were opened in 1641 by Ferdinand III (who had become Emperor on the death of his father, Ferdinand II, in 1637), but they bore no fruit until after the death of Cardinal Richelieu in 1642 and the occupation of Bavaria by the French in 1646. At last, in 1648, by a series of treaties concluded at the towns of Münster and Osnabrück in Westphalia, the Thirty Years' War was terminated and peace was restored within the Holy Roman Empire.

### 4. PEACE OF WESTPHALIA AND THE PYRENEES AND EMERGENCE OF THE MODERN STATE-SYSTEM

The peace of Westphalia left the Austrian Habsburgs in possession of their hereditary dominions—Austria, Hungary, and Bohemia—but its political provisions deprived them of any effective control over the Holy Roman Empire and at the same time wrought numerous changes within the Empire. (1) Practically, each prince was invested with sovereign authority in his own territory; each prince was free to make peace or war without let or hindrance by the Emperor. (2) France obtained Alsace, except the free city of Strasbourg, and was confirmed in the possession of the bishoprics of Metz, Toul, and Verdun. (3) Sweden received part of Pomerania, controlling the mouth of the Oder, and the secularized bishopric of Bremen, surrounding the city of that name and commanding the mouths of the Elbe and Weser. (4) France and Sweden, thus getting German lands in the Holy Roman Empire, were awarded votes in the imperial Diet, with implied right of future intervention in German affairs. (5) Brandenburg secured eastern Pomerania and several bishoprics, including Magdeburg. (6) The Palatinate was divided between Maximilian of Bavaria and the son of the deposed Frederick; and Bavaria, as well as the Palatinate, was henceforth to be an electorate. (7) Switzerland and the northern Netherlands (Holland) were formally recognized as free and independent—Holland, of the Spanish Habsburgs; and Switzerland, of the Austrian Habsburgs.

**Westphalian Peace Settlement**

In addition to its political provisions, the peace of Westphalia contained certain stipulations concerning religion. (1) Calvinists were to share all the privileges of their Lutheran fellow Protes-


THE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE IN 1648
DENMARK
HOLSTEIN
EAST POMERANIA
WEST POMERANIA
Stralsund
Danzig
EAST PRUSSIA
Lübeck
MECKLENBURG
DUTCH NETHERLANDS
BREMEN
ENGLAND
Amsterdam
BRUNSWICK
BRANDENBURG
BRANDENBURG
Berlin
Posen
London
MAGDEBURG
POLAND
Lutter
Antwerp
Leipzig
Cologne
Lützen
Breslau
ARTOIS
AUSTRIAN DOMINIONS
Amiens
SPANISH NETHERLANDS
Frankfurt
Prague
BOHEMIA
Mainz
Würzburg
Paris
Reims
PALATINATE
MORAVIA
Ratisbon
LORRAINE
Strasbourg
DANUBE R.
BAVARIA
FRANCE
Munich
Vienna
AUSTRIA
HUNGARY
EMPIRE
Budapest
Dijon
FRANCHE COMTÉ
SWITZERLAND
TYROL
Geneva
STYRIA
OTTOMAN
Lyons
SAVOY
MILAN
VENICE
CARNIOLA
SWEDISH
DANISH
FRENCH
SPANISH
LANDS IN FOREIGN POSSESSION
LANDS COMPLETELY LOST TO THE EMPIRE
UNNAMED TERRITORY WITHIN THE EMPIRE REPRESENTS NEARLY 300 PETTY STATES (PRINCIPALITIES, BARONIES, BISHOPRICS, FREE CITIES, ETC.)
TRM
300 MILES

tants. (2) Any piece of Church property was to be secured to such Catholic or Protestant as held it at the beginning of the year 1624. (3) An equal number of Catholic and Protestant judges were to sit in the imperial courts. Inasmuch as there was relatively little change of religious profession in Germany after 1648, there was general acquiescence in these religious stipulations.

The era of the Thirty Years' War and of the peace of Westphalia is highly important in the history of modern Europe. The Thirty Years' War itself was the worst but the last of the so-called religious wars. While it began as a fight between Protestants and Catholics, its chief stakes were economic and political, and it closed in a major conflict between Habsburg and Bourbon dynasties, both nominally Catholic but both chiefly concerned with statecraft. That a Protestant prince of Brandenburg should give assistance to the Catholic Emperor and that a Cardinal of the Roman Church should incite Catholic France to aid German Protestants were clear signs of a noteworthy transfer of interest from religion to politics.

**Rise of Modern State-System**

From the Thirty Years' War finally emerged the modern state-system of Europe, with its formulated principles of international law and usages of international diplomacy. The latter had originated among the Italian city states in the fifteenth century and had been adopted early in the sixteenth century by the monarchs of Spain, Portugal, France, England, and other countries for the conduct of interstate business. But a real *state-system* could not emerge so long as one European state, the Holy Roman Empire, claimed to be, and potentially was, superior to all other states. What the Thirty Years' War did in this respect was to reduce the Empire to a position certainly no higher than that of the national monarchies of France, Sweden, England, and Spain, or that of the Dutch Republic. There could now be a European state-system based on the novel modern principle of the essential equality of independent sovereign states, though admitting of the fact that there were great powers as well as lesser powers. Thereafter the public law of Europe was to be made by diplomats and by congresses of ambassadors representing theoretically equal sovereign states. Westphalia pointed the new path.

Another aspect of international relations was emphasized in the first half of the seventeenth century. The Thirty Years' War

with its protracted destruction, turned the attention of a considerable number of scholars to the need of formulating rules for the protection of non-combatants in time of war, the treatment of the sick and wounded, the prohibition of wanton pillage and other horrors which shocked the awakening humanitarianism of seventeenth-century Europe. The foremost of such scholars was Grotius, whose famous treatise *On the Law of War and Peace* was published in the midst of the Thirty Years' War. Hugo Grotius was a learned Dutch humanist, whose political activity against the Stadholder of Holland and whose agitation for religious toleration against the dominant Calvinists of his country combined to bring upon him a sentence of life imprisonment. Immured in a Dutch fortress in 1619, he managed to escape and fled to Paris, where he published his great work. It was one of the first of the systematic treatises on international law.

**German Losses**

Of more immediate significance than the rise of the modern state-system and of modern international law was the terrible havoc—political and especially economic—which the Thirty Years' War wrought in Germany. On the political side, the already shadowy imperial power became a mere phantom, and the resulting disunity of Germany, coupled with the selfishness of its several princes, postponed indefinitely the establishment of a national German state and at the same time invited continuous encroachments by powerful neighbors, particularly Sweden and France.

On the economic side, the war left Germany impoverished. There were few areas in the country which at one time or another had not been ravaged as the war shifted from north to south and from east to west. Tales were told of wolves that roamed over what had once been cultivated fields and of people reduced to savagery and even cannibalism. Schools had suffered, superstition increased, and manners coarsened. Trade had been disrupted, and much of it had fallen into Dutch or French hands.

There is no doubt that the prosperity and culture of Germany received a terrific setback or that it took decades for the country to recover from the war. But certain reservations should be noted. The stories of the time were much exaggerated. For example, of the many reports of cannibalism, only one instance has been authenticated, and that occurred toward the end of a long siege. The Thirty Years' War was primarily a civil war, and

civil wars are apt to be especially destructive. However disastrous were its effects on Germany, they must be attributed quite as much to native princes as to foreign powers.

The effects of the Thirty Years' War on Germany must not blind our eyes to its results for Spain. Spain itself was not a scene of major military operations during those thirty years, and hence its fields and towns were not laid waste. But Spanish armies bore the brunt of the fighting during all those years in the Netherlands, in southern Germany, in northern Italy. To serve the Habsburg cause, the Spanish treasury was emptied and Spanish manhood was bled white. What had appeared in the sixteenth century to be the wealthiest and most virile state in Europe was now, in 1648, gravely weakened.

And what had Philip IV, the Habsburg King of Spain, gained? Faithfully he had served his kinsmen, the Austrian Habsburgs. But these made peace in 1648 without him, and a peace fairly advantageous to themselves. Austria was less injured than the other German states by the Thirty Years' War, and with its dependencies of Bohemia and Hungary it could continue as a great power in Europe, regardless of what befell the Holy Roman Empire.

Philip IV knew that he had made great sacrifices in order to preserve intact the possessions of the Austrian Habsburgs. He knew also that France insisted on obtaining some of the Spanish possessions. Why should not his Austrian cousin prolong the war after 1648 to help him check France, recover Portugal, and maintain Habsburg prestige in the Spanish inheritance? The pleas were cynically rejected, and the unhappy Spanish King, unwilling to agree to the peace of Westphalia except for the recognition of Dutch independence, persevered alone in the struggle against France.

**Spanish Defeat**

Spain had already been at war thirty years. For another eleven years, from 1648 to 1659, it remained at war. Valiantly the Spanish soldiers fought on; doggedly the Spanish King declined to make concessions. In time, however, the French pressure became unbearable. French generals won victories in the Belgian (Spanish) Netherlands and in northern Spain. French statesmen had an ally in Portugal, and by promising to cede the fortress of Dunkirk to England they obtained still another ally. At length, in 1659, Philip IV bowed to the inevitable and signed with France the treaty of the Pyrenees.

The treaty of the Pyrenees formally registered the end of Spanish predominance in Europe. Its provisions were as favorable to France as they were unfavorable to Spain. (1) Spain ceded to France the province of Roussillon at the eastern end of the Pyrenees. (2) Spain ceded to France a southern strip of the Belgian Netherlands, including the province of Artois and several fortified towns. (3) Philip IV humbled himself to agree to the marriage of his daughter Maria Theresa to the Bourbon King of France, Louis XIV, who, in consideration of the payment of a large dowry by his Habsburg wife, renounced any further claim to the Spanish dominions. The dowry, it may be noted, was never paid; Spain was too poor.

**Treaty of Pyrenees, 1659**


Following the conclusion of peace with France, Philip IV made an attempt to subdue Portugal, but his army was decisively defeated by the Portuguese in 1665. In the year of this crowning defeat, Philip IV died. France, not Spain, already held the predominant position among the powers of Europe.



# CHAPTER VI

## PREDOMINANCE OF FRANCE AND THE BOURBONS

### I. FRANCE UNDER HENRY IV, RICHELIEU, AND MAZARIN



ANY ills of civil war and foreign invasion befel France in the sixteenth century, when Spain was the foremost country of Europe. Not until 1598 the year of the death of Philip II of Spain, was there a cessation of fighting in France. In that year, the edict of Nantes,[1] by according qualified religious toleration to the Huguenots, promised to establish internal peace, while the treaty of Vervins,[2] concluded in the same year with Spain, freed France from immediate external danger. The French King who achieved these things was the Bourbon Henry IV (1589–1610). He laid the foundations for the seventeenth-century predominance of France.

Henry IV was strong and vivacious. With his high forehead, sparkling eyes, smiling mouth, and neatly pointed beard *(Henri quatre)*, he was prepossessing in looks, while his affability and simplicity and his constant expression of interest in the welfare of his subjects earned him the appellation of "Good King Henry." His closest companions knew that he was selfish and avaricious, but that his quick decisions were likely to be good and certain to be put into force. Above all, Henry had soldierly qualities and would brook no disloyalty or disobedience.

**Henry IV**

During his reign, Henry IV was well served by his chief minister, the Duke of Sully, a loyal Huguenot, who, however, was avaricious like the King and subject to fits of temper. Appointed to the general oversight of financial affairs, Sully made tours of

[1] See above, p. 178.
[2] See above, p. 223.

inspection through the country and reformed the royal finances. He forbade provincial governors to raise money on their own authority, removed many abuses of tax-collecting, and by rigorous administration was able between 1600 and 1610 to save an average of a million livres a year. The King zealously upheld Sully's policy of retrenchment; he reduced the subsidies to artists and the grants to favorites, and he retained only a small part of his army, just sufficient to overawe rebellious nobles and to maintain order throughout the realm. To promote and preserve universal peace, he even proposed the formation of a European confederation—his so-called "grand design"—which, however, came to nought through the mutual jealousies and rival ambitions of the various European sovereigns. It proved to be much too early to talk convincingly of general pacifism and disarmament.

While domestic peace was being established and provision made for immediate financial contingencies, Henry IV and his minister were both laboring to increase the resources of their country and thereby to promote the prosperity and contentment of the people. Sully believed that the true wealth of the nation lay in farming pursuits and that agriculture should be encouraged, even, if necessary, to the neglect of manufacturing and trade. While the King allowed Sully to cater to the farming interests, he himself encouraged the commercial classes.

To foster agriculture, Sully urged the abolition of interior customs lines and the free circulation of grain, subsidized stock-raising, forbade the destruction of the forests, drained swamps, rebuilt roads and bridges, and planned a system of canals. On his side, Henry IV was contributing to the wealth of the middle class. He introduced silkworms and the mulberry trees on which they feed, and thus gave impetus to an industry which was to become one of the most important in France. A marked stimulus to the economic development of Paris, Lyons, and Marseilles dates from the reign of Henry IV.

The King likewise encouraged commerce. A French merchant marine was built up by means of royal bounties. A navy was started. Little by little the French began to break in on the commercial monopoly of Spain and to compete for trade on the high seas at first with the Dutch and subsequently with the English. French trading posts were established in India; and Champlain was dispatched to the New World to lay the foundations of a

French colonial empire in North America. It was fortunate for France to have two men like Henry IV and Sully, each supplementing the work of the other.

The assassination of Henry IV by a religious maniac in 1610 threatened for a time to nullify the effects of his labors, for supreme authority passed to his widow, Marie de' Medici, an ambitious but incompetent woman, who dismissed Sully and undertook to act as Regent for her nine-year-old son, Louis XIII. The Queen-Regent was surrounded by worthless favorites and was hated by Huguenots, who feared her rigid Catholicism, and by nobles, Catholic and Huguenot alike, who were anxious to maintain their privileges and power.

**Marie de' Medici**

The savings of Henry IV were quickly exhausted, and France once more faced a financial crisis. In this emergency the Estates General were again convened (1614). Since the accession of Louis XI (1461), the French monarchs with their absolutist tendencies had endeavored to remove this medieval check upon their authority; they had convoked it only in times of public confusion or economic necessity. Had the Estates General really been an effective body in 1614, it might have taken a position similar to that of the seventeenth-century Parliament in England and established constitutional government in France, but its organization and personnel militated against such heroic action. The three Estates—clergy, nobles, and commoners—sat separately in as many chambers; the clergy and nobles would neither tax themselves nor cooperate with the third Estate; the commoners, many of whom were Huguenots, were disliked by the court and despised by the first and second Estates. It is not surprising, under the circumstances, that the session of 1614 lasted but three weeks and ended as a farce: the Queen-Regent locked up the halls and sent the representatives home—she needed the room for a dance, she said. It was not until the momentous year of 1789—after a lapse of 175 years—that the Estates General would again assemble.

After the fiasco of 1614, affairs went from bad to worse. There was a renewal of internal strife and disorder. Nobles and Huguenots contended among themselves, and both against the court favorites. There was also a reversal of Henry IV's foreign policy. Henry IV had regarded Spain as the chief rival and natural enemy of France. Not only had he thwarted the efforts of Philip II to

meddle in French affairs, but he had avoided any entangling alliances with the Spanish Habsburgs. Marie de' Medici, on the other hand, was pro-Spanish, because she was dazzled by the apparent might of Spain and because she imagined that Spain would help her to surmount her difficulties in France. She arranged in 1615 the marriage of her youthful son, Louis XIII, with Anne of Austria, the daughter of Philip III of Spain (and sister of the future Philip IV), and she subordinated policies of the French Bourbons to those of the Spanish Habsburgs.

Her obsequiousness to Spain only added to Marie de' Medici's unpopularity in France and occasioned fresh revolts by nobles and Huguenots against her rule. At length, the young King broke with his mother, forced her into retirement, and assumed the reins of government. But Louis XIII was more interested in music and hunting than in affairs of state, and it is extremely doubtful whether he would have bettered matters, had he not inherited from his mother a public servant, Cardinal Richelieu, who possessed the statesmanship and the capacity for hard work which he lacked. For eighteen years—from 1624 to 1642—the royal power in France was exercised not so much by Louis XIII as by his famous minister.

**Cardinal Richelieu**

Born of a noble family of Poitou, Armand de Richelieu (1585–1642) had been trained for an ecclesiastical career and at the age of twenty-one had been appointed bishop of the small diocese of Luçon. His eloquence and sagacity as spokesman for the clergy in the fatuous Estates General of 1614 attracted the notice of Marie de' Medici, who invited him to court, gave him a seat in the royal council, and secured his nomination as a Cardinal of the Roman Church. Richelieu analyzed the evils in France and came to the conclusion that he would be the agent to eradicate them. Subtle and calculating, he advanced himself in the graces, first of the Queen-Regent, then of Louis XIII. By 1624 he was the latter's chief advisor—and real master.

"I promise," Richelieu told Louis XIII in 1624, "to devote all my energy and all the authority that it may please you to place in my hands to destroying the Huguenots, abasing the pride of the great nobles, restoring all your subjects to their duty, and raising the name of Your Majesty among foreign nations to its rightful place." Toward the fulfilment of this promise, the Car-

dinal toiled the next eighteen years with unswerving patriotism and imperious will, with tortuous diplomacy and the blandishments of court intrigue, sometimes with stern and merciless cruelty. Marie de' Medici opposed him, and he exiled her. Louis XIII never truly liked him, but he owerawed the King, and Richelieu's basic loyalty to crown and country was the one transparent quality of a mind otherwise quite inscrutable.

**Religious Policy**

The domestic trouble-makers against whom Richelieu first moved were the Huguenots. Though a Cardinal of the Roman Church, he was more politician and statesman than ecclesiastic; living in an age of religious zeal, he was by no means a bigot. As we have already seen,[1] this Catholic Cardinal gave military support to Protestants in Germany—for political purposes. It was similarly for political purposes that he attacked the Protestants in France.

French Protestantism meant an influential political party as well as a religion; it meant a state within the state, a constant source of national disunity and strife.[2] Since Henry IV had issued the edict of Nantes, the Huguenots had had their own assemblies, officers, judges, and even certain fortified towns, all of which interfered with the sovereign authority and impaired that uniformity which thoughtful royalists believed to be the very cornerstone of national monarchy. Richelieu had no desire to deprive the Huguenots of religious freedom, but he was resolved that in political matters they should obey the King. Consequently, when they revolted in 1625, he determined to crush them. In spite of the considerable aid which England endeavored to give them, the Huguenots were subdued. Richelieu's long siege of La Rochelle, lasting nearly fifteen months, showed his forceful resolution. When the rebellion was put down, the edict of Alais was published (1629), leaving to the Protestants freedom of conscience and worship but depriving them of their fortifications and forbidding them to hold political assemblies. Public office was still open to them, and their representatives kept their judicial posts. "The honest Huguenot retained all that he would have been willing to protect with his life, while the factious and turbulent Huguenot was deprived of the means of embarrassing the government."

The repression of the nobles was a more difficult task, and one

[1] See above, pp. 232–234, 235.
[2] See above, pp. 220–223.

which Richelieu undertook in the face of redoubtable opposition. It had long been customary to name noblemen as governors of the various provinces, but the governors had gradually become masters instead of administrators. They commanded detachments of the army; they repeatedly defied the royal will. The country, moreover, was sprinkled with noblemen's castles or châteaux, protected by fortifications and armed retainers, standing menaces to internal peace and to the execution of the King's orders. Finally, the noblemen at court, jealous of the Cardinal's advancement and spurred on by the intrigues of the disaffected Marie de' Medici or of the King's brother, the Duke of Orleans, annoyed and hampered the minister at every turn. Of such intolerable conditions, Richelieu determined to be quit.

**Repression of Nobles**

Into the ranks of noble courtiers, Richelieu struck terror. He ferreted out conspiracies and put their leaders to death. Every attempt at rebellion was severely punished, no matter how exalted in rank the rebel might be. Richelieu was never moved by entreaties or threats; he was as inexorable as fate itself.

The Cardinal did not confine his attention to noblemen at court. As early as 1626 he published an edict ordering the immediate demolition of all fortified castles not needed for defense against foreign invasion. In enforcing this edict, he found warm supporters among the peasantry and townsfolk who had long suffered from the exactions and depredations of their noble but warlike neighbors. The ruins of many a château throughout modern France bear eloquent witness to the Cardinal's activity.

Another enduring monument to Richelieu was the centralization of French administration. The great minister was tired of the proud, independent bearing of the noble governors. Without getting rid of them altogether, he checked them by transferring most of their powers to a new kind of royal officer, the *intendant*. Appointed by the crown usually from among the loyal middle class, each intendant was given charge of a certain district, supervising it in the assessment and collection of royal taxes, the organization of local police or militia, the preservation of order, and the conduct of courts. These intendants, with their wide powers of taxation, police, and justice, were later dubbed, from their approximate number, the "thirty tyrants" of France. But they owed their positions solely to the

**Centralization of Government**

favor of the crown; they were drawn from a class whose economi interests were long and well served by the royal power; an their loyalty to the monarch could be depended upon. The in tendants regularly made reports to, and received orders from the royal minister at Paris. They were so many eyes, all ove the kingdom, for an ever watchful Richelieu. And as the dutie of the bourgeois intendants increased, those of the noble governor diminished, until, by the eighteenth century, the offices of th latter were largely honorary though still richly remunerative.

With the exception of the intendants, Richelieu fashioned n new instruments of government. In form, the French monarch continued to be what it had been for a long time previously an what most other European states still were. Unlike the highl organized and broadly functioning state which is usual in th twentieth century, the French monarchy of Richelieu's day wa loosely organized. The King was "absolute" in theory, but hi absolutism was exercised in restricted fields and without the aid of an elaborate impersonal "central government." Nor did Richelieu create any such central government. The central governmen of his time was Richelieu acting personally in the name of the King. And for local administration, Richelieu superimposed hi new intendancies on the traditional provinces, municipalities, villages, parlements, bishoprics, and estates of semi-feudal and semi-royalist France.

Yet there can be no doubt that Richelieu transformed the spirit of government in France. He made it less feudal and more royalist. He adapted existing political machinery to his purpose of exalting the royal authority, uprooting "divided loyalty," and removing local checks upon royal absolutism in the domains of finance and army. He did not formally abolish the medieval Estates General. But because they had existed primarily to vote taxes, he refused to convoke them and allowed them to become an obsolete institution. The local estates, which existed in certain French provinces, notably in Brittany, Provence, Burgundy, and Languedoc, Richelieu permitted to go on, but he saw to it that they confined their activity to the mere apportionment of the taxes which the King and he assessed. He did get rid of the divisive political power of the Huguenots and the separatist military establishments of the nobles. He would have but one public treasury in France—the King's. He would have but one

armed force in France—the King's. And there would be no accounting by the King for either.

Richelieu's internal policies promoted obedience and unity and paved the way for the assurance of absolute monarchy in France, at the very time when, across the Channel, England, by means of revolution and bloodshed, was establishing parliamentary government.[1] Simultaneously, while England was precluded by domestic quarrels from taking an active part in Continental affairs, France, under Richelieu's guidance, was participating in the Thirty Years' War and acquiring international prestige.

Richelieu was both a French patriot and a loyal servant of the Bourbon dynasty. As French patriot, he wanted to assure to his country an independent and honored place in Europe and especially to weaken Spain, whose dependencies in the Netherlands, Franche Comté, and northern Italy all but surrounded France. As loyal servant of Louis XIII, he desired to extend the sway of the Bourbon family at the expense of its principal European rival, the Habsburg family.

**Foreign Policy of Richelieu**

It was in this twofold role that Cardinal Richelieu directed French foreign policy during the Thirty Years' War against the allied Habsburgs of Austria and Spain. At first he was content to give advice and money to any force that took the field against the Habsburgs—the Protestant princes in Germany, the Swedes, the Dutch. Ultimately, in 1635, when indirect aid to enemies of the Habsburgs proved unavailing, Richelieu had France intervene directly in the struggle, and thenceforth until his death he was organizing and dispatching one French army after another, now against the Habsburg Holy Roman Empire, and now against the adjacent territories of the Habsburg King of Spain, while simultaneously he was continuing to incite Dutch and Swedes and German Protestants to fresh endeavors against the Habsburgs.[2]

Richelieu did not live to witness the outcome of the Thirty Years' War. He died in 1642, six years before the conclusion of the peace of Westphalia and seventeen years before the signing of the treaty of the Pyrenees with Spain. But he lived long enough to behold the turning of the tide, the passing of military leadership from Spain to France. By 1642, thanks to his efforts and energy, France had a larger and better army than Spain and, thanks to a

[1] See below, pp. 435–440.

[2] On the Thirty Years' War, see above, pp. 228–238.

group of remarkable young generals whom he had called to service, particularly Turenne and Condé,[1] French forces were wresting Alsace from the Austrian Habsburgs and Roussillon from the Spanish Habsburgs. It was already apparent that whatever political advantage might be gained from the miseries of the Thirty Years' War must accrue primarily to France and the Bourbons—and to the fame of Cardinal Richelieu.

Such in brief was the achievement of the grim Cardinal who moved across the stage at a critical period in French history. In person, Richelieu was frail and sickly. Yet his pale drawn face displayed a firm determination and an inflexible will; and when clothed in his red robes, he appeared distinguished and commanding. Unscrupulous, exacting, and without pity, he preserved to the end a proud faith in his moral strength and in his loyalty to king and country.

In 1643, very soon after Richelieu's death, the monarch whom he had served so faithfully followed him to the grave, leaving the Bourbon crown of France to a boy of five years, Louis XIV. Louis XIV was the son of Louis XIII and Anne of Habsburg, and a nephew of Philip IV of Spain.

**Cardinal Mazarin**

The minority of Louis XIV might have been disastrous to France and to the royal power, had not the strong policies of Richelieu been maintained by another remarkable minister and cardinal, Mazarin. Mazarin (1602–1661) was an Italian, born near Naples and educated for an ecclesiastical career at Rome and in Spain. In the discharge of several diplomatic missions for the Pope, he had acted as nuncio at Paris, where he so ingratiated himself in Richelieu's favor that he was invited to enter the service of the King of France, and in 1639 he became a naturalized Frenchman.

Despite his foreign birth and the fact that he never spoke French without a bad accent, he rose rapidly in public office in his adopted country. He was named Cardinal and recognized as

[1] Turenne (1611–1675), the son of a French nobleman and, on his mother's side, the grandson of the great Dutch leader, William the Silent, received his early military training in the Netherlands and entered French service in 1630. He commanded French armies, with noteworthy success, in Alsace, Belgium, northern Italy, and Roussillon, and was made a marshal of France in 1643. He was a Protestant until late in life. Condé (1621–1686), a prince of the royal Bourbon family and known in his youth as the Duke d'Enghien, won the decisive French victory at Rocroy in 1643, when he was only twenty-two.

Richelieu's disciple and imitator. From the death of the greater Cardinal in 1642 to his own death in 1661, Mazarin actually governed France.

Against the Habsburgs of Spain and Austria, Mazarin continued the struggle which Richelieu had begun, and he brought it to a successful conclusion for France. He negotiated the peace of Westphalia with the Holy Roman Empire in 1648 and the treaty of the Pyrenees with Spain in 1659. He obtained from the former the cession of Alsace (except Strasbourg) and the recognition of French "rights" on the Rhine and in Germany; he secured from Spain the cession of Roussillon and a strip of the Spanish (Belgian) Netherlands. He thus reaped the harvest which Richelieu had sowed, and he must have felt a peculiar thrill in extracting from the Habsburg King of Spain the pledge that his eldest daughter should marry her hereditary foe, Mazarin's young ward and nominal master, Louis XIV.

In internal affairs, Mazarin encountered grave difficulties. The great nobles had naturally taken umbrage at the vigorous policy which Richelieu had pursued against them and from which Mazarin gave no sign of departing. They had been unable to resist Richelieu, but against Mazarin they found allies among the patriotic middle class who disliked the Italian Cardinal's foreign birth and foreign accent, as well as his avarice, his plundering of the revenues of the realm for the benefit of his own family, and his tricky double-dealing ways.

**The Fronde and Its Suppression**

The result was the Fronde,[1] the last attempt prior to the French Revolution to cast off royal absolutism in France. It represented a vague popular protest, coupled with a selfish reaction on the part of the nobles. The pretext for it was Mazarin's interference with the parlement of Paris. The Fronde lasted, in an acute form, from 1648 to 1652.

The French *parlements* were judicial bodies[2] which tried important cases and heard appeals from lower courts. That of Paris, being the most eminent, had come, in course of time, to exercise the right of "registering" royal decrees—that is, of receiving the King's edicts in formal fashion and entering them upon the statute

[1] Probably so called from the name of a street game played by Parisian children and often stopped by policemen.

[2] There were thirteen in the seventeenth century.

unsuccessful attempt had been made to weaken it. Henry IV, Richelieu, and Mazarin had made straight the way for the royal despotism of Louis XIV.

## 2. ERA OF LOUIS XIV

Upon the death of Cardinal Mazarin in 1661, the young King, Louis XIV, declared that he would assume personal charge of the domestic and foreign affairs of the French monarchy. From that date, throughout a long reign, Louis was actual ruler. He inherited a comparatively prosperous state, the population of which was patriotic and loyal to the crown. Insurrections of Protestants and rebellions of great nobles were things of the past. The Estates General, the medieval form of representative government, had fallen into disuse and oblivion. Local administration was conducted by faithful middle-class officials, the intendants. Abroad, the rival Habsburgs had been humbled and French boundaries had been extended and French prestige heightened. Everything was in readiness for a great King to inaugurate a new era in European history.

**"Grand Monarch"**

Louis XIV was a great King—the "grand monarch," he was designated alike by his contemporaries and by posterity. Endowed with a superb constitution, a fund of common sense, and a cautious judgment, and marked by suavity, dignity, and elegance in manners and speech, he looked and acted like a King. Indeed, so great was the impression which he made upon France and upon Europe that the period of his reign—approximately the second half of the seventeenth century—has ever since been styled the "age of Louis XIV."

The age of Louis XIV was famous, first of all, for the crystallizing of the doctrine of royal absolutism. The theory of government which Louis held and acted upon was nicely elaborated, fairly early in his personal reign, by a learned French bishop, the celebrated Bossuet, whom the King employed as mentor for his son and heir.

Government, according to Bossuet, is divinely ordained in order that men may satisfy the God-given natural instincts of living together in organized political society. Under God, monarchy is, of all forms of government, the most usual and the most ancient, and therefore the most natural. It is likewise the strongest and most efficient, therefore the best. It is analogous to the rule of a

family by the father, and, like that rule, should be hereditary. Four qualities are attributed by the eloquent bishop to such an hereditary monarch. (1) He is sacred, because he is anointed at the time of coronation by the priests of the Church, and hence it is blasphemy and sacrilege to assail the person of the King or to conspire against him. (2) He is, in a very real sense, the father of his people, the paternal King, and therefore it belongs to him to provide for the welfare of the nation. (3) His power is absolute and autocratic, and for its exercise he is accountable to God alone; no man on earth may rightfully resist the royal commands, and the only recourse for subjects against an evil King is to pray God that his heart be changed. (4) Greater reason is given to a King than to anyone else; the King is an earthly image of God's majesty, and it is wrong, therefore, to look upon him as a mere man. The King is a public person and in him the whole nation is embodied. "As in God are united all perfection and every virtue, so all the power of all the individuals in a community is united in the person of the King."

Such was Louis XIV's theory of absolute divine-right monarchy. The theory had gradually been taking shape and gaining ground during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in various countries of Europe (including England),[1] but the fact that it was exemplified in the second half of the seventeenth century by such an impressive monarch as Louis XIV served to convince the mass of Frenchmen—and other Europeans too—of the substantial truth and validity of the theory. Thanks to Louis XIV, France acquiesced in the doctrine; thanks to the new predominance of France in Europe, other Continental peoples imitated the French and endorsed the principle of divine-right monarchical absolutism. The era of Louis XIV thus sanctioned a political principle which was to dominate most of Europe for a century and until the French Revolution.

Another, and very important, political achievement of the age of Louis XIV was the inauguration of an organized system of central government and administration. Here Louis himself took the lead. Instead of entrusting sole power to a Richelieu or a Mazarin to be exercised to such an extent and through such channels as a masterful minister could personally exercise it, the King organized a number of ministries

**Personal Rule**

[1] See below, pp. 426–429.

(finance, army, navy, public works, etc.) whose heads should be his servants rather than his masters. The King would determine all policies; the ministers would simply execute his will. The ministers would function somewhat impersonally through a staff of assistants and secretaries at the capital and through the intendants, royal governors, parlements, and other officials in the provinces, but they would report regularly to the King and would take no independent action without his express approval. Local officials, whether bourgeois intendants or noble governors, would be appointed by the King and would be brought, through the central ministries, into close and direct subjection to him.

For twenty or thirty years after his assumption of personal rule, Louis XIV was busily engaged in fashioning this new system of government. It was perhaps the most distinctive achievement of his reign, and it was peculiarly his own creation. He alone had the vision, the ambition, and the energy necessary to accomplish the very arduous task of transforming his realm from a congeries of semi-feudal principalities into an orderly centralized state. He worked hard at the task. "One reigns by work and for work," he said. Day after day he reviewed the details of administration. Over all things and all officials he kept a watchful eye. Methodically he practiced what he termed the "trade of a King." By 1685 his application to his "trade" was producing obvious results, one of the chief of which was the fact that the French state of 1685 was thoroughly orderly and one to which foreigners looked as a model of royal centralization.

**Versailles and the Court**

Louis XIV did not content himself with hard work as God's lieutenant on earth. He must have a palace befitting his glory and majesty. Such a palace he erected at Versailles, in the midst of what had been a sandy waste, some twelve miles from Paris. With its lavish furnishings and its broad parks and great groves and myriad statues and delightful fountains, it was the wonder of France and Europe. Its magnificent "Hall of Mirrors" was a perfect symbol of the "Grand Monarch."

In and about the palace of Versailles, Louis XIV gathered the court of France—his ministers, his central officialdom, his family, his mistresses, and his pick of French nobles and French artists —and he prescribed for all these a rigid ceremonial. He was particularly anxious that the nobles should pay due homage to him.

He had shorn them of real political power in the provinces, but he made a kind of reparation to them by summoning them to bask in the light of his presence and to play stellar roles in the pageant at Versailles. He must have persons of noble birth as valets-de-chambre for himself and his progeny and as masters of the wardrobe, of the table, of the chase, and of the revels. Only a nobleman was worthy to comb the royal hair or to dry off the King after a bath. Only nobles could vie with the crystal chandeliers in providing decorative luster for the palace of the "Grand Monarch."

**French Art and Literature**

Louis XIV was a patron of the arts—architecture, sculpture, painting, engraving, music, literature. A galaxy of artists he patronized and subsidized, and many of them graced the court at Versailles and dedicated their talents to the beautifying of the royal setting. J. H. Mansart, the architect, built the greater part of the main palace as well as the Grand Trianon at Versailles and designed the dome of the Invalides at Paris. Girardon was official sculptor, and Le Brun official painter, to Louis XIV. Lully, official musician, composed operas and ballets for the court. Even cooking became a fine art under Louis XIV; Vatel, a master chef, committed suicide over the artistic failure of one of his dishes.

The era of Louis XIV was a golden age of French literature. Among the host of celebrated literary persons whom the King applauded and attracted to Versailles were Corneille, the father of the French theater; Molière, the greatest of French dramatists; Racine, the author of infinitely polished plays; Madame de Sévigné, the composer of brilliant witty memoirs; La Fontaine, the rhymer of whimsical fables and teller of scandalous tales; Bossuet, the preacher, historian, and philosopher. Backed by the merit of these writers and by the international prestige of the King whom they served, the French language became, before the close of the seventeenth century, the language both of polite society and of diplomacy all over Europe. Not only French political principles and practices, but French speech and literature and French manners, dress, and art were adopted as the models and property of civilized Europe.

At least until 1685, remarkable success attended the domestic and foreign policies of Louis XIV. By virtue of his domestic policy France was consolidated politically, enriched economically,

and enabled to give substance to the reputation of the "Grand Monarch." Simultaneously, by virtue of his foreign policy, France was safeguarded against invasion and exalted to a commanding position in the warfare and diplomacy of Europe.

**Colbert and French Mercantilism**

In his domestic policy, Louis XIV had the assistance of an extraordinarily talented minister, Colbert. He was the son of a merchant and was intensely interested in the middle class to which he belonged. Installed in office through the favor of Mazarin, he was successively named by Louis XIV, after the Cardinal's death, superintendent of public works, controller-general of finances, minister of marine, of commerce and agriculture, and of the colonies. In short, until his death in 1683, Colbert exerted power in every department of government except that of war. Although he never possessed the irresponsible personal authority which marked the ministries of Richelieu and Mazarin, and was plainly subservient to the King's commands, nevertheless he enjoyed for many years the royal confidence and by incessant toil succeeded in accomplishing a good deal for the material well-being of France.

First, financial reform claimed the energies of Colbert. Under Richelieu, and still more under Mazarin, public expenditures had been greatly increased, the noble class had been largely exempted from taxation, and the weight of the financial burden had been put upon the lower classes, while an evil system of tax-gathering, called "farming the taxes," [1] had grown up. Colbert appointed fiscal agents whose honesty he could trust and he reformed many of the abuses in tax-collecting. While he was unable to impose the direct land tax, the *taille,* upon the privileged nobility, he stoutly resisted every attempt to augment the number of exemptions, and he lowered this direct tax upon the peasantry by substituting indirect taxes, or customs duties, which would affect nobles as well as commoners. To lighten the burden of the country-folk, he sought to promote agriculture. He provided that no farmers' tools might be seized for debt. He encouraged the breeding of horses and cattle. He improved the roads and other means of interior communication. The great canal of Languedoc, joining the

[1] "Farming the taxes" meant entrusting the collection of taxes to individuals or corporations that squeezed as much money as they could from the taxpayers and kept for themselves what they collected over and above the lump sum due the government.

Mediterranean with the Garonne River and thence with the Atlantic, was planned and constructed under his patronage. As far as possible, the duties on the passage of agricultural produce from province to province were equalized.

Colbert fostered manufactures and commerce in every way he could devise. New industries were established, inventors protected, workmen invited from foreign countries, native workmen forbidden to leave France. A high tariff was placed upon foreign imports in order to protect "infant industries" and to profit French manufacturers and traders. Liberal bounties were granted to French ships engaged in commerce, and foreign ships were compelled to pay heavy tonnage duties for using French ports. And along with the protective tariff and the subsidizing of the merchant marine went other pet policies of mercantilism,[1] such as measures to prevent the exportation of precious metals from France, to encourage corporations and monopolies, and to extend governmental supervision over the manufacture, quality, quantity, and sale of commodities.

Stimulation of industry and commerce seemed to Colbert to require a protecting navy. He accordingly reconstructed the docks and arsenal of Toulon and established shipyards at Rochefort, Calais, Brest, and Havre. He fitted out a royal navy comparable with the navy of Spain or England or Holland. To supply it with recruits, he drafted seamen from the maritime provinces and resorted to the use of criminals, who were often chained to the galleys like so many slaves of the new industry.

Likewise, mercantile policy seemed to demand the acquisition of a colonial empire, in which the mother-country should enjoy a trade-monopoly. So Colbert became a vigorous colonial minister. He purchased Martinique and Guadeloupe in the West Indies, encouraged settlements in San Domingo, Canada, and Louisiana, and set up important posts in India, Senegal, and Madagascar. France, under Colbert, became a serious colonial competitor with its older European rivals.[2]

Colbert was essentially a financier and economist. But to the arts of peace, which adorned the reign of Louis XIV, he was a noteworthy contributor. He strengthened the French Academy, which had been founded by Richelieu, and established the Acad-

[1] On mercantilism, see above, pp. 88–90.

[2] On the French colonial empire, see below, pp. 340–344.

emy of Sciences, later called the Institute of France. He also built an astronomical observatory at Paris and purchased for Louis XIV the celebrated tapestry factory of the Gobelins. He pensioned many writers, and attracted foreign artists and scientists to France. A number of public buildings and triumphal arches were erected under his auspices.

**The French Army**

Louis XIV, in his foreign policy, relied upon a combination of diplomacy and arms. He himself was not a soldier. He never appeared in military uniform or rode at the head of his troops. He knew little of military science. But what he lacked of technical knowledge of warfare, he compensated for in wise choice of war ministers and military commanders. Thus in Louvois he possessed a minister as capable of directing military affairs as Colbert was of superintending economic matters.

Louvois recruited and supported the largest and finest standing army of his day. He introduced severe regulations and strict discipline. He prescribed a distinctive military uniform, and inaugurated regular drill and the custom of marching in step. Under his supervision, camp life was placed upon a sanitary basis; and under his influence, promotion in the service no longer depended exclusively on social position but upon merit as well.

In addition to such an extraordinary military organizer and administrator as Louvois, Louis XIV could count upon several highly competent generals and engineers. Among his generals were Condé and Turenne, who had won deservedly high reputations in the Thirty Years' War and who were devoted to him and his policies. Chief among the engineers was Vauban, a master of defensive warfare and the builder of strong fortifications on the northern and eastern frontiers of France.

**Foreign Policy of Louis XIV**

Louis XIV was a diplomat of no mean ability, and with Colbert furnishing him with necessary funds and Louvois supplying him with a redoubtable army, he was in a position to prosecute an effective foreign policy. This policy, in line with the traditional foreign policy of French Kings since the time of Francis I, had for its goal the humiliation of the powerful Habsburgs, whether of Spain or of Austria. Although France had gained materially at their expense in the treaties of Westphalia and the Pyrenees,[1] much remained to be done by Louis XIV.

[1] See above, pp. 237, 242.

When the Grand Monarch assumed personal control of affairs in 1661, the Spanish Habsburgs still ruled not only the peninsular kingdom south of France, but the Belgian Netherlands to the north, Franche Comté to the east, and Milan in northern Italy, while their kinsmen of Austria maintained shadowy imperial government over the rich Rhenish provinces on the northeastern boundary of France. France was still almost completely encircled by Habsburg holdings.

To justify his subsequent aggressions, Louis XIV stressed the doctrine of "natural boundaries." Every country, he maintained, should secure such frontiers as nature had obviously provided—mountains, lakes, or rivers; and France was naturally provided with the frontiers of ancient Gaul—the Pyrenees, the Alps, the Rhine River, and the Ocean. Any foreign ruler that claimed power within such frontiers was an interloper and should be expelled.

For many years, and in three wars, Louis XIV endeavored, with some success, to reach the Rhine. These three wars—the War of Devolution, the Dutch War, and the War of the League of Augsburg—we shall now discuss. A fourth great war, directed toward the acquisition of the Spanish throne by the Bourbon family, will be treated in the following section.

**War of "Devolution" with Spain**

The War of Devolution was an attempt of Louis to gain the Spanish (Belgian) Netherlands. It will be remembered that in accordance with the peace of the Pyrenees, Louis had married Maria Theresa, the eldest daughter of Philip IV of Spain.[1] Now Philip IV, by a subsequent marriage, had a son, a weak-bodied, half-witted prince, who came to the Spanish throne in 1665 as Charles II. Louis XIV at once took advantage of this turn of affairs to assert in behalf of his wife a claim to a portion of the Spanish inheritance. The claim was based on a custom which had prevailed in the inheritance of private property in the Netherlands, to the effect that children of a first marriage should inherit to the exclusion of those of a subsequent marriage. Louis claimed that this custom, called "devolution," should be applied not only to private property but also to sovereignty, and that his wife should consequently be recognized as sovereign of the Belgian Netherlands.

Before opening hostilities, Louis XIV made use of his diplomatic talents to isolate Spain. He obtained promises of friendly

[1] See above, p. 242.

neutrality from Holland, Sweden, and the Protestant states of Germany, which had been allied with France during the Thirty Years' War. He threatened the Austrian Habsburgs with another civil war in Germany if they should help their Spanish kinsman.[1] He left England out of account because it was in the midst of a bitter trade war with the Dutch.[2]

The War of Devolution lasted from 1667 to 1668. Spain was now weak, and the well-disciplined and splendidly generaled armies of Louis XIV had no difficulty in capturing the border fortresses in the Spanish Netherlands. The whole territory would undoubtedly have fallen to France, had not a change unexpectedly occurred in international relations. The trade war between England and Holland came to an end, and the two former rivals joined with Sweden in forming a triple alliance to arrest the war and put a stop to the French advance. The "balance of power" demanded, in the belief of the allies, that the other European states should combine in order to prevent any one state from becoming too powerful. This stand for the "balance of power" was the reply to the French King's aggressive desire for "natural boundaries."

The threats of the triple alliance caused Louis XIV to negotiate the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, by which Spain, while retaining the greater part of the Belgian Netherlands, surrendered to France an important section, including the fortified towns of Charleroi, Tournai, and Lille. The taste of the Grand Monarch was thereby whetted, but his appetite was hardly appeased.

Louis blamed the Dutch for his rebuff. He was thoroughly alive to the fact that Holland would never take kindly to having powerful France as a near neighbor, and that French acquisition of the Belgian Netherlands would be opposed by the Dutch. Nor were wounded vanity and political considerations the only motives for the Grand Monarch's second war, that against the Dutch. France, no less than England, was becoming a commercial and colonial rival of Holland, and it seemed to Colbert as well as to Louis XIV that the French would be greatly benefited by breaking the trade monopolies of the Dutch. Louis's

**War with Dutch**

[1] Leopold I had succeeded his father, Ferdinand III, as Habsburg ruler of Austria and Holy Roman Emperor in 1658. Leopold's mother was a sister of Philip IV of Spain, and his wife was a sister of Charles II of Spain. Leopold reigned from 1658 to 1705.

[2] See below, p. 339.

second war was quite as much a trade war as a political conflict.

As a preliminary to war, Louis sought to break up the triple alliance and isolate Holland. He took advantage of the political situation in England to arrange (1670) a secret treaty with Charles II, the King of that country and his own cousin. Charles, in return for a pension which should free him from reliance upon Parliament, undertook to declare himself a Catholic and to withdraw from the triple alliance. Liberal pensions likewise bought off the Swedish government. Wherefore it seemed as if Holland, alone and friendless, would have to endure a war with its powerful French enemy. Nor was Holland in shape for a successful resistance. Ever since it had gained formal recognition of its independence (1648), it had been torn by civil strife. On one side, the head of the Orange family, who bore the title of Stadholder, supported by the country districts, the nobles, the Calvinistic clergy, and the peasantry, hoped to consolidate the state and establish an hereditary monarchy. On the other side, the aristocratic burghers and religious liberals, the townsfolk generally, found an able leader in the celebrated "Grand Pensionary," John DeWitt, who sought to preserve the republic and the rights of the several provinces. For over twenty years, the latter party was in power, but as the young Prince of Orange, William III, grew to maturity, signs were not lacking of a reaction in his favor.

Under these circumstances, Louis XIV declared war against Holland in 1672. French troops at once occupied Lorraine on the pretext that its Duke was plotting with the Dutch, and, proceeding down the Rhine, past Cologne, invaded Holland and threatened the prosperous city of Amsterdam. A frenzied Dutch mob murdered John DeWitt, whom they unjustly blamed for their reverses; and, at the order of the young William III, who assumed supreme command, they cut the dykes and flooded a large part of northern Holland. The same expedient which had helped them expel the Spaniards in the War of Independence now stayed the victorious advance of the French.

The refusal of Louis XIV to accept the terms of peace offered by the Dutch aroused general apprehension throughout Europe. The Emperor Leopold and the Elector of Brandenburg made an offensive alliance with Holland, which subsequently was joined by Spain and several German states. The general struggle, thus precipitated, continued with success for France. Turenne, by a

brilliant victory, compelled Brandenburg to make peace. The Emperor was defeated. The war was carried into the Spanish Netherlands and Franche Comté.

But when at length the English Parliament compelled Charles II to adhere to the general anti-French alliance, Louis XIV thought it was time to make peace. As events proved, it was not Holland but Spain that had to pay the penalties of Louis's second war. By the treaty of Nimwegen, the former lost nothing, while the latter ceded to France the long-coveted province of Franche Comté and several strong fortresses in the Belgian Netherlands. France also continued to occupy the duchy of Lorraine.

Thus if Louis XIV failed to penalize the Dutch, he at least succeeded in extending the French frontiers one stage nearer the Rhine. He had become the greatest and most feared monarch in Europe. Yet for these gains France paid heavily. The border provinces had been wasted by war. The treasury was exhausted, and the necessity of negotiating loans and increasing taxes put Colbert in despair. Turenne, the best general, had been killed late in the contest, and Condé, on account of ill health, was obliged to withdraw from active service.

At the darker side of the picture, the Grand Monarch refused to look. No sooner was the Dutch War concluded than he made new and provocative efforts to augment the French territories. The cessions which the treaties of Westphalia and Nimwegen guaranteed to France, had been made "with their dependencies." It now occurred to Louis that doubtless in the old feudal days of the middle ages or early modern times some, if not all, of his new acquisitions had possessed feudal suzerainty over other towns or territories not yet incorporated into France. Although in most cases such earlier feudal ties had practically lapsed by the close of the seventeenth century, the French King decided to reinvoke them in order, if possible, to add to his holdings. He accordingly constituted special courts, called "chambers of reunion," composed of his own obedient judges, who were to decide what districts by right of feudal usage should be annexed. So painstaking and minute were the investigations of these chambers of reunion that they adjudged to their own country, France, no less than twenty important towns of the Holy Roman Empire, including Luxemburg and Strasbourg. Nothing seemed to prevent the prompt execution of these judgments by Louis XIV. He had kept

his army on a war footing. The King of England was again in his pay and his alliance. The Emperor was hard pressed by a war with the Ottoman Turks.[1] Armed imperial resistance at Strasbourg was quickly overcome (1681), and Vauban, the great engineer, proceeded to make that city the chief French fortress upon the Rhine. A weak effort of the Spanish monarch to protect Luxemburg from French aggression failed (1684).

Alarmed by the steady advance of French power, the Emperor Leopold in 1686 formed a league (called the League of Augsburg) with Spain, Sweden, and several German princes, to preserve the territorial integrity of the Holy Roman Empire. Nor was it long before the League was called upon to resist further aggressions of Louis XIV. In 1688 he dispatched an army into the Rhenish Palatinate to enforce a preposterous claim to that valuable district. The war which resulted was Louis's third struggle, and has been variously styled the War of the League of Augsburg or the War of the Palatinate. In America, it was paralleled by a conflict between French and English colonists, known as King William's War.

**War with League of Augsburg**

In his first two wars, Louis XIV could normally count upon the neutrality, if not the friendly aid, of England, whose King was dependent upon him for financial support, and whose influential trading classes, still suffering more from Dutch than from French rivalry, displayed no anxiety to mix unduly in dynastic conflicts on the Continent. Louis had an idea that he could count upon the continuation of the same English policy; he was certainly on good terms with the English King James II (1685–1688). But the deciding factor in England and in the war was not the subservient James II but the implacable William III. This William III, as Stadholder of Holland, had long been a stubborn opponent of Louis XIV on the Continent; he had repeatedly displayed his ability as a warrior and as a cool, crafty schemer. Through his marriage with the Princess Mary, elder daughter of James II, he managed to ingratiate himself with the Protestant, parliamentary, and commercial parties in England that were opposing the Catholic and absolutist policies of James. In 1688 he headed a revolution which drove James II into exile and made himself King of England.[2]

[1] See below, pp. 287–288.
[2] See below, pp. 449–451.

England, under the guidance of its new sovereign, promptly joined the League of Augsburg, and declared war against France. Trade rivalries between Holland and England were in large part composed, and the colonial empires of the two states, now united under a joint ruler, naturally came into conflict with the colonial empire of France. Thus, in addition to the difficulties which the Bourbons encountered in promoting their dynastic interests on the Continent of Europe, they were confronted by a colonial and commercial struggle with England. It was the beginning of a protracted struggle for the mastery of India and North America.


Louis XIV hardly appreciated the importance of the overseas contest. He was too engrossed in his ambition of stretching French boundaries in Europe. So in discussing here the War of the League of Augsburg, and later the War of the Spanish Succession, we shall devote our attention in this chapter primarily to the European and dynastic elements, reserving the account of the parallel colonial struggle to a later chapter.[1]

The War of the League of Augsburg, Louis's third war, lasted from 1689 to 1697. Notwithstanding the loss of Turenne and Condé, the splendidly organized French armies were able to hold the allies at bay and to save their country from invasion. They even won several victories on the frontier. But on the sea the struggle was less successful for Louis, and a French expedition to Ireland, in favor of James II, proved disastrous. After many years of strife, the Grand Monarch sued for peace.

**Treaty of Ryswick**

By the treaty of Ryswick, which concluded the War of the League of Augsburg, Louis XIV (1) surrendered nearly all the places adjudged to him by the chambers of reunion, except Strasbourg; (2) allowed the Dutch to garrison the chief fortresses in the Spanish Netherlands as a "barrier" against French aggression; (3) granted the Dutch a favorable commercial treaty; (4) restored Lorraine to its Duke; (5) abandoned his claim to the Palatinate; (6) acknowledged William III as King of England and promised to support no attempt against his throne. The French King lost no territory. On the other hand, he obtained full recognition of his ownership of the whole province of Alsace. And it had required a forceful union of most of the great powers of Europe to check Louis XIV and to halt the expansion of France.

[1] See below, pp. 345–346.


ENGLAND
DUTCH NETHERLANDS
SPANISH
Amsterdam
Utrecht
Ryswick
Nimwegen
London
Antwerp
Ghent
Cologne
Aix-la-Chapelle
Coblenz
Mainz
GERMANY
Lille
FLANDERS
LIÉGE
ENGLISH CHANNEL
Cherbourg
Rouen
SEINE R.
Paris
Versailles
VERDUN
LORRAINE
ALSACE
Brest
BRITTANY
Orleans
LOIRE R.
Tours
Nantes
FRANCE
BURGUNDY
SWITZERLAND
La Rochelle
Bresse
SAVOY
Lyons
Pinerlo
Bordeaux
PIEDMONT
GARONNE R.
Montauban
LANGUEDOC
RHONE R.
Orange
Alais
Avignon
Nimes
PROVENCE
Nice
Bayonne
Toulouse
Marseilles
Toulon
ROUSSILLON 1659
SPAIN
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
100 MILES
EXTENSION OF FRENCH FRONTIERS UNDER LOUIS XIV
TRM

When Louis XIV signed the treaty of Ryswick in 1697, he was in his sixtieth year, and he could look back with satisfaction upon his achievements during the thirty-six years which had elapsed since his assumption of personal rule in France. He had consolidated his country and given it an orderly, broadly functioning central government. He had extended his sway to the Pyrenees and (in Alsace) to the Rhine, and had acquired Franche Comté and important towns in the Belgian Netherlands. France had clearly supplanted Spain as the predominant power in Europe; the Bourbon family had obviously become the peer of the Habsburgs; and thanks to the new supremacy of French art and culture, as well as of French arms, the second half of the seventeenth century was already styled, quite appropriately, the era of Louis XIV.

Yet as Louis XIV grew old and the seventeenth century neared an end, serious imperfections appeared in his system of government; and his "golden age" took on aspects of gilt and tinsel. After the completion of his monumental palace at Versailles, he was so infatuated by it and so engrossed in its ceremonial that he mistakenly came to regard Versailles as France. His predecessors had traveled all over the country, seeing and knowing it first-hand. But he and his successors down to the French Revolution knew only Versailles; they were increasingly indifferent to anything outside and almost unconscious of its existence; they seldom traveled, and when they did they took the courtiers and ceremonies of Versailles with them.

Louis XIV grew ever fonder of bending all his subjects to his own will. Much of what he had done, prior to 1685, to establish an orderly central government was undoubtedly beneficial, but as time went on he was too inclined to entrust the central government to second-rate courtiers and to close his ears to complaints from the provinces. His zeal for centralization in the state prevented him from recognizing any virtue in local autonomy or individual initiative. What was not done by the express authority of himself or his agents should not be done at all.

**Increasing Autocracy**

In ecclesiastical matters, Louis XIV was increasingly autocratic. He insisted that the Catholic Church in France should follow his dictates rather than the Pope's and, with the assistance of Bossuet, he compelled the French bishops to declare (1682)

that (1) the temporal sovereignty of Kings is independent of the Pope; (2) a General Council is above the Pope; (3) the "ancient liberties" of the Gallican Church are sacred; (4) authority in the church belongs to Pope and bishops jointly. This so-called "declaration of liberties of the Gallican Church" led to a violent quarrel between Louis XIV and Pope Innocent XI, but while the King formally withdrew the declaration in 1693, he continued to encourage the teaching of its doctrines.

Against other dissent from Catholic Christianity, Louis XIV in his later years was sternly forceful. He persecuted the Jansenists and other Catholic groups whom he deemed heretical.[1] He also persecuted the Protestants. In this he was moved alike by the despot's desire for uniformity and by the penitent's fervor to make amends for earlier scandals of his private life. For a time he sought to terrify the Huguenots into conversion by quartering licentious soldiers upon them—the so-called *dragonnades*—but at length in 1685 he formally revoked the edicts of Nantes and Alais.[2] Thus did Louis XIV reverse the policy which for almost a century had made France a leading country in the practice of religious toleration. Huguenots were still accorded liberty of conscience, but they were denied freedom of worship and deprived of all civil rights in the kingdom. An immediate effect of this arbitrary action was the emigration of large numbers of industrious citizens, who settled in Prussia, Holland, England, or the English colonies in America and added materially to the economic and political life of the chief Protestant rivals of France.

**Revocation of Edict of Nantes**

Centralization, as Louis XIV conceived and achieved it, meant taking real political functions from the nobles, turning them into a useless class socially, and leaving them without political experience or capacity. Many lesser nobles remained on their landed estates, but, shorn of political power or influence, they became more and more isolated from their peasants and other fellow citizens and more and more devoted, in a selfish way, to festive hunting or to critical philosophy. On the other hand, many great nobles were obliged to take up their residence at Versailles, away from their hereditary estates and apart from the life of the nation. At Versailles, nobles grew

**Social and Financial Abuses**

[1] On the Jansenists, see below, pp. 393–394.

[2] See above, pp. 178, 247.

wasteful and vicious—and purely ornamental—at the very time when English nobles were exercising full political sway and directing their country's foreign and domestic policies.

The French clergy continued to comprise a large number of devout and self-sacrificing priests, but the bishops and other higher clergy, with some notable exceptions, tended, under Louis XIV's later rule, to be drawn from the nobility, to live in luxury apart from the common people, and to share in the pleasures and sometimes the vices of Versailles. Too few of the bishops were true religious leaders, as too few of the nobles were political leaders. The weight of Louis XIV's government was becoming heavier; the persons trained to bear it were becoming fewer.

Louis XIV countenanced ever increasing expenditures of money —for the building and upkeep of Versailles, for entertainment and show, for the maintenance of army and navy, for the waging of a long series of foreign wars, for the promotion of Bourbon ascendancy in Europe. Especially after the death of Colbert in 1683, the expenditures of Louis XIV became prodigal.

France was a relatively wealthy country. Its fields were fertile, its peasants were hard-working and thrifty, its artisans were acquiring an international reputation for the quality of French hand-made goods, and its middle classes were becoming more numerous and richer. France might have borne the burden of Louis XIV's expenditure without grave distress or popular murmur, had the burden been broadly and equitably distributed. But the King undertook no fiscal reform in this direction. On the contrary, he persevered in exempting the nobility and clergy from taxation and in deriving state income almost wholly from the peasants and middle classes.

Thereby, the state was deprived of income from wealth in the hands of nobility and clergy, and these classes felt less responsibility for curbing expenditure or correcting fiscal abuses. At the same time, there was no parliament or other public agency through which the peasants and middle classes could exercise any financial control. This fact, coupled with the bad technique of "farming the taxes," which Louis XIV after Colbert's time did nothing to remedy, explains why in the last years of the Grand Monarch the accumulating financial burden of his domestic and foreign policies fell with crushing weight upon the masses of the French people.

### 3. BOURBON SUCCESSION TO SPAIN

The Grand Monarch in his old age was vainglorious and increasingly ambitious. By 1697 he was not content to labor for the French monarchy. He must use the strength and prestige of France for the dynastic ascendancy of the Bourbons in Europe. It was no longer a matter simply of securing the "natural frontiers" of France. It was a matter now of constructing a dynastic empire, of which France should be the core, but which should assure to the Bourbon family the direction of as many dominions as the Habsburg family had ever ruled.

Indeed, one of the main reasons which prompted Louis XIV to conclude the War of the League of Augsburg without obtaining the Rhine boundary for France was his mounting ambition to effect the transfer of the Spanish empire from the Habsburgs to the Bourbons. Spain was traditionally accounted a great power, and under its Habsburg crown were still gathered the peninsular kingdoms of Castile and Aragon, the greater part of the Belgian Netherlands, the kingdom of the Two Sicilies, the island of Sardinia, the duchy of Milan, and the huge colonial possessions in America and the Philippines. The sovereign of all these diverse lands, while Louis was exercising personal rule in France, had been Charles II. Charles, of course, was a Habsburg; he was the son of Philip IV of Spain, and the grandson, on his mother's side, of Ferdinand III of Austria. But he was also related to the Bourbons; his aunt was the mother of Louis XIV, and his half-sister was Louis XIV's wife.

**Charles II Last of Spanish Habsburgs**

Despite his proud ancestry, Charles II of Spain from birth had been sickly and almost imbecile, and by 1697 he was far gone in physical and mental decay. What would become of his realms? He had no children and no brothers. His nearest male heir was Leopold I, Holy Roman Emperor and head of the Austrian Habsburgs. But his nearest (and most mighty) neighbor was Louis XIV. And the little wit of Charles II was torn between his wish to transmit his inheritance to "the illustrious house of Austria," his own kin, and the belief instilled into him by French agents that only the power of Louis XIV could avert the dismemberment of the Spanish empire. Adding to the perplexity of the unhappy Charles, was the fact that while one of his sisters was the

wife of Louis XIV, the other was married to Leopold. The question of the Spanish succession was terribly difficult, not only for Charles, but for all Europe.

It will be recalled that by the treaty of the Pyrenees (1659) Louis XIV had renounced Bourbon claims to the Spanish succession on condition that a large dowry be paid him,[1] but the impoverished state of the Spanish exchequer had prevented the payment of the dowry. Louis, therefore, might lay claim to the whole inheritance of Charles II and entertain the hope of seeing the Bourbons supplant the Habsburgs in some of the fairest lands of Christendom. In opposition to the claim of Louis XIV, which rested on female descent, the Emperor Leopold was moved by family pride to put forth the claim of his wife (who, however, was younger than the wife of Louis XIV)[2] and the more impressive claim of himself as the nearest male relative of the Spanish King. If the contention of Leopold were sustained, a single Habsburg ruler might once more unite an empire as vast as that which the Emperor Charles V had ruled.[3] On the other side, if the ambition of Louis XIV were realized, a new and formidable Bourbon empire would be erected. In either case the European "balance of power" would be upset.

**Disputed Succession**

Bound up with the political problem in Europe were grave commercial and colonial questions. According to the mercantilist theories that flourished throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, every country which possessed colonies should reserve trade privileges with them exclusively to its own citizens. So long as France and Spain were separate and each was only moderately powerful, their commercial rivals, notably England and Holland, might hope to gain special trading concessions from time to time in French or Spanish colonies. But once the colonial empires of France and Spain were joined under a common ruler or dynasty, a monopoly would be created which might effectually prevent the expansion of English or Dutch commerce, while heightening the economic prosperity of the Bourbon subjects.

It was natural, therefore, that William III, as Stadholder of Holland and King of England, should seek to preserve a balance of power between the Austrian Habsburgs and the French Bour-

[1] See above, p. 242.

[2] See genealogical tables next to pp. 205 and 251.

[3] See above, p. 193.

bons. Both the claimants appreciated this fact and understood that neither would be allowed peacefully to appropriate the entire Spanish inheritance. In fact, several "partition treaties" were patched up between Louis XIV, Leopold I, and William III, with a view to maintaining a balance of power and preventing either France or Austria from unduly increasing its power. But flaws were repeatedly found in the treaties, and, as time went on, the problem grew more vexatious.

After the conclusion of the peace of Ryswick (1697), Louis XIV was absorbed in projects for dividing the property of the dying Spanish King. A chief triumph of Louis' diplomatic art was the way in which he ingratiated himself in Spanish favor. It must be remembered that it was Spain which the Grand Monarch had attacked and despoiled in his earlier wars of aggression, and neither the Spanish court nor the Spanish people could have many patriotic motives for loving him. Yet such was his tact and finesse that within three years after the treaty of Ryswick he secured the respect of the feeble Charles II and the favor of the Spanish people.

Charles II, the last of the Spanish Habsburgs, a month before his pitiful death (1700), summoned all his strength and dictated a will that awarded his whole inheritance to Philip of Anjou, a grandson of Louis XIV, with the resolute proviso that under no circumstances should the Spanish possessions be dismembered. When the news reached Versailles, the Grand Monarch hesitated. He knew that acceptance meant war at least with Austria, probably with England. Perhaps he thought of the economic burdens which his other wars had already imposed on the French people.

Hesitation was but an interlude. Ambition triumphed over fear, and the glory of the Bourbon family over the peace of France. In the great hall of mirrors at Versailles, the Grand Monarch heralded his grandson as Philip V, the first Bourbon King of Spain. And when Philip left for Madrid, his aged grandfather proudly kissed him, and the Spanish ambassador exultantly declared that "the Pyrenees no longer exist."

Anticipating the inevitable outbreak of hostilities, Louis, in violation of the treaty of Ryswick, seized the "barrier" fortresses from the Dutch and recognized the son of James II as King of England. He then made hasty alliances with Bavaria and Savoy, and called out the combined armies of France and Spain.

Meanwhile, William III and the Emperor Leopold formed a "Grand Alliance," including England, Holland, Austria, and the German states of Brandenburg-Prussia, Hanover, and the Palatinate. Subsequently, Portugal, by means of a favorable commercial treaty with England,[1] was induced to join the alliance, and the Duke of Savoy abandoned France in favor of Austria with the understanding that his country should be recognized as a kingdom. The Allies demanded that the Spanish crown should pass to the Archduke Charles, the second son of the Emperor Leopold, that Spanish trade monopolies should be broken, and that the power of the French King should be curtailed.

**"Grand Alliance" against Louis XIV**

The War of the Spanish Succession—the fourth and final war of Louis XIV—lasted from 1702 to 1713. Although William III died at its very commencement, it was vigorously pushed by the English government of his sister-in-law, Queen Anne (1702–1714). The struggle developed into a veritable world war. On the high seas and in the colonies, it was known as Queen Anne's War, and will be treated in another place.[2] In Europe, the military campaigns were on a larger scale than had hitherto been known. Fighting was carried on in the Netherlands, in southern Germany, in Italy, and in Spain.

The tide of war turned steadily for several years against the Bourbons. The opposing Allies possessed the ablest generals of the time in the Duke of Marlborough, the conscientious self-possessed English commander, and in the skillful and daring Prince Eugene of Savoy. The battle of Blenheim (1704) drove the French from the Holy Roman Empire, and the capture of Gibraltar (1704) gave England a foothold in Spain and a naval base for the Mediterranean. Prince Eugene crowded the French out of Italy (1706); and Marlborough, by the victories of Ramillies (1706), Oudenarde (1708), and Malplaquet (1709), cleared the Netherlands. On land and sea one Franco-Spanish reverse followed another. The Allies at length were advancing on French soil. It appeared almost certain that they would dictate peace at Paris on their own terms.

Then it was that Louis XIV displayed an energy and devotion worthy of a better cause. He appealed straight to the patriotism

[1] The "Methuen Treaty" (1703).

[2] See below, pp. 345–347.

of the French people. He set an example of untiring application to toil. Nor was he disappointed in his expectations. Recruits hurried to the front; rich and poor poured in their contributions; a supreme effort was made to stay the advancing enemy.

The fact that Louis XIV was not worse punished was due to this remarkable uprising of the French and Spanish nations, and also to dissensions among the Allies. A change of ministry in England led to the disgrace and retirement of the Duke of Marlborough and made that country lukewarm in prosecuting the war. The unexpected accession of the Archduke Charles to the Imperial and Austrian thrones (1711) rendered the claims of the Allies' candidate for the Spanish throne as menacing to the European balance of power as would be the recognition of the French claimant, Philip of Bourbon.

These circumstances made possible the conclusion of the peace of Utrecht (1713), with the following major provisions:

(1) Philip V, grandson of Louis XIV, was acknowledged King of Spain and the Indies, with the proviso that the crowns of France and Spain should never be united. **Treaty of Utrecht**

(2) The Austrian Habsburgs were indemnified by securing Naples, Sardinia,[1] Milan, and the Belgian Netherlands. The last named, which had been called the Spanish Netherlands since the days of Philip II, were styled from 1713 to 1797 the Austrian Netherlands.

(3) England received the lion's share of the commercial and colonial spoils. It obtained Newfoundland, Acadia (Nova Scotia), and Hudson's Bay from France, and Gibraltar and Minorca from Spain. It also secured a preferential tariff for its imports into Cadiz, a monopoly of the slave trade, and the right to send one ship of merchandise a year to the Spanish colonies. France promised not to assist the Stuarts in their attempts to regain the English throne.

(4) The Dutch recovered the "barrier" fortresses, and for garrisoning them were promised financial aid by Austria. The Dutch were also allowed to establish a trade monopoly on the River Scheldt.

(5) The Elector of Brandenburg was acknowledged King of

[1] By the subsequent treaty of London (1720), Austria exchanged Sardinia for Sicily.

Prussia, an important step in the fortunes of the Hohenzollern family.[1]

(6) The duchy of Savoy was recognized similarly as a kingdom and was given the island of Sicily, which was subsequently exchanged for the island of Sardinia.[2]

It will be noted that France gained no territory and no direct advantage from the War of the Spanish Succession. Indeed, it lost some important colonies and its burden of debt and taxation was made heavier.

Yet in a Europe where nations were identified with their sovereigns, the success of Louis XIV in seating his grandson on the Spanish throne served to uphold his own prestige and that of France. France was still deemed the predominant power in Europe, and the Bourbon dynasty was ascendant.

For eighty years after the treaty of Utrecht—through the greater part of the eighteenth century—the Bourbon dynasty reigned in both France and Spain. The result was that the foreign and colonial policies of these countries, hitherto divergent and conflicting, were now usually conducted in harmony. Just as Spain had been used by the Austrian Habsburgs against France in the seventeenth century, so in the eighteenth century Spain was employed by the French Bourbons against Austria and England.

Nevertheless, the Habsburg dynasty remained influential in Europe. Though it had ceased to rule Spain, it now controlled an Austrian dominion which had been enlarged by the acquisition of former Spanish territories in Italy and the Belgian Netherlands.

Louis XIV survived the treaty of Utrecht but two years, and so fallen was his popularity among his own people that his corpse, as it was borne from the palace at Versailles to the tombs of the French Kings at St. Denis, "was saluted by the curses of a noisy crowd sitting in the wine-rooms, celebrating his death by drinking more than their fill as a compensation for having suffered too much from hunger during his lifetime. Such was the coarse but true epitaph which popular opinion accorded to the Grand Monarch."

[1] See below, p. 294.

[2] The title of King was recognized by the Emperor only in 1720, when Savoy exchanged Sicily for Sardinia. Afterwards the kingdom of Savoy was referred to as the kingdom of Sardinia.

### 4. LOUIS XV AND BOURBON SUCCESS IN ITALY

The successor of Louis XIV upon the French throne was his great-grandson,[1] Louis XV, a boy of five years of age at the time. During his minority, the government of the country was directed for about eight years by his uncle, the Duke of Orleans, and then for twenty years by Cardinal Fleury.

Orleans was intellectually gifted and considerably interested in natural science, but most of all he loved pleasure and led a debauched life. He cared little for the Boy-King, whose education and training he grievously neglected. His foreign policy was pacific, but he failed to correct the major abuses which had developed in the political and economic administration of the previous long reign. It was while experimenting with the disorganized finances that he was duped by a Scottish adventurer and capitalistic promoter, a certain John Law. Law had a scheme to form a big corporation for French colonial trade, shares of which would be sold throughout the country, and the proceeds utilized to wipe out the public debt. Orleans accepted the scheme and for a while the country went mad with the fever of speculation. In due time, however, the stock was discovered to be worthless, the bubble burst, and a terrible panic ensued.[2]

**Regency of Orleans**

Cardinal Fleury was naturally modest and frugal, and he was sincerely anxious to assure to France a foreign peace and an internal reform which would repair the financial damage done by Louis XIV and Orleans. He husbanded the resources of the state. He reduced public expenditure and promoted the expansion of French manufacturing and trade. He managed to balance the royal budget. But Fleury was an old man—he was over seventy when he became chief minister, and ninety when death removed him from office in 1743—and he was not as energetic or as thorough as the situation required. He effected no fundamental internal reform, and by exacting forced labor from the peasants for the construction of a fine system of commercially valuable roads he aroused angry discontent in for-

**Cardinal Fleury**

[1] Louis XIV's son, the Dauphin, had died in 1711, and his eldest grandson, the Duke of Burgundy, in 1712. Louis XV was the latter's son, and, it may be noted, the nephew of Philip V of Spain.

[2] Law's corporation was important in the development of the French colony of Louisiana.


BOURBON AND HABSBURG DOMINIONS IN EUROPE ABOUT 1740
BOUNDARY OF THE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE UNDER NOMINAL HABSBURG RULE
BOURBON DOMINIONS
SCOTLAND
NORTH SEA
IRELAND
Dublin
Limerick
Wexford
York
Hull
Liverpool
Derby
WALES
ENGLAND
DUTCH NETHERLANDS
TEXEL
Amsterdam
Utrecht
AUST. NETH.
RHINE R.
W.SCHELDE R.
SHEERNESS
Bristol
London
Plymouth
Portsmouth
BEACHY HEAD
CAPE LA HOGUE
CHANNEL
ENGLISH
ATLANTIC OCEAN
Antwerp
Lille
Malplaquet
Aix-la-Chapelle
St. Malo
Brest
Rennes
Quiberon
BELLE ISLE
Nantes
Tours
Bourges
Besançon
La Rochelle
Poitiers
FRANCE
Geneva
Limoges
Bordeaux
Grenoble
Nîmes
Avignon
Marseilles
Toulon
Bayonne
Toulouse
PYRENEES MTNS.
Perpignan
Santiago
Leon
Oporto
Valladolid
Burgos
Pamplona
Saragossa
CATALONIA
PORTUGAL
Alcantara
Madrid
Toledo
Barcelona
Lisbon
TAGUS R.
SPAIN
Badajoz
Ciudad Real
Valencia
ISLANDS
MINORCA (BR. 1713)
BALEARIC
Port Mahon
IVIZA
MAJORCA
Beja
Lagos
GUADALQUIVIR R.
Almanza
Seville
Granada
Cadiz
Cartagena
MEDITE
Tangier
GIBRALTAR (BR. 1713)
Algiers
ALGERIA
400 MILES


SWEDEN
BALTIC SEA
Copenhagen
DENMARK
PRUSSIA
Königsberg
LITHUANIA
Minsk
Grodno
Schleswig
RÜGEN I.
Danzig
Hamburg
Bremen
Stettin
Thorn
Pinsk
ELECT. BRANDENBURG
HANOVER
Osnabruck
Hanover
Minden
Berlin
Posen
VISTULA R.
Warsaw
POLAND
Magdeburg
Lublin
Leipzig
Dresden
Breslau
HABSBURG DOMINIONS
Cologne
Frankfort
PALATINATE
Strasbourg
BAVARIA
HUNGARY
Zürich
SWITZ.
DUCHY OF MILAN
VENICE
Turin
Genoa
Bologna
ADRIATIC SEA
Nish
Sofia
LUCCA
GRAND DUCHY OF TUSCANY
PAPAL STATES
DALMATIA (VEN.)
REP. OF RAGUSA
MONTE-NEGRO
OTTOMAN EMPIRE
Orbetello
Ajaccio
CORSICA (GEN., FR. 1768)
Rome
Benevento
Bari
Salonica
KINGDOM OF SARDINIA (AUST., 1714 SAVOY, 1720)
Naples
(AUST., 1714 SP. BOURB., 1735)
CORFU
IONIAN ISLANDS (VEN.)
Cagliari
KINGDOM OF THE TWO SICILIES
Athens
MOREA (VEN., 1699 TURK., 1718)
Messina
Palermo
SICILY (SAVOY, 1714 AUST., 1720 SP. BOURB., 1735)
Tunis
MALTA (KNIGHTS OF ST. JOHN)
TRM

eign affairs, despite his personal eagerness for peace, he found himself a victim of Bourbon dynastic ambition.

Louis XV married in 1725 the daughter of Stanislaus Leszczynski, a Polish nobleman who had long struggled, in alliance with Sweden, to supplant the Saxon Augustus II as King of Poland. On the death of Augustus II in 1733, Stanislaus hastened to Warsaw and obtained his election to the kingship, but Russia interfered and prevailed upon the Polish electors to depose him and substitute the son of the late King as Augustus III. Whereupon Louis XV sent an army to the assistance of his father-in-law, and the War of the Polish Election began.

**War of Polish Election**

The War of the Polish Election (1733–1738) was soon complicated by the ambition of the Spanish Bourbon, Philip V (1700–1746). Philip had never taken kindly to the enforced cession of Spanish possessions in Italy to the Austrian Habsburgs, and, egged on by his masterful wife, Elizabeth Farnese, he devoted his chief energies after 1715 to undoing the treaty of Utrecht. At first, both Orleans and Fleury cooperated with Austria and England in holding Philip V in check, but gradually the dynastic interests of the Bourbon family outweighed the national interests of France. At length in 1733, when the Polish war was beginning and Austria was preparing to aid Russia against France, Fleury was induced to sign a treaty of alliance between France and Spain for the spoliation of Austria. The War of the Polish Election thus became a conflict between Russia and Austria on the one side and France and Spain (and Savoy) on the other.

The war was not so costly as the wars of Louis XIV had been, and the ensuing treaty of Vienna (1738) maintained Bourbon prestige in Europe. Austria and Russia had the satisfaction, it is true, of keeping Augustus III on the throne of Poland, but Austria guaranteed the duchy of Lorraine to Stanislaus during his lifetime and after his death to Louis XV, and agreed to the transfer of Sicily and Naples, and eventually (in 1748) of Parma, from Habsburg to Bourbon control. Philip V put his son, Charles, on the throne of Naples and Sicily and another son on the throne of Parma.

**Bourbon Gains in Italy**

Lorraine was formally added to France on the death of Stanislaus in 1766. Two years later Louis XV purchased the Italian island of Corsica from the impoverished city state of Genoa.

Thus the Bourbons gained ascendancy in Italy. To their two kingdoms of France and Spain, they added, besides the duchy of Parma and the island of Corsica, a third kingdom, that of the Two Sicilies. The son of Philip V of Spain, Charles, who became the first Bourbon King of the Two Sicilies, proved an able and enlightened ruler there (1738–1759), and afterwards in Spain, where he reigned as Charles III (1759–1788). He reformed the internal administration of his realms, in the direction of more efficient centralization, but with an eye to popular welfare. He was greatly interested in art and in the scientific advance and philosophical speculation of the eighteenth century. He also devoted much attention to the improvement of colonial government throughout Spanish America. Unfortunately, Charles III's sons who succeeded him—Ferdinand I in the Two Sicilies (1759) and Charles IV in Spain (1788)—lacked his ability.

Perhaps the most fateful figure in the Bourbon family, however, was Louis XV of France. After the death of Cardinal Fleury in 1743, Louis made a show of exercising direct personal power, and this show he spasmodically maintained until his death in 1774. He had some good qualities of mind and heart, and for a time his subjects called him Louis the Well Beloved. But basically he was fickle and frivolous. Easily bored by the details of statecraft and by the etiquette of the Versailles court, he sought escape in hunting, supper-parties, and spicy indiscretions. He was sensuous and the willing slave of a succession of mistresses—Chateauroux, Pompadour, Barry, to mention only three. Pompadour, particularly, was not only Louis XV's mistress but for almost twenty years (1745–1764) his prime minister in petticoats, and a sinister influence she had.

**Louis XV of France**

Nothing was done to arrest the maladies which since the latter days of the Grand Monarch had been afflicting French society and government. On the contrary, almost everything was done which could aggravate those maladies. The gulf between Versailles and the nation was widened. The privileges—and idleness—of the upper classes were enhanced. The central government was rendered more arbitrary and more aimless. And to cap the climax, there was a series of long and disastrous wars. Of these wars, we shall have more to say in another place.[1] Here it suffices to

[1] For accounts of the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–1748) and the Seven Years' War (1756–1763), see below, pp. 317–322.

remark that they prepared the bankruptcy which precipitated the French Revolution.

Yet throughout the greater part of the eighteenth century the internal weaknesses of the royal government and the external defeats of its armies and fleets were veiled in the appearance of continuing French predominance and Bourbon ascendancy in Europe. France was naturally a rich country. Its soldiers and sailors were brave and daring. Its elegance was manifest at Versailles, and the brillance of its art and science and letters was scarcely rivaled anywhere in Europe. The Bourbon dynasty was still admired and envied. A Bourbon ruled France and its overseas dependencies. Another ruled the kingdom of the Two Sicilies Still another ruled Spain, Mexico, Florida, the West Indies, Central America, most of South America, and the Philippines. If the overseas empire of France suffered diminution, that of Spain remained intact, growing in population, culture, and economic prosperity.

As we now know, a great deluge was preparing for France and the Bourbons. Louis XV had wit enough to guess it, but as he cynically predicted, it would come after he was gone. *Après moi, le déluge.*



# CHAPTER VII

## CONFLICT IN GERMANY AND EXPANSION OF RUSSIA

### I. THE GERMANIES IN THE SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES



ERMANY in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was no such national state as France or England or Spain. It was rather an aggregation of over three hundred separate states, some large and important, some small and insignificant. At least in a political sense, it could best be described, not as Germany, but as "the Germanies."

There was, of course, an historic bond among all the Germanies in the Holy Roman Empire, which continued a formal existence even after the disastrous dissension of the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648). There was still an Emperor, chosen customarily from the Habsburg descendants of Ferdinand I, the brother of Charles V. There were still electors—the number was increased from seven to nine[1]—with some influence and considerable honor. There was still a Diet, composed of representatives of the princes and the free cities, meeting regularly, after 1663, at Ratisbon (or Regensburg) in Bavaria.

But Diet, Electors, and Emperor were only nominal bonds of political union. In reality, the Holy Roman Empire was but a loose alliance of the three hundred different states. Its Emperor and Electors were titular dignitaries, and its Diet was a congress of diplomats. And within the Holy Roman Empire there was now neither the popular will nor the social and economic pressure needful for its strengthening as an Empire or for its transformation into a German national state.

[1] To the original seven electorates of Mainz, Trier, Cologne, Saxony, Brandenburg, Bohemia, and the Palatinate, Bavaria was added as an eighth in 1623, and Hanover as a ninth in 1708. The union of Bavaria and the Palatinate in 1778 again reduced the number of electorates to eight.

On the one hand, the wave of national enthusiasm which Martin Luther and the German knights invoked early in the sixteenth century,[1] had spent itself in religious wrangling and dissension, intolerance and war. Half the Germans remained Catholic; the other half became Protestant. But Protestant Germans were divided between Lutheranism and Calvinism, and the mutual intolerance of these two kinds of Protestantism was surpassed only by the mutual intolerance of Protestant and Catholic. In the circumstances, each German state was a law unto itself in religion and the population of each was more devoted to its peculiar form of Christianity than to German nationalism.

**Lack of National State**

On the other hand, the rise of capitalism and of a numerous, well-to-do middle class had not gone steadily on within the Holy Roman Empire as it had in the Netherlands, France, and England. If it had, it might have provided the same basis for national spirit and national monarchy in Germany as in the countries of western Europe. There certainly had been a remarkable growth of capitalism in the German cities at the beginning of the sixteenth century, and during the first half of that century it seemed as if the German middle classes were profiting greatly from Spanish and Portuguese undertakings overseas and as if the Holy Roman Empire would become the center of European banking. But religious quarrels and destructive civil wars served to weaken the Empire economically as well as politically. And in the first half of the seventeenth century, when the Netherlands, France, and England were forging ahead in wealth and fortifying the position of their middle classes by overseas colonies and commerce, Germany was suffering the havoc of the Thirty Years' War.

**Economic Backwardness**

By 1635 the Hanseatic League was virtually dissolved. German banking declined, and with it German trade and manufacturing. All this involved grave losses to the German bourgeoisie; and it was accompanied, moreover, by a sorry impoverishment and oppression of the peasantry. These native sons of the German soil had fondly hoped for better things from the religious revolution and agrarian insurrections of the sixteenth century; but they were disappointed. The peasantry were in a worse plight in the

[1] See above, pp. 141–142, 201–202.

eighteenth century in Germany than in any other country of western or central Europe.

The German princes alone knew how to profit by the national prostration. Enriched by the confiscation of ecclesiastical property in the sixteenth century and relieved of political interference on the part of the Emperor or the Diet, they utilized the decline of the middle class and the serfdom of the peasantry to exalt their personal power. They got rid of the local assemblies or greatly curtailed their privileges, and gradually established petty tyrannies. After the Thirty Years' War, it became fashionable for the heirs of German principalities to travel abroad and especially to spend some time at the court of France. Here they imbibed the political ideas of the Grand Monarch, and in a short time nearly every petty court in Germany was a small-sized reproduction of the court of Versailles. Even the lesser German princes aped their showy French neighbor. They too maintained armies, palaces, and numerous household officials. Their mimic pomp imposed a heavy burden upon the people, although it was so insignificant in comparison with the real pomp of France that the petty princes were the laughing-stock of Europe. Beneath an external gloss of refinement, they were, as a class, coarse and selfish, and devoid of any compensating virtue. Neither the common people, whom they had impoverished, nor the Church, which they had robbed, could now resist their growing absolutism.

**Princely Autocracy**

Certain princes took advantage of the situation to aggrandize their territories by conquest or marital alliance. They thus secured sufficient revenues to enable them to maintain fairly large armies and to play important roles in international affairs. In other words, while the Empire was growing weaker, some of the states within it were becoming stronger. By the eighteenth century, Brandenburg-Prussia was a great power, Bavaria and Saxony were aspiring to be great powers, and Austria possessed dependencies outside the Holy Roman Empire which amply compensated for loss of effective leadership within the Empire.

The most famous and influential German state was undoubtedly the archduchy of Austria, centering in Vienna and including the provinces of Styria, Carinthia, Carniola, and the Tyrol. It was the most culturally advanced of all the Germanies, and from its reigning family of the Habs-

**Habsburg Austria**

burgs the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire was traditionally chosen.

In modern times, what gave Austria special luster and strength was not so much its headship of the decaying Holy Roman Empire as its acquisition of important non-German dominions and their incorporation into a Habsburg "dynastic" empire. This was not technically an empire at all; its ruler was properly styled Emperor only if he were elected to the honorary headship of the Holy Roman Empire. Nor was it in any way a national state, like France or England or Spain. It was rather a personal union, under a common monarch, of widely disparate dominions. Yet its government was exercised from Vienna and was far more effective than that of the Holy Roman Empire, and its Habsburg sovereign could draw on economic and military resources which the old Empire lacked.

**Its Dynastic Empire**

From the time of Ferdinand I, in the sixteenth century, this Austrian "empire" embraced the kingdoms of Bohemia and Hungary.[1] Bohemia, though within the Holy Roman Empire and accounted one of its "electorates," was inhabited chiefly by Czechs.[2] Hungary, entirely outside, comprised the old Magyar state on the plains of the lower Danube, centering in Budapest, and certain crownlands, such as the Yugoslav "kingdom" of Croatia, the Rumanian principality of Transylvania, and the region of Slovakia whose population was akin in speech to the Czechs of Bohemia.

Austria, Bohemia, and Hungary, these, from the sixteenth century, were the hereditary dominions—the real "empire"—of the Austrian Habsburgs. They constituted a continuous block of territory from Saxony on the northwest to the Ottoman Empire on the southeast, but at the same time a confused realm of disparate peoples and languages. Only the German archduchy of Austria was consistently and enthusiastically loyal to the common Habsburg monarch. With both Bohemia and Hungary the monarch had trouble. It was a revolt of the Czechs in Bohemia against Ferdinand II which precipitated the Thirty Years' War. The revolt was suppressed, and Ferdinand and his successors ruled Bohemia with an iron hand, impairing its parliament, stamping out Prot-

[1] See above, pp. 34–35.

[2] Silesia, one of the crown lands of Bohemia, was largely German, and there was a German minority in the other crown land of Moravia, as well as in Bohemia proper.

estantism which had taken root in its soil, and, in general, favoring its German minority at the expense of its Czech majority.

In Hungary the Habsburg monarchs at the outset were confronted with the most serious difficulties. A third of the country, including the city of Budapest, was in the possession of the Moslem Turks and under the government of the Sultan at Constantinople. Another third, the principality of Transylvania, was semi-independent under a native Magyar prince of Protestant persuasion. In the remaining third, which was ruled by the Habsburg monarch but which had to pay annual tribute to the Turks, most of the nobles were Protestant and were more inclined to support the prince of Transylvania than the Catholic archduke of Austria. Gradually, toward the close of the sixteenth century, the Austrian power made headway in Hungary. There was a marked revival of Catholicism; the princes of Transylvania reverted to the older faith, and the majority of Magyar nobles abandoned Protestantism. As a result of a so-called "Long War" with the Turks (1593–1606), the Habsburg monarch was freed from the humiliating payment of tribute to the Sultan. Moreover, a succession of weak and corrupt Sultans in the first half of the seventeenth century prevented the Turks from taking advantage of Austria's absorption in the Thirty Years' War.

In the latter part of the seventeenth century, the Sultan Mohammed IV (1648–1687) undertook to resume the offensive against Hungary and Austria. His armies overran Hungary in 1682, and in the following year invaded Austria and laid siege to Vienna. The Austrian monarch, the Emperor Leopold I (1657–1705),[1] was hard pressed and the fall of his capital city seemed imminent, when a valiant King of Poland, John III (Sobieski), came to his rescue, defeated the Turks, and raised the siege of Vienna. Then, when Leopold hesitated to follow up Sobieski's victory, Pope Innocent XI preached and organized what was in reality the last of the great crusades. The Pope, the Republic of Venice, the King of Poland, the Tsar of Russia, and, for a time, even Louis XIV of France, cooperated in furnishing generals, men, and money to Leopold for a crusading counter-offensive

[1] Leopold I was the son and successor of Ferdinand III during whose reign the Thirty Years' War had been brought to an end. See above, p. 237. Leopold was the foremost rival of Louis XIV of France for the inheritance of the Spanish Habsburgs. See above, pp. 271–272.

against the Moslems. For sixteen years the struggle raged in Hungary and with increasing success for Christian arms. The wave of Turkish conquest recoiled and began finally to recede. The inspiration was the Pope's, and the heroes were Sobieski of Poland and Prince Eugene of Savoy; but the major political advantages accrued to Austria. By the treaty of Karlowitz (1699) the Turks surrendered all their earlier conquests north of the Danube, and Hungary was reunited under the scepter of the Austrian monarch.[1] Already in 1687, while the war was in progress, an assembly of Magyar magnates was induced to declare the crown of Hungary hereditary in the Habsburg family, and three years later Transylvania was finally incorporated in the Habsburg dominions.

Hardly was Hungary freed from the Turks and definitely joined with Austria and Bohemia, when the Austrian Habsburgs plunged into the War of the Spanish Succession (1702–1713). Though they were unable to prevent Louis XIV from securing Spain and its colonial empire for the Bourbon family, they were successful in adding to the Austrian dominions a considerable number of scattered Continental lands which had previously belonged to Spain.[2] By the treaty of Utrecht (1713), Leopold's successor, the Emperor Charles VI, obtained the Belgian Netherlands, the duchy of Milan, and the kingdom of the Two Sicilies.[3] All these newer possessions of the Austrian Habsburgs were outside the Holy Roman Empire.

Among the various peoples who, by the eighteenth century, were thus brought under Austrian sway, the bond could not be close. They spoke a dozen different languages and presented an even greater diversity of economic interests. Their common monarch ruled them by manifold titles: he was Archduke of Austria, King of Bohemia, King of Hungary, Duke of Milan, and Prince of the (Belgian) Netherlands; and the administration of each of these five major groups was independent of the others. Besides, he still bore the title of Holy Roman Emperor and as such

[1] In addition to these Austrian gains, Poland obtained territory north of the Dniester River, and Venice secured certain ports on the eastern coast of the Adriatic.

[2] They were also successful in suppressing an attempt which Hungarians made during the War of the Spanish Succession to free themselves from the Habsburg connection and reestablish their complete independence.

[3] The kingdom of the Two Sicilies was eventually surrendered (1738) to the Bourbons. See above, p. 280.

enjoyed an honorary precedence among all the princes of the other Germanies.

Of the three hundred states which constituted the Germanies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Austria, by reason of its far-flung foreign dependencies and its historic prestige, was foremost. But there were others of considerable size and importance, with ambitious reigning families. Such, for example, were the German states of Bavaria, Saxony, Hanover, and Brandenburg-Prussia.

**Bavaria**

Bavaria lay on the upper Danube to the west of Austria. For centuries it was ruled by the Wittelsbach family, whose remarkable prince, Maximilian I (1597–1651), had headed the Catholic League and loyally supported the Habsburgs in the Thirty Years' War. By the peace of Westphalia Maximilian gained a part of the Palatinate [1] together with the title of "Elector." His successor had labored with much credit in the second half of the seventeenth century to repair the damage caused by the war, encouraging agriculture and industries, building or restoring numerous churches and monasteries. But the Bavarian Electors in the first half of the eighteenth century sacrificed a sound, vigorous policy of internal reform to a far-reaching ambition in international politics. Despite the bond of a common religion which united them to Austria, they felt that their proximity to their powerful neighbor made the Habsburgs their natural enemies. In the War of the Spanish Succession, Bavaria took the side of France against Austria.

**Saxony**

The Saxony of the seventeenth century was but a small fraction of the vast Saxon duchy which had once comprised all northwestern Germany and whose people in early times had emigrated to England or been subjugated by Charlemagne. Saxony had been restricted since the thirteenth century to a district on the upper Elbe, wedged in between Bohemia and Brandenburg. Here, several elements combined to give it an importance far beyond its extent or population. It was the geographical center of Germany. Its ruling family—the Wettins—were Electors of the Empire. It had been, after the championship of Martin Luther by one of its most notable Electors,[2] a leader of

[1] The other part of the Palatinate, under another branch of the Wittlesbachs, was reunited with Bavaria in 1778. On Maximilian I, see above, pp. 228–229, 237.

[2] Frederick the Wise (1486–1525).

the Lutheran cause, and the reformer's celebrated translation of the Bible had helped to fix the Saxon dialect as the literary language of Germany. At one time it seemed as if Saxony might become the dominant state in Protestant Germany. But the trend of events determined otherwise. A number of amiable but weak Electors in the seventeenth century repeatedly allied themselves with Catholic Austria; and toward the close of the century the Elector Frederick Augustus I (1694–1733) separated himself from his people by becoming a Catholic, and, in order that he might establish himself as King of Poland, he burdened the state with a continued Austrian alliance, with war, and with heavy taxes.[1] The unnatural union of Saxony and Poland was maintained throughout the greater part of the eighteenth century. It was unfortunate for both countries.

**Hanover**

A part of the ancient territory of the Saxons in northwestern Germany was included in modern times in the state of Hanover, extending between the Elbe and the Weser and reaching from Brandenburg down to the North Sea. Hanover was recognized as an electorate during the War of the Spanish Succession,[2] but its real importance rested on the fact that one of its first Electors, through his mother's family, became in 1714 George I of Great Britain, the founder of the Hanoverian dynasty in that country. This personal union between the British kingdom and the electorate of Hanover continued for over a century, and was not without vital significance in international relations. Both George I and George II thought of themselves as German princes. They preferred Hanover to England as a place of residence and directed their primary efforts toward the protection of their German lands from Habsburg or Hohenzollern encroachments.

Brandenburg was a north-German state lying along the Oder River and centering in the town of Berlin. It had originally been a "mark," or frontier province, of the Holy Roman Empire and an outpost of German language and Christian culture against pagan Slavic peoples to the east. In 1415 the Habsburg Em-

[1] Another source of weakness in Saxony was the custom in the Wettin family of dividing the inheritance among members of the family. Such was the origin of the infinitesimal states of Saxe-Weimar, Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, Saxe-Meiningen, and Saxe-Altenburg.

[2] The Emperor had given the title of Elector to Ernest Augustus in 1692; other powers recognized his son, George I, as Elector in 1708.


GROWTH OF HOHENZOLLERN DOMINIONS, TO 1795
SWEDEN
DENMARK
BALTIC SEA
NORTH SEA
HELIGOLAND
SCHLESWIG
HOLSTEIN
EAST FRIESLAND
Lübeck
Rostock
WEST POMERANIA
Kolberg
POMERANIA
Danzig
Marienburg
Königsberg
EAST PRUSSIA
Memel
NIEMEN R.
MECKLENBURG
Hamburg
Emden
Bremen
WESER R.
ELBE R.
Stettin
NEUMARK
WEST PRUSSIA (1ST POL. PART.)
NEW EAST PRUSSIA (3RD POL. PART.)
Thorn
Lingen
MINDEN
RAVENSBERG
Minden
Hanover
BRANDENBURG
Brandenburg
Berlin
Potsdam
Frankfurt
WARTHE R.
Posen
VISTULA R.
Warsaw
BUG R.
CLEVES
MARK
Magdeburg
Halberstadt
Wernigerode
MAGDEBURG
Kottbus
SOUTH PRUSSIA (2ND POL. PART.)
Kalisz
PILICA R.
Lublin
Halle
Rossbach
Leipzig
Dresden
Leuthen
Breslau
SILESIA
NEW SILESIA
Cologne
RHINE R.
Weimar
SAXONY
Coblenz
Frankfurt
Mainz
Dettingen
MAIN R.
BAYREUTH
Bayreuth
Prague
ELBE R.
Cracow
VISTULA R.
BOHEMIA
Nuremberg
Ansbach
ANSBACH
AUSTRIA
200 MILES
BRANDENBURG IN 1415
ACQUISITIONS, 1415–1740
ACQUISITIONS BY FREDERICK THE GREAT, 1740–1786
ACQUISITIONS BY FREDERICK WILLIAM II, 1786–1797
TRM

cended the throne, the Thirty Years' War had already reduced his scattered dominions to a wretched condition. With resolution, however, he set out to restore and unify them and to make them a factor in general European politics. By diplomacy more than by military prowess, he obtained in the peace of Westphalia the title to the above-mentioned additions of territory. Then, taking advantage of a war between Sweden and Poland (1655–1660),[1] he made himself so invaluable to both sides, now helping one, now the other, that, by cunning and sometimes by unscrupulous intrigue, he induced the King of Poland to renounce suzerainty over East Prussia and to give him that duchy in full sovereignty. In the Dutch War of Louis XIV (1672–1678) [2] he defeated the Swedes, who were in alliance with France, and, although he was not allowed by the provisions of the peace to keep what he had conquered, nevertheless the fame of his army was established and Brandenburg-Prussia took rank as the chief competitor of Sweden for the hegemony of the Baltic.

**Great Elector Frederick William**

In matters of government, the Great Elector was, like his contemporary Louis XIV, a firm believer in monarchical absolutism. At the commencement of his reign, each one of the three parts of his lands—Brandenburg, Cleves, and East Prussia—was organized as a separate state with its own Diet or parliament, its own army, and its own independent administration. After a hard constitutional struggle, Frederick William deprived the several Diets of their significant functions, centralized financial control in his own person, joined the local armies together, and merged the three separate administrations into one, subservient to his royal council at Berlin. Thus, the three states were amalgamated into one; and to all intents and purposes they constituted united monarchy.

The Great Elector was a tireless worker. He encouraged industry and agriculture, and built the Frederick William Canal, joining the Oder with the Elbe. When the revocation of the edict of Nantes caused many Huguenots to leave France, the Great

[1] This so-called "First Northern War" was concluded by the peace of Oliva (1660), by which Poland formally relinquished Livonia to Sweden and East Prussia to Brandenburg. Sweden, nominally the victor, was greatly weakened by the struggle. The real victor was Brandenburg.

[2] See above, pp. 262–264.

Elector's warm invitation attracted to Brandenburg some 20,000, who were settled around Berlin and who gave French genius as well as French names to their adopted country. The capital city, which at the Great Elector's accession numbered barely 8,000, counted at his death a population of over 20,000.

Brandenburg-Prussia was becoming an important monarchy, but its ruler was not recognized as "King" until 1701, when the Emperor Leopold I conferred that title upon the Elector Frederick I (1688–1713) in order to enlist his support in the War of the Spanish Succession. In 1713, by the treaty of Utrecht, the other European powers acknowledged the title. It was Prussia, rather than Brandenburg, which gave its name to the new kingdom, because the former was an entirely independent state, while the latter was a member of the Holy Roman Empire. Thereafter the "kingdom of Prussia" [1] designated the combined territories of the Hohenzollern family.

**Prussian Kingdom**

Prussia rose rapidly in the eighteenth century. It began to share with Austria the leadership of Germany and to secure a position in Europe as a first-rate power. This rise was the result largely of the efforts of Frederick William I (1713–1740).


King Frederick William was a curious reversion to his grandfather: he was the Great Elector over again with all his practical good sense if without his taste for diplomacy. Paternal despotism was his ideal of kingship, and it was his ambition to use the limited resources of his country so effectively that Prussia would be feared and respected abroad. He felt that absolutism was the only kind of government consonant with the character of his varied and scattered dominions. He understood in a canny way the need of a strong army. He realized that only the closest economy would permit a relatively small kingdom to support a relatively large army. Under Frederick William I, financial economy, military might, and divine-right monarchy became the characteristics of Hohenzollern rule in Prussia.

**King Frederick William**

By thrift that often bordered on miserliness King Frederick William I managed to increase his standing army from 38,000 to

[1] At first, the Hohenzollern monarch assumed the title of King *in* Prussia, because West Prussia was still a province of the kingdom of Poland. Gradually, however, under Frederick William I (1713–1740), the popular appellation of "King of Prussia" prevailed over the formal "King in Prussia." West Prussia was acquired in 1772 (see below, p. 326).

## THE HOHENZOLLERN FAMILY (1415–1888): ELECTORS OF BRANDENBURG AND KINGS OF PRUSSIA



80,000 men, bringing it up in numbers so as to rank with the regular armies of such first-rate states as France and Austria. In efficiency, it probably surpassed the others. An iron discipline molded the Prussian troops into the most precise military engine then to be found in Europe, and a staff of officers, who were not allowed to buy their commissions, as in many European states, but who were appointed on the basis of professional merit, commanded the army with skill and loyalty.

In civil administration, the King persevered in the work of centralizing the various departments. A "general directory" was entrusted with the businesslike conduct of public finances, and it gradually evolved an elaborate civil service—the famous Prussian bureaucracy, which, in spite of inevitable red tape, became justly famous for its honesty and devotion to duty. The King endeavored to encourage industry and trade by enforcing up-to-date mercantilist regulations, and, although he repeatedly expressed contempt for current culture because he thought its tendencies were weakening, he nevertheless prescribed compulsory elementary education for his people.

Yet Frederick William did not spend much money on what today we call the "peace" activities of government. Of his modest annual budget of about seven million thalers, he spent less than one million on education, the civil service, and the court; he put a million away as a reserve-fund for emergencies, and he expended over five millions on the maintenance of his military establishment.

King Frederick William had many personal eccentricities that highly amused Europe. Imbued with patriarchal instincts, he had his eye on everybody and everything. He treated his kingdom as a schoolroom, and, like a zealous schoolmaster, flogged his naughty subjects unmercifully. If he suspected a man of possessing adequate means, he might command him to erect a fine residence so as to improve the appearance of the capital. If he met an idler in the streets, he would belabor him with his cane and perhaps put him in the army. And his craze for tall soldiers led him to create the famous Potsdam Guard of Giants, a special company whose members must measure at least six feet in height. For service in the Guard he attracted many foreigners by liberal financial offers: it was the only luxury which the parsimonious King allowed himself.

During a portion of his reign the crabbed old King feared that all his labors and savings would go for nought, for he was supremely disappointed in his son, the crown-prince Frederick. The stern father had no sympathy for the literary, musical, artistic tastes of his son, whom he thought effeminate and whom he abused roundly. When Prince Frederick tried to run away, the King arrested him and for punishment put him through such an arduous, slave-like training in the civil and military administration, from the lowest grades upward, as perhaps no other royal personage ever received. It was this despised and misunderstood prince who as Frederick II succeeded his father on the throne of Prussia in 1740 and is known in history as Frederick the Great.

### 2. THE EASTERN POWERS: SWEDEN, POLAND, THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, AND RUSSIA

Bordering on the Germanies to the east were the states of Sweden, Poland, and the Ottoman Empire, all of which appeared as great powers in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. They might have taken advantage of the division of the Germanies following the Thirty Years' War, and particularly of the conflict which later broke out between Prussia and Austria, if they had not developed internal weaknesses and been impelled to pit their waning strength against an expanding and aggressive Russia still farther east.

**Sweden**

It will be recalled that the remarkable Gustavus Adolphus had aimed to make the Baltic a Swedish lake.[1] To his own kingdom, lying along the western shore of that sea, and to its dependency of Finland, he added by conquest the eastern provinces of Karelia, Ingria, Estonia, and Livonia;[2] and his intervention in the Thirty Years' War gave Sweden possession of western Pomerania and the mouths of the Elbe, Oder, and Weser rivers and a considerable influence in German affairs. For years after the death of Gustavus Adolphus, Sweden was the recognized leader of Continental Protestantism, and its trade on the Baltic grew and thrived. Exports of Russia and Poland found

[1] See above, p. 232.

[2] Livonia, occupied by Gustavus Adolphus during the Polish War of 1621–1629, was not formally relinquished by Poland until 1660. Estonia had been conquered by the Swedes in 1561, but Russia did not renounce its claims to this province until 1617.

a convenient outlet through the Swedish port of Riga, and those of northern Germany were most commonly shipped on Swedish vessels from Stettin or Stralsund.

Repeated efforts were made by Denmark, Poland, and Brandenburg to break the commercial monopoly which Sweden enjoyed upon the Baltic and to deprive it of its conquests, but for a long time in vain. Victory continued to attend Swedish arms and a general treaty in 1660 confirmed its dominion. At this time Sweden was a military power of the first magnitude and one of the largest states of Europe, possessing about as much area as present-day Sweden and Germany combined. Stockholm, the capital, lay in the very center of the empire, whose second city was Riga, on the other side of the sea. In politics, in religion, and in trade, Sweden was feared and respected.

Yet the greatness of Sweden in the seventeenth century was more apparent than real. Its commerce provoked the jealousy of all its neighbors. Its dependencies across the Baltic were difficult to hold; peopled by Finns, Estonians, Letts, Poles, and Germans, their bond with Sweden was essentially artificial, and many of them naturally sympathized with their sovereign's enemies. They imposed on the mother country the necessity of remaining a military monarchy, armed from head to foot for every possible emergency. The consequent financial burden was too heavy for Sweden's sparse population, most of which consisted of impoverished peasants.

To the decline of Sweden, its rulers in the seventeenth century contributed no small share. Nearly all of them were born fighters and nearly all of them were neglectful of home interests and the works of peace. They sacrificed thousands of lives that were urgently needed to build up their country; and their absorption in foreign affairs, with its attendant excessive expenditures, led to neglect of domestic well-being. Taxes were burdensome and badly apportioned. The nobles jealously reasserted themselves and recovered many of their political privileges. The royal power steadily dwindled away at the very time when it was most needed; and a selfish, grasping aristocracy hastened the country's downfall. A temporary improvement occurred under the capable King Charles XI (1660–1697), but its fruits were lost by his martial son and successor, Charles XII (1697–1718).

Poland, too, had been a large and important power in the six-

teenth and seventeenth centuries. It represented a geographic unit, embracing the whole watershed of the Vistula (including what much later was called the "Polish corridor," down to the Baltic). It represented, moreover, a union and partial fusion of three nationalities—Poles, Lithuanians, and Letts. The Letts (Latvians) of Courland had been annexed in 1561, and in 1569 the previously separate parliaments and administrations of Poland and Lithuania had been united in much the same way as afterwards, in 1707, the governments of England and Scotland were united. During the seventeenth century, the unified Polish state played a conspicuous military role. It then contested Baltic ports with Sweden, interfered in Russia, helped the Austrian Habsburgs to defend Vienna against the Turks (1683), and extended its own frontiers southeastward at the expense of the Ottoman Empire.[1]

**Poland**

The expansion of the Polish state aroused the jealousy of its neighbors, and by the eighteenth century certain internal weaknesses manifested themselves. Relative to its geographical extent, its population was sparse and its public wealth slight. It encountered increasing difficulty in raising and maintaining armies of sufficient size and effectiveness to cope with the newer military establishments of Prussia, Russia, and Austria; and against attacks of these powers Poland lacked natural as well as artificial fortifications. Its land was wide and flat, unprotected by mountains and almost inviting foreign invasion.

Then, too, there were troublesome minorities within Poland. The majority of the population was Polish in language and nationality and Catholic in religion. Part of the country was peopled by Lithuanians, who, though mainly Catholic like the Poles, constituted a national minority. In many of the towns were considerable settlements of Jews, who were treated, and wished to be treated, as a separate nation. In the eastern and southeastern districts were numerous Byelorussians and Ukrainians, who were non-Polish in speech and some of whom were Orthodox in religion.[2] In the western towns and Baltic provinces was an ap-

[1] On this "last crusade" and its Polish hero, Sobieski, see above, p. 287.

[2] A considerable number of the Ukrainians and Byelorussians in the Polish kingdom, while retaining the liturgy of the Orthodox Church, accepted papal headship in the seventeenth century and were henceforth known as "Uniates" of the Catholic Church.

preciable number of Protestant Germans. A liberal degree of religious toleration had been accorded in the sixteenth century to the "dissenters," as the Orthodox and Protestant minorities were termed, but these were not satisfied; in the eighteenth century they demanded from the Catholic majority an equality which at the time existed in no other country of Europe, and when it was not forthcoming they appealed for assistance to foreign powers—Protestants to Prussia, and Orthodox to Russia.

Social and political conditions in Poland were particularly bad. By the end of the seventeenth century, Swedish commercial control of the Baltic had inflicted hardships on the economic life of Poland. Its cities were not growing and its middle class was declining in wealth and numbers. The one class which retained an eminent social position was the nobility, and the Polish nobles, as a class, were too much given to feuds and factional fights to present a united front to any foreign enemy. Yet the nobles owned the land, lived prodigally, looked out selfishly for their own economic advantage, and depressed the peasantry into an ever more miserable condition. With a grasping, quarrelsome nobility on one hand, and an oppressed peasantry on the other, social solidarity was notably lacking.

A strong national government might have done something to remedy the social ills, but at the very time when monarchical absolutism was being established in every other country of Continental Europe, the Polish government was becoming almost anarchical. Since the sixteenth century, the monarchy in Poland had been elective. As a result the reign of every sovereign was disfigured by foreign intrigues and domestic squabbles over the choice of his successor. The noble electors were able not only to secure liberal bribes but to wring from the chosen candidate such concessions as gradually reduced the kingship to an ornamental figure-head. Most of the later Kings were foreigners who used what little power was left to them in furtherance of their native interests rather than for the welfare of Poland. Thus the Kings in the first half of the eighteenth century were German Electors of Saxony, who owed their new position to the interested friendship of Austria, Prussia, or Russia, and to the large sums of money which they lavished upon the Polish magnates. These same Saxon rulers cheerfully applied Polish resources to their German projects.

Another peculiarity of the Polish constitution was the famous "liberum veto," a kind of gentlemen's agreement among the magnates that no law would be enacted by the parliament if a single member felt it was prejudicial to his interests, and objected. In the course of the seventeenth century the principle of the liberum veto was so far extended as to entail the right of any one of the ten thousand noblemen of Poland to refuse to obey a law which he had not approved. This amounted to anarchism. And anarchism, however fine it might appear as an ideal, was hardly a trustworthy weapon with which to oppose the greedy, hard-hearted, despotic monarchs who governed the surrounding countries.

The Ottoman Empire was not in such sore straits as Poland, but its power and prestige were obviously waning. In other places we have explained how, after an amazing succession of spectacular triumphs, the tide of Moslem Turkish conquest had gradually turned; how the sea-power of the Ottoman Empire suffered a serious reverse from Spain and Venice at the battle of Lepanto (1571); [1] how, as a result of the "last crusade" and the treaty of Karlowitz (1699), the Ottoman Empire was compelled to surrender all Hungary to the Austrian Habsburgs.[2]

**Ottoman Empire**

The reasons for the waning of the Ottoman Empire are to be sought less in the inherent strength of its neighbors than in its own internal weakness. Domestic, not foreign, difficulties prepared the way for its subsequent shrinkage.

It should be borne in mind that the Moslem Turks never constituted a majority of the population of their European possessions. They were essentially a body of conquerors. In moments of religious or martial enthusiasm, inspired with the idea that Divine Providence was using them as agents for the spread of Islam, they had fought valiantly with the sword or had taken clever advantage of their enemies' quarrels to plant over wide areas the crescent in place of the cross. In the conquered regions, the native Christian peoples were reduced to serfdom, and the Turkish conquerors became the chief land-owning and official class.[3] To extend, even to maintain, such an artificial order of

[1] See above, p. 224.
[2] See above, pp. 287–288.
[3] See above, pp. 13–14.

things, the Turks would be obliged to keep their military organization always at the highest pitch of excellence and to preserve their government from weakness and corruption. In neither of these respects did the Turks ultimately succeed.

The Sultans of the eighteenth century were not of the stuff of which a Mohammed II or a Suleiman the Magnificent had been made. To the grim risks of battle they preferred the cushioned ease of the palace, and what energy they had was largely devoted to the management of household and harem. Actual authority was gradually transferred to the Divan, or board of ministers, whose appointments or dismissals were the results of palace intrigues, sometimes petty but more often bloody. Corruption ate its way through the office-holding element of the Empire. Positions were bought and sold from the Divan down to the obscure village, and office seemed to exist primarily for financial profit and secondarily as a means of oppressing the subject peoples.

The army, on which so much in the Ottoman Empire depended, naturally reflected the demoralized condition of the government. While Peter the Great was organizing a strong army in Russia, and Frederick the Great was perfecting the Prussian military machine, the Ottoman army steadily declined. It failed to keep pace with the development of tactics and of firearms in western Europe, and fell behind the times. The all-prevalent corruption impaired its discipline, and its best organized portion—the "janizaries"—became the masters rather than the servants of the Sultans and the Turkish government.

The state that profited most from the growing weakness of the Ottoman Empire, Poland, and Sweden—and eventually from renewed conflict within the Germanies—was Russia.

**Russian Empire**

It had originated in the grandduchy of Muscovy, which in the middle ages and early modern times was a relatively backward and even primitive country, but the only one, after the fall of Constantinople in 1453, which independently preserved the imperial Byzantine tradition of Eastern Orthodox Christendom.

Under the rule of such princes as Ivan the Great and Ivan the Terrible,[1] Muscovy was transformed into the Russian Empire, and foundations were laid for its later greatness. The Ivans regarded themselves as successors of the Christian Emperors at

[1] See above, pp. 36–37.

Constantinople. Ivan the Great had himself described in the ritual of the Orthodox Church as "the ruler and autocrat of all the Russians, the new Tsar Constantine in the new city of Constantine, Moscow." [1] Each of his successors invariably had himself crowned as "Tsar and Autocrat of all the Russias." Simultaneously the Ivans freed Russia from the payment of tribute to Mongols and Tatars, and in 1582 Russia was freed from ecclesiastical dependence on the patriarch of Constantinople.[2] Thenceforth Moscow was both political and religious capital of the Tsars and of their expanding Empire.

For two centuries after the time of Ivan the Great, Russia remained a distinctly backward country. Its commercial and cultural contacts with western Christendom were comparatively few and infrequent. It was untouched by the rise of capitalism, the religious upheaval, the new learning, or the scientific development, which profoundly affected the countries of western and central Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Not until the eighteenth century did Russia enter the general family of European nations and assume an important part in international relations. Nevertheless, the two preceding centuries paved the way for the subsequent, almost startling, rise of the powerful Russian Empire of northern and eastern Europe.

The most fundamental of these occurrences was the expansion of the Russian people. Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the farming folk of the region about Moscow were emigrating south and east and establishing themselves in the fertile plains of the Don and the Volga.[3] A glance at a physical map of Russia will show how the network of rivers and the comparatively level character of the country facilitated this process of national expansion. The gentle southerly flowing rivers of the Dnieper, Don, and Volga, radiating from the same central region, and connected by way of the northern Kama with the headwaters of the Dvina, which empties into the White Sea in

[1] The first Cæsar of the Græco-Roman Empire had been Constantine I, and the last had been Constantine XI. See above, p. 11. It was significant that the Grand Duke of Muscovy, whose subjects owed their Christianity and such culture as they possessed to the Greeks, should now revive and continue the title of Cæsar (in its Russian form, Tsar or Czar).

[2] See above, p. 172.

[3] Armies of the Tsar backed up the colonists: they occupied Kazan in 1552 and Astrakhan, near the Caspian Sea, in 1554.

the extreme north, became chief channels of trade and migration, and contributed much more to the elaboration of national unity than any political institutions. Boats could be conveyed over flat and easy portages from one river-basin to another, and with a relatively small amount of labor these portages were gradually changed into navigable channels, which served as highly convenient arteries of commerce.

As the emigrants threaded their way along the river courses and over the broad plains, they had to be constantly on the alert against attacks of native tribesmen, and they accordingly organized themselves in semi-military fashion. Those in the vanguard of territorial expansion constituted a peculiar class known as Cossacks, who, like frontiersmen of other times and places, for example, like those that gained for the United States its vast western domain, lived an adventurous life in which agricultural and pastoral pursuits were mingled with hunting and fighting. In the basins of the southern rivers, the Cossacks formed semi-independent military communities: those of the Volga and the Don professed allegiance to the Tsar of Muscovy, while those of the Dnieper usually recognized the sovereignty of the King of Poland.

Nor was the migration of the Russian nationality restricted to Europe. The division between Europe and Asia is largely imaginary, as another glance at the map will prove. The low-lying Urals are a barrier only toward the north, while southward the plains of Russia stretch on interminably above the Caspian until they are merged in the steppes of Siberia and Turkestan. Across these plains moved a steady stream of Cossacks and peasants and adventurers, carrying with them the habits and traditions of their Russian homes. Ever eastward wended the emigrants. They founded Tobolsk in 1587 and Tomsk in 1604; they established Yakutsk on the Lena River in 1632, and Irkutsk on Lake Baikal in 1652. In 1638 they reached the Sea of Okhotsk, and, by the close of the seventeenth century, they occupied the peninsula of Kamchatka and looked upon the broad Pacific. Early in the eighteenth century they crossed the Bering Sea, appropriated Alaska, and penetrated southward along the American continent into what is now California. It thus transpired that at the time when the Spaniards were extending their speech and laws in South America and the English were laying the founda-

tions for the predominance of their institutions in North America, the Russians were appropriating northern Asia and demonstrating that, with them at least, the course of empire takes its way eastward.

Then, too, wherever the Russians settled, they retained their language and national customs and their loyalty to Orthodox Christianity. Expansion of the Russian people meant extension of the Russian Church, and with this extension the sway of the Tsars tended to keep pace. By military and ecclesiastical agents, the Tsars exercised their control over widening territories of the Russian people.

Yet this greater Russia remained essentially Oriental. Its form of Christianity was derived from the East rather than the West. Its social customs savored more of Asia than of Europe. Its nobles and even its Tsars were rated by western Christendom as little better than barbarians. In fact, the Russian state was looked upon in the seventeenth century in much the same way as China was regarded in the nineteenth century.

For an understanding of this relative backwardness of Russia, account should be taken of certain special circumstances. In the first place, the religion of the state was a direct heritage of the expiring Eastern Empire and was different from either the Catholicism or the Protestantism of western Europe. Secondly, long and close contact with conquering Mongols or Tatars of Asia had saturated the Russian people with Oriental customs and habits.[1] Thirdly, the nature of the country tended to exalt agriculture and to discourage industry and foreign commerce, and at the same time to turn emigration and expansion eastward rather than westward. Finally, so long as the neighboring states of Sweden, Poland, and the Ottoman Empire remained powerful and retained the entire coast of the Baltic and Black Seas, Russia was deprived of seaports that would enable it to engage in direct traffic with western Europe. Briefly in the sixteenth century, the province of Karelia, on the Baltic, had been held by Russian Tsars, but it was conquered for Sweden by Gustavus Adolphus and confirmed in Swedish possession by treaties of 1617 and 1661.

The direct line of Ivan the Great died out at the close of the sixteenth century, and there ensued what in Russian history is

[1] See above, p. 36.

described as "the troublous times." Disputes over the succession led to a series of civil wars, and the consequent anarchy invited foreign intervention. For a time the Poles harassed the country and even occupied the Kremlin, or citadel, of Moscow. The Swedes, also, took advantage of the disorders in Russia to enlarge their conquests on the eastern shore of the Baltic and to seize the important trading center of Novgorod. In the south, the Ottoman Turks warred with the Cossacks and strengthened their own hold on the Crimean principality.

Under these discouraging circumstances a national assembly of Russian magnates convened at Moscow in 1613 to elect a Tsar, and its choice fell upon one of the Russian nobles, a certain Michael Romanov, whose family had been connected by marriage ties with the medieval princely line. It is an interesting fact that the subsequent autocrats of Russia, down to 1917, were lineal descendants of the Romanov who was thus elected to supreme authority in 1613.

**The Romanovs**

Michael Romanov was no genius, but with the aid of his father (who was Orthodox patriarch of Moscow) he reestablished order and security throughout the country and successfully resisted foreign encroachments. He founded several fortified towns in the south against the Tatars and the Turks. He recovered Novgorod from the Swedes. During the reign of his son, Poland was compelled to cede to Russia, by the treaty of Andrussovo (1667), the areas of Smolensk, Kiev, and eastern Ukraine, and the Dnieper River was fixed upon as the general dividing line between the two countries.

### 3. CAREER OF RUSSIA'S PETER THE GREAT

The grandson of Michael Romanov was the celebrated Peter the Great, who may rightfully be designated as the father of modern Russia. An older and half-witted brother, with whom during his youth he was nominally associated in the government, died without leaving a male heir, and Peter became sole ruler in 1696. From the outset he showed an insatiable curiosity about the arts and sciences of western Europe, the authority of its monarchs, and the organization of its armies and fleets. To an intense curiosity, Peter added an indomitable will. He was resolved to satisfy his every curiosity and to utilize whatever he learned or found.

From childhood, Peter had displayed an aptitude for mechanical tools and inventions and especially for boat-making. Ship-building and ship-sailing became his favorite pastimes. When he was barely twenty-one, he launched at Archangel, on the ice-bound White Sea, a ship which he had built with his own hands. Now in 1696, being sole Tsar at the age of twenty-four, he fitted out a fleet which defeated the Turks on the Black Sea and allowed him to capture the valuable port of Azov. No other successes were gained, however, in this Turkish war; and the young Tsar began to perceive that if he were to succeed in his cherished project he would have to obtain western aid. In 1697, therefore, a special commission left Moscow to solicit the cooperation of the principal western powers against the Ottoman Empire, and to this commission the young Tsar attached himself as a volunteer sailor, "Peter Mikhailov," in order that he might incidentally learn much about ship-building and other technical crafts.

In its primary purpose, the Russian commission failed signally. Western Europe was on the eve of the War of the Spanish Succession,[1] and all its sovereigns seemed to be engrossed in the distractions of dynastic politics. No help against the Turks was forthcoming. But Peter learned many useful things. In Holland he studied ship-building, and also anatomy and engraving. In England he investigated industry and commerce. He closely scrutinized the military establishment of Prussia. In all places which he visited he collected artisans, sailors, engineers, and other workmen, whom he sent back to Russia to instruct his people.

While he was on his way from Vienna to Venice, news reached him that the royal bodyguard, the *streltsi,* had taken advantage of his absence of a year and a half and had mutinied at Moscow. In hot haste he hurried home and wreaked characteristic vengeance upon the mutineers. Two thousand were hanged or broken on the wheel, five thousand were beheaded, and Peter for many days amused himself and edified his court by the dexterity with which he sliced off the heads of *streltsi* with his own royal arm. The severe punishment of the rebellious *streltsi* and the immediate abolition of their military organization were clear evidence that Peter was determined both to break with the past traditions of his country and to compel all the Russian people to do likewise.

[1] See above, pp. 273–274.

The reign of Peter the Great was noteworthy for the removal of checks upon the power of the Tsar and the definitive establishment of that form of monarchical absolutism which in Russia has been called autocracy. By ambition and will-power, the Tsar was qualified to play the role of despot, and his observation of the absolute government of Louis XIV convinced him that that kind of government was the most suitable for Russia.

**Autocracy in Government**

In preparation for warlike aggression abroad, Peter's first care was the creation of a strong and dependable army. Recruited from the Russian masses, and officered and disciplined by foreigners loyal to himself, the new army replaced the *streltsi* and proved a potent factor in executing his domestic and foreign policies. Indeed, it was this new army which was Peter's chief concern throughout his reign and the instrument of all his "reforms."

To meet the increased expenses of his new military establishment, Peter acquired the habit of taking money wherever he found it. Unable to obtain sufficient funds through the old agencies of local and central government in Russia, he ignored and then destroyed those agencies. In place of them, he divided his Empire into a number of "governments" *(gubernii)*—or provinces—over each of which he put an army officer with the principal duty of extorting from the inhabitants enough money to maintain their specified quota of troops.

Peter's replacement of the independent, turbulent *streltsi* with a loyal and orderly standing army was one important step in the direction of autocracy. Another was the subordination of the Church. The Tsar understood the very great influence which the Orthodox Church exerted over the Russian people and the danger to his policies which ecclesiastical opposition might create. He was naturally anxious that the Church should become the ally, not the enemy, of autocracy. He therefore took such steps as would exalt the Church in the opinion of his countrymen and at the same time would render it a serviceable agent of the imperial government. On the one hand, he professed an intense loyalty to the Orthodox faith and harried Russian heretics and dissenters with fire and sword.[1] On the

**Control of Orthodox Church**

[1] The most numerous "dissenters" in Russia were the "Old Believers," who broke away from the Orthodox Church in the second half of the seventeenth century

other hand, he subjected the Orthodox Church to his own authority; he abolished the patriarchate of Moscow and vested the government of the Church in a body, the Holy Synod, whose members were bishops and whose chief was a layman, all chosen by the Tsar himself. No appointment to ecclesiastical office could be made without the approval of the Holy Synod; no sermon could be preached and no book published unless it had received the sanction of that body. The results were in keeping with Peter's fondest expectations, for the Orthodox Church in Russia speedily became the right-hand support of the Tsardom. The Tsars exalted the Church as the source of order and holiness; as a veritable ark of the covenant the clergy magnified and extolled the autocracy.

**Social and Political Changes**

Under Peter the Great, Russian society was revolutionized. On the one hand, he swamped the old (and presumably independent) medieval nobility of Russia by ennobling a large number of families who did conspicuous military service for him, with the result that a new class of "gentry" appeared, possessing most of the land and devoted to the army and the autocratic tsardom.[1] On the other hand, the various kinds of free and unfree peasants—the mass of the Russian people—were put more rigorously under the domination of the gentry and reduced to a position of serfdom which was not far removed from slavery. Peter the Great, more than any other person, was responsible for the peculiar structure of society which existed in Russia from his day to the twentieth century.

Of traditional civil government, Peter the Great was a destroyer rather than a reformer. He foreshadowed the kind of civil government which Russia was to have during the ensuing two centuries. At the head of the state was the Tsar or Emperor, possessing absolute, unlimited powers. The medieval assembly, or Duma, of great nobles, which had formerly exercised some legis-

when a patriarch of Moscow made some slight changes in the liturgy. The Old Believers were reactionary and as hostile to Protestantism as to any reform in the Orthodox Church. They were quite scandalized by the "reforms" of Peter the Great and became his chief political and religious adversaries; he and succeeding Tsars persecuted them, but they remained fairly numerous throughout modern times. In 1905 they were said to number twelve millions.

[1] In 1700, before Peter's "reforms" there were 2,985 noble families in Russia. In 1737, after his "reforms," there were 100,000 noble families, comprising 500,000 male nobles, of whom 200,000 were officials.

lative rights, was practically abolished; its place was taken by an advisory council of state whose members were selected by the Tsar. Most traces of local self-government were similarly swept away, and the country was administered by the Tsar's personal agents. To enforce his autocratic will, he relied upon his new army and his new gentry. The Tsar encountered a good deal of opposition to these, as to all his other "reforms," and for a while he was obliged to depend principally on foreigners to carry them out. As soon as possible, however, Peter employed natives, especially his newly ennobled gentry, for it was a cardinal point in his policy that Russia must be managed by its own upper classes without foreign interference or help.

Like his contemporaries in western Europe, Peter gave considerable attention to the economic condition of the monarchy. He strove, in a rather bungling manner, to promote agriculture. Moreover, he understood that Russia grievously lacked a numerous and prosperous middle class, and he aimed to create one by encouraging trade and industries. He undertook to establish some state-owned industries and to man them with serfs whom he requisitioned from the gentry. He also had an idea of introducing the guild system from Germany into Russia. Yet his almost constant preoccupation with the army and participation in wars prevented him from bringing his economic plans to fruition.

Almost from the beginning, Peter the Great was resolved to make the Russian people look like Europeans. He at least would change their clothing and manners from Oriental to Occidental. With this end in view, edict followed edict with amazing rapidity. The chief potentates of the Empire were solemnly assembled so that Peter with his own hand might shave off their long beards and flowing mustaches. A heavy tax was imposed on such as persisted in wearing beards. French or German clothes were to be substituted, under penalty of large fines, for the traditional Russian costume. The use of tobacco was made compulsory. The Oriental semi-seclusion of women was prohibited. Both sexes were to mingle freely in the festivities of the court. These innovations were largely superficial; they partially permeated the upper classes, but made little impression on the mass of the population. Peter had begun a work, however, which was to bear significant results in the future.

**"Westernization"**

Internal reforms were but one half of Peter's ambitious pro-

gram. To him Russia owed not only the creation of a new militarism, the loss of the independence of the Church, the revolutionizing of society, the Europeanization of manners and customs, and the firm establishment of autocracy, but also the development of plans for external aggression. On one hand, the Tsar showed a lively interest in the exploration and colonization of Siberia and the extension of Russian dominion around the Caspian Sea and toward Persia. On the other hand—and this, for our present purposes, is far more important—he was resolved to make the commercial and cultural connection between Russia and Europe strong and intimate, to open a way to the west by gaining outlets on both the Black and Baltic Seas—"windows" to the west, as he termed them.

To obtain an outlet on the Baltic, would involve aggression against Sweden, and for such aggression Russia might find helpful allies among the Western countries which were particularly jealous of Swedish hegemony in northern Europe. An apparently favorable opportunity presented itself in 1697, with the death of the capable Swedish King Charles XI and the succession of his son, Charles XII, a boy only fifteen years old and presumably weak and incompetent.

**Coalition against Sweden**

Consequently the Tsar Peter, while returning home the following year from his travels abroad, discussed with Augustus II, Elector of Saxony and King of Poland, a scheme for the dismemberment of the Swedish empire: Poland would recover Livonia and appropriate Estonia; Russia would seize Ingria and Karelia and thereby gain the desired frontage on the Baltic. To win other allies against Sweden, Brandenburg-Prussia would be offered western Pomerania, while Denmark would be invited to take Holstein and the mouths of the Elbe and Weser. Charles XII would thus be left only his homeland in the Scandinavian peninsula and the grandduchy of Finland. At the last moment Brandenburg-Prussia balked, but Russia, Poland, and Denmark signed the menacing treaty of alliance in 1699, and at once prepared a joint attack upon Sweden. The allies expected quick and decisive victory. All western and southern Europe was on the verge of the struggle for the Spanish inheritance [1] and would obviously be unable to prevent them from partitioning the Swedish inheritance.

[1] See above, pp. 273–274.

But the allies grossly underrated their foe. Charles XII was a mere boy, gloomy and sensitive, but precocious and endowed with all the martial spirit and heroism of his ancestors. He desired nothing better than to fight against overwhelming odds, and the fury of the youthful commander soon earned him the sobriquet of the "madman of the North." The alliance of 1699 precipitated the Great Northern War which lasted until 1721 and very slowly, but no less surely, reduced Sweden to the position of a third-rate power. It was amid the most spectacular exploits of the Boy-King that the fall of Sweden was accomplished. It was a grander but more tragic fate than in the same period befell Spain.

Charles XII did not give the allies time to unite. Hurriedly crossing the straits, he invaded Denmark, whose terrified King promptly signed a treaty with him (1700), paying a large indemnity and engaging to keep peace in the future.

Thence Charles hastened across the Baltic to Estonia, in order to deal with the advancing Russians. At Narva he met and annihilated their army. Then he turned southward, clearing Livonia and Lithuania of Poles and Russians.

Into the very heart of Poland he carried the war, possessing himself of both Warsaw and Cracow. He obliged the Polish parliament to dethrone Augustus and to accept a King of his own choice in the person of Stanislaus Leszczynski (1704).[1]

All these things were done by a youth between the age of seventeen and twenty-two. It was quite natural that he should be puffed up with pride in his ability and successes. It was almost as natural that, hardened at an early age to the horrors of war, he should become increasingly callous and cruel. Many instructions the impulsive youth sent out over conquered districts in Russia, Poland, and Saxony "to slay, burn, and destroy." "Better that the innocent suffer than that the guilty escape" was his favorite adage.

**Charles XII, "madman of the North"**

Small wonder, then, that neither Peter the Great nor the Elector Augustus would abandon the struggle. While Charles was overrunning Poland, Peter was reorganizing his army and occupying Karelia and Ingria; and when the Swedish King returned to engage the Russians, Augustus drove out Stanislaus and regained the crown of Poland. Yet Charles, with an unreasoning stubbornness, would not perceive that the time had arrived for terminating

[1] See above, p. 280.

the conflict with a few concessions. Russia at that time asked only a port on the Gulf of Finland as the price of an alliance with Sweden against Poland.

To all entreaties for peace, Charles XII turned a deaf ear, and pressed the war in Russia. Unable to take Moscow, he turned southward in order to effect a juncture with some rebellious Cossacks, but met the army of Peter the Great at Poltava (1709). Poltava marked the decisive triumph of Russia over Sweden. The Swedish army was destroyed, only a small number being able to accompany their King in his flight across the southern Russian frontier into Turkish territory.

Then Charles stirred up the Turks to attack the Tsar, but from the new contest he was unable to profit. Peter bought peace with the Ottoman Sultan by re-ceding to him the town of Azov, and the Sultan gradually tired of his guest's continual and frantic clamor for war. After a sojourn of over five years in the Ottoman Empire, Charles suddenly appeared, with but a single attendant, at Stralsund, which by that time was all that remained to him outside of Sweden and Finland.

Still the war dragged on. The allies grew in numbers and in demands. Peter the Great and Augustus were again joined by the Danish King. Great Britain, Hanover, and Prussia, all covetous of Swedish trade or Swedish territory, were now members of the coalition. Charles XII stood adamant: he would retain all or he would lose all. So he stood until the last. It was while he was directing an invasion of Norway that the brilliant but ill-balanced Charles lost his life (1718). He was then but thirty-six years of age.

Peace, which had been impossible during the lifetime of Charles, became a reality soon after his death. It certainly came none too soon for the exhausted and enfeebled condition of Sweden. By the treaties of Stockholm (1719 and 1720), Sweden resigned all its German holdings except a small district of western Pomerania including the town of Stralsund. Denmark obtained Holstein and a money indemnity. Hanover gained the mouths of the Elbe and Weser. Prussia secured the mouth of the Oder and the important city of Stettin. Augustus was formally restored to the Polish throne, though without territorial gain. Great Britain, Denmark, and Prussia became the principal commercial heirs of Sweden.

The treaty of Nystad (1721) was the turning point for Russia,


ARCTIC OCEAN
SWEDEN
GULF OF BOTHNIA
SWEDISH FINLAND
WHITE SEA
Archangel
1584
DVINA R.
Nystad
Helsingfors
G. OF FINLAND
KARELIA
St. Petersburg
INGRIA 1721
ESTONIA 1721
Narva
Novgorod
LIVONIA 1721
BALTIC SEA
COURLAND 1795
Riga
NIEMEN R.
DÜNA R.
VOLGA R.
Nishni Novgorod
Kazan
KAMA R.
LITHUANIA 1795
Moscow
MUSCOVY
PRUSSIA
Minsk
Smolensk
1552
RUSSIA
Warsaw
BYELORUSSIA 1793
PRIPET R.
AUSTRIA
Kiev
Voronezh
UKRAINE 1686
1793
DNIESTER R.
DNIEPER R.
Poltava
DON R.
VOLGA R.
ASTRAKHAN 1557
HUNGARY
EDISAN 1792
Odessa
Tagan-rog
Azov
SEA OF AZOV
Astrakhan
DANUBE R.
CRIMEA 1783
Stavropol
Kutchuk Kainardji
CIRCASSIA 1763
CASPIAN SEA
BLACK SEA
OTTOMAN EMPIRE
Constantinople
EXPANSION OF THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE IN EUROPE, TO 1795
500 MILES

for thereby it acquired from Sweden full sovereignty over Karelia and Ingria, the important Baltic provinces of Estonia and Livonia, and a narrow strip of southern Finland including the fortress of Viborg. Peter the Great thus realized his ambition of affording his country a "window to the west." On the waste marshes of the Neva he founded, with enormous effort and sacrifice of life, a city which he planned to be a center of commerce and a bond of connection between Russia and the western world. He named it St. Petersburg.[1] Here were reared palatial offices and residences in the "classical" style of western Europe, rather than after the Byzantine models of old Moscow. And hither from Moscow was transferred the government of the Russian Empire. Russia supplanted Sweden in the leadership of northern Europe and assumed a place among the powers of the world.

**Russian Expansion on Baltic**

Peter the Great did not realize his other ambition of securing a Russian port on the Black Sea. Although he captured and held Azov for a time, he was obliged to relinquish it, as we have seen, in order to prevent the Turks from joining hands with Charles XII.

Nevertheless, when Peter died in 1725, he left his Empire a compact state, with a big army and a degraded peasantry, westernized at least superficially, and ready to play a conspicuous role in the international politics of Europe. The man who succeeded in doing all these things has been variously estimated. By some he has been represented as a monster of cruelty and a murderer,[2] by others as a demon of the grossest sensuality, by still others as a great national hero. Probably he merited all such opinions. But, above all, he was a genius of fierce energy and will, who toiled always for what he considered the welfare of his country.

### 4. CONFLICT BETWEEN HOHENZOLLERN PRUSSIA AND HABSBURG AUSTRIA

Next to Russia, the state that gained most from the fall and dismemberment of Sweden was Prussia, then ruled by the Hohen-

[1] Known generally in the Teutonic form "St. Petersburg" from its foundation until the World War in 1914, when the Slavic form of "Petrograd" was substituted. Later, under Soviet auspices, it was renamed "Leningrad."

[2] Peter had his son and heir, the Grand-Duke Alexius, put to death because he

zollern King Frederick William I. Twenty years afterwards, this monarch, who had managed to build up a powerful military establishment and at the same time to amass a considerable financial reserve in the royal treasury, was succeeded on the Prussian throne by his still more famous son, Frederick II (1740–1786), commonly called Frederick the Great.

**Prussian Aggression against Austria**

Frederick already had plans for committing aggression against the Austrian empire of the Habsburgs similar to that which his father, in conjunction with Peter the Great of Russia, had committed against Sweden.

An unkind fate had attended the Habsburgs of Spain in the extinction of their direct male line, and the fateful War of the Spanish Succession had ensued in the early part of the eighteenth century.[1] A similar fate now faced the Habsburgs of Austria. For Charles VI (1711–1740), Archduke of Austria and Holy Roman Emperor, had neither sons nor brothers, but only a daughter, Maria Theresa. Spurred on by the fate of his Spanish kinsman, Charles directed his energies toward securing a settlement of his possessions prior to his death. Early in his reign he promulgated a so-called Pragmatic Sanction which declared that the Habsburg dominions were indivisible and that, contrary to long custom, they might be inherited by female heirs in default of male. Then he subordinated his whole foreign policy to securing general European recognition of the right of Maria Theresa to succeed to all his territories. One after another of his dominions swore to observe the Pragmatic Sanction. One after another of the foreign powers—Prussia, Russia, Great Britain, Holland, the Empire, Poland, France, Spain, and Savoy, to whom liberal concessions were made—pledged themselves to respect the Pragmatic Sanction. When Charles VI died in 1740, he left his daughter a disorganized state, an empty treasury, and a relatively small army, but he bequeathed her an ample number of parchment guarantees. The cynical Hohenzollern King of Prussia remarked that 200,000 fighting men would have been a more useful legacy, and, as events proved, he was right.

No sooner was Charles VI dead and Maria Theresa ruler in Vienna than Frederick II arranged with Bavaria and France to

did not sympathize with his reforms. The Tsar's many punishments often assumed a most disgusting character.

[1] See above, pp. 273–276.

dismember her realm. While Prussia would appropriate the rich Austrian province of Silesia, the Elector of Bavaria would be made Holy Roman Emperor as Charles VII, and France encouraged to take the Austrian Netherlands.

The duchy of Silesia thus became the bone of contention between Hohenzollern Prussia and Habsburg Austria. It covered the fertile valley of the upper Oder, separating the Slavic Czechs of Bohemia on the west from the Slavic Poles on the east. It was a fairly prosperous area, and its population, which was largely German, was as numerous as that of the whole kingdom of Prussia. If annexed to the Hohenzollern possessions, it would enrich them and make them overwhelmingly German. On the other hand, the loss of Silesia would give Austria less direct influence in strictly German affairs and would deprive it of an important source of revenue and military strength.

Trumping up an old and very dubious family claim to the duchy, Frederick immediately marched his army into Silesia and occupied Breslau, its capital. To the west, a combined Bavarian and French army prepared to invade Austria and Bohemia. Maria Theresa, pressed on all sides, fled to Hungary and begged the Magyars to help her. The effect was electrical. Hungarians, Austrians, and Bohemians rallied to the support of the Habsburg throne; recruits were drilled and hurried to the front; the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–1748) was soon in full swing.

**War of Austrian Succession**

A trade war which had recently broken out between Great Britain and Spain [1] was soon merged with the continental struggle. Great Britain, bent on maintaining its privileged trade with the Belgian Netherlands, opposed their impending incorporation in the rival and powerful monarchy of France, preferring that they should remain in the hands of some distant and less-feared, less commercial power, such as Austria. Great Britain, moreover, had fully recognized the Pragmatic Sanction and now determined, in its own interests, to supply Maria Theresa with money and to dispatch armies to the Continent to defend the Netherlands against France and also to protect Hanover against aggressive Prussia. On the other side, the royal family of Spain now sympathized with their Bourbon kinsmen in France and hoped

[1] Commonly called the War of Jenkins' Ear (1739). See below, pp. 348–349.

to recover from Austria all the Italian possessions of which Spain had been deprived by the treaty of Utrecht (1713).

The main parties to the War of the Austrian Succession were, therefore, on the one hand, Prussia, France, Spain, and Bavaria, and, on the other, Austria and Great Britain. To the former at first adhered the Elector of Saxony, who wished to play off Prussia against Austria for the benefit of his Saxon and Polish lands, and the King of Sardinia, who was ever balancing in Italy between Habsburg and Bourbon ambitions. With Austria and Great Britain was united Holland, because of its desire to safeguard itself against possible French aggression.

The war was not so terrible or bloody as its duration and the number of contestants would seem to indicate. Saxony, which inclined more naturally to Austrian than to Prussian friendship, was easily persuaded by bribes to desert its allies and make peace with Maria Theresa. Spain would fight only in Italy; and Sardinia, alarmed by the prospect of substantial Bourbon gains in that peninsula, went over to the side of Austria. The Dutch were content to defend their own territories.

Despite the greatest exertions, Maria Theresa was unable to expel Frederick from Silesia. Her generals suffered repeated reverses at his hands, and three times she was forced to recognize his occupation in order that she might employ all her forces against her western enemies. By the third treaty between the two German sovereigns, concluded at Dresden in 1745, Silesia was definitely ceded by Austria to Prussia.[1] Frederick thus gained his ends: he coolly deserted his allies and withdrew from the war.

**Prussian Conquest of Silesia**

Meanwhile the Austrian arms had elsewhere been more successful. The French and Bavarians, after winning a few trifling victories in Bohemia, were forced back to the upper Danube. Munich was occupied by the troops of Maria Theresa at the very time the Elector was being crowned at Frankfurt as Holy Roman Emperor. The whole of Bavaria was soon in Austrian possession, and the French were in retreat across the Rhine. Gradually, also, the combined forces of Austria and Sardinia made headway in Italy against the Bourbon armies of France and Spain.

In the last years of the war the French managed to protect

[1] Except a very small district, which thereafter was known as "Austrian Silesia."

Alsace and Lorraine from Austrian invasion, and, under the command of the gifted Marshal Saxe, they succeeded in subjugating the greater part of the Austrian Netherlands and in carrying the struggle into Holland. On the high seas and in the colonies, the conflict raged between France and Great Britain as "King George's War." [1]

The treaties which ended the War of the Austrian Succession were signed at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748. They confirmed the acquisition of Silesia by Frederick II of Prussia and restored everything else to the situation at the opening of the conflict. The Wittelsbach family was reinstated in Bavaria and in the Palatinate, and the husband of Maria Theresa, Francis of Lorraine, succeeded Charles VII as Holy Roman Emperor. France, for all its expenditures and sacrifies, gained nothing. The War of the Austrian Succession was but a preliminary encounter in the conflict between Prussia and Austria for leadership of the Germanies. It was likewise only an indecisive round in the prolonged conflict between France and Great Britain for colonial and commercial mastery.

**Austrian Plan for Revenge**

In the war just closed, Austria had been the chief loser, and the resolute Maria Theresa set herself at once to the difficult task of recovering her prestige and her ceded territory. Her first efforts were directed toward internal reform— consolidating the administrations of her various dominions by the creation of a strong central council at Vienna, encouraging agriculture, equalizing and augmenting the taxes, and increasing the army. Her next step was to isolate Prussia by forming a comprehensive league of states against it. She knew she could rely on Saxony. She easily secured an ally in the Tsarina Elizabeth of Russia, who had been deeply offended by the caustic wit of the Prussian King. She induced depleted Sweden to agree to a "war of revenge" against Prussia. She counted on the continuance of her earlier alliance with Great Britain and Holland. She had only France to win to her side, and in this policy she had the services of an invaluable agent, Count Kaunitz, the foremost diplomat of the age.

Kaunitz held out to France, as the price for abandonment of its alliance with Prussia and acceptance of one with Austria, the

[1] See below, pp. 348–349.

tempting bait of the Austrian Netherlands (Belgium). But Louis XV of France at first refused an Austrian alliance: it meant a radical departure from the traditional French and Bourbon policy of opposing the Habsburgs. Kaunitz then appealed to the King's mistress, the ambitious Madame de Pompadour, who, like the Tsarina Elizabeth, had had plenty of occasions for taking offense at the witty verses of the Prussian monarch. The favor of Pompadour was won, and France entered the league against Prussia. The grandson and heir of Louis XV—the future Louis XVI—married Maria Theresa's daughter, Marie Antoinette.

Meanwhile Great Britain had entered into a special agreement with Frederick to guarantee the integrity of Hanover and the general peace of Germany. When, therefore, the colonial conflict between Great Britain and France was renewed in 1754, the former contracted an outright alliance with Prussia. Thus it befell that, whereas in the indecisive War of the Austrian Succession Prussia and France were pitted against Austria and Great Britain, in the determinant Seven Years' War, which ensued, Austria and France were in arms against Prussia and Great Britain. This overturn of traditional alliances has been commonly designated the "diplomatic revolution."

**Realignment of Great Powers**

The Seven Years' War lasted in Europe from 1756 to 1763, and, as regards both the number of combatants and the brilliant generalship displayed, deserves to rank with the War of the Spanish Succession as the greatest war which the modern world had so far witnessed. Like that war, too, it was a world war. In another chapter will be related the story of its maritime and colonial counterpart, which embraced the French and Indian War in America (1754–1763) and the triumphant campaigns of Clive in India, and which decisively established the supremacy of Great Britain on the seas, in the Far East, and in North America.[1] Here is sketched its course on the European continent.

**Seven Years' War**

Without waiting for a formal declaration of hostilities, Frederick seized Saxony, from which he exacted large indemnities and drafted numerous recruits, and with his well-trained veteran troops crossed the mountains into Bohemia. He was obliged by superior

[1] See below, pp. 349–356.

Austrian forces to raise the siege of Prague and to fall back on his own kingdom. Thence converged from all sides the allied armies of his enemies. Russians moved into East Prussia, Swedes from Pomerania into northern Brandenburg, Austrians into Silesia, while the French were advancing from the west. Here Frederick displayed those qualities which entitle him to rank as a foremost military commander and to justify his title of "the Great." Inferior in numbers to his opponents, he dashed with lightning rapidity into central Germany and at Rossbach (1757) inflicted an overwhelming defeat upon the French, whose general wrote to Louis XV, "The rout of our army is complete: I cannot tell you how many of our officers have been killed, captured, or lost." No sooner was Frederick relieved of danger in the west than he was back in Silesia. He flung himself upon the Austrians at Leuthen, took captive a third of their army, and put the rest to flight.

The victories of Frederick, however, decimated his army. He still had money, thanks to the subsidies which he received from Great Britain, but he found it difficult to procure men. He gathered recruits from hostile countries; he granted amnesty to deserters; he even enrolled prisoners of war. He was no longer sufficiently sure of his soldiers to take the offensive, and for five years he was reduced to defensive campaigns in Silesia. The Russians occupied East Prussia and penetrated into Brandenburg; in 1759 they captured Berlin.

The French, after suffering defeat at Rossbach, directed their energies against Hanover but encountered unexpected resistance at the hands of an army collected by British funds and commanded by the Duke of Brunswick, a nephew of Frederick. Brunswick defeated them and gradually drove them out of Germany. This series of reverses, coupled with disasters that attended French armies in America and in India, caused the French King to call upon his cousin, the King of Spain, for assistance. The outcome was the formation of a close defensive alliance (1761)—the "Family Compact"—between the Bourbon states of France, Spain, and the Two Sicilies, and the entrance of Spain into the war (1762).

What really saved Frederick the Great was the death of the Tsarina Elizabeth (1762) and the accession to the Russian throne of Peter III, a dangerous madman and an intense admirer of the

military prowess of the Prussian King. Peter in brusque style transferred the Russian forces from the standard of Maria Theresa to Frederick's and restored to Prussia the conquests of his predecessor. Peter III was dethroned in the same year, but his wife, Catherine II, who succeeded him, was a German princess who owed her position in large part to Frederick the Great and was naturally friendly with him. The "benevolent neutrality" which she maintained toward Prussia marked the final break-up of the coalition which had supported Austria and the real beginning of a long and fruitful cooperation between Russia and Prussia.

Spain had entered the Seven Years' War too late to affect its fortunes materially. It was unable to regain what France had lost, and in fact the Bourbon states were utterly exhausted. So too was Sweden. The Austrians, after frantic but vain attempts to wrest Silesia from Frederick, finally despaired of their cause.

The treaty of Hubertusburg (1763) put an end to the Seven Years' War in Europe. Maria Theresa finally though reluctantly surrendered all claims to Silesia. Prussia had clearly humiliated Austria and become a first-rate power. The Hohenzollerns were henceforth the acknowledged peers of the Habsburgs. The almost synchronous treaty of Paris closed the war between Great Britain, on the one hand, and France and Spain on the other, by ceding the bulk of the French colonial empire to the British.[1] It made Great Britain mistress of the seas and chief colonial power of the world.

**Prussian-British Victory**

Rivalry between Hohenzollern and Habsburg did not cease with the Seven Years' War. When, a few years later, the succession to the electorate of Bavaria was in some doubt and Austria laid claims to the greater part of that state (1777–1779), Frederick again stepped in, and now by intrigue and now by threats of armed force prevented any considerable extension of Habsburg control. The last important act of his foreign policy was the formation of a league of princes to champion the lesser German states against Austria.

### 5. CAREER OF RUSSIA'S CATHERINE THE GREAT

It is hardly possible to feel much respect for the character of the Russian rulers who succeeded Peter the Great in the eighteenth

[1] See below, p. 355.

century.[1] Most of them were women with loose morals and ugly manners. The most noteworthy was Catherine II, usually called Catherine the Great (1762–1796). By birth she was not a Russian but a princess of Protestant Germany whom Frederick the Great helped to make the wife of the heir to the Russian crown.

No sooner was she in her adopted country than she set to work to ingratiate herself with its people. She learned the Russian language. She outwardly conformed to the Orthodox Church. She slighted her German relatives and surrounded herself with Russians. She established a reputation for quick wit and lofty patriotism. So great was her success that when her half-insane husband ascended the throne as Peter III in 1762, the people looked to her rather than to him as the real ruler, and before the year was over she had managed to make away with him and to become sovereign in name as well as in fact. For thirty-four years Catherine was Tsarina of Russia. Immoral to the last, without conscience or scruple, she ruled the country with a firm hand and consummated the work of Peter the Great.

**Domestic Policy**

In the administrative system, Catherine reorganized the "governments" and "districts," divisions and subdivisions of Russia, over which she placed governors and vice-governors respectively, all appointed by the central authority. To the ecclesiastical alterations of Peter, she added the secularization of church property, thereby making the clergy dependent upon her bounty and strengthening the autocracy.

The Tsarina was certainly a despot, and she wished her contemporaries to regard her as an "enlightened" despot. She took some personal interest in the literary and scientific progress of the age. She established several schools and academies and encouraged the upper classes in Russia to use French as the language of polite society. She sent Russian princes to England to observe the latest experiments in agriculture.

At heart, Catherine was little moved by desire for reform or by pity for the peasants. She had the heavy whip—the knout—applied to the bare backs of earnest reformers, and she did nothing to relieve the poverty or to lessen the ignorance of the masses. To the governor of Moscow she expounded her true thought on the subject of popular education: "My dear prince, do not com-

[1] Catherine I (1725–1727), Peter II (1727–1730), Anna (1730–1740), Ivan VI (1740–1741), Elizabeth (1741–1762), Peter III (1762), Catherine II (1762–1796).

plain that the Russians have no desire for instruction; if I institute schools, it is not for us,—it is for Europe, where we must keep our position in public opinion. But the day when our peasants shall wish to become enlightened, both you and I will lose our places."

Yet this obviously insincere and scandalously immoral woman pursued a strong and aggressive foreign policy. She made herself (and Russia) seem "enlightened" to the statesmen and philosophers of the age, and by war and conquest she made Russia a great power in Europe.

Of the three foreign countries which at the beginning of the eighteenth century blocked the European expansion of Russia, Sweden had been humbled and shorn of Baltic provinces by Peter the Great in the Great Northern War and the ensuing treaty of Nystad (1721). Poland and the Ottoman Empire remained to be dealt with by Catherine the Great, and she dealt with them effectually.

Catherine began by cultivating close friendship with Prussia. She gave practical assistance to Frederick the Great in the final and decisive stage of his conflict with Austria, and she concerted with him schemes for the control and eventual partition of Poland. Almost immediately, the death of Augustus III, Elector of Saxony and King of Poland (1734–1763), afforded her an opportunity to meddle in Polish affairs and to set up a puppet government at Warsaw. With the astute aid of Frederick the Great, she induced the Polish nobles to reject the Saxon dynasty, which was more or less under Austrian influence, and to elect as Augustus III's successor one of her own courtiers and favorites, Stanislaus Poniatowski, who thus in 1764 became Stanislaus II of Poland.

**Intervention in Poland**

With the accession of Stanislaus, the predominance of Russia was established in Poland. And Prussia joined Russia in a special and very sordid agreement to uphold the anarchical constitution of the unhappy and victimized country. When patriotic Poles made efforts—as they now did—to reform their government, to abolish the *liberum veto,* and to strengthen the state, they found their attempts thwarted by the allies either by force of arms or by bribes of money. Feuds among the Polish nobles, together with complaints of religious discrimination, afforded pretexts for the intervention of neighboring Prussia and Russia.

A popular insurrection of Polish Catholics against the intolerable meddling of foreigners was crushed by the troops of Catherine, with the single result that the Russians, in pursuing some fleeing insurgents across the southern frontier, violated Turkish territory and precipitated a war between the Ottoman Empire and Russia.

The Turkish War lasted from 1768 to 1774. The Ottoman government was profoundly alarmed by the Russian foreign policy. It believed that the intrigues in Poland would end in the annexation of that state to Russia and the consequent upsetting of the balance of power in the East. Once Poland was disposed of, Turkey would come next. The Turks, moreover, were egged on by the French government, which, anxious also to preserve the balance of power and to defend the liberties of Poland, was financially too embarrassed to go to war with Prussia and Russia.

The war between Russia and the Ottoman Empire clearly showed that the power of the latter was waning. The Turkish troops, badly armed and badly led, suffered a series of defeats. The Russians again occupied Azov, which Peter the Great had been compelled to relinquish; they overran the Rumanian principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia; they seized Bucharest; and they seemed likely to cross the Danube and enter the Balkan peninsula. Catherine went so far as to fan a revolt among the Greek subjects of the Sultan.

**War with Ottoman Empire**

At length, in 1774, the treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji was concluded between the belligerents. It was a landmark both in the expansion of the Russian Empire and in the contraction of the Ottoman Empire. By its provisions, (1) the latter formally ceded Azov and adjacent territory to Russia and renounced sovereignty over all land north of the Black Sea; (2) the Ottoman Empire retained Wallachia, Moldavia, and Greece, but promised that they should be better governed; (3) Russia obtained the right of free navigation for its merchant ships in Ottoman waters; and (4) Russia was recognized as the protector of certain churches in the city of Constantinople.

Within a few years after the signature of the treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji, Catherine established Russian control over the various Tatar principalities north of the Black Sea, whose sovereignty the Sultan had renounced. By a supplementary agreement in


1792, the Dniester River was made the boundary between the Russian and Ottoman Empires.[1]

The policy of Catherine the Great in respect of the Ottoman Empire bore three significant results. In the first place, Russia acquired a natural boundary in southern Europe and became the chief power on the Black Sea. Its ships might now pass freely through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles out into the Mediterranean to trade with western Europe. Russia's second "window to the west" was gained. In the second place, Russia was henceforth looked upon as the natural ally and friend of oppressed Orthodox Christian nationalities within the Ottoman Empire. Finally, the special clause conferring on Russia the protectorate of certain churches in Constantinople afforded a pretext for the later claim to Russian protection of Christians throughout the Ottoman lands and consequently for interference in Turkish internal affairs. After the treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji, the Ottoman Empire declined with ever increasing rapidity, and Russia became an eager candidate for a liberal share of the spoils.

Even while Catherine the Great was engaged in war with the Ottoman Empire, she had not lost sight of her Polish ambitions. Frederick the Great had doubtless hoped that she would, in order that he might be free to direct a distribution of territory entirely satisfactory to himself and to Prussia. But the wily Tsarina was never so immersed in other matters that she neglected Russian interests in Poland. In 1772, therefore, she joined with Frederick and with Maria Theresa of Austria in making the first partition of Poland. Russia took all the country which lay east of the Düna and Dnieper rivers—Byelorussia and most of the Ukraine. Prussia took West Prussia except the towns of Danzig and Thorn, thereby linking up East Prussia and Brandenburg by a continuous strip of territory. Maria Theresa, moved by the loss of Silesia and by fear of the undue preponderance which the partition of Poland would give to her neighboring rivals, thought to adjust the balance of power by sharing in the transaction; she appropriated Galicia, except the city of Cracow. She repeatedly expressed her abhorrence of the whole business, but, as the scoffing Frederick said, "She wept, though she kept on taking." Altogether, by this partition of 1772,

**Partition of Poland**

[1] The treaty of 1792 concluded a war which Catherine, in alliance with Joseph II of Austria, waged against the Ottoman Empire. Austria got nothing from the war.




**PARTITIONS OF POLAND, 1772-1815**

Poland lost about a fifth of its population, a fourth of its territory, and almost half of its wealth.

The partition of 1772 sobered many of the Polish magnates and brought them to perceive the necessity of radical political reform. Yet every effort which they made in this direction was rendered abortive by the shameful and hypocritical attitude of the neighboring sovereigns. For another twenty-one years the wretched country struggled on, a victim of selfish foreign tutelage. Although both Frederick and Maria Theresa died in the interval, their successors proved quite as willing to cooperate with the implacable Tsarina. In 1793 Russia and Prussia effected a second partition of Poland, and in 1795, following a last desperate attempt of the Poles to establish a new government, Austria joined Prussia and Russia in the third and final dismemberment of the unhappy country.[1] Desperately did the Polish patriotic leader, Kosciuszko, try to stem the tide of invasion which poured in from all sides. His few forces, in spite of great valor, were no match for the veteran allies, and the defense was vain. "Freedom shrieked when Kosciuszko fell." King Stanilaus II resigned his crown and betook himself to St. Petersburg. Poland ceased to exist as an independent state

By the partitions of 1793 and 1795, Austria obtained the upper valley of the Vistula, and Prussia the lower, including the city of Warsaw, while the rest of Poland—the major share—went to Russia. The Ukraine, Byelorussia, and almost the whole of Lithuania thus passed into the hands of the Tsarina. Russia thenceforth bordered immediately on Prussia and Austria and became geographically a vital—and in the long run a very disturbing—member of the European family of nations.

Catherine the Great died in 1796. She thus survived her friend and confederate, Frederick the Great, by a decade, and the final partition of Poland by a year. If it can be said of Peter that he made Russia a European power, it can be affirmed with equal truth that Catherine made Russia a great power. The eighteenth century had witnessed a marvelous growth of the Russian Empire in Europe. It had acquired territory and a capital on the Baltic. It had secured valuable ports on the Black Sea. Its boundaries

[1] The second and third partitions of Poland were effected in the midst of a European situation which was complicated by the French Revolution. See below, p. 520.

# CHAPTER VIII

## BRITISH EXPANSION

### I. SUCCESSES AGAINST SPAIN AND FOUNDATION OF OVERSEAS EMPIRE



IMULTANEOUSLY with the emergence of Prussia and Russia as great military powers, England (joined with Scotland as the kingdom of Great Britain) became the leading commercial and colonial power. For England to reach this preeminence, it had taken two centuries and successive struggles with Spain, the Netherlands, and France.

In the sixteenth century, England had been a second-rate power. Its wealth was slight compared with that of the Netherlands. Its population was much less than that of France. Its armed forces (including its navy) were inferior to Spain's. It possessed no such commercial importance as Portugal and no such colonial empire as Spain.

Yet in that same sixteenth century, foundations were laid for the later maritime and imperial predominance of England. The Tudor sovereigns of the time, from Henry VII to Elizabeth, patriotically pursued national interests. The confiscation of ecclesiastical property and the accompanying process of "enclosing" landed estates and transforming them into noblemen's private property served to enrich certain Englishmen and to provide capital for foreign ventures. The introduction of Calvinistic ethics into England and Scotland stimulated the growth of a capitalistic spirit. The absence of protracted and destructive civil wars, such as troubled France and the Netherlands and wrought havoc in Germany, afforded England special opportunity to devote its resources to commerce and money-making. Besides, the championship of a distinctively national type of Protestantism provided emotional impulse and convenient slogans for ranging the mass of Englishmen in support

**Factors Favoring British**

of their sovereigns, adventurers, and capitalists against such a power as Catholic Spain.

Though the English King Henry VII had patronized the discovery of the North American continent at about the same time as Columbus had opened up for Spain the Caribbean lands and South America, almost a hundred years elapsed before England made any attempt to colonize the New World. Meanwhile Spain created a huge American dominion, extending from Florida and Mexico to Chile and Argentina, peopled it with some 150,000 colonists, guarded it with soldiers and a powerful navy, and derived from it the store of precious metals and other wealth which made the mother-country the hub and envy of sixteenth-century Europe. Meanwhile, too, Portugal was colonizing Brazil and enjoying a profitable monopoly of oceanic trade with the East Indies; and the union of Portugal with Spain in 1580 added to the latter's prestige as the outstanding commercial and colonial power of Europe—and the world.

In the first half of the sixteenth century, England was more satellite than foe of Spain. Henry VIII (1509–1547) was long wedded to a Spanish princess and frequently in alliance with her country. Queen Mary (1553–1558) was the wife of Philip II of Spain and his constant ally. But with the advent of Queen Elizabeth (1558–1603), a change occurred. Several factors—political, religious, and economic—conspired, as has elsewhere been explained,[1] to precipitate a protracted duel between her and Philip II, between England and Spain.

At first Elizabeth refrained from open attack. Spain seemed too strong, and its American empire too secure. Surreptitiously, however, she tolerated and encouraged the fitting out of expeditions by Englishmen to prey upon Spanish commerce on the high seas and to engage in the questionable pursuits of piracy, smuggling, and slave-trading. It was an irregular and illicit beginning of English conflict with Spain for supremacy on the seas, and it led eventually to the planting of English colonies in North America.

**Queen Elizabeth and English Privateering**

One of the pioneer English freebooters for Elizabeth was John Hawkins, a native of Plymouth, who in the 1560's inaugurated the daring and lucrative industry of stealing Negroes from Portuguese slave-catchers on the Guinea coast of Africa, smuggling

[1] See above, pp. 217–219.

them into the New World, and selling them to Spanish colonists. He shared his financial profits with the Queen, and still grew so wealthy that in the 1570's he could settle down in England as a capitalist and send out numerous expeditions to engage in the slave-trade, to raid the overseas colonies of Spain, and to fight and rob Spanish treasure-ships on the way from America. Under royal auspices, he organized an English navy; and as rear-admiral he had a conspicuous part in the repulse of the Spanish Armada (1588). Throughout his harsh, unscrupulous career, Hawkins professed an ardent Puritanism. On one of his voyages, when he was becalmed and his Negroes were suffering and dying, he could console himself with the reflection that he at least was one of the elect whom God would not suffer to perish.[1]

Francis Drake, a cousin of Hawkins, was formally commissioned in 1570 by Elizabeth as a privateer; and with initial financial backing from her and her favorite, the Earl of Essex, he also acquired fame and wealth at Spanish expense. In 1580 he returned from a three-year trip around the world, laden with booty which he had taken from Spaniards and Portuguese; it was the second circumnavigation of the globe, and the first by an Englishman. In 1588 Drake served as English vice-admiral against the Spanish Armada. And the failure of this great Spanish fleet, it should be borne in mind, marked the decisive passing of naval superiority from Spain to England.

Among other famous sea-captains of Elizabeth's time were two half-brothers, Humphrey Gilbert and Walter Raleigh. Gilbert profited from piracy and campaigned in the Netherlands against Spain, but his principal title to fame rests on two other achievements. In the first place, he advanced the theory that China and India could be reached from England not only by utilizing the Portuguese and Spanish routes, but also, and more quickly, by sailing northwest or northeast over the polar seas.[2] He personally

[1] Hawkins explained to Queen Elizabeth his failure to capture a particular Spanish treasure-fleet by quoting from the Bible: "Paul doth plant, Apollo doth water, but God giveth the increase;" which exhibition of piety is said to have provoked the Queen into exclaiming, "God's death! This fool went out a soldier, and has come home a divine."

[2] Even before the reign of Elizabeth, Sir Hugh Willoughby had attempted to sail to China by following the north shore of Europe eastward, but he had perished on the coast of Lapland in 1554. Gilbert interested himself in the "northern passage" as early as 1566 and ten years later he published an influential book on the subject.

attempted such a "north passage" in 1578–1579, and a number of other English sailors, including Henry Hudson, did likewise. Though all such efforts were doomed to failure by impassable ice, they served to increase geographical knowledge and to give England a start in the rich northern fisheries, particularly in the whaling industry. In the second place, Gilbert was the pioneer English colonizer. Armed with a charter from Queen Elizabeth authorizing him to discover and occupy "any remote barbarous, and heathen lands not actually possessed of any Christian prince or people," he founded a colony in 1583 at St. Johns, Newfoundland. The settlement was short-lived, but thenceforth the attempts of Englishmen to create an overseas colonial empire were persistent and, before long, successful.

Walter Raleigh, a handsome fellow and a bragging buccaneer, was a favorite of Queen Elizabeth and an idol of patriotic Englishmen. He gained money easily by raids on Spanish colonies and commerce and spent it lavishly at court and in colonial undertakings. By royal favor he acquired extensive estates in Ireland and planted English settlers on them. He cooperated with his half-brother in founding the English colony in Newfoundland. He also gave the name "Virginia" (in honor of Elizabeth, the "virgin queen") to the vast but then vague stretch of American land north of the Spanish settlements in Florida; and on Roanoke Island (in the present state of North Carolina) he settled the first English colony in what is now the United States. This colony, like that in Newfoundland, was short-lived, but it was soon followed by permanent English settlements.

Raleigh and Gilbert, Drake and Hawkins, these are only conspicuous examples of a large number of Englishmen who in the second half of the sixteenth century sought—and obtained—rich rewards from distant adventurings. Most of the rewards were at Spanish expense, and Queen Elizabeth winked at them when she did not openly abet them. They contributed to English sea power and whetted the appetite of Englishmen for overseas adventure.

In her duel with Philip II, Queen Elizabeth took advantage of his manifold difficulties in Europe, and at critical times she dispatched aid to Dutch, French, Portuguese, or any other people who revolted against his rule or opposed his interference. This distracted much of Philip's attention from overseas and helped to break down the Spanish monopoly of world commerce. Eng-

land was unable to appropriate any significant part of Spain's flourishing colonial empire, but by the close of Elizabeth's reign Englishmen were to be found in every quarter of the globe, following Drake's lead into the Pacific or Gilbert's into the Arctic, hunting for slaves in the wilds of Africa, journeying in caravans across the steppes of Russia into central Asia, bargaining with Turks and Greeks in the Near East, laying the foundations of the East India Company and (outside the Spanish domain) of the colonies of Virginia and Newfoundland. All of which meant that new wealth was pouring into England, enriching many a courtier and nobleman and many an upstart adventurer, and stimulating the growth of a numerous and influential middle class.

**Extension of Overseas Enterprise**

Following the death of Elizabeth, James VI of Scotland ascended the English throne as James I (1603–1625), and the two British kingdoms were joined under a common sovereign. Under James and his Stuart successors, the advance of England as a commercial and colonial world power continued with ever quickening speed. James I, it is true, formally reversed the foreign policy of Elizabeth. To the disgust of many of his subjects he concluded peace with Spain, tried to arrange a marriage between his son and a Spanish princess, and put Walter Raleigh to death for the same sort of piracy for which Raleigh had been honored and promoted by Elizabeth. Outside of strictly Spanish preserves, however, James I fostered commerce and colonies. He followed Elizabethan precedent by large-scale plantings of Protestant Englishmen and Scotsmen in northern Ireland (Ulster). He confirmed the charters of earlier English trading companies and chartered new ones.

The Muscovy Company, the oldest of the "chartered companies," which had originated in the time of Mary Tudor and had obtained during the reign of Elizabeth exclusive trading privileges on the White Sea, was now encouraged to extend its operations in the expanding Russian Empire. During the seventeenth century and until the advent of Peter the Great, what foreign commerce Russia had was almost completely in the hands of the English Muscovy Company and profitable to it.

An English East India Company had been chartered in 1600, in the last years of Elizabeth, for the purpose of monopolizing for fifteen years all English trading east of the Cape of Good

Hope "in places not held by other Christian powers." At first, slight success had attended this company, but after 1609, when it was rechartered by James I, with increased capital and privileges, it became an important source of English power and wealth in India. From the city of Surat, as a center, English fleets of the East India Company ousted the Portuguese from several towns along the west coast between Goa and Diu and seized the strategic port of Masulipatam on the east coast. In 1622 another fleet captured from the Portuguese the town of Ormuz on the Persian Gulf. Foundations were being laid for a British mercantile empire in India and Persia.

**English East India Company**

It was also during the reign of James I that the first permanent settlements were made by Englishmen in the New World. Under the auspices of the London Company, which he chartered, and under the able leadership of Captain John Smith, an expedition of some hundred settlers arrived on the coast of Raleigh's "Virginia," sailed up a river which they christened the James in honor of their King, and on a low-lying peninsula founded Jamestown (1607). Five years later, under the auspices of another newly chartered company, a settlement was effected in the Bermuda Islands. In 1620, a band of English radical Protestants—so-called "Separatists" or "Congregationalists"—who had been persecuted by James I and other Anglican Protestants and had found temporary refuge in Holland, and who were now enlisted as overseas colonists by a branch of the London Company and led by Captain Miles Standish, established themselves at Plymouth on the coast of "New England" (1620).

**English Colonization in America**

Under Charles I (1625–1649), the son and successor of James I, English colonization in America proceeded apace. Settlements were made in New England, at Boston (1630), Providence (1636), Hartford (1636), New Haven (1638), and elsewhere. The population of Virginia increased from two thousand to fifteen thousand. A new colony was planted on the banks of Chesapeake Bay by Lord Baltimore, under royal patent, and named Maryland in honor of the wife of Charles I (1634). As a result of renewed fighting with Spain, important footholds were obtained in the West Indies, on the islands of St. Christopher and Barbados (1625), Nevis (1628), Antigua, and Montserrat (1632).

## 2. SUCCESSES AGAINST THE DUTCH NETHERLANDS

In the seventeenth century, England found its chief maritime commercial rival not so much in Spain as in the Dutch Netherlands. The Netherlands, in the first half of the sixteenth century, had been the wealthiest dominion of Charles V, and its traders and bankers, supplanting Italians in capitalistic leadership, had helped to finance the construction of the Spanish and Portuguese overseas empires.[1] Then in the second half of the sixteenth century, when the Dutch of the northern Netherlands fell out with their Spanish sovereign, Philip II, and waged a long and eventually successful struggle for national independence,[2] they had the reasons, the means, and the opportunities for preying on Spanish commerce and colonies; and when Portugal was incorporated with Spain in 1580, the Dutch were in an excellent position to extend their preying to Portuguese commerce and colonies. This they did with alacrity and extraordinary success.

**Rise of Dutch Commercial Empire**

In 1593 the Dutch began systematic slave-trading on the Guinea coast of Africa. In 1595 they undertook their first expedition to India and the Spice Islands. In 1602 they merged a number of earlier commercial companies into the Dutch East India Company, which drove the Portuguese from Ceylon, Java, Sumatra, and the Moluccas (Spice Islands). A naval victory at Malacca in 1606 over a combined Spanish-Portuguese fleet and a decisive defeat of the remaining Spanish squadron at Gibraltar in 1607 rendered the Dutch virtual masters of the ocean trade routes and enabled a remarkable governor of the Dutch East India Company, John Coen, to do for Holland what Albuquerque a century earlier had done for Portugal.[3] He reorganized the East Indian trading posts which had been captured from the Portuguese, made favorable treaties with native chieftains, and consolidated and extended the empire of the Dutch Netherlands in the Far East so that it eventually included not only Ceylon, Java, Sumatra, and the Moluccas but also the Malay peninsula, Formosa, Borneo, Celebes, a part of New Guinea, and a claim to the western coast of Australia (which was named New

[1] See above, pp. 85–86.
[2] See above, pp. 210–216.
[3] See above, pp. 66–67, 72.

Holland). As the political and commercial capital of this huge and rich domain, Coen founded in 1619 the city of Batavia on the island of Java.

For some time after Coen's death, the Dutch continued to extend and strengthen their monopoly of Far Eastern trade. They largely supplanted other Europeans in the commerce of Japan, China, and India. The most famous navigator in the service of the Dutch East India Company, Abel Tasman, sailed completely around Australia (1642–1643) and discovered Tasmania, New Zealand, and the Tonga and Fiji islands. Another Dutch navigator appropriated the island of St. Helena in the southern Atlantic; and a shipwreck of Dutch sailors at the Cape of Good Hope in 1648 led shortly afterwards to the founding of Cape Town and the establishment of a Dutch colony in South Africa.

In the meantime, the Dutch were laying foundations for commercial and colonial dominion in America. Like contemporary Englishmen, they at first resorted to piracy, smuggling, and slave-trading within Spanish or Portuguese areas, but soon, under the auspices of chartered companies, they began to capture strategic posts from their rivals or to stake out claims to hitherto unoccupied territories. On the one hand, they invaded Portuguese Brazil (1624) and wrested from the Spaniards the West Indian islands of Tobago and Curaçao (1632–1634). On the other hand, they first colonized the Hudson valley in North America. Their claim to this valley rested on its exploration in 1609 by Henry Hudson, the English navigator, who was then in Dutch service, and on its occupation by Dutch traders and colonists shortly afterwards. At the mouth of the river they founded the town of New Amsterdam, and a hundred and fifty miles up the river they built Fort Orange. They were soon extending this promising colony of New Netherland eastward toward the Connecticut River and westward to the Delaware.[1]

By the middle of the seventeenth century, the Dutch had won a predominant place as the carriers of Europe. Though their own products were few and relatively unimportant, they had made their country an entrepôt of the world. Thither came goods from every clime. There, Russian furs could be exchanged for East Indian spices, French wine for Swedish tar, Turkish rugs for

[1] A Swedish company, patronized by King Gustavus Adolphus, had established a fort on the Delaware in 1638. It was captured by the Dutch in 1655.

West Indian sugar, or American tobacco for African ostrich plumes. In 1669 the French statesman, Colbert, estimated that the Dutch had some fifteen or sixteen thousand ships, as against three or four thousand for the English and five or six hundred for the French.

Dutch commercial success was fostered by a business-minded government. Composed largely of merchants, it made laws designed to aid business. For example, unlike most other European governments of the time, it permitted fairly free import and export of silver, and kept tariff dues low to stimulate the carrying trade. Its diplomats always kept an eye on economic advantages. Its navy was ever ready to protect Dutch shipping and to fight for the right of Dutch vessels to sail anywhere. It was the Dutch government which first insisted upon the "freedom of the seas" as a part of the evolving international law of the seventeenth century.

Closely associated with the government, and often headed by the same men, were a number of institutions that materially assisted Dutch trade. Insurance companies, underwriters, and brokers supplied coverage for ventures at the lowest rates in Europe. The Amsterdam money market was so highly organized and so well supplied with capital that a Dutch merchant could borrow funds at three or four per cent when his English or French competitor had to pay from six to ten per cent. The Bank of Amsterdam, founded in 1609, provided a safe place to keep deposits, and bills of exchange on it were accepted all over Europe and regarded as safer and more convenient than cash.

The Amsterdam stock exchange, or Bourse, was no less significant than the Bank. It was a center for deals in shares of stock, for trade in coin and bullion, and for loans. Around it grew up an essentially modern mechanism of trade and speculation. Goods could be bought and sold subject to future delivery. Stock could be bought on a margin or sold short. "Bulls" sought to push up prices and "bears" to depress them. Fortunes could be made or lost by speculation on the Bourse.

Between England and the Netherlands rivalry developed early in the seventeenth century. It developed over fisheries in the north Atlantic, over commercial posts in India, over slave-trading in Africa and the West Indies, over settlements in America. In the West, the Dutch by establishing the colony of New Netherland,

thrust a wedge between English settlements in Virginia and New England. In the East, the English East India Company was prohibited by the Dutch East India Company from trading with the Spice Islands, and in 1623 English merchants and settlers on the island of Amboyna were massacred by a Dutch naval force.

At length, in 1651, when the English government, then headed by Oliver Cromwell, enacted a special navigation act, confining English trade to English ships and thereby forbidding the Dutch to trade direct with England, formal hostilities commenced. They were continued through three wars.

**Anglo-Dutch Wars**

In this first Anglo-Dutch War (1652–1654), the English suffered several defeats at the hands of the Dutch admirals, De Ruyter and Van Tromp, but they also won some successes; and by the treaty of Westminster (1654) they obtained from the Netherlands a trading-post in the Spice Islands and an indemnity for the "massacre of Amboyna." Indirectly, the English were aided in this war by an uprising of the Portuguese colonists in Brazil against their Dutch masters. By a treaty of 1662, the Netherlands re-ceded Brazil to Portugal[1] and retained in South America only a portion of Guiana (Surinam).[2]

In a second Anglo-Dutch War (1664–1667) the English were even more successful. Though a Dutch fleet under De Ruyter burned English shipping on the Thames and temporarily terrorized London, the English captured New Amsterdam, rechristened it New York in honor of the Duke of York (the heir to the English throne), and secured its permanent cession by the treaty of Breda (1667).

A third Anglo-Dutch War (1672–1674) was merged in the attack which Louis XIV of France made on the Netherlands and which has already been discussed.[3] The English King at the time, Charles II, was in alliance with Louis XIV, and believed that the Netherlands constituted the chief obstacle to his country's com-

[1] This treaty was favored by King Charles II of England who had just married a Portuguese princess and had obtained, as her dowry, the important city of Bombay in India. Charles II preferred that Brazil should belong to a weak Portugal rather than to the strong Netherlands.

[2] Just on the eve of the first Anglo-Dutch War, the South Atlantic island of St. Helena was occupied by the English. It was confirmed in their possession by an agreement of 1661.

[3] See above, pp. 262–264.

mercial and colonial expansion. On the other hand, the English Parliament, critical of the domestic policies of Charles II and doubtless more reflective of the sentiments of English traders and capitalists, held that the Netherlands was becoming a less dangerous rival than France.

Consequently, through the remainder of the reign of Charles II and through that of his brother and successor, James II (1685–1688), England pursued a wavering policy between the Netherlands and France, now favoring the one and now the other. This unsteady course was abruptly and finally ended in 1689 with the deposition of James II and the succession of William III (1689–1701). William was Stadholder of Holland as well as King of England, and henceforth the colonial and commercial policies of the two countries were harmonized and jointly directed against France.[1]

### 3. RIVALRY WITH FRANCE

France, almost equally with England, had been, since the sixteenth century, an aspirant for overseas trade and empire and an adversary of Spain. French Protestants and even patriotic French Catholics had vied with English and Dutch Protestants in detesting Philip II[2] and poaching upon his distant and wide domains.

Indeed, the emergence of France as a commercial and colonial power curiously paralleled England's. What Cabot had originally been to England, Verrazano and Cartier were to France. In the second half of the sixteenth century, there were French as well as English buccaneers, smugglers, and adventurers. Admiral Coligny, one of the leaders of the French Protestants, inspired many an attack on Spanish or Portuguese shipping, and many an attempt to found overseas colonies for France, notably in Brazil and Florida. These first foundations were short-lived, but they were followed, in the early part of the seventeenth century, by permanent settlements. Under King Henry IV, Samuel Champlain, a wise and courageous adventurer, explored the valley of the St. Lawrence and in 1608 founded Quebec. By 1650 the French were colonizing Canada and Acadia,[3] exploiting

**Rival Colonization in America**

[1] See above, pp. 265–266.

[2] See above, pp. 222–223.

[3] The region now known as Nova Scotia.

the furs, forests, and fisheries of northern America, and also engaging in commercial undertakings in the Far East and in the slave trade between Africa and the New World.

During the second half of the seventeenth century, both France and England continued to develop and intensify colonial and commercial ambitions, so that by the year 1689 their rival dominions and trading posts faced each other in North America, in the West Indies, in Africa, and in India.

In North America, England possessed in that year a continuous and relatively populous strip of Atlantic seacoast, comprising ten colonies. The oldest of these, Virginia, had been settled in 1607. Plymouth, founded in 1620, was about to be merged (1691) with the neighboring New England colony of Massachusetts (which then included what is now Maine). Adjoining Massachusetts, in "New England," had grown up the three separate colonies of Connecticut, Rhode Island, and New Hampshire. Maryland had been established (1634) to the north of Virginia, and Carolina (1665) to the south. The capture of New Netherland from the Dutch in 1664 had enabled the English to form the additional colonies of New York and New Jersey. And the appropriation of the territory between New Jersey and Maryland by William Penn and fellow English Quakers had recently (1681) set Pennsylvania as the keystone in the arch of English colonies along the Atlantic. Besides, since 1623 a permanent English settlement had existed in Newfoundland, and since 1670 an English chartered company had been active in the fur trade of Hudson's Bay.

Numerous causes contributed to the growth of the British colonies on the North American continent. Anglican religious intolerance drove Radical Protestants to New England and Catholics to Maryland. Subsequently, the intolerance of Radicals in England sent Anglicans to Virginia. Thousands of others migrated merely to acquire wealth or to escape starvation. And America seemed a place wherein to mend broken fortunes. Upon the landed estates (plantations) of gentlemen in the southern colonies, Negro slaves toiled without pay in the tobacco fields.[1] New England was less fertile, but its shrewd colonists found wealth in fishing, whaling, rum-making, and shipping. By 1689 the population of the ten colonies was estimated at nearly three hundred thousand.

[1] Later, rice and cotton became important products of southern agriculture.

The French settlers were less numerous[1] but more widely spread. From their first posts in Quebec and Acadia, they pushed on up the St. Lawrence. Jesuit and other Catholic missionaries led the way from Montreal westward to Lake Superior and southward to the Ohio River. In 1682 LaSalle, a French nobleman, after paddling down the Mississippi, laid claim to the whole basin of that mighty stream and named the region Louisiana in honor of Louis XIV of France. Nominally, this territory was claimed by the English, for in most of the colonial charters emanating from the English crown in the seventeenth century were clauses which granted lands "from sea to sea"—that is, from the Atlantic to the Pacific.

The heart of "New France" remained on the St. Lawrence, but, despite English claims, French forts were commencing to mark the trails of French fur-traders down into "Louisiana," and it was clear that whenever the English colonists should cross the Appalachian Mountains to the westward they would have to fight the French. Besides, there were French, as well as English, settlers in Newfoundland, and the French in Canada resented the activities of the English Hudson's Bay Company.

French and English were neighbors also in the West Indies, where both intruded upon Spanish territory. Martinique and Guadeloupe acknowledged French sovereignty, while Jamaica, Barbados, and the Bahamas were English.[2] These holdings in the West Indies were highly prized for their sugar production and for their convenience as stations for illicit trade with Mexico and South America.

In Africa the French made settlements in Madagascar, at Gorée, and at the mouth of the Senegal River, and the English established themselves in Gambia and on the Gold Coast, but as yet the African posts were mere stations for trade in gold-dust,[3] ivory, and, principally, Negro slaves. Africa as a whole was not then

[1] Probably not more than 20,000 Frenchmen were residing in America in 1689. By 1750 their number had increased perhaps to 60,000.

[2] The following West Indies were also English: Nevis, Montserrat, Antigua, St. Lucia, and the Turks and Caicos Islands. St. Kitts was divided between England and France; and the western part of Haiti, already visited by French buccaneers, was definitely annexed to France in 1697. The Bermudas, lying outside the "West Indies," were already English.

[3] Gold coins are still often called "guineas" in England, from the fact that a good deal of gold used to come from the Guinea coast of Africa.

inviting to Europeans, and the big contest for it did not come until the nineteenth century.

Of much greater lure to both France and England was Asiatic India, which, unlike America or Africa, offered a field more favorable for commerce than for conquest or colonization. For it happened that the fertility and extent of India— its area was half as large as all of Europe—were taxed to their uttermost to support a population of probably two hundred millions; and consequently what Europeans desired there was not colonization but favorable opportunity to buy such Indian products as cotton, indigo, spices, dyes, drugs, silks, and precious stones.

**Rivalry in India**

In the seventeenth century, India was ruled by a dynasty of Moslem Emperors called Moguls, who had entered the peninsula as conquerors in the previous century and had established a splendid court in the city of Delhi on a branch of the Ganges. But the bulk of the natives adhered to their ancient Hindu religion with its polytheism, its social ranks or "castes" and its distinctive customs. Over a country like India, broken up into many disparate regions by diverse physical features, climates, industries, and languages, the Moslem conquerors—the "Great Mogul" and his viceroys, called *nawabs* [1]—found it impossible to establish more than a loose sovereignty. Many of the native princes or "rajas" retained considerable independence, and the millions of Hindus felt little love or loyalty for the Great Mogul. It was this fatal weakness of the Indian Empire which enabled European traders, who in the seventeenth century besought its favor and protection, to set themselves up in the eighteenth as its masters.

It will be remembered that after the voyage of Vasco da Gama the Portuguese had monopolized the trade with India and the East until they were attacked by the Dutch toward the close of the sixteenth century. This was the very time when the English were making their first voyages [2] to the East and capturing trading posts in India and Persia. By 1689 the English held three important stations in India. (1) Madras, on the east coast, was occupied and fortified (1640). (2) On the west coast, the original

[1] More popularly, "nabobs."

[2] Actually the first English voyage to the East Indies was made between 1591 and 1594, almost a century after the first Portuguese voyage.

trading post of Surat was now surpassed in value by Bombay, the dowry of the Portuguese princess who married King Charles II (1662). (3) Calcutta, in the delta of the Ganges (and in the province of Bengal), was founded in 1686, but it was yet uncertain whether the English could secure it against the Mogul Emperor.

The first French Company for Eastern trade was formed only four years after the English East India Company, but the first French factory in India—at Surat—was not established until 1668 and the French did not seriously compete with the English and Dutch in India until the close of the seventeenth century. However, their post at Chandarnagar (1672), in dangerous proximity to Calcutta, and their thriving station at Pondicherry (1674), within a hundred miles of Madras, augured ill for the future harmony of French and English in India.

In general colonial policy France seemed superior to England. Louis XIV took over the whole of "New France" as a royal province, and the French could present a united front against the divided and discordant English colonies. Moreover the French, both in India and in America, were almost uniformly successful in gaining the friendship and trust of the natives, whereas, at least with the redmen, the English were frequently at war.

The English, however, had an advantage in the number of American colonists. The population of France, held in check by wars, did not overflow to America naturally; and the Huguenots, persecuted in the mother country, were not allowed to emigrate to New France, lest their presence might impede the missionary labors of the Jesuits among the Indians. England was more fortunate in that its Puritan, Quaker, and Catholic exiles went to its colonies rather than to foreign lands. The English colonists, less under the direct control of the mother country, were more self-reliant.

Latent rivalry between England and France turned into open hostility with the accession of William III to the English throne in 1689 and the immediately ensuing juncture of England with Holland in the War of the League of Augsburg against Louis XIV. The war was waged chiefly on the continent of Europe,[1] but it had naval and colonial repercussions. The French navy, at first

[1] See above, pp. 265–266.

successful against combined Dutch and English squadrons off Beachy Head (1690), was subsequently defeated by the English in a three-day battle near La Hogue (1692). French sea power proved inferior to England's.

Between the colonists of England and France in North America, the War of the League of Augsburg had its counterpart in the so-called "King William's War." Two aspects of this may be noted. In the first place, the New England colonists aided in the capture (1690) of the French fortress of Port Royal in Acadia (Nova Scotia) and in an inconsequential attack on Quebec. In the second place, native Indians, in alliance with the French, savagely assailed English settlements. As early as 1670, Roger Williams, a famous New England preacher, had declared that "the French and Romish Jesuits, the firebrands of the world, for their godbelly sake, are kindling at our back in this country their hellish fires with all the natives of this country." The war kindled fires more fearful than those imagined by the good divine; the burning of Dover (N.H.), Schenectady (N.Y.), and Groton (Mass.) by the red men earned them and the French the lasting hatred of the "Yankees."

**King William's War**

The conflict was interrupted rather than settled by the colorless treaty of Ryswick (1697). According to this treaty, Louis XIV promised not to question William's right to the English throne, and all colonial conquests, including Port Royal, were restored.

Only five years later Europe was plunged into the long War of the Spanish Succession (1702–1713). King William formed with the Habsburg Emperor and other European princes a Grand Alliance to prevent Louis's grandson Philip from inheriting the Spanish crowns. For if France and Spain were allied under the Bourbon family, their combined armaments might overawe Europe and their united colonial empires surround and perhaps engulf the British. Furthermore, the British were angered when Louis XIV, upon the death of James II (1701), openly recognized the Catholic son of the exiled royal Stuart as "James III," King of Great Britain.

While the Duke of Marlborough and Prince Eugene were winning victories in Europe,[1] the British colonists in America

[1] See above, p. 274.

were fighting "Queen Anne's War" against the French. Again the French sent Indians to destroy New England villages and again the English retaliated by attacking Port Royal and Quebec.

**Queen Anne's War**

After withstanding two unsuccessful assaults, Port Royal fell in 1710 and left Acadia open to the British. The French, however, repulsed British attempts to capture Quebec and Montreal and successfully defended the main part of their Canadian possessions.

On the high seas, the British won fresh laurels. Their navy, sometimes with valuable aid of the Dutch, played an important part in defeating the French fleet in the Mediterranean and driving French privateers from the sea, in besieging and capturing Gibraltar, in seizing a rich squadron of Spanish treasure ships near Cartagena, and in terrorizing the French West Indies.

The main provisions of the treaty of Utrecht, which terminated this second stage of the Franco-British conflict, in so far as they affected the colonial situation,[1] were as follows: (1) the French Bourbons were allowed to become the reigning family in Spain, and though the proviso was inserted that the crowns of France and Spain should never be united, nevertheless so long as the Bourbons reigned in both countries, the colonies of Spain and France might almost be regarded as one immense Bourbon empire. (2) Great Britain was confirmed in possession of Acadia,[2] which was rechristened New Scotland (Nova Scotia), and France abandoned its claims to Hudson's Bay, Newfoundland, and the island of St. Kitts in the West Indies. (3) Great Britain secured from Spain the island of Minorca and the rocky stronghold of Gibraltar—bulwarks of Mediterranean commerce. (4) Of more immediate value to Great Britain was the trade concession, called the Asiento, made by Spain (1713). Prior to this, British trade with the Spanish possessions in America had been illegal, and the French had especially profited from the sale of Negro slaves to the Spanish colonies. The Asiento, however, granted to Great Britain exclusive right to supply Spanish America with Negro slaves, at the rate of 4,800 a year, for thirty years. The English were still formally forbidden to sell other commodities in the domains of the Spanish King, except that once a year one

[1] For the European settlement, see above, pp. 275–276.

[2] A dispute later arose whether, as the British claimed, "Acadia" included Cape Breton Island.

British ship of five hundred tons' displacement might visit Porto Bello on the Isthmus of Panama for purposes of general trade.

For almost three decades after the peace of Utrecht, the smoldering colonial and commercial jealousies between Great Britain and France were not allowed to break forth into the flame of open war. During the interval, however, British ambitions were coming more and more obviously into conflict with the claims of Spain and France in America, and with those of France in India. Piracy and buccaneering continued.

In spite of its losses by the treaty of Utrecht, France still held the St. Lawrence River, with Cape Breton Island defending its mouth. French fishermen still had special privileges on the Newfoundland banks. The French islands in the West Indies flourished under greater freedom of trade than that enjoyed by the English. French pioneers were occupying the vast valley of the Misissippi. Moreover, in preparing for the next stage of conflict, France displayed astonishing energy. Fort Louisburg was erected on Cape Breton Island to command the entrance to the Gulf of St. Lawrence. A long series of fortifications was constructed to stake out and safeguard the ambitious claims of France in North America. From Crown Point on Lake Champlain, the line was carried westward by Fort Niagara, Fort Detroit, Sault Sainte Marie, on to Lake Winnipeg and even beyond; other forts commanded the Wabash and Illinois rivers, and followed the Mississippi down to the Gulf. Settlements were made at Mobile (1702) and at New Orleans (1718), and British sailors were given to understand that the Mississippi was French property. By the year 1750 there were over sixty French forts between Montreal and New Orleans. The governors of the surrounded British colonies along the Atlantic seaboard had ample cause for envy and alarm.

**French Fortification in America**

In India, likewise, the French were too enterprising to be good neighbors. Under the leadership of a remarkably able governor-general, Dupleix, who was appointed in 1741, they were prospering and extending their influence in the effete Empire of the Great Mogul. Dupleix exhibited a restless ambition. He interfered in native politics and assumed the pompous bearing, gorgeous apparel, and proud titles of a native prince. He conceived the idea of augmenting his

**Dupleix in India**

slender garrisons of Europeans with "sepoys," or carefully drilled natives, and he fortified his capital, Pondicherry, as if for war.

To the dangerous rivalry between British and French colonists and traders in America and in India, during the thirty years which followed the treaty of Utrecht, was added the continuous bickering which grew out of the Asiento concluded in 1713 between Great Britain and Spain. Spaniards complained of British smugglers and protested with justice that the British outrageously abused their special privilege by keeping the single stipulated vessel in the harbor of Porto Bello and refilling it at night from other ships. On the other hand, British merchants resented their general exclusion from Spanish markets and recited to willing listeners at home the tales of their grievances against the Spanish authorities. Of such tales the most stirring was that of a certain Captain Robert Jenkins, who with dramatic detail told how the bloody Spaniards had attacked his good ship, plundered it, and in the fray cut off one of his ears, and to prove his story he produced a box containing what purported to be the ear in question. In the face of the popular excitement aroused in England by this and similar incidents, Sir Robert Walpole, the peace-loving Prime Minister of the time, was unable to restrain his fellow countrymen from declaring war against Spain.

**"War of Jenkins' Ear"**

In 1739 the commercial and colonial warfare was thus resumed —involving at the outset only Spain and Great Britain—in a curious struggle commonly referred to as the War of Jenkins' Ear. A British fleet captured Porto Bello, but failed to take Cartagena. In North America the war was carried on fruitlessly by James Oglethorpe, who had recently (1733) founded the English colony of Georgia,[1] to the south of Carolina, in territory claimed by the Spanish colony of Florida.

The War of Jenkins' Ear proved but a prelude to the resumption of hostilities on a large scale between France and Great Britain. In 1740 the War of the Austrian Succession broke out on the

[1] So named in honor of the then reigning King George II (1727–1760). Georgia was the last of the original thirteen English colonies along the Atlantic seaboard and was established as a camp for transported criminals. Delaware had been set off from Pennsylvania in 1701, and Carolina had been divided into the two colonies of North and South Carolina in 1713.

continent of Europe—a war stubbornly fought for eight years, and a war in which Great Britain entered the lists for Maria Theresa of Austria against France and Prussia and other states.[1] The European conflict was naturally reflected in "King George's War" (1744–1748) in America, and in simultaneous hostilities in India. The only remarkable incident of King George's War was the capture of Louisburg (1745) by Colonel William Pepperell of New Hampshire with a force of British colonists, who were sorely disappointed when, in 1748, the captured fortress was returned to France by the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle.

**King George's War**


The war in India was similarly indecisive. In 1746 a French squadron easily captured the British post at Madras; other British posts were attacked, and Dupleix defeated the nawab of the Carnatic, who tried to punish him for violating Indian peace and neutrality. The tables were turned by the arrival of a British fleet in 1748, which laid siege to Dupleix in Pondicherry. At this juncture, news arrived that Great Britain and France had concluded the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748), whereby all conquests, including Madras and Louisburg, were restored. So far as Spain was concerned, Great Britain in 1750 renounced the privileges of the Asiento in return for a money payment of £100,000.

### 4. TRIUMPH OVER FRANCE

Up to this point, the wars between France and Great Britain had been generally indecisive, although Great Britain had showed, on the whole, a naval superiority and had secured title to Hudson's Bay, Newfoundland, and Nova Scotia by the peace of Utrecht (1713). Two crucial questions were still unanswered. Should France be allowed to make good its claim to the Mississippi valley and to confine the British in America to a narrow strip of seacoast? Should Dupleix be allowed to make India a French empire? To these major disputes was added a minor quarrel over the boundary of Nova Scotia.

The decisive war, which was in the nature of a world war, was fought in the years between 1754 and 1763. France lost, and its

[1] See above, pp. 317–319.


BRITAIN AND FRANCE
IN NORTH AMERICA
ABOUT 1755
LABRADOR
NEWFOUNDLAND
HUDSON'S BAY
HUDSON'S BAY TERRITORY
GULF OF ST. LAWRENCE
CAPE BRETON ISLAND
Louisburg
NOVA SCOTIA
Halifax
Port Royal
FRENCH POSSESSIONS
CANADA
LABRADOR
NEW ENGLAND
LAKE SUPERIOR
LAKE MICHIGAN
Detroit
Fort Frontenac
Albany
New York
NEW JERSEY
ENGLISH POSSESSIONS
Philadelphia
DELAWARE
Jamestown
LOUISIANA
Vincennes
Cahokia
SOUTH CAROLINA
Charleston
GEORGIA
Savannah
SPANISH POSSESSIONS
St. Augustine
FLORIDA
GULF OF MEXICO
New Orleans
RED
ATLANTIC OCEAN
500 MILES

loss was fourfold. (1) Its European armies were defeated in Germany by Frederick the Great, who was aided by English gold, in the Seven Years' War (1756–1763).[1] (2) At the same time its naval power was almost annihilated by the British, whose war vessels and privateers conquered most of the French West Indies and temporarily swept French commerce from the seas. (3) In India, the efforts of Dupleix were foiled by the equally astute but more martial Clive. (4) In America, the "French and Indian War" (1754–1763) dispelled the dream of a New France across the Atlantic. We shall first consider the war in the New World.

**French and Indian War**

The immediate cause of the French and Indian War was a contest for the possession of the Ohio valley. The English had already organized an Ohio Company (1749) for colonizing the valley, but they did not fully realize the pressing need of action until the French began the construction of a line of forts in western Pennsylvania—Fort Presqu'Isle (Erie), Fort Le Boeuf (Waterford), and Fort Venango (Franklin). As the most important position—the junction of the Monongahela and Allegheny rivers—was still unoccupied, the Ohio Company, early in 1754, sent a small force to seize and fortify it. The French, however, were not so easily outwitted; they captured the newly built fort with its handful of defenders, enlarged it, and christened it Fort Duquesne in honor of the governor of Canada. Soon afterward a young Virginian, George Washington by name, arrived on the scene with four hundred men, too late to reinforce the English fort-builders, and he also was defeated on July 4, 1754.

In the next year the British General Braddock arrived in America with a regular army and an ambitious plan to attack the French in three places—Crown Point (on Lake Champlain), Fort Niagara, and Fort Duquesne. But his forces were badly defeated at Fort Duquesne and he was killed. Repulsed at Niagara and Crown Point, the English contented themselves with building Forts Edward and William Henry on Lake George, while the French constructed Fort Ticonderoga.[2]

[1] For the European aspects of this struggle, see above, pp. 320–322.

[2] This same year, 1755, so unfortunate for the English, was a cruel year for the French settlers in Nova Scotia. Like so many cattle, seven thousand of them were packed into English vessels and shipped to various parts of North America. The English feared their possible disloyalty.

The gloom which gathered about English fortunes seemed to increase during the year 1756. Great Britain's most valuable ally, Frederick the Great of Prussia, was defeated in Europe; an English squadron was worsted in the Mediterranean; the French captured the island of Minorca; and a British attack on the French fortress of Louisburg failed. To the French in America, the year 1756 brought the Marquis de Montcalm and continued success. Montcalm had learned the art of war on European battlefields, but he readily adapted himself to frontier conditions and proved an able commander of the French and Indian forces in the New World. The English fort of Oswego on Lake Ontario and Fort William Henry on Lake George were captured, and all the campaigns projected by the English were foiled.

In 1757, however, new vigor was infused into the war on the part of the British, largely by reason of the entrance of William Pitt (the Elder) into the cabinet. He was determined to arouse all British subjects to fight for their country. Stirred with martial enthusiasm, colonial volunteers joined with British regulars to provide a force of about 50,000 men for simultaneous attacks on four important French posts in America—Louisburg, Ticonderoga, Niagara, and Duquesne. The success of the attack on Louisburg (1758) was insured by the support of a strong British squadron. Fort Duquesne was taken and renamed Fort Pitt[1] (1758). Ticonderoga repulsed one expedition (1758) but surrendered in July 1759, one day after the capture of Fort Niagara by the British.

Not content with the capture of the menacing French outposts, the British next aimed at the central strongholds of the French. While one army marched up the Hudson valley to attack Montreal, General Wolfe, in command of another army of 7,000, and accompanied by a strong fleet, moved up the St. Lawrence against Quebec. An inordinate thirst for military glory had been Wolfe's heritage from his father, also a general. An ensign at fourteen, Wolfe had become an officer in active service while still in his teens, had commanded a detachment in the attack on Louisburg in 1758, and now at the age of thirty-two was charged with the capture of Quebec, a natural stronghold, defended by the redoubtable Montcalm. The task seemed impossible; weeks were wasted in futile efforts; sickness

**Wolfe's Capture of Quebec**

[1] Whence the name of the modern city of Pittsburgh.

and apparent defeat weighed heavily on the young commander. With the energy of despair he fastened at last upon a daring idea. Thirty-six hundred of his men were ferried in the dead of night to a point above the city where his soldiers might scramble through bushes and over rocks up a precipitous path to a high plateau—the Plains of Abraham—commanding the town.

Wolfe's presence on the heights was revealed at daybreak on September 13, 1759, and Montcalm hastened to repel the attack. For a time it seemed as if Wolfe's force would be overpowered, but a well-directed volley and an impetuous charge threw the French lines into disorder. In the moment of victory, General Wolfe, already twice wounded, received a musket-ball in the breast. His death was made happy by the news of success, but no such exultation filled the heart of the mortally wounded Montcalm, dying in the bitterness of defeat.

Quebec surrendered a few days later. It was the beginning of the end of the French colonial empire in America. All hope was lost when, in October 1759, a French armada, ready to embark against England, was destroyed in Quiberon Bay by Admiral Hawke. In 1760 Montreal fell and the British completed the conquest of New France.

In his extremity, Louis XV of France appealed for the aid of his Bourbon kinsman, Charles III of Spain, but Spain's assistance was unavailing. In 1762 British squadrons captured Cuba and the Philippine Islands as well as the French possessions in the West Indies.

The loss of New France was paralleled by French defeat in the contest for the vastly more populous and opulent empire of India. The Mogul Empire, to which reference has already been made, had been rapidly falling to pieces during the first half of the eighteenth century. The rulers, or nawabs, of the Deccan, Bengal, and Oudh had become semi-independent princes. The French governor, Dupleix, planned to take advantage of the situation to bring all India under French control. In 1750, as part of the plan, he had overthrown the nawab of the Carnatic, a large province embracing Madras and Pondicherry, and had installed a pretender whom he could dominate more easily.

The project of the experienced and crafty Dupleix was frustrated by a young man of twenty-seven—Robert Clive. At the age of eighteen, Clive had entered the employ of the English

East India Company as a clerk at Madras, and then, during the War of the Austrian Succession, he had joined the army, which he found more to his liking. He soon gave abundant evidence of military ability, and in 1751 he proposed a bold scheme for attacking Arcot, the capital of the Carnatic, and ousting the upstart nawab who was supported by Dupleix. Clive could muster only some two hundred Europeans and three hundred sepoys, but this slender force, infused with the daring and irresistible determination of the young leader, sufficed to seize and hold the citadel of Arcot against thousands of assailants. With the aid of British and native reinforcements, he at length defeated the pretender; and in 1754 the French had to acknowledge their failure in the Carnatic and withdraw support from their vanquished protégé. Dupleix was recalled to France in disgrace; and the British were left to enjoy the favor of the nawab who owed his position to Clive.

**Clive's Victories in India**

Clive's next work was in Bengal. In 1756 the young nawab of Bengal, Suraj-ud-Dowlah by name, seized the English fort of Calcutta and locked 146 Englishmen overnight in a stifling prison—the "Black Hole" of Calcutta—from which only twenty-three emerged alive the next morning. Clive, hastening from Madras, chastised Suraj for this atrocity and forced him to give up Calcutta. And since by this time Great Britain and France were openly at war, Clive did not hesitate to capture the near-by French post of Chandarnagar. His next move was to give active aid to a certain Mir Jafir, a pretender to the throne of the unfriendly Suraj-ud-Dowlah. Whereupon the French took sides with Suraj against Clive.

In 1757 Clive drew up 1,100 Europeans, 2,100 sepoys, and nine cannon in a grove of mango trees at Plassey, and there attacked Suraj, who, with an army of 68,000 native troops and with French artillerymen to work his fifty-three cannon, anticipated an easy victory. The outcome was a brilliant victory for Clive, as overwhelming as it was unexpected. The British candidate forthwith became nawab of Bengal, and as token of his indebtedness he paid over £1,500,000 to the English East India Company and made Clive a rich man. The British were henceforth dominant in Bengal. And their successful siege of the French stronghold of Pondicherry, in 1761, finally established the British as masters of the whole eastern coast of India.

The fall of Quebec (1759) and of Pondicherry (1761) practically decided the issue of the colonial struggle, but the war dragged on until, in 1763, France, Spain, and Great Britain concluded the peace of Paris. Of its American possessions France retained only two insignificant islands on the Newfoundland coast,[1] a few islands in the West Indies,[2] and a foothold in Guiana in South America. Great Britain obtained from France the whole of the St. Lawrence valley and all the territory east of the Mississippi River, together with the island of Grenada in the West Indies; while from Spain, Great Britain secured Florida. Beyond the surrender of the sparsely settled territory of Florida, Spain suffered no loss, for it recovered Cuba and the Philippines, and in addition was rewarded by France with the cession of western Louisiana, that is, the western half of the Mississippi valley. The French were allowed to return to their old posts in India, but were not to build forts or maintain troops in Bengal. In other words, the French returned to India as traders but not as empire builders.[3]

**Peace of Paris**

Thus, in the eighteenth century, France suffered an even more humiliating and overwhelming defeat at the hands of the British than the Netherlands had suffered in the seventeenth century, or Spain in the sixteenth. Spain and the Netherlands had in turn been humbled and deprived of any monopoly of world-trade or world-dominion, but each still retained valuable and extensive oversea empires—Spain in America and the Philippines, the Netherlands in the East Indies. France, however, was not only humbled but shorn of almost all its colonial possessions and much of its ocean trade. It is true that France refused to regard these losses as permanent; its rivalry with Great Britain continued long after 1763. In the years immediately following the Seven Years' War, France made heroic and expensive efforts to rebuild its navy. In 1778 it undertook a war of revenge in concert with rebellious English colonies.[4] And much later, in the latter part of the nineteenth century, it succeeded in building a new colonial empire, larger than the one it

**French Losses**

[1] St. Pierre and Miquelon.

[2] Including Guadeloupe and Martinique.

[3] During the war, the French posts in Africa had been taken, and now Gorée was returned while the mouth of the Senegal River was retained by the British.

[4] See below, pp. 473–476.

had lost in the eighteenth century and second only to Britain's in size and strength.

Yet India and America were irretrievably lost to France. Its trade in India soon dwindled into insignificance before the powerful and wealthy British East India Company. "French India" to-day consists of five insignificant towns, covering 196 square miles. French empire in America is now represented only by two puny islands off the coast of Newfoundland, two small islands in the West Indies, and an unimportant tract of tropical Guiana, but historic traces of its former greatness and promise have survived alike in Canada and in Louisiana. In Canada the French population has stubbornly held itself aloof from the British in language and in religion, and even today over a fourth of the ten million Canadians are of French descent, intent on the preservation of their distinctive nationality. In the United States the French element is less in evidence; nevertheless in New Orleans sidewalks are called "banquettes," and embankments, "levees"; and still the names of Champlain, Detroit, Terre Haute, Des Moines, St. Louis, Baton Rouge, and Mobile perpetuate the memory of a lost French empire.

### 5. ACQUISITION OF INDIA AND AUSTRALIA

From two centuries of warfare with Spaniards, Dutch, and French, Great Britain emerged in 1763 as the foremost commercial and colonial power in the world. It was now mistress of all lands of the North American continent east of the Mississippi River, of valuable trading posts in the West Indies and on the western coast of Africa, and of the most productive parts of India. The actual area of this empire was still somewhat less than Spain's and only slightly more than Portugal's,[1] but its population was now greater and its commerce more flourishing.

Besides, British overseas dominion continued to grow. Though

[1] Spain's colonial empire embraced, in 1763, all of South America (except Brazil and Guiana), Central America (except British Honduras), Mexico, North America west of the Mississippi, the major part of the West Indies (including Cuba, eastern Hispaniola, and Puerto Rico), the Canary Islands, and the Philippine Islands. Portugal, at the same date, still retained Brazil, the Angola and Mozambique coasts of Africa, the three towns of Goa, Diu, and Daman in India, and the Azores, Madeira, and Cape Verde Islands. The Netherlands, it may be added, still held Ceylon, Sumatra, Java, Borneo, Celebes, the Moluccas (Spice Islands), western New Guinea, South Africa, a few small islands in the West Indies, and Surinam (Dutch Guiana) in South America.

it experienced a serious setback in the revolt of thirteen colonies on the North American coast,[1] it steadily advanced, during the latter part of the eighteenth century, in Asia and Oceania.

Especially in India did British dominion grow. Until the Seven Years' War India had been viewed by Englishmen as a field for profitable trade but not as a country to be conquered and administered by themselves. The English East India Company had built forts and established commercial posts ("factories") in certain coastal cities and had negotiated with native princes for economic advantages, but the Company had not attempted to exercise any extensive political control. With the Seven Years' War, matters changed. While profitable trade continued to be the chief end of British policy in India, the means became increasingly political. More and more the officials of the English East India Company interfered in the complicated internal politics of India. More and more they brought native princes under British tutelage or sovereignty. It was a lesson which Clive learned from Dupleix and the French.

**British India**

At the close of the Seven Years' War in 1763, the British found themselves relieved of any serious competition in India, whether commercial or political, with other Europeans.[2] The war had settled the predominance of the British over their latest and most dangerous rivals, the French. At the same time, it had firmly entrenched the British in areas where they could exercise political, as well as economic, control. Clive's victory at Plassey (1757) really inaugurated a British political empire in India.

Yet in 1763 this British Indian "empire" was territorially small. It comprised Calcutta and the lower Ganges basin (Bengal) in the northeast, Madras and a few scattered strips along the southeast coast, and the strongly fortified port of Bombay on the west. Besides, though they had gotten rid of the French menace, the British were confronted with an especially chaotic internal situation in India which threatened alike their economic prosperity and their political "empire," but which, paradoxically, might be utilized by them to expand their empire and ensure their prosperity.

[1] For the American Revolution, see below, pp. 464–481.

[2] France still held five commercial stations, and Portugal three, while the Dutch continued to occupy Ceylon. But the trade of all these was insignificant in comparison with the trade of the flourishing British stations.

During the years immediately following 1763 India was in wild turmoil. The decline of the Mogul Empire continued. Most of its viceroys and local governors set themselves up as independent princes, and they warred almost constantly against one another, without let or hindrance from the Great Mogul at Delhi, and with much destructiveness. Worst of all, a group of princes of the Mahratta people in central and western India formed a confederacy which, holding sway over a large part of the peninsula, wrought havoc in the decaying native Empire and gravely menaced the English settlements on the coasts.

**Clive**

As Clive was the real creator of British rule in India, so he was the formulator of the policy under which this rule was preserved and extended. In 1765, after a well-earned rest in England, Clive, now ennobled as Lord Clive of Plassey, returned to the governorship of Calcutta and at once adopted the policy of championing against native forces of disorder the cause of the Mogul Emperor and of any prince who desired peace and order. By respecting the Emperor, he obtained numerous favors for himself and the English East India Company, and he always kept up the pretence that favors received by the British served the interest of the native Empire. For example, in Bengal, Clive meticulously observed the form of vassalage to the Great Mogul and honored his local nawab; but he saw to it that British officials, rather than nawab or Emperor, levied the taxes in Bengal, organized and commanded the army, and in general governed the province. To Bengal, moreover, Clive added, by special treaties, other provinces, notably Behar (up the Ganges) and the Circars (down the east coast); and in these provinces he pursued a like policy. When he finally returned to England in 1767, he left behind him in India a larger and stronger British dominion.[1]

**Hastings**

Clive's policy was continued and perfected by Warren Hastings, another extraordinary agent of the East India Company. He had first entered the employ of the Company at the age of seventeen, and an apprenticeship of over twenty years in India thoroughly acclimated him and gave him insight into native politics and character. In 1772 he succeeded to the

[1] Clive offended many under-officials of the English East India Company by attempting to prohibit their acceptance of bribes from natives, and on his return to England some of them pressed charges against him (doubtless true) that he had

governorship of Bengal, and two years later he became the first governor-general of all the English possessions in India.[1] For the first time, the three hitherto separate "presidencies" of Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay were united under a common administration, of which Hastings remained the head until 1785.

Against the Mahratta confederacy, Hastings waged war from 1774 to 1782, incessant, perilous, but on the whole advantageous to the British. First, with the support of certain nawabs whose territories were threatened, he defeated the Mahrattas in northern India and prevented them from appropriating the native states along the Ganges. Next, he successfully defended Bombay against a determined assault by them. Finally, after desperate and ruthless fighting, he managed to curb the pretensions of an ambitious Moslem chieftain, Hyder Ali by name, who had made himself sultan of Mysore (in southern India) and sought, in alliance with the Mahrattas, to expand his state at British expense. Mysore was held in check; the Mahrattas made peace by ceding to the British the town of Salsette (near Bombay); and the Mogul Emperor gratefully suffered the inclusion of the "holy city" of Benares (on the Ganges) in the British province of Bengal.

Not only did Hastings enlarge the British empire in India. He improved and centralized its administration. He reformed the finances and police-system. He converted a primarily military occupation into a stable civil government. At the same time he was not neglectful of opportunities to secure financial profits for the stockholders of the English East India Company and for himself. Eventually Hastings was called to England to answer charges in Parliament against his official conduct, and the famous Edmund Burke did his best to convict the redoubtable governor-general of "high crimes and misdemeanors." But the oratory of Burke proved powerless to win from a patriotic assembly the convic-

employed his powers in India to obtain illicit gains for himself. Parliament pronounced him guilty, and under stress of his disgrace his mind became partially unhinged, and in 1774 he committed suicide.

[1] This was in accordance with a "Regulating Act" of 1773, whereby the British Parliament enacted that there should be one governor-general for all British Indian provinces and that all officials of the East India Company should be confirmed by the King. This was the first formal recognition that India was the seat of a British empire and not merely of a private trading company. Another act of Parliament, in 1785, went farther in the same direction and set up in London a governmental "Board of Control" to supervise the policies and activities of the East India Company.

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In the eighteenth century, after Hastings, two other governors of the English East India Company did signal service in empire-building. One was Lord Cornwallis, who had recently surrendered a British army to British rebels in America [1] and who was as successful in India (1786–1793) as he had been unfortunate on the other side of the world. The second was the Marquess of Wellesley, who was an ardent imperialist and proved himself in India (1798–1805) a military genius. Under these governors, Mysore and the Mahratta Confederacy were fought and decisively defeated; and British dominion was extended rapidly and widely. In the east, Orissa and Guntur were acquired; in the south, Travancore, the Carnatic, and a large part of Mysore; in the west, Malabar and Broach. In the north, the native prince of the large state of Oudh became a protégé of the British, and in 1803 Delhi, the capital of the old Mogul Empire, was "rescued" from the Mahrattas and appropriated by the British, the Great Mogul being gently pushed into rich ornamental seclusion.


**Cornwallis and Wellesley**

When Lord Wellesley returned home in 1805, the greater part of the huge and varied land of India was dominated, if not actually governed, by the English East India Company and constituted a veritable British empire. The Mogul Emperor was now a cringing creature, anxious only to please the British and to retain a show of majesty. The majority of the native nawabs and princes were in pay or in awe of the British governor-general at Calcutta. British power and British trade were becoming synonymous, and they were paramount in India.

Outside of India, the trade and political power of the English East India Company were expanding. In the strategic straits between Sumatra and the Malay peninsula, the ocean gateway from India to China and Japan, the Company acquired Penang from a native prince in 1785 and Malacca from the Dutch in 1795. These acquisitions were the beginnings of the British colony of the Straits Settlements.[2]

[1] See below, p. 475.

[2] The important port of Singapore, now the capital of the Straits Settlements, was acquired by the English East India Company from a native prince in 1819. Malacca, it may be noted, was returned to the Dutch in 1818 but recovered by the British in 1824.


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Surat
Nagpur
ORISSA
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CIRCARS
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BENGAL
ARABIAN
SEA
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
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Simultaneously, Ceylon was taken from the Dutch (1795), and the British increased the number of convenient stopping places and fortified stations on the long water route around Africa from England to India. They founded the colony of Sierra Leone on the west coast of Africa (1787), ostensibly as a refuge for freed slaves. They occupied several groups of islands, including the Seychelles, off the east coast (1794). And they wrested Cape Town and South Africa from the Dutch (1795).[1]

In the second half of the eighteenth century the British also sowed the seeds for another and more enduring overseas achievement—the colonization of a whole continent. For it was then that they struck roots into Australia.

**Discovery of Australia**

Ever since the sixteenth century there had been gossip among mariners and geographers about a continent in the southern Pacific, and early in the seventeenth century a Portuguese pilot, De Quiros by name, in the service of Philip III of Spain, had searched eagerly and had almost (but not quite) found the "Terra Australis." Shortly afterwards, Dutch sailors from the East Indies actually visited and explored the west coast of the continent, named it "New Holland," and reported its unprofitable and forbidding appearance. In 1642 the famous Dutch Captain Tasman charted its southern and southeastern shores and named one region of it "Van Diemen's Land" in honor of his superior at Batavia. In 1688 an English buccaneer, William Dampier, on a wild and adventurous circumnavigation of the globe, stumbled on to "New Holland" and wrote such an interesting account of what he saw that the British government commissioned him ten years later to return and survey the country. He returned, landed at Shark's Bay (on the west coast), and did some surveying. But little came of the work of this buccaneer except considerable popular interest at home in his travel-books.

**Captain Cook**

Though Australia was known in a general way to the Dutch in the seventeenth century and was twice visited by an Englishman at the close of that century, knowledge of it remained slight and vague. Its occupation by Europeans was delayed until after the sensational voyages of Captain James Cook in the latter part of the eighteenth century. Cook,

[1] South Africa was restored to the Dutch in 1803 but reverted finally to the British in 1806.

the son of an agricultural laborer in Yorkshire, was apprenticed as a boy to an English firm of shipowners and learned much about the sea from voyages he made for them to Norway and the Baltic. At the age of twenty-seven he enlisted in the royal navy and during the Seven Years' War saw active service against the French in American waters. After a four-year employment as marine surveyor of Newfoundland, he was appointed to conduct a British expedition of geographical exploration in the South Seas. Three such expeditions he made, and his discoveries, combined with remarkable powers of leadership, observation, and description, entitle him to rank as a great explorer and one of the master-builders of the British Empire.

On his first voyage (1768–1770), Cook visited Tahiti, explored the Friendly Islands, circumnavigated and charted the shore of New Zealand, and, proceeding to "New Holland," surveyed its east coast with minute care and rechristened it "New South Wales." Landing at Botany Bay (near the site of present-day Sydney), he took formal possession of it for Great Britain. On his second voyage (1772–1775), he revisited Australia and New Zealand, discovered New Caledonia, and by sailing completely around the southern hemisphere (south of Australia, Africa, and South America) convinced himself that there was no continent in the south seas—no "Terra Australis"—except what the Dutch had called "New Holland" and he had renamed "New South Wales." On his third voyage (1776–1779), Cook rediscovered the Hawaiian Islands, which had been visited by Spaniards in the sixteenth century but had since been forgotten; he called them the Sandwich Islands, in honor of the English nobleman who was then chief of the British navy. After cruising in the northern Pacific and exploring the straits between Siberia and Alaska, Cook returned to Hawaii and was killed in a skirmish with its natives in 1779. The British government never gave to James Cook the recognition and honor which he merited both as a man of science and as the pioneer of British imperialism in the South Seas.

**Colonization of Australia**

The British government was not slow, however, to exploit the discoveries of Cook. In 1786 the eastern half of Australia was erected as the British territory of New South Wales, and in 1788 the first British settlement was made near Botany Bay at a point called Port Jackson and now known as Sydney. This first settlement was of convicts, and New

South Wales served for fifty years as a kind of open-air prison for British criminals. With criminals, however, an increasing number of venturesome freemen went out from Great Britain and settled in Australia, and gradually, in the early part of the nineteenth century New South Wales was subdivided. Van Diemen's Land, originally settled at Hobart in 1803 as a subcolony of convicts, was separated from New South Wales in 1825 and subsequently became the colony of Tasmania. The town of Brisbane was founded in 1825, Melbourne in 1835, and Adelaide in 1836; these towns subsequently became the respective capitals of the colonies of Queensland, Victoria, and South Australia, which in turn were detached from New South Wales. In the meantime, western Australia was appropriated as a new British colony (1829) and settlements were effected in it at Albany (1826) and Perth (1829). In New Zealand, English Protestant missionaries established themselves in 1814, but the immigration of British colonists and the formation of British government did not begin until about 1840.

Already, by the close of the eighteenth century, it was obvious that Great Britain was gaining, while other European powers were losing, in the race for colonial dominion and commercial supremacy throughout the non-European world. Britain, if forced to part with thirteen of its original colonies in North America, was vigorously extending its sway in Canada, the West Indies, India, South Africa, the Straits Settlements, Australia, and islands scattered over the seas and oceans. Thanks to the relative maritime decline of Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, and France, a decline which Britain had materially assisted and speeded, the British were in possession of an empire wider, richer, and more diverse than that of a Cæsar or an Alexander. It promised to spread the English language and the British nation as no other tongue or tribe had ever spread.

**British Sea Power**

Even more important than the land empire which Great Britain was erecting was the command of the sea which it was securing against all rivals. Its navy, already the most powerful in the world, was enabling its armed forces to seize whatever foreign coastal stations blocked or threatened its commercial routes and to afford protection on the high seas for its expanding merchant marine.

With the expansion of British trade went a rapid growth of

# PART III

## REVOLUTIONARY TRANSITION

IX. NOVEL INTELLECTUAL CURRENTS
X. THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN REVOLUTIONS
XI. THE FRENCH REVOLUTION
XII. NAPOLEON AND THE SPREAD OF REVOLUTIONARY PRINCIPLES

# CHAPTER IX

## NOVEL INTELLECTUAL CURRENTS

### I. NATURAL SCIENCE AND THE "ENLIGHTENMENT"



EATED religious partisanship in behalf of Protestantism or of Catholicism had been a main feature of the intellectual life of western Europe in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. In the later seventeenth century, however, intellectual interests gradually shifted from supernatural religion to natural science and what is commonly called the "Enlightenment." This dominated the eighteenth century and prepared the way for a revolutionary era in politics and society.

Natural science, in itself, was no novelty. It had been advanced by ancient Greeks and medieval monks; and its subsequent sensational progress stemmed from such early modern scientists as Copernicus, Galileo, and Harvey.[1] The novelty about it now was its extension and popularization and the philosophical speculation proceeding from it. Hitherto it had been the avocation of relatively few intellectuals. Now it became the vocation of numerous curious persons, and it was more rigorously separated from magic and superstition. Kings and princes patronized natural science. Most intellectuals and would-be intellectuals at least toyed with it. Large numbers of the upper and middle classes became "science-conscious."

**Promotion of Science**

Interest in natural science was both reflected and promoted by the rise of a new institution, the "scientific academy." At Rome, in 1603, a group of scientists and persons interested in science had founded the so-called Academy of Lynxes, and similar scientific academies were established in the seventeenth century in other urban centers, notably in Italy and Germany. In 1662 the English "Royal Society" was chartered by

[1] See above, pp. 117–124.

Charles II "to examine all systems, theories, principles, hypotheses, elements, histories, and experiments of things natural, mathematical, and mechanical, invented, recorded or practiced by any considerable author, ancient or modern." In 1666 an earlier French "Academy of Sciences" was reorganized, through Colbert's influence, by Louis XIV. As offshoots of the English academy, a philosophical society was organized in Massachusetts in 1683 and another at Dublin in 1684. Beginning in 1665, both the English and French academies published scientific periodicals, and before long similar scientific journals were emanating from Italy, Germany, Denmark, and other countries.

In addition to the academies, observatories and museums multiplied. The famous astronomical observatory of Tycho Brahe at Uraniborg[1] was surpassed in equipment by the observatories founded at Paris in 1667 and at Greenwich (in England) in 1675. To the establishment of museums an impetus was given by Robert Boyle's discovery, about 1663, that organic substances can be preserved and rendered visible in alcohol. A first-rate museum was built at Oxford in 1683 to house natural curiosities which a certain Dr. Ashmole had collected and presented to the university.

Rulers and statesmen gave impetus to science by patronage and example. The brother of Louis XIV had a laboratory and amused himself with "curious experiments." Charles II of England sought diversion in a "chymical laboratory." John DeWitt, grand pensionary of Holland, was immensely interested in science; he himself invented chain-shot and wrote ably on statistics. Samuel Pepys, the London gossip and gadabout, obtained enough scientific reputation to be elected president of the Royal Society. And a host of publicists increased their income by writing books on science for the general reading public.

**Isaac Newton and Physical Science**

Among the large number of persons who devoted themselves during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to the acquisition of "natural knowledge," Isaac Newton was undoubtedly the most illustrious and influential. He was born in the year in which Galileo died (1642), and attended Cambridge University, where he showed such proficiency in mathematics that he was given a professor's chair when he was twenty-seven. Later in life he was knighted by Queen Anne and is known in history as Sir Isaac Newton.

[1] See above, p. 118.

As a mathematician, Newton invented the infinitesimal calculus [1] and established the binomial theorem. In mathematical physics, he calculated tables by which the future position of the moon among the stars could be predicted—a helpful contribution to navigation. He explained hydrodynamics, including the theory of the propagation of waves, and made many improvements in hydrostatics. In optics, he showed that the rainbow is caused by the decomposition of white light, and he foreshadowed the much later doctrine that the structure of light is essentially atomic.

But it was in the realm of mechanics that Newton won his greatest claim to distinction. In a very famous book, the *Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy,* commonly called the *Principia,* he set forth in 1687, with a wealth of mathematical evidence, the "law of gravitation," that "every particle of matter in the universe attracts every other particle with a force varying inversely as the square of the distance between them and directly proportional to the product of their masses." Here was a sensational and convincing explanation not only of how apples fall to the ground but of how the earth and other planets are held in their orbits about the sun. It was an explanation at once universal and simple, and at the same time highly useful. Lagrange, the foremost mathematician of the eighteenth century, described the *Principia* as the greatest production of the human mind, and Newton as the greatest genius that had ever lived and likewise the most fortunate. "for there is but one universe, and to be the interpreter of its laws can happen to but one man in the world's history."

Newton's "law of gravitation" served to establish the Copernican system of astronomy on a firm basis,[2] and thenceforth the advance of astronomical science was rapid. Two English astronomers were particularly important. Edmund Halley, a close friend of Newton, charted a large number of fixed stars, especially in the southern hemisphere, and by calculating the orbit of a comet which he observed in 1682 he predicted its return in 1759—a prediction which was verified to the intense satisfaction of the ensuing generation. William Herschel, a musician by profession,[3] a

[1] The calculus was invented simultaneously and independently by the German philosopher and mathematician Leibnitz.

[2] John Milton was the last important celebrity to entertain serious doubt of the truth of the astronomy of Copernicus and Galileo.

[3] William Herschel was not an Englishman by birth. He was born in Hanover, the son of a musician in the Hanoverian Guard of George II, and it was as a mili-

self-taught mathematician, a most assiduous observer of the heavens, and a perfecter of the telescope, detected spots on the sun, mountains on the moon, and polar snow on Mars, and in 1781 discovered the planet Uranus.

A number of useful inventions attended and aided the development of physical science. Optical instruments such as the telescope and microscope were constantly being improved. Torricelli, an Italian, discovered the principle of the barometer in 1643. Otto von Guericke, a German, invented the air-pump in 1650. Fahrenheit, a German who lived mainly in England and Holland, perfected the mercury thermometer and invented the system of reckoning temperature which is still in use in English-speaking countries. Some experimentation was carried on with electricity and magnetism, and in 1746 two professors of the university of Leyden invented the so-called Leyden jar for the storage and sudden discharge of el tric energy. It was from experiments with the Leyden jar that enjamin Franklin identified thunderbolts with electricity and was led to invent the lightning-rod.

**Chemistry**

If Newton was the father of modern physics, the father of modern Chemistry was Robert Boyle. In 1660 he set forth the "law" that the volume of gas varies inversely with the pressure. He distinguished a mixture from a compound. He prepared phosphorus and collected hydrogen in a vessel over water. He manufactured wood alcohol. He studied the form of crystals as a guide to chemical structure. Most important, in his book *The Sceptical Chymist* (1661) he protested vigorously against the traditional union of chemistry with alchemy and at the same time advanced the modern idea of chemical "elements" and even foreshadowed the atomic theory.

Despite the work of Boyle, the development of chemistry was retarded by the prevalence of a misunderstanding of the phenomena of flame and combustion. When an article is burned, something seems to escape. This something, for long identified with sulphur, was imagined to be a peculiar principle of fire and early in the eighteenth century was named "phlogiston" by a German physician to the King of Prussia. The phlogiston theory dominated most chemical thought and experiment during the century.

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tary bandsman that he came to England in 1755. He was organist at Bath when he began his researches in astronomy. In his last years he was knighted, and he left a son, Sir John Herschel, who was a celebrated scientist of the nineteenth century.

Gradually a truer and more fruitful theory was evolved. The beginning of the change appears in the work of Joseph Black, a Scot, who, about 1755, discovered that a certain gas, distinct from atmospheric air, was combined in the alkalies. This gas he named "fixed air"; it was what we nowadays call carbon dioxide or carbonic acid. About ten years later, Henry Cavendish, son of an English nobleman and one of the richest men of his time, reported his discovery of "inflammable air," or hydrogen. Then in 1774 Joseph Priestley, an English Unitarian clergyman, discovered still another gas and showed both that it supported combustion and that it was needful for the respiration of animals; this gas the French chemist Lavoisier named oxygen. Whereupon Cavendish demonstrated that air was a compound of oxygen and nitrogen and that water was composed of oxygen and hydrogen. Finally, Lavoisier, the greatest chemist of the eighteenth century, disposed completely of the phlogiston theory, and showed that, although matter may alter its state in a series of chemical actions, its quantity remains the same. This "quantitative analysis" meant that the principles which had been established by Newton in physics could be carried over into chemistry.

In mineralogy there was steady progress from the sixteenth century, and early in the eighteenth century fossils, which had long been noted and discussed, were described and classified with some fullness. But the father of modern geology, as distinct from mineralogy, was an eighteenth-century product—James Hutton, a Scot who was in turn lawyer, physician, scientific farmer, and student of rocks. In 1785 he communicated a summary of his geological observations and theories to the Royal Society of Edinburgh in a paper entitled *Theory of the Earth, or an Investigation of the Laws Observable in the Composition, Dissolution, and Restoration of Land upon the Globe.* In this remarkable work, he maintained that past changes in the earth's crust could be explained by those which are seen in process, and that the changes of almost countless centuries was evidenced in contemporary geological formations. Thus, according to Hutton, the Earth was not a comparatively recent creation, as was commonly inferred from the Biblical account, but the outcome of a long and gradual evolution.

**Geology**

There was marked development of the biological and medical sciences during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In

**Medicine and Biology**

medicine, Malpighi, a modest and industrious professor at the university of Bologna, learned much from vivisection and the microscope and confirmed Harvey's theory of the blood by actually observing capillary circulation. Thomas Sydenham, an eminent practitioner of London, propounded the theory that disease, and especially fever, is nature's effort to expel morbific material from the system. Morgagni, a brilliant Italian physician and professor, summed up his post-mortem autopsies in a work on morbid anatomy so illuminating as to win for him the title of "father of pathology."

In biology, Malpighi, famous in medicine, was one of the first, in his *Anatomy of Plants* (1671), to describe the sexuality of plants and to compare the function of vegetable leaves with that of animal lungs. Robert Hooke, son of an Anglican clergyman, discovered the cellular structure of plants and invented the name "cell." Anthony van Leeuwenhoek, a Dutch manufacturer of microscopes, discovered protozoa and bacteria and was the first to describe the human spermatozoön.

In 1660 John Ray, son of an English blacksmith and himself an Anglican clergyman and university preacher, published the first of a series of works on systematic botany, which led to a great improvement in classification and also to progress in morphology. Subsequently Ray turned his attention to animals and made use of comparative anatomy. Here again his work marked an advance toward a natural classification of quadrupeds, birds, and insects.

The most famous classifier of existing botanical knowledge, however, was a Swede, Carl von Linné, usually cited by his Latinized name of Linnæus. His classification, based on the sex organs of plants, was widely accepted and for long supplanted Ray's. It is interesting to note that Linnæus, during his wanderings among the Laplanders in search of Arctic plants, was struck by the obvious differences between human races and that in his *System of Nature* he placed man with apes, lemurs, and bats in the order of "primates," and subdivided man into four groups according to color and other characteristics.

A corresponding development in the knowledge of animals was stimulated by the accounts of numerous overseas travelers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and by the collection of rare and strange beasts in various royal menageries in Europe.

The summation of this knowledge was achieved by the celebrated French zoologist Buffon in his encyclopedic *Natural History of Animals*. Buffon, in treating of all animal life, could not close his eyes to striking zoological resemblances between man and the lower animals, and he ventured the remark, which he afterwards withdrew, that, were it not for the express statements of the Bible, one might be tempted to seek a common origin for the horse and the ass, the monkey and the man.

Buffon in zoology, Linnæus in botany, Hutton in geology, Lavoisier and Boyle in chemistry, and Newton in mathematics and physics—these were the leading scientists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Together with numerous secondary colleagues and popularizers, they inspired an ever widening circle of intellectuals with the conviction that a rapid spurt of revolutionary discoveries was taking place in the realm of nature. There was, it now seemed clear, a "natural order," regulated by "natural law," in the universe, in the solar system, in the Earth's formation, in all matter and motion, in animals and plants, in disease and health, in man himself. This was the base and starting-point of the "Enlightenment." Anyone who accepted it was "enlightened."

**Natural Philosophy and the "Enlightenment"**

The Enlightenment, originating in the "natural order" of the scientists, was reflected and broadened by speculation of contemporary philosophers. One of the earliest and most influential of these was René Descartes, a Frenchman by birth, who traveled all over Europe, serving as a soldier in the Netherlands, Bavaria, and Hungary, living in Holland, dying in Sweden, with a mind as restless as his body. He was a mathematician and physicist of no mean attainments,[1] but his chief title to fame was the so-called Cartesian system of philosophy which he set forth in his famous *Discourse on Method* (1637) and *Principles of Philosophy* (1644). The Cartesian system was a radical departure from the scholastic philosophy of earlier times. It distinguished sharply between soul and body, between mind and matter. Mind and soul have an immaterial existence of their own, but body and matter are alone susceptible of scientific observation and hence subject to "natural

[1] By his invention of analytical geometry, Descartes provided useful new mathematical methods for physicists, and by his application of the principles of terrestrial mechanics to celestial phenomena he stimulated interest in the physical and mathematical aspects of astronomy.

law." Descartes was a professing Catholic Christian, but his philosophy left no room for any interposition of the supernatural in the natural.

More radical was an Englishman, Thomas Hobbes, whose basic philosophy was strictly materialist. All nature, to him, was a machine. Unlike Descartes, he admitted of no dualism, but insisted that in the human mind and soul, as in the physical universe, there are only matter and motion. He was one of the first to apply materialism to psychology.

Baruch Spinoza, a contemporary Jewish lens-grinder of Amsterdam and a very gentle soul, was as confident as Descartes of the power of human reason, and as sceptical as Hobbes of Descartes's dualism. Spinoza, however, did not follow Hobbes in reducing everything to matter. Rather, he advanced the notion that everything is both body and spirit; body and spirit are the same phenomena considered under different attributes of space and thought. Substance and ideas, nature and God, are identical: this was the essence of Spinoza's philosophy of pantheism, and to it was attached the corollary that free will is an illusion of consciousness. Orthodox Jews were scandalized by Spinoza; they repudiated and persecuted him; but he enjoyed the favor and patronage of John DeWitt, the grand pensionary of Holland.

In 1690 appeared John Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. Locke was an Englishman, trained as a physician, and already famous as a political philosopher. In his new work, a profound psychological study, he reached the conclusion that knowledge is the discernment of agreement or disagreement, either of our thoughts among themselves or between our thoughts and natural phenomena independent of them, and hence that human knowledge can be only an affair of probability. Locke, like Newton, was a professing Protestant Christian, but in his still later work on the *Reasonableness of Christianity* he divorced religion from the miraculous and unknown and based it on human experience and reason.

In the following century (the eighteenth), David Hume, a Scottish student of history and economics as well as of natural philosophy, maintained that "thought is merely a practical instrument for the convenient interpretation of our human experience; it has no objective or metaphysical validity of any kind." Consequently, according to Hume, it is impossible to establish the

reasonableness of God or religion, and the proper sphere of human thought is merely human experience.

Last of the major philosophers of the Enlightenment was Immanuel Kant. He was the grandson of a Scottish immigrant in Prussia, and spent his whole life at Königsberg. He was always interested in natural science; he was a competent physicist; and he wrote on such various topics as earthquakes, races of man, volcanoes in the moon, and physical geography. In his extensive philosophical writings he grappled with the problem of how to base moral duty on natural science rather than on revealed religion. His solution of the problem was "idealism"—the doctrine that, while we cannot know that God exists, our moral sense requires us to recognize the transcendental existence of God and likewise the freedom of the will and the immortality of the soul. If the conception of natural science in Hume's mind meant truth without God, in Kant's mind it meant God without certain truth. Kant's idealism closed the eighteenth century and emphasized the humanitarian note in the Enlightenment.

We have touched on only a few first-rate philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries—Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke, Hume, and Kant. They differed considerably in general systems and in detail, but all of them—and numerous other philosophers of the age whom we have not mentioned by name—were under the spell of the contemporaneous development of natural science. They all tried, in one way or another, to explain man, mentally and spiritually as well as physically, with reference to the discoveries and assumptions of physical science.

It was not only philosophers and scientists who became "enlightened" in the twofold sense of knowing more about the physical universe and making novel generalizations concerning it. In the course of the eighteenth century, many aristocrats and gentleman farmers, many bankers and business men, many writers and publicists, many professors, preachers, and priests prided themselves on being "enlightened." Even the absolute monarchs of the century became "enlightened."

With the Enlightenment were ultimately associated, in the minds of most of its devotees, *four* noteworthy concepts: (1) *Naturalism.* The substitution of the natural for the supernatural, of science for theology, and the assumption that the whole universe of matter and mind is guided and controlled by *natural*

*law.* (2) *Rationalism.* The exalting and almost deifying of *human reason,* which could and, according to the rational moral sense, should be utilized by the individual to discover the laws of nature and to enable him to conform his life to them. (3) *Optimistic Progress.* A hopeful belief in the steady betterment and ultimate perfecting of mankind, through increasing use of reason and broadening knowledge of natural law. (4) *Humanitarianism.* A tender regard for the natural rights of the individual and a predilection for the social blessings which "enlightenment" would bestow.

**Concepts of the Enlightenment**

In the light of these essentially metaphysical concepts, a good deal of criticism was indulged in, much of it destructive and some of it constructive. Institutions and practices which through age had acquired any degree of popular veneration in the domains of religion, politics, and society were dissected by the "enlightened" in order to discover if they were rational, if they were in harmony with natural law, if they promoted human progress, guaranteed individual rights, and conferred immediate benefits on the world. It was this critical spirit which somewhat paradoxically combined with a lively faith in the novel metaphysical concepts to produce the most notable intellectual features of the eighteenth century.

### 2. FRUITS OF CLASSICISM AND SEEDS OF ROMANTICISM

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, while novel developments were occurring in natural science and philosophy, one aspect of intellectual life remained fairly constant. This was classicism, the harking back, for literary and artistic models, to the classics of ancient Rome and Greece. Almost every "enlightened" person of the period entertained an admiration for classical antiquity and, like the humanists of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries,[1] could see no good in the culture of the middle ages. Oliver Goldsmith ascribed Dante's reputation to his obscurity and the barbarous times in which he lived. Voltaire referred to Gothic art as "what unhappily remains of the architecture of those times."

**Continuing Classicism**

To understand the spell which Greek and Roman antiquity cast over the men of the Enlightenment, we should remember that these men were the direct heirs of the humanist movement, which was represented as ushering the world out of the ignorance and

[1] See above, pp. 95–106.

superstition of the middle ages and into the knowledge and reason of modern times. If the men of the Enlightenment were reasonable and scientific—and they were quite sure that they were—it was because the preceding humanists had taught them valuable lessons from pre-Christian Greece and Rome.

There may be some difference of opinion about the value of "classical education," but there can be no doubt that all intellectuals of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had such an education. All the universities in Europe, all the secondary schools, whether conducted by disciples of John Calvin, Martin Luther, or Ignatius Loyola, regarded the Latin and Greek classics as the very core of their curricula.

Certain fruits were obvious. Anyone who aspired to be thought of as "enlightened" could and normally did interlard his writing and conversation with classical allusions. The most estimable speakers in the British Parliament were those who most consciously modeled their discourses after Demosthenes or Cicero and lugged in classical phrases and elaborate metaphors reminiscent of Homer or Virgil. It was similar with preachers, with letter writers, with essayists, with scholars. Such a highly "enlightened" despot as Frederick the Great indited dialogues in form and content as he had been taught that Plato or Socrates might have indited them. On the other hand, such "enlightened" democrats as the leaders of the American and French Revolutions were prone to display their classical training by assuming Cato-like attitudes and hurling Brutus-like anathemas against tyrants.

The influence of classicism upon art and literature was profound and abiding. Indeed, the dominant art of the seventeenth century and of the greater part of the eighteenth was essentially a continuation of the renaissance art of the sixteenth century.

**Baroque Architecture**

The word "baroque" has commonly been employed to designate the architecture of the period. It was patterned after that of ancient Rome, but it was more exuberant in decoration. Its origins are traceable to such sixteenth-century Italian masters as Michelangelo and Palladio,[1] and its most renowned seventeenth-century exponent was the Italian Bernini, who lived most of his life at Rome in the service of successive Popes and was equally distinguished in architecture and sculpture. He designed the colonnade and square in front of St.

[1] See above, p. 107.

Peter's, and his canopy over the high altar of St. Peter's, with its twisted and floriated columns, is a striking example of the ornate "baroque."

Taking its rise in Italy, the baroque style soon spread widely. It was employed so much for Jesuit churches that it is sometimes called the "Jesuit" style, but it was employed for other kinds of churches and for palaces too. Usually in baroque churches, spacious naves were flanked by chapels or by two narrow aisles and supported by decorative pilasters; ornamented domes or cupolas are conspicuous; walls gleam with colored marbles and altars glisten with gilt. In baroque palaces, special importance was attached to the principal doorway, entrance, and stairway, but much effort was expended on enriching the whole interior with brocades and tapestries and the splendor of metals. From palaces and churches, the baroque style was carried on and applied to theatres, colleges, tombs, and finally to vast conceptions of entire open squares and parks and the perspective of streets, with stairways, colonnades, and fountains.

In France, baroque architecture characterized the palace of the Luxembourg, built for Queen Marie de' Medici; the palace and library of Cardinal Mazarin (now the seat of the French Academy); the Invalides, constructed with its imposing dome, under the auspices of Louis XIV, as a hospice for old soldiers; and especially the royal palace and gardens at Versailles. Later, in the eighteenth century, during the reign of Louis XV, French baroque assumed a freer, less strictly classical form. Curves were multiplied, and the elaborate use of delicate shell-like ornamentation earned it the special designation of "rococo."

Baroque was much employed in Spain, Germany, the Netherlands, and Poland. Especially at Vienna and in the towns of southern Germany and of Poland it took a grandiose form in the Roman manner. In northern Germany and the Netherlands it was more imitative of French baroque; and Frederick the Great's palace of Sans Souci at Potsdam was a rococo echo of Louis XIV's palace at Versailles. Into Russia, baroque architecture penetrated, modifying the traditional Byzantine types. Peter the Great and his eighteenth-century successors, anxious to westernize and "enlighten" Russia, filled the newly founded city of St. Petersburg with classical domes and columns and baroque decorations.[1]

[1] See above, p. 315.

In England, an early example of similar baroque adaptation of classical architecture was furnished by Inigo Jones in the royal banqueting hall which he built at Whitehall for James I in 1619. Then, after a great fire had swept London in 1666, Sir Christopher Wren replaced many a destroyed Gothic edifice with a stately classical pile. Wren designed a profusion of Anglican churches; his masterpiece was St. Paul's cathedral, constructed between 1668 and 1710. Classical architecture was employed by British noblemen for their country seats and town residences, and by British capitalists for banks and places of business.

In America, "colonial" architecture usually displayed the simpler forms of classicism. George Washington's home at Mount Vernon and the plans which he approved for the capital city of the United States provided the foundation for what is now the dominant "classical" type of the public architecture of the American nation.

In Europe, several architects about the middle of the eighteenth century began to react against the rococo developments of baroque art and to turn from the grandiose models of antiquity to simpler classical models. The inspiration was still classical, but it was of a severer, less ornamental, supposedly "truer" classicism; it involved close imitation, rather than free adaptation, of ancient monuments. Examples of this latest "pure" phase of classicism are the royal palace at Madrid, begun about 1734, and particularly, in France, in the last years of Louis XV and under Louis XVI, the Panthéon and the palaces of the Place de la Concorde.

**Conventional "Elegance"**

As classicism dominated architecture, so a classically inspired elegance characterized the house furnishings and the personal adornments of polite society. Particularly in the eighteenth century, prior to the French Revolution, every lady and every gentleman strove for an environment and an appearance of studied elegance. It was the age of crystal chandeliers and flashing mirrors, of graceful mahogany furniture[1] and delicately patterned porcelain from Sèvres or Dresden or from the Wedgwood factories in England. It was the age when gentlemen wore curly wigs and silk stockings

[1] The eighteenth century was a "classical" period for cabinet-makers. It gave us, in France, the "styles" of Louis XIV, Louis XV, and Louis XVI, and in England the "styles" of certain master craftsmen: Thomas Chippendale, Robert Adam, George Hepplewhite, and Thomas Sheraton.

and knee breeches, when ladies appeared with towering wigs of powdered hair, with little patches of court plaster on cheek or forehead, with wasp waists and billowing skirts. It was the age, too, when Lord Chesterfield wrote the famous *Letters to his Son,* explaining with wit and polish that essential morals are identical with external graces of manner; when the rascally Italian adventurers Casanova and Cagliostro acquired international fame by the very elegance of their knavery; when "Beau" Brummel was becoming the prince of fops and the chum of George III's rakish son and heir. At Versailles and at all the other European courts which aped Versailles, the courtiers who danced the minuet and accompanied their graceful bows with nicely worded compliments were surely as devoted to what they thought was classical as any architect or sculptor.

**Painting**

The art of painting in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was perhaps less affected by classicism than architecture and sculpture. Yet classical subjects were favorites with many a painter during the Enlightenment, and baroque classicism was as strikingly exemplified in Rubens' canvases as in Bernini's tombs and altar-pieces. Rubens, a native of the Spanish (Belgian) Netherlands and the most celebrated painter in the first half of the seventeenth century, made his art a profitable business, employing a number of student-assistants and accepting numerous commissions from such patrons as Henry IV and Marie de' Medici of France and James I of England. The 2,200 huge compositions which issued from Rubens' workshop, whether pagan or Christian or merely regal in subject, were quite baroque in manner, sensual and colorful and richly decorative. Rubens was the greatest of the "Flemish" painters.

As Italy had been the center of the greatest painting in the sixteenth century, so the Netherlands and Spain produced the most remarkable painters of the seventeenth century. Among those who in some degree were under classical influence—in addition to Rubens—were Van Dyck, Velasquez, and Murillo. In the eighteenth century, classical painting was chiefly exemplified in England and France. In England, it was a golden age of portrait-painters, such as Reynolds, Gainsborough, Romney, and Raeburn. In France, it was the age of the graceful decorative court painting of Watteau, Fragonard, and Greuze.

All the painters so far mentioned—and they were the most

popular in their day—were deemed "classical." From the baroque of Rubens to the grandiose portraits of Reynolds and the ornamental delicacy of Fragonard, the chief styles of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century painting bore more or less close relationship to parallel developments of "classicism" in architecture and sculpture, and in education and thought and taste. In the main, the exponents of these styles had a marked fondness for the formality and elegance which they thought were associated with ancient Greek and Roman art.

But there were other pictorial artists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries who were more independent of classicism and who are more highly esteemed nowadays than they were in their own time. Among these were several "realistic" painters who flourished in the Netherlands in the seventeenth century and who were chiefly concerned with almost photographic portrayal of the life of the common people about them. Such, for example, were Frans Hals, David Teniers, Jan Vermeer, and, greatest of all, Rembrandt. Rembrandt lived a stormy and miserable life in the towns of Leyden and Amsterdam. Instead of finding conventional inspiration in pagan mythology or employing fanciful decoration, he painted quite realistically the life of the people among whom he lived and the things which concerned them—lively portraits of contemporary burgomasters and popular amusements, simple landscapes, and stern scenes from the Old Testament. His *Lesson in Anatomy* and his *Night Watch,* in their somber settings, are wonderfully realistic products of Rembrandt's mastery of the brush.

**"Realism" and Satire**

Rembrandt and his Dutch contemporaries represented one significant reaction against the dominant "classicism" in painting—a reaction toward "realism." Another kind of reaction was represented in England in the eighteenth century by William Hogarth, satirist and moralist and author of a treatise on art in opposition to the "classical" vogue. Hogarth's paintings and engravings, notably his *Rake's Progress, Marriage à la Mode,* and *Parliamentary Election,* expressed the growing critical spirit of the eighteenth century toward abuses in society and government.

A younger and much greater artist was a Spaniard, Francisco Goya, at once realist and satirist, who despised the conventions of society, disliked the aristocracy, and detested the clergy. It was doubtless because of Goya's sympathy with the revolutionary

philosophy of the age that the "enlightened" King Charles III of Spain appointed him court painter, and in this post, not only under Charles III but under his stupid successor Charles IV, Goya made the most of the opportunity afforded him to unmask hypocrisy. Superficially Goya's style was sometimes reminiscent of Watteau's (which is probably why Goya was popular), but actually there was a great difference. Watteau fancifully idealized aristocrats, while Goya, with equal art, suggested caricature by painting them a bit too realistically.

Satire and "realism" were not the only evidences of reaction against the prevailing "classicism" in the pictorial arts. In the eighteenth century "naturalism" also appeared, deriving its inspiration from idealized nature rather than from conventionalized Greek and Roman art. This idealizing of "nature" was part and parcel of the Enlightenment. It was an expression of the new faith in natural law and natural rights, and an accompaniment of newly discovered beauty of natural men and natural scenery. It was associated with the growing interest of European intellectuals in the forests and redmen of the New World, and, even more, with the mounting enthusiasm of European connoisseurs for the strangely "natural" art of the Chinese. Chinese paintings, porcelains, lacquers, embroideries, wall-papers—a host of "chinoiseries"—were imported into Europe during the eighteenth century. Maria Theresa of Austria fitted up a "Chinese apartment" in her palace at Schönbrunn, Frederick the Great of Prussia built an "oriental pavilion" at Sans Souci, and the Elector of Bavaria constructed a pagoda. Soon, European princes and nobles were laying out gardens in the "Chinese" manner and expecting a "Chinese" touch in the works of European artists.

Much of the shell-like "rococo" art of the eighteenth century was a more or less conscious imitation of Chinese art. A painter like Watteau, though belonging to the "classical" tradition, was obviously influenced by "Chinese" models; the gay doings of his festal figures were depicted against a fairy-story landscape which was suggestively Chinese in form and feeling. The pastoral mood, the impressionistic treatment of nature, the sophisticated "primitiveness" of Watteau and his successors were novel features of European art.

Among the "naturalist" painters, other than Watteau and his school, was Richard Wilson, the "father of British landscape." At

the very time when scientists were talking about natural laws, and philosophers were writing about natural rights, Wilson was seeing and showing the beauties of English nature, the rivers, the trees, and the fields. At the same time, Piranesi, an Italian etcher and engraver, was decorating his pictorial records of classical Roman remains with symbolic representations of the groves and streams and mountain crags of his own contemporary Italy.

This newer pictorial art of the eighteenth century, whether treating of nature directly or through Chinese influence, served to usher in the romantic painting of the nineteenth century. It was part of the transition from "classicism" to "romanticism."

In the literature of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, "classicism" was dominant. The use of the Latin language for literary expression steadily declined, it is true, but the rising flood of vernacular literatures continued to be freighted with much of the form and content of classical Latin (and Greek) literature.

Classicism in the seventeenth century took a baroque form in literature, as in architecture and painting. At its best the literary baroque meant a studious, decorative style of writing; at its worst it involved affectation, bombast, high-flown metaphors, and, in general, poverty of content cloaked under exuberance of forms. These latter qualities characterized much of the seventeenth-century literature of Italy, Germany, and Spain and rendered it far less noteworthy than the sixteenth-century literature of the same countries.

**Literature**

Baroque literature flourished at its best in France and England. In France, the best traditions of classicism were cherished and adapted by a group of geniuses and were so fostered and patronized by the Grand Monarch as to render the age of Louis XIV the golden age—the classical age—of French letters.[1] It should be recalled that it was the heyday of such distinguished French writers as Corneille, Molière,[2] Racine, Madame de Sévigné, La Fontaine, and many another literary light of lasting brilliance. No wonder that, as the armies of Louis XIV fought over the Continent, the literature of France became the prized possession of all Europe and the model for a vast output of literature in divers

[1] See above, p. 257.

[2] Molière was not "classicist," like Corneille and Racine; he was rather a French Shakespeare—realist and profoundly psychological. He belongs only chronologically to the "classical" age.

languages. In Germany, for example, it became fashionable to use the French language and to read French literature in the original.

In England, an outstanding instance of studious, decorative baroque writing was supplied by John Milton, the contemporary of Corneille. Then, under Charles II and James II, English contacts with France served to reinforce the classicism of Milton and to inspire in England the so-called "Restoration" literature, whose foremost exponent was John Dryden. In Alexander Pope, who flourished in the first half of the eighteenth century, classicism reached its acme in English poetry; the wit, point, and lucidity of his verse, combined with his powers of satire and his sympathy with the new metaphysics of natural science, made him the supreme poet of his century.

The eighteenth century was a period of great prose, however, rather than of great poetry. It was a time when literary men, like other intellectuals, were "enlightened," when they were obsessed not only with natural science, but with social science, with humanitarianism, and with criticism of existing institutions and usages. The "enlightened" literary men found prose a more convenient and pliable medium than poetry for exposition and criticism, but the prose which they employed—the most characteristic eighteenth-century prose—showed unmistakable evidence of classical background. It was formal and elaborate, ornamented and polished, graced with flowing balanced sentences and adorned with classical allusions.

Among the masters of "classical" English prose may be mentioned John Locke, the philosopher; Edward Gibbon and David Hume, the historians; Samuel Johnson, the lexicographer; Adam Smith, the economist; Blackstone, the jurist; Lord Chesterfield, the moralist. But the most original use of eighteenth-century English prose was for a new type of literature—the novel.

It was now that the English novel arose, a new and subsequently favorite kind of literature, the long-winded description and rather chaotic analysis of human life and love and behavior (as opposed to the earlier romance of adventure). The roots of the English novel lay in the character studies of Joseph Addison, in the journalistic stories of Daniel Defoe, and in the satirical tales of Jonathan Swift. Whence proceeded the extraordinary work of four eighteenth-century British novelists: Richardson, the sentimental and somewhat priggish author of *Pamela* (1740)

and *Clarrisa* (1748); Fielding, the acute and tolerant delineator of contemporary manners, whose *Tom Jones* appeared in 1749; Smollett, the caustic author of *Roderick Random* and *Humphrey Clinker;* and Laurence Sterne, antiquarian and humorist, creator of *Tristram Shandy*. All these English novelists were known and acclaimed on the Continent, as in Great Britain, and Richardson especially provided inspiration for a host of sentimental novels.

In France, there was an outpouring of prose literature in the eighteenth century similar to that in England. Voltaire, the most celebrated French writer of the age, imagined that his classical dramas constituted his greatest work, and he surely labored to make them faultlessly "classical" in form and content. But the plays and poems of Voltaire now seem dreadfully stilted and boring, and it is only the prose of his essays and histories which still lives and sparkles. With the prose of Voltaire must be coupled, as best in eighteenth-century French literature, the prose of Montesquieu, Diderot, and Rousseau, the *Manon Lescaut* of Abbé Prévost, the *Barber of Seville* and *Figaro* of Beaumarchais.

In eighteenth-century Germany, Lessing lamented the dependence of German literature on French models and urged his countrymen to go direct to ancient Greece for the canons of their art. He set an example in his drama *Nathan der Weise* (1779), an interesting utilization of classicism for an "enlightened" deistic discussion of the relations between Jews and Christians. In Italy, Alfieri penned, in terse style and with fiery ardor, a series of tragedies, drawn from antique sources and directed against contemporary tyranny.

**Rise of Romanticism**

The eighteenth century was not wholly classical. It also was marked by the rise of a novel romanticism—a tendency to ignore classical models and to seek inspiration in natural scenery, in supposedly primitive life, in folk customs. This meant, in literature as in painting, a revolt or reaction against the long dominant renaissance, against the worship of classical art. Romanticism was not to reach fruition and affect all arts until the nineteenth century,[1] but its seeds were implanted in the eighteenth century and already in this century its germination was clear in certain arts. Architecture and sculpture were least affected by it, but the landscapes of Wilson and Piranesi and the pastoral moods of the eighteenth-century French

[1] For later developments, see below, pp. 600–606, 686–691.

"school" heralded its appearance, as we have seen, in painting. It was, however, in literature that romanticism gained an even sturdier growth, and especially in English literature.

In Great Britain, romantic love of natural beauty was expressed by James Thomson in his *Seasons* (1726). Romantic predilection for lowly scenes and simple emotions was voiced in the ballads of Thomas Gray, particularly in his *Elegy* (1750). Romantic fondness for "primitive" folk-legends was stimulated by the *Reliques of Ancient English Poetry* which Thomas Percy published in 1765, and by the poems of "Ossian" which the school-teacher James Macpherson invented and published, also in 1765, as translations from a pretended Scottish bard of the third century.

"Ossian," in particular, created a great sensation all over Europe, and very soon numerous literary men were seeking inspiration for their poetry and prose, not in the conventional classic qualities of civilized Greeks and Romans, but in the "naturalness," "simplicity," and "virtue" of primitive peoples and ordinary peasants. Something like a literary revolution began.

In Great Britain, romanticism inspired new types of poetry. There was the homely, dialect verse of Robert Burns, the strange "medieval" verse of Thomas Chatterton, the enthusiastically humanitarian verse of William Cowper. All these types were far removed from the classical poetry of Alexander Pope.

In the meantime, romanticism was entering Germany. Here, in something of a revolt against national dependence on French classicism, several writers turned to England for counter-inspiration. Shakespeare was studied, and, most portentous of all, "Ossian" and Percy's *Reliques* were translated and extolled. If England could have a truly national literature and cherish its own folk poetry, why not Germany? The foremost German apostle of romanticism was Herder, who knew Ossian by heart and was an untiring advocate of folk lore, folk literature, and folk customs. He not only published (1778) German folk songs of earlier ages but exerted a strong influence on younger literary men, notably Goethe and Schiller. Goethe's play *Götz von Berlichingen* (1771) and his novel *The Sorrows of Werther* (1774) were quite romantic; and so too was Schiller's first important drama, *The Robbers* (1781).

Musical art developed during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries parallel with literature, painting, and architecture.

Throughout the seventeenth century Italy remained the center of Europe's music, and just as Italy in the preceding century had given vogue to polyphony,[1] so now it fashioned opera. **Music** The new Italian opera usually dealt with themes derived from classical tragedy, and it proved very popular. At Venice three opera houses were opened in the decade of the 1630's, and over 350 different operas were produced between 1630 and 1700. It was similar at Bologna, at Naples, and at Rome. Operas were performed in convents, and Pope Clement IX wrote an opera. At Naples, at the close of the century, flourished Alessandro Scarlatti, the most esteemed composer of the age, who wrote 125 operas and 500 cantatas, besides oratorios and masses.

From Italy, the opera spread to France and England. Lully, a native of Florence, was brought to Paris in 1643. Here he cooperated with Molière and won the favor of Louis XIV, so that Lully's classical operas, together with his ballets and divertissements, constituted the musical mode at the court of the Grand Monarch. In England, Henry Purcell, organist of Westminster Abbey, and chief musician at the court of Charles II and James II, composed the opera of *Dido and Æneas* in 1680; six years later he established an English opera-house.

To Germany, too, the vogue of Italian opera spread. One of its first German exponents was Handel, who, after writing operas for the Hamburg stage and sojourning for three years in Italy as court musician to the Medici of Florence, became a pensioner of the Elector George of Hanover. Then, when this prince succeeded to the throne of Great Britain as George I, Handel was established in London as successor to Purcell. He turned Covent Garden into an opera house (which it still is); and when he died he was buried in Westminster Abbey with befitting pomp.

In the meantime, the seventeenth century had witnessed a marked development of oratorio music, and also of instrumental music. While the piano was developing in France, the violin was being perfected in Italy. The Amati and Stradivari, famous Italian families of violin-makers, lived in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.

Early in the eighteenth century appeared one of the greatest masters of organ music which the world has known, Johan Sebastian Bach. Born of a German family of professional musicians, he

[1] See above, pp. 112–113.

grew up pious and humble. As organist at Weimar and Leipzig, he knew little of what went on in the world of affairs, but, introspective and conscientious, he turned out in the course of his everyday work a vast number of chorales and fugues, sonatas and concertos (and four masses for the Elector of Saxony). It was left for subsequent generations to appreciate Bach. In his own day, he was not popular. His deeply religious feeling and constant awareness of the supernatural were alien to the century of the Enlightenment and likewise to the frivolous courtiers who ornamented that century. The latter preferred the classical pomp of Handel or the lyric grace of such court composers as Rameau and Gluck.

**Mozart**

The supreme musician of the eighteenth century, however, was Mozart. Of a musically gifted family, he was a prodigy in youth and manhood; his brief life was all music. He wrote 200 works before he was eighteen, and when he died at the age of thirty-five he left more than 600 compositions. And what compositions they were!—symphonies, sonatas, quartets, chamber music, a majestic requiem Mass, and a series of world famous operas, including the *Marriage of Figaro* (1785), *Don Giovanni* (1787), and the *Magic Flute* (1791).

In Mozart the best features of the whole musical development of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were synthesized, with consummate art and great originality. For Mozart not only drew on the past; he was an innovator and pointed to the future. He was at once heir to the gayety of classical Italy and France and father of the profundity of the later German school. It was Mozart who really founded German opera. There had already been other great German composers, but Bach was hidden in his organ-loft, while Handel expatriated himself to England, and Gluck to France. Mozart was born and died in German Austria, and he exerted decisive influence on both Haydn and Beethoven, whose principal works were to be produced in the age of the French Revolution and Napoleon and to distinguish, in the sphere of musical art, the age of full-fledged romanticism.

### 3. NEW QUESTIONINGS OF TRADITIONAL RELIGION: PIETISM, DEISM, AND ATHEISM

From the middle of the seventeenth century, certain novel developments occurred in the religious thought and practice of west-

ern and central Europe. Hitherto, both the classes and the masses of Europeans, with negligible exceptions, had professed traditional Christian beliefs in the divinity of Jesus and the immortality of the soul, in the divine inspiration of the Bible, the efficacy of prayer, and the reality of the supernatural and the miraculous. During the century after Luther and Calvin, there had been differences between Catholics and Protestants, and among various kinds of Protestants, concerning church, clergy, and sacraments, but the Protestant churches and sects had vied with the Catholic Church in insisting upon particular dogmas.

Now, however, new tendencies arose, either to push dogmatic teaching into the background or to question the very foundations of Christianity. Part of this is attributable to weariness with the theological disputes and fanaticism which had attended the religious upheaval of the sixteenth century, and another part to absorption in the scientific and philosophic enlightenment of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

One of the new religious developments was *pietism*. It appeared mainly in Protestant countries and was probably less an effect of "enlightened" philosophy than a reaction against sectarian wrangling. If Christians would but cease to argue about dogmas and content themselves with pious feelings and with earnest efforts to lead Christ-like lives, they would realize the true inwardness of Christianity and would behave more seemly before the world.[1]

**Pietism**

A prominent apostle of pietism was a German Lutheran pastor, Philip Spener, who published in 1675 a book entitled *Heartfelt Longings for a Reform of the True Evangelical Church which will be pleasing to God.* Spener urged his fellow Lutherans to abandon debatable dogmas and fiery polemics and to become practical mystics. He minimized the importance of a visible church and insisted that religion should be highly individual, an indwelling of the Holy Ghost in each believer, a vital force moving the emotions and making for personal holiness. His ideas were espoused by a considerable number of Lutherans—and Calvinists too—during the ensuing generation, and throughout the eight-

[1] This tendency had been foreshadowed by some of the Radical Protestant sects of the sixteenth century, and, among Calvinists, by Arminius who questioned Calvin's doctrine of predestination and protested against putting too much emphasis on dogmas. See above, p. 164 note.

eenth century pietism had able champions and numerous disciples on the Continent of Europe, especially in Germany.

Another noteworthy pietist was Emmanuel Swedenborg, the gifted son of a professor of Lutheran theology at the Swedish university of Upsala. Having acquired an international reputation as a scientist—mathematician, physicist, geologist, and engineer,—Swedenborg received in 1745 a "divine revelation" and devoted himself thenceforth to the writing of a large number of mystical works on "divine love and wisdom" and the "new Jerusalem."[1]

**Quakers**

Contemporary with Spener was the Englishman George Fox, the founder of the sect of "Friends"—or Quakers, as they were popularly labeled. Fox possessed no such training or position as Spener or Swedenborg had; he was not an "intellectual"; he was self-taught, self-opinionated, and given to superstition. But he was sincere, earnest, and very much of a pietist. To him existing churches were despicable (he called them "steeple houses"); external observances were silly (he denounced conventional manners as "hat honor"); and war was anathema. In England, in Scotland, in America, he preached his doctrine that Christianity is purely a spirit, a strictly personal experience, an "inner light," independent of state, clergy, and temples, a matter of plain speaking and plain living, of refusing to take oaths or bear arms. The sect which Fox created was long despised, but it counted among its members such a respected aristocrat as William Penn,[2] and its basic pietism, if not its revolutionary attitude toward war and intolerance, was soon influential among Radical Protestants, such as Baptists and Congregationalists, and even among some Anglican Protestants.

At first the Anglican Church did not harbor much pietism. Indeed, throughout the eighteenth century, the established Church of England was marked by a formality and a dependence upon the state and the landed aristocracy, which was not conducive to pietism. Yet, as the Anglican Church became more obviously the property of the upper classes and its worship more perfunctory, the opportunity of converting its lower-class adherents to emo-

[1] After Swedenborg's death, his disciples organized the "Church of the New Jerusalem," which, commonly called the Swedenborgian Church, has subsisted to the present day as a pietist Protestant sect.

[2] See above, p. 341, and below, p. 416.

tional pietism grew greater. The opportunity was seized by John Wesley.

Wesley, the son of an Anglican clergyman, while studying at Oxford University in 1729 became the leader of a small group of fellow students who called themselves the Holy Club and who were nicknamed "Methodists" by reason of their methodical abstinence from frivolous amusements and their methodical cultivation of fervor and piety. Leaving England a few years later as an Anglican missionary to the Indians in Georgia, Wesley was thrown in close contact with some German Protestant missionaries from whom he learned of Continental pietism, and on his return to England in 1738 he experienced a pietist conversion. "I felt my heart strangely warmed. I felt I did trust in Christ, Christ alone, for salvation; and an assurance was given me that He had taken away *my* sins, even *mine,* and saved *me* from the law of sin and death." Wesley was tireless in propaganda. For fifty years he traveled an average of 5,000 miles a year, mainly on horseback, rising at four o'clock every morning, filling every moment with work, living most frugally. He preached some 40,000 sermons, and the number of hymns written by himself and his brother Charles ran into the thousands. By hymns, sermons, and "methodist rules," he was ever exhorting to personal piety. Christianity, to him, was a matter of individual feeling and experience, and anyone was a Christian who "accepted" Christ and gave evidence of living according to Christian principles.

**Methodists**

Wesley and his early associates were Anglicans, and for a time they tried to keep Methodism within the Anglican Church. But their emotionalism, their neglect of ritual, and their appeal to the lower classes served to make a breach between them and the established Church. Gradually the followers of Wesley formed an independent body—known as Wesleyans or Methodists—governed by "conferences" of preachers and by bishops (in the Lutheran, rather than the Anglican or Catholic sense). Methodist churches grew up rapidly in Great Britain, and in 1771 Francis Asbury crossed the Atlantic and inaugurated in America the itinerant preaching and "revival meetings" which have made the Methodists the most numerous body of Protestant Christians in the United States.

Within the Catholic Church, pietism appeared in the Jansenist movement, so called from its originator, Cornelius Jansen. He

was a bishop in the Spanish Netherlands who taught that above and beyond the ministrations of the Church every Christian, to be saved, must experience a "conversion" and must lead a life of holiness. After the death of Jansen a number of his French disciples possessed themselves of a sort of monastery and convent at Port-Royal in the vicinity of Paris, and from Port-Royal as a center a famous group of brilliant and pious apostles propagated Jansenism in France and the Netherlands. Blaise Pascal, a celebrated mathematician and physicist, was for a time an eloquent defender of the movement. Eventually, however, the Jesuits, backed by King Louis XIV, raised the question of heresy, accusing the Jansenists of adopting Protestant practices and doctrines, including Calvin's principles of predestination. In 1709 Louis XIV broke up the convent and monastery at Port-Royal, and four years later Pope Clement XI, by a famous document, the bull *Unigenitus*, definitely condemned Jansenism as heretical. Jansenism was thus cut off from the Catholic Church, but it continued to distinguish a sect of "Old Catholics" which under the leadership of the bishop of Utrecht repudiated the papacy and has survived in the Dutch Netherlands to the present day.

**Jansenists**

Even in Russia, within the orbit of Eastern Orthodox Christendom, something like pietism appeared in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The attempt of the patriarch of Moscow in 1654 to revise the liturgy of the Russian Church was followed by the secession of a large number of "Old Believers," among whom several dissenting sects arose. All of these were hostile to religious "innovations," but as they developed fanatical opposition to the established Church, some of them came in time to regard the individual conscience, rather than any ecclesiastical organization, as the supreme authority in religion and the sole guide of spiritual life. For example, in the eighteenth century appeared among dissenting peasants a sect known as the Doukhobors, who, like the English Quakers, stressed the "inner light," deprecated the state, and repudiated military service as un-Christian.

Pietism was but one novel religious development of the time. While it minimized dogma and reason and emphasized experience and emotion, many intellectuals turned from traditional Christianity, whether Catholic or Protestant, in an opposite direction. These were drawn toward *deism* (or even *atheism*), which in-

volved a rationalistic scepticism concerning the fundamentals of any "revealed" or "supernatural" religion, particularly Christianity.

To the rise of such scepticism, three factors contributed. One was the same repugnance to squabbles among Christian churches and sects as operated in behalf of the pietist movement. A second, more peculiar to rationalist scepticism, was admiration for what was heard of non-Christian peoples and religions overseas. In the seventeenth century, and to a greater extent in the eighteenth, European intellectuals were signally impressed by romantic reports from travelers and missionaries of naked savages in America who lived in simple piety, virtue, and happiness without priests, bibles, or creeds, and of highly cultured natives of India and China who lived philosophically without benefit of Christianity. Thus the "noble savage" and the "Chinese sage" were invoked as censorious critics of European faiths and morals. Finally, there can be no doubt that the contemporary development of natural science and especially the rise of the new natural philosophy prompted rationalist scepticism. If the universe was a huge machine, operating in accordance with natural law, what place was left in it for a supernatural religion? Was not religion itself, like physics, simply natural? Could not true religion, like the law of gravitation, be discovered by the human reason, without recourse to "revelation" or "authority"?

**"Natural" Religion**

The idea of "natural religion" was not new. It had long been held by Christian theologians. The greatest Catholic theologian of the middle ages, St. Thomas Aquinas, had argued, for example, that underlying all revealed religions (Christianity included) is a natural and therefore universal religion in accordance with which rational human beings share fundamental beliefs in God, in immortality, in the moral law, and in future rewards and punishments; Christianity is a revelation, supplementary to, but not in contradiction with, natural religion. In the seventeenth century, however, with the growing emphasis on nature and natural law, certain radical exponents of natural religion began to inveigh against Christianity. Either Christian doctrines coincide with the rational tenets of natural religion, in which case they are superfluous, or they constitute irrational additions, in which case they are superstitious.

One of the earliest champions of this view was an English nobleman, Baron Herbert of Cherbury. He was educated at Oxford, and developed, through contacts with scientists and philosophers of the age, a critical and sceptical bent. At the same time his wealth and social position and his devotion to the royal pretensions of James I and Charles I protected him in the free expression of his religious opinions. In two treatises—*On Truth as it is distinguished from Revelation,* printed in 1624, and *On Religion of the Heathen,* published posthumously in 1663—Cherbury maintained that religious truth resides in the rational common sense of mankind, that natural religion, consisting of rational belief in God, virtue, and immortality, is all that common sense dictates, and that religious "revelations" are inventions of priests.

The scepticism of Cherbury was reinforced by the rise of biblical criticism. Hobbes, the political philosopher and materialist, not only denied the "inspiration" of the Old Testament but also questioned its historical accuracy. Spinoza, the Jewish philosopher and pantheist, also applied historical criticism to the Old Testament, and, like Hobbes, maintained its mythological nature. A French scholar, Simon by name, published a *Critical History of the Old Testament* in 1680 and a *Critical History of the New Testament* in 1689. Thenceforth there was considerable scepticism among intellectuals as to the sacredness of the Scriptures and as to the truth of the miracles recorded in them.

**Deism**

The new sceptical attitude had its origin in England, and Englishmen gave the name of *deism* to the "natural religion" which the sceptics would substitute for traditional Christianity. Deism seemed simple and reasonable. The deistic God was merely the first cause of natural law, the original giver of reason, natural rights, and the impulse to progress. This God had once, at the very beginning, acted in the grand manner by starting things, but thereafter he was fated to be a helpless supernumerary of the physical universe, enchained by the natural laws which he had decreed for human beings and for the stars, and incapable of working miracles or heeding prayers.

Deism spread from England to France, and thence all over the Continent. One of its leading French exponents was Pierre Bayle. The son of a Huguenot clergyman, he was converted to Catholicism, reconverted to Protestantism, and finally became doubtful

of all forms of Christianity. He settled in the Netherlands, and in 1697 published a *Critical and Historical Dictionary*. This proved a landmark in the development of modern religious scepticism. With a show of scholarship and impartiality, and with insinuating wit, it held up all manner of traditional religious beliefs to ridicule, resolving them into myths and fairy tales which had presumably been invented to amuse or terrify children and save parents the trouble of more rational discipline.

Bayle's arguments and methods were appropriated by Voltaire. Indeed, it was Voltaire who especially personified the sceptical and deistic aspects of eighteenth-century thought, and who was as much the literary arbiter of Europe in the age of Enlightenment as Erasmus had been in the age of Humanism.

**Voltaire**

François Arouet, or, as he styled himself, François de Voltaire (1694–1778), had a wonderful facility with the pen. Even in boyhood he was clever at turning verses and fully appreciative of his cleverness. His businesslike father did not enjoy the boy's poetry, especially as much of it was written when young François should have been studying law. But François had a mind of his own; he liked to show his cleverness in gay society and relished making rhymes about the foibles of public ministers or the stupidity of the Prince Regent of France.[1] The Regent struck back by imprisoning Voltaire a year in the Bastille. And a few years later, an offended nobleman had him beaten, sent again to the Bastille, and then exiled for three years in England, where he enjoyed association with English scientists and philosophers and imbibed their deistic ideas.

On his return to France, and for years afterwards, Voltaire poured out a flood of writings—tragedies and comedies, histories, essays, and letters—which established his reputation as the most versatile and accomplished author of his age. Much of what he wrote was superficial; most of his "hundred volumes" are seldom read nowadays; and his plays, on which he particularly prided himself, are apt to bore present-day readers. Yet his writings, especially his letters and essays, are undoubtedly clever, witty, and graceful; and, inspired as they are with the spirit of the Enlightenment, it is easy to understand why they were immensely popular and influential in his day.

[1] The Duke of Orleans. See above, p. 277.

For a great part of his life, Voltaire resided at Cirey in Lorraine, with his mistress, his books, and his laboratory, for Voltaire, true son of the Enlightenment, liked to play at science. For a time he lived in Prussia as the protégé of Frederick the Great, but he treated this irascible monarch with neither tact nor deference, and soon left Berlin to escape the King's ire. He was in high favor at the court of Catherine the Great of Russia. He lived at Geneva, in Switzerland, for a while. We may recall him at the age of eighty-four when he made a famous visit to Paris—a sprightly old man with wrinkled face, and with sharp eyes peering out from either side of the long nose, beaming with pride at the flattery of his many admirers, sparkling with satisfaction at making a witty repartee; still clever, cynical, and amusing; still the literary arbiter of Europe.

Voltaire made sharp thrusts at organized Christianity, whether Protestant or Catholic; the only Christian body for which he expressed any sympathy was the Quakers. To him all priests were impostors, all miracles were illusions, and all revelations were human inventions. Christian churches might remain for a time to solace the ignorant and keep the lower classes in order, but for intelligent men Voltaire was sure that deism—the true religion of Nature—was sufficient. He was certain that the God of Nature who had made the myriad stars of the firmament and had promulgated eternal laws for the universe could have no concern for the petty and perhaps imaginary souls of men.

Voltaire's deism represented the prevalent religious trend among a large number of middle-class and upper-class Europeans in the eighteenth century, a trend more basically revolutionary than the Protestant movement of the sixteenth century. For, whereas the Protestant movement had assailed and disrupted the historic Church, deism now assailed and threatened to destroy all the distinctive tenets of historic Christianity, whether Catholic or Protestant. Many clergymen denounced Voltaire and undertook to refute deism. But such efforts were not very successful. There were too many influential laymen and even too many high-placed ecclesiastics who wished to be thought of as "enlightened" and who sympathized with deism and enjoyed the sallies of Voltaire; and few monarchs of the age could be relied upon for systematic or effective measures against the new scepticism.

Deism had special literary vogue in the eighteenth century

not only in the voluminous writings of Voltaire, but in the poetry of Pope, the prose of Herder, the historical work of Gibbon, the encyclopedia of the Frenchmen Diderot and D'Alembert. This encyclopedia deserves special mention. It was a compilation, in seventeen volumes (with supplementary pictorial volumes), of articles by a group of mathematicians, astronomers, physicists, social scientists, and philosophers, who undertook to describe the latest progress in their respective fields.

Some of the Encyclopedists (as the editors and writers of the encyclopedia were called) were more radical than Voltaire about religion. Some, in criticizing Christianity, did not stop at deism, but went on to *atheism*. One of these, a most interesting character, was Holbach, a native of the German Palatinate who, brought to Paris in his youth by a suddenly wealthy and socially climbing father, was enabled by his income and amiability to keep open house for "enlightened" philosophers and to provide them with costly wines and excellent cuisine. To Holbach's salon repaired such men as the editors Diderot and D'Alembert, the statesman Turgot, the scientist Buffon, the historian Hume, the actor Garrick, and the novelist Sterne—Frenchmen, Englishmen, Germans of intellectual fame and revolutionary proclivities.

**Atheism**

Holbach himself contributed several articles to the encyclopedia and outdid his colleagues and guests in expression of anti-religious sentiments. In his *Christianity Unveiled* (1767) he assailed not only Christianity but religion in general as the source of human evils. In his *System of Nature* (1770), in the writing of which Diderot collaborated, it was maintained that there is no God at all—not even a God of Nature—that the universe is only matter in spontaneous movement, that what man calls the soul becomes extinct when the body dies, that self-enjoyment is the object of mankind, and that the restraints of religion should be replaced by education in enlightened self-interest.[1] The *System of Nature* was intended for intellectuals, but its principles were vulgarized by Holbach in a volume entitled *Good Sense* (1772) and in a series of declamatory brochures: *On Sacerdotal*

[1] Holbach's atheism was anticipated to some extent by Helvetius, who in his treatise *On the Soul* (1758) had asserted that there is no difference between man and the lower animals and no freedom of choice between good and evil. Ethics, according to Helvetius, should be purely utilitarian.

*Imposture, Priests Unmasked,* etc. Holbach's writings created a sensation. They troubled not only Christians but deists, and Frederick the Great and Voltaire, as well as Catholic priests and Protestant preachers, attempted to refute Holbach. Holbach, however, made converts, so that toward the close of the eighteenth century, while deism was contending with Christianity, atheism was emerging as a contender with deism.[1]

In its conflict with older conceptions of Christianity, deism was aided by the contemporary rise and spread of freemasonry. Free-

**Free-masonary**

masonry, as we know it, originated in England early in the eighteenth century. Previously there had been "lodges" of "free masons," local societies which preserved some of the external ceremonial of the medieval guilds of master masons that had fallen into decay or been suppressed in the sixteenth century,[2] but these "lodges," while honorary and admitting to membership aristocrats and intellectuals who were not masons at all, had been rigidly Christian and closely affiliated with Christian churches. Now, however, as deism spread among English intellectuals and aristocrats, the lodges of "free masons" underwent a change. In the year 1717 several of them were federated in a Grand Lodge, which, with London as its headquarters, proceeded to revise and unify the "constitutions" and ritual in the spirit of the Enlightenment and to inaugurate a rapid extension of the new freemasonry.

Under the auspices of the English Grand Lodge, freemasonry spread quickly throughout Great Britain and the British colonies. By the close of the eighteenth century there were 1,600 subordinate lodges in England. In the meantime, lodges were founded in America and India. Aristocrats, even princes of the royal family, flocked to freemasonry, and at far-flung military posts army officers formed lodges. The first masonic publication in America was the work of Benjamin Franklin (1734). George Washington was initiated by a lodge in Virginia in 1753.

Outside of British territory freemasonry was soon implanted. The first French lodge was chartered at Paris in 1732, and before long French freemasons had a grand lodge of their own—the

[1] A classic of deism was Thomas Paine's *Age of Reason* (1794), which, because of its assaults on "superstition," was long but mistakenly regarded by Christians in English-speaking lands as a plea for atheism.

[2] See above, pp. 54–55, 88.

Grand Orient. Freemasonry was introduced into Germany in 1733, Portugal and Holland in 1735, Denmark in 1745, Italy in 1763, Russia in 1771, Sweden in 1773.

This ramifying freemasonry was not ostensibly anti-Christian but it was distinctly pro-deist. Among its founders and propagandists were Anglican clergymen,[1] and on the Continent it included at the outset a number of Protestant ministers and Catholic priests, but its ritual and symbolism reflected the deistic philosophy of the Enlightenment. Individual freemasons might adhere to any kind of Christianity, but they were not to defend or discuss it in the lodges. What was expected of all of them, according to Masonic teaching, was rational faith in the God of Nature—the "Great Architect of the Universe"—and in His physical and moral laws. Such continued to be the central tenet of English-speaking freemasonry, but on the Continent, in Catholic countries, the growing opposition of the Pope and other ecclesiastics to the whole institution of freemasonry served to render it more radical and more receptive to atheistic propaganda. In 1772, two years after the publication of Holbach's *System of Nature,* a schism occurred in the Grand Orient of France; one faction rejected, and the other retained, the Great Architect of the Universe.

**Increase of Religious Toleration**

One result of the novel religious developments of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was an increase of religious toleration. Pietists, in minimizing theological differences and emphasizing that religion was a matter of inner feeling rather than of external observance, a concern of the individual conscience rather than of church or state, were inclined to deprecate any attempt of ecclesiastics or statesmen to oblige people to adhere to a particular creed or to an established church. On the other hand, deists, convinced that all forms of supernatural religion were more or less superstitious and yet recognizing that their own "natural religion" was not shared by the masses, could hardly approve of any state action which would militate against the "enlightenment" and in favor of "superstition." It was natural, in the circumstances, that deists and pietists should make common cause against religious intolerance. A deist like Voltaire was politic, if not strictly logical, in applauding Quaker pietism while damning Catholic Christianity. It was in

[1] One of the most active and zealous was the Rev. James Anderson.

the guise of a Quaker that Thomas Paine wrote against traditional Protestant Christianity.

In the second half of the eighteenth century, anti-Protestant laws in France and anti-Catholic laws in England were less enforced. The last French execution for heresy occurred in 1766. The first British step toward Catholic emancipation was the enfranchisement of Irish Catholics in 1793. In Spain, King Charles III (1759–1788) curbed the Inquisition and exercised an unwonted religious tolerance. Even a Pope of the period, Benedict XIV (1740–1758), was praised by many an intellectual, including Voltaire, for his tolerant spirit as well as for his unfailing wit.

The new tolerance was not applied by "enlightened" persons to the Jesuits. Since its foundation in the sixteenth century, the Society of Jesus had been a strong pillar of the Catholic Church; its members had played leading roles in education, missionary enterprise, and controversy with Protestants. In the eighteenth century, the Society incurred special dislike and hostility. In 1759, Pombal, the "enlightened" chief minister to the King of Portugal, expelled the Jesuits from Portuguese territory; in 1767 they were expelled from France and Spain; and in 1773 Pope Clement XIV, yielding to pressure, formally suppressed the Society.

In the Austrian dominions, religious toleration found a champion in Joseph II (1765–1790). In Prussia, its outstanding exponent was Frederick the Great (1740–1786), the first monarch to proclaim that the state should tolerate all religions and favor none. Catherine the Great of Russia (1762–1796) was likewise tolerant of religious dissent, in her fashion. While outwardly conforming with the Orthodox Church, she secularized its property and despised its clergy, and with cynical liberality she allowed Jesuits who had been expelled from other countries to settle at one end of her Empire and Moslems to erect mosques at the other end.

Simultaneously, witchcraft was discredited, and penalties for its practice were abolished. The last English trial for witchcraft was in 1712, when a woman was convicted but not executed; and the last trial and execution in Scotland occurred in 1722. The last witch-trial in Spain was in 1782, and the last in Germany in 1793.

The novel religious developments in Christendom had effects upon Judaism and led to the beginning of Jewish "emancipation."

thought of the era. He argued with sweet reasonableness that Judaism is but one of several true religions, and that every religion must be judged pragmatically, that is, by its effects upon personal conduct. He also urged his fellow Jews, while clinging to their central faith and their high moral standards, to know and participate in the world about them, to abandon their clannishness, to cease to repine for Jerusalem, and to strive to become good citizens of the countries in which they lived. He likewise labored for an "enlightened" reform of Jewish education, whereby the gulf between Jews and Gentiles would be lessened, and in a book which he published in 1783 he pleaded for complete religious toleration and the admittance of Jews to full civil rights.

Mendelssohn's work was nicely timed. It was done when the Enlightenment was at its height, when all manner of intellectuals, Protestant, Catholic, deist, and Jewish, were demanding a surcease of religious persecution, and when most European monarchs stood ready to prove their own "enlightenment" by decreeing religious toleration. Frederick the Great did not like Jews and his comments about them were sharp and sarcastic, but "enlightened" despot that he was, he inaugurated their emancipation in Prussia.

Further than Frederick the Great went Joseph II of Austria. In 1781–1782 this reforming Habsburg issued a series of edicts concerning the Jews in his extensive dominions. No longer must they wear beards and distinctive dress and live in ghettos; they might freely attend the universities, learn handicrafts, and engage in the arts and sciences. Joseph repeatedly commanded that Christians should behave toward Jews "in a friendly manner."

### 4. SOCIAL SCIENCE AND POLITICAL SPECULATION

The vogue of natural science in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries carried with it, as we have seen, the vogue of a new philosophy of natural law, and this involved, in turn, the rise of rationalist scepticism about supernatural religion. But as intellectuals became more sceptical of God, they grew more dogmatic about man, which was doubtless quite natural. For, while they were uncertain of the reality of God, they were sure that man is as real as a star or a rabbit and as obedient to natural law. Hence, the age was characterized both by the neglect of theology

and by the cultivation of the rationalist study of man—what we call *social* science.

Social science developed parallel with natural science. Both betokened a novel and widespread curiosity to explore the universe with critical eyes and without religious predilection. Both were aspects of the Enlightenment.

Knowledge of man's past—that is, history—would seem to be an important and fundamental part of social science. And certainly one impressive phase of the development of social science in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was the advance of critical historical scholarship. History was to be based on authentic "documents," to tell the story of the past objectively, to eschew miracles, and to be "natural."

**History**

Vico, an Italian professor, introduced a new critical attitude in narrative history. He was almost the first to subject the sources of ancient Greek and Roman history to searching criticism and to contend that many of their accounts were unreliable. He was likewise almost the first to describe political institutions and works of art as products of changing environment and circumstance. Vico's attitude was adopted by Montesquieu, the French political philosopher, who, in his *Spirit of the Laws,* traced an historical evolution of political ideas and practices and based it on differing environments, particularly on differing climates.

The newer historical tendencies were extolled and forwarded by Herder. He was not a "scientific" historian; but in his *Ideas on the Philosophy of History* he indicated the goal and method of the "new history." History should be "a pure natural history of human powers, actions, and propensities, as modified by time and place." It should be genetic, explaining how the human race has evolved from earliest times to the present. It should be national, showing how various tribes and nationalities have been differentiated and what contributions they have respectively made to world civilization. It should be cultural, dealing not so much with politics and war as with society, art, and thought. Above all, it should be humanitarian, promoting a real understanding and appreciation of human nature and therefore promoting a wide new range of social science—anthropology, archæology, philology, and comparative religion. Herder provided a prospectus for the development of social science not alone in his age, but in ours also.

In the eighteenth century, at the height of the Enlightenment, most historical writing reflected the scepticism, rationalism, and deism (or atheism) of contemporary philosophy. There was a pronounced tendency to belittle the middle age as an "age of faith and superstition" and at the same time to expatiate on the "enlightenment" of classical pagan Rome as well as on that of the modern "age of reason." The greatest and most typical history was the *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* by Edward Gibbon, a well-to-do English gentleman, who, like Bayle before him, had been converted to Catholicism, reconverted to Protestantism, and eventually drawn into complete agnosticism. With devastating rhetoric and mordant wit, Gibbon contrasted pagan "civilization" with Christian "barbarism" and attributed the fall of Rome to the triumph of Christianity.

Gibbon's history enjoyed large sales and great popularity. But even more popular—and certainly more superficial—were the historical writings of Voltaire, especially his *Age of Louis XIV* and his *Life of Charles XII* (of Sweden), and the series of histories which emanated from the pen of Raynal, a French ex-priest and close friend of Diderot and Holbach. Raynal's histories were far from scholarly, but they were widely read because their subjects were timely and their contents "philosophical." His histories of Holland and England were political tracts, contrasting the reasonableness of Dutch and English "liberty" with the irrationality of French "despotism," and his *Philosophical and Political History of European Commerce and Establishments in the Two Indies* catered to the current prejudices of "enlightened" Europeans in favor of the "noble savages" of America and the "noble sages" of Asia.

**Political Science**

What is the most rational form of political government for man? That was the question, next to the question of how religion may be rationalized, which aroused the greatest interest among the philosophers of the Enlightenment and elicited the largest number of answers. The question was raised in practical and forceful ways by the British political revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,[1] and some of the most impressive (and partisan) answers were supplied by Englishmen. The answers were not limited to Englishmen, however. For, with the success of the British revolutions, English

[1] See the following chapter.

political philosophy inspired a vast deal of political discussion and criticism on the Continent, particularly in France.

At the outset, attempts were made to show that the prevalent practice of absolute divine-right monarchy was based on principles of sound philosophy. At the beginning of the seventeenth century King James I of England argued the case chiefly from the Bible, and so likewise did the French Bishop Bossuet in the second half of that century. Another kind of argument, and one more in keeping with the dictates of the new social science, was advanced by Hobbes, the English materialist, in his famous *Leviathan* (1651). Hobbes, quite sceptical of the Bible and of any supernatural religion, justified absolute monarchy on the ground that it is the most rational means of dealing with human nature. Man, according to Hobbes, is by nature an unsocial animal, guided by selfishness, and instinctively hostile to every other man. But, in order to overcome the hostility of others and to achieve his own selfish ends in peace, man has naturally entered into a "social contract" with his prince, whereby the absolute [illegible] state is established with supreme authority [illegible] ing control of religion and individual conscience. Such a social contract, once made, is forever binding; to break it would remove the one effective check on civil war, barbarism, and anarchy.

Hobbes set forth his political philosophy as a protest against the Puritan Revolution, the execution of King Charles I, and the attendant civil war in England. In its immediate purposes, it was a failure; it was too royalist to appeal to the parliamentary party or to Cromwell, and it was too irreligious to attract either Anglicans or Dissenters. Indirectly, however, it was very influential. It centered attention on the need of a strong, authoritative state. It set the fashion for "rational" speculation about government. It helped to strengthen the idea that the church should be subordinate to the state. It provoked lively debate and stimulated interest in the "social contract."

"Social contract" found favor with certain advocates of the parliamentary and Puritan cause in England. John Lilburne, a radical Puritan and leader of the group known as "Levellers," declared that men are free and equal by nature, that they create government by social contract in order to preserve their natural rights of freedom and equality, and that whenever these rights are impaired they may revise their contract and create a new govern-

ment. John Milton, in numberless pamphlets of majestic prose, argued that liberty is the badge of natural man and the true goal of society and the state, that liberty is best assured by rational self-government, and that the rational state should guarantee to its citizens free worship,[1] free speech, free marriage and divorce, freedom from custom. In his celebrated *Areopagitica,* Milton pleaded for the abolition of press censorship.

Of greater immediate influence was John Locke, who provided the reasoned apology for the revolution of 1689 which dethroned the absolutist King James II. Locke argued that all men possess natural rights of life, liberty, and property; that for the protection of these rights people create governments; and that if a government fails to fulfill its task, the people may logically assert the equally natural right of revolution, the right to overthrow the government. In other words, the people are the real sovereign, the true power behind the throne. Never before had the doctrine of popular sovereignty been urged with quite such cogency,[2] and from the central doctrine Locke deduced, further, two important principles. First, since the "people" is simply a collection of individuals having equal rights, political decisions should rest with the majority of individuals. Second, since the purpose of government is to protect individual liberty, the government should not interfere with the religious convictions of its citizens. Here, however, Locke was not so thoroughgoing as might be imagined. He argued against the toleration of atheists, because without a belief in God they could not be depended upon to respect social obligations, and he argued, too, against the toleration of Catholics on the ground of their assumed allegiance to a foreign sovereign.

**Locke**

French political writers of the eighteenth century were influenced by Locke and also by the curious contrasts which they perceived between the government of his country and their own. England had a "constitution," and France lacked one. England's King was limited, while France's was absolute, and arbitrary. In England Parliament was powerful and personal freedom was respected, while in France there was no effective participation of

[1] For Protestants but not for Catholics. Earnest Puritan that he was, Milton was not an advocate of complete or real religious toleration.

[2] Similar doctrines had been urged by Cardinal Ballarmine and by two Spanish Jesuits, Mariana and Suarez, and also by the Protestant Grotius.

the people in government and no safeguards of individual liberty. We have already noticed how Voltaire as a young man spent several years in England and admired English institutions and customs. In this, he was not unique. Most French intellectuals of the time were inclined to envy the constitution, the liberties, the practical political philosophy, of their island neighbors.

The greatest of these was undoubtedly Montesquieu, a lawyer and nobleman, a student of natural science, and an admirer of Isaac Newton and John Locke. In his *Persian Letters,* and more especially in his masterpiece, *The Spirit of the Laws* (1748), he proved himself an original and brilliant political scientist. Unlike most of his contemporaries, he did not think that political science should depend on pure logic or that it should be based on an hypothetical "state of nature" or an imaginary "social contract." Rather he undertook to show, from a critical study of history, that there is no one perfect system of government for all nations but that political institutions and laws are extremely complicated and, to be successful, must be adapted to the peculiarities of particular climates and peoples. He deemed the British constitution especially well adapted to the English people, and presented a most flattering, though not fully accurate, account of it, with its checks and balances, and its separation of powers among executive, legislature, and judiciary.

It remained, however, for a younger Frenchman to catch the imagination of a host of eighteenth-century intellectuals and would-be intellectuals with a political philosophy at once extremely simple and quite revolutionary. This Frenchman, or French Swiss—he was born at Geneva—was hailed as *the* political philosopher. He was Jean Jacques Rousseau.

**Rousseau**

Rousseau was a maladjusted person. He was everything he should not have been. He was a failure as footman, servant, tutor, secretary, music copier, lace-maker. He wandered in Geneva, Turin, Paris, Vienna, London. His immorality was notorious, and his children he put in a foundling asylum. He was dishonest, discontented, and, in his last years, demented.

Yet this man, who knew so little how to order his own life, exercised an amazing influence over the lives of others. Sordid as was his career, the man himself was not without generous impulses. He loved nature in an age when many other men merely

studied nature. Other philosophers who were praising the intellect were inclined to scorn the emotions; Rousseau reminded the eighteenth century that after all it may be as sane to enjoy a sunset as to solve a problem in algebra. Rousseau possessed the soul of a poet. He was a pioneer of romanticism.

Rousseau was interested in "natural man." To him, this was not the dangerous selfish brute imagined by Hobbes, but a trustful and virtuous being, a truly "noble savage." Rousseau never had personal experience with North American Indians or South Sea Islanders, but he was sure that just such "savages" were living specimens of a genus of "natural men" who had been the progenitors of all civilized nations. In his first significant essay, the *Discourse on Arts and Sciences* (1749), he contrasted the naturalness and inherent goodness of primitive men with the artificiality and acquired wickedness of civilized men and pictured the delights which would attend a return to "nature." All men would be free and equal; nobody would claim to own the land which God had given to all; there would be no wars to kill, no taxes to oppress, no laws to restrict liberty, and no philosophers to deceive the people.

It was all quite appealing to a generation which was eager for intellectual novelties, and Rousseau became immediately famous. He followed up his first success with a second, his essay on the *Origin of Inequality among Men* (1753). Here he imagined how vanity, greed, and selfishness had found lodgment in the hearts of "simple savages," how the strongest had fenced off plots of land for themselves and forced the weak to acknowledge the right of private property. This, he maintained, was the origin of inequality among men, of the tyranny of the strong over the weak; and private property, "for the profit of a few ambitious men," had subjected the human race "to labor, servitude, and misery." There was little "science" in Rousseau's theorizing about inequality, but there was some captivating novelty about it.

Rousseau's fame rose still higher with his pamphlet on political philosophy, the *Social Contract* (1761). Its thesis was essentially Locke's, that all governments exercise their powers in last analysis by virtue of a contract which men in a state of nature have voluntarily made with one another and which they may change at will. But Rousseau's pamphlet had tremendous vogue. Its version of popular sovereignty was romantic, clear-cut, and richly stocked

with memorable catch-words. Rousseau was soon acclaimed, or denounced, as the father of modern democracy and republicanism.

Rousseau's constant cry, "Back to nature," had another significant aspect. In a romantic novel, *Émile* (1762), he counseled a novel type of education. Children, he said, should be allowed to follow their natural inclinations, instead of being driven to artificial studies which they detested and which corrupted them. They should learn practical, useful things, not Latin and Greek.

It is hard to fix limits to Rousseau's influence. True, he was condemned by many an earnest Christian and denounced by such a rationalist and sceptic as Voltaire. But his followers were numerous, especially among the bourgeoisie. "Back to nature" speedly became a fad of the day, and even the stilted courtiers at Versailles pretended to like "nature." Queen Marie Antoinette built herself a little farm-house and played the role of dairy-maid; her ladies-in-waiting took to fishing in the outdoor pools. And it was not alone the rattle-brained who fell under the spell of Rousseau. David Hume was fond of him and befriended him. Thomas Paine admired him and was indebted to him for much of the political philosophy of *Common Sense*. Herder fairly worshipped him. Kant appropriated many of his ideas, and, after clothing them in idealistic garb, spread them in Germany. In France, thousands of "enlightened" townsfolk were very shortly to precipitate a political, social, and religious revolution—the great French Revolution—of which the chief motifs were to be Rousseau's: liberty, equality, fraternity; popular sovereignty; democracy; the republic of virtue; the outlawry of aristocrats and plutocrats, of privilege and priestcraft.

Along with political speculation went a good deal of legal study. Montesquieu's *Spirit of the Laws* was a notable example. So too was Blackstone's *Commentaries* (1765), a classic handbook on the English legal system, in which the author maintained that the law of England could be ascertained as scientifically as the law of gravitation or any other law of nature. Still another example was the treatise *On Crimes and Punishments* (1761) by Beccaria, an Italian nobleman and professor of law and economics at Milan. Beccaria urged, on "scientific" grounds, the prevention, rather than the punishment, of crime, and promptness in punishment where punishment was

**Legal Study**

inevitable. Above all, he condemned such common current practices as confiscation, capital punishment, and torture.

Of all the "scientific" jurists of the eighteenth century, the most interesting was Jeremy Bentham. He came of a well-to-do family of London lawyers, and was educated at Oxford. Underlying his long lifetime of research in law and various excursions into politics, economics, ethics, and religion, was a special "Benthamite" philosophy, which has been defined as "utilitarianism." It was the idea that every individual deed should be judged by its utility in promoting the happiness, which is the "good" or "enlightened interest" of the doer. This idea might appear to be thoroughly selfish, and Bentham frankly admitted that it was. But he argued each man, in serving his own interests and therefore in assuring his own happiness, will necessarily serve the best interests of his fellows and promote their greatest happiness. For, whatever acts to make one's fellows unhappy is bound eventually to react on one's self in the same manner. Hence, according to utilitarianism, the aim of social science should be to promote the greatest happiness of individuals—"the greatest good of the greatest number." [1] And self-interest, Bentham was at pains to point out in true eighteenth-century manner, must be "enlightened" self-interest.

The first fruits of Bentham's studies, the *Fragment on Government,* appeared in 1776. It was mainly an attack upon Blackstone's praises of the British constitution and a plea for the reform of political institutions to the end that they might be more rational and more conducive to popular happiness. Then, after several years' cogitation in his secluded home, Bentham brought out in 1789 an even more impressive and celebrated volume, his *Principles of Morals and Legislation,* in which he insisted that the object of all legislation must be "the greatest good of the greatest number." He expressed immense admiration for the newly established government and laws of the United States and eagerly besought his own countrymen to imitate the overseas experiments and to adopt a simple written constitution and a logical code of laws. Thenceforth he expended much time and effort on the drafting of "reasonable" constitutions and codes for

[1] This famous phrase, which has long served as an epitome of Bentham's utilitarianism, was used by Beccaria in the preface to his treatise *On Crimes and Punishments* (1761). The idea was older than Beccaria.

England, and indeed for the whole universe. Bentham was a persistent advocate of "reform," at once logical and utilitarian. He was an outstanding pioneer of modern individualism, liberalism, and radicalism.

It was not surprising, in the new age of social speculation, when international trade was expanding, financial profits were accruing, and capitalism was growing by leaps and bounds, that a goodly number of "enlightened" persons should seek rational explanations of economic phenomena and that economics should take its place, with politics, law, and history, among the social sciences.

**Political Economy**

The dominant economic practice of the seventeenth century was mercantilism, the meaning and significance of which have already been indicated.[1] It may here be recalled that mercantilism was exemplified by the Spanish and Portuguese governments of the time, by the economic policies pursued in France by Richelieu and especially by Colbert, and by the navigation laws and other trade regulations enacted in England under Cromwell and Charles II. It may also be remarked that mercantilism was expounded and defended, in more or less scientific manner, by a group of seventeenth-century writers. The most significant was Thomas Mun, a London merchant and official of the English East India Company, whose *Discourse on England's Treasure by Forraigne Trade* (1664) was a closely reasoned exposition of the principle of the balance of trade and of the economic advantages which would accrue to the nation whose exports exceeded its imports and whose wealth in precious metals was ever increasing.

In the eighteenth century, with the advance of economic science, doubts arose about current mercantilist assumptions. Beccaria attacked mercantilism, insisted on the labor basis of capital, and expounded "laws" of the relation between the growth of population and subsistence. More influential was François Quesnay, a physician at the court of Louis XV of France. He was sure he had discovered a "law" of the circulation of wealth as natural and binding in economics as Harvey's law of the circulation of the blood in human physiology, and that, tested by his "law," mercantilism was erroneous and injurious. He was a solemn, cocksure person, and perhaps because of these qualities he ac-

[1] See above, pp. 88–90, 358–359.

quired the reputation of being a great scientist. He became the center of a group of scholars and publicists who styled themselves "*the* economists" and are known in history as the "Physiocrats." [1] Quesnay and the Physiocrats taught that a nation's wealth comes from farming and mining; that manufacturers and traders do not create wealth, but merely transform or exchange it; and consequently that governmental restrictions on trade and manufacturing are unnatural and are bound to react against the highest economic interests, which are those of agriculture. "*Laissez-faire*"—"Let them do as they will"—became the slogan of the new economic liberty espoused by Quesnay and his disciples.

Still more outstanding in eighteenth-century political economy was a Scotsman, Adam Smith. He was quite in harmony with the philosophic spirit of the age, with its "natural rights," "natural religion," and "natural laws"; and as professor of "moral philosophy" in the university of Glasgow he became absorbed in quest of the natural laws by which a nation might increase its wealth. In his quest he was aided by a sojourn in France and by personal association with Quesnay and the Physiocrats, but the findings in his classic, *The Wealth of Nations* (1776), while embodying a good deal of the Physiocratic doctrine, were far more inductive in method, richer in content, and more convincing in argument. Smith had a fairly clear idea of the intricacies of economic phenomena. He argued that neither commerce nor agriculture, but only labor, is the source of wealth, and urged an economical division of labor. More effectively than any of his predecessors he taught that each man, each employer of labor, each seller of merchandise should follow his own economic interests without let or hindrance on the part of the state, for in so doing he is "led by an invisible hand" to promote the good of the whole nation. Let the government abolish all monopolies, all restrictions on trade, all burdens on industry. *Laissez-faire!*

**Adam Smith**

One conspicuous aspect of the social science, and in fact of the whole Enlightenment, of the eighteenth century was humanitarianism, an absorbing interest in humanity at large and a firm

[1] Prominent among their number were Dupont de Nemours, a nobleman and ancestor of the American Du Ponts; Baudeau, an "enlightened" priest; and the Comte de Mirabeau, father of the French revolutionary leader.

conviction that its lot could and should be bettered. Humanitarian, as well as "scientific," motives prompted many a social scientist, and the eighteenth-century development of social science was closely related to the growing vogue of humanitarianism.

Humanitarianism took many forms. It was evidenced in the widespread demand for "reform"—reform of society as preached by Rousseau, reform of economics as advocated by Adam Smith, reform of laws as demanded by Beccaria and Bentham, reform of ethics as sponsored by Kant, reform of religion as urged by Voltaire and the deists or by Wesley and the pietists. All such reform, it was contended, would make for human liberty, for human health and wealth, for human perfection. Indeed it was optimistically assumed that the study of man, his individual and social characteristics, would but prove how perfectible he is; how, if freed from the trammels of the past and reliant only on his own reason, he would create a social, political, economic, ethical, and religious paradise on earth and would create it very soon.

**Humanitarianism**

Humanitarianism was evidenced in movements for a more humane treatment of criminals, for the abolition of Negro slavery, for popular education, and for international peace. A more humane treatment of criminals was urged, as we have seen, by Beccaria and Bentham. It was espoused by a host of eighteenth-century intellectuals, including the "enlightened" despots of the age. It bore fruit in the growth of religious toleration, in the lessening of capital punishments, in the waning of torture, and in the improvement of prison conditions.

Negro slavery, which had seemed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries an economic necessity for Europeans in the New World,[1] was now assailed on religious and humanitarian grounds. Quakers in Pennsylvania protested in 1696 against the slave trade; English Quakers in 1727 declared it to be "not a commendable or allowed" practice, and in 1761 they forbade their members to engage in it. In America a society for the abolition of slavery was founded at Philadelphia in 1774. In England, an *Essay on the Slavery and Commerce of the Human Species* by a certain Thomas Clarkson, published in 1786, attracted wide attention and led in the following year to the formation of an active anti-slavery committee under the leadership of William Wilberforce. In

[1] See above, pp. 82–83, 275, 346.

France, a "Society of Friends of the Blacks" was inaugurated for like purposes in 1788. The first country actually to prohibit commerce in slaves was Denmark (1792).

Humanitarian motives were likewise in back of eighteenth-century movements for popular education. Such "enlightened" persons as Milton and Locke had already argued in England for what might be termed a national system of popular education, and early in the eighteenth century several religious groups undertook the establishment of "charity schools" for the grounding of poor children in elementary knowledge and "sober piety." Such were the "sunday schools" set up by Methodists and evangelical Anglicans; such were the day schools founded in England by the Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge and in France by Jean Baptiste de la Salle and the Catholic congregation of Christian Brothers. To the efforts of pious Christians was soon added the inspiration of humanitarian deists. Rousseau in his *Émile* gave vogue, as we have seen, to claims of "natural" and popular education. Herder gave impetus to the utilitarian reformation of German schools. Pestalozzi, a professional Swiss educator, gave practical demonstrations of how lower-class persons might interestingly and profitably be schooled.

Humanitarianism was also exemplified in the simultaneous development of movements for international peace. Against the atrocities of the religious and political wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries there was a pronounced reaction. Against the continuing destructiveness of the commercial and dynastic wars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries there were numerous protests on the part of scholars and other "enlightened" individuals. Hugo Grotius, the Dutch jurist and religious liberal, penned his famous treatise *On War and Peace,* a landmark of modern international law, in the midst of the barbarities of the Thirty Years' War and in the hope that the recurrence of such barbarities might be prevented by an explicit statement of civilized usages. William Penn, the English Quaker, at the height of the War of the League of Augsburg (King William's War) wrote an *Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe,* advocating the establishment of an international court of arbitration and the substitution of judicial for military procedure in the settlement of international disputes. The Abbé Saint Pierre, a French priest and member of the French Academy, put forth a

*Project of Perpetual Peace* in 1713, at the conclusion of the vast War of the Spanish Succession. This project, which envisaged a kind of permanent league of nations, appealed to a considerable number of humanitarians and was followed, later in the eighteenth century, by similar projects from the pens of Rousseau, Bentham, and Kant.

Accompanying the peace-projects of the eighteenth century were two general concepts which, though somewhat contradictory, sprang from a common humanitarian impulse. One was the idea that man is a social animal not only within a relatively small group but also in respect of his whole kind and species, that all men are brothers, and that the welfare of each is or should be the responsibility of all. Not since the days of the early Christians and the Stoical Marcus Aurelius had there been so much preaching of the principle of cosmopolitanism, so much decrying of narrow patriotism, and so much counseling of one's fellows to transcend local and group loyalties and to become "citizens of the world." "No more," said Rousseau, "are there Frenchmen, Spaniards, Germans, or even Englishmen; there are only Europeans. All have the same tastes, the same passions, the same customs." "Love of country," said Lessing, "is at best but an heroic vice, which I am quite content to be without." "The world is my country," said Thomas Paine, "mankind are my brothers."

**Cosmopolitanism**

The other concept was nationalism. For many eighteenth-century intellectuals were nationalist as well as humanitarian. They were interested not only in humanity at large but in special "primitive" manifestations of humanity, which they perceived in the savage tribes of America, in the strange peoples of the Orient, and also in the more or less fanciful aborigines of the civilized nationalities of Europe. Whence they fell to speculating on the similarities and contrasts between "peoples" or "nationalities"; and the more they speculated, the more they convinced themselves that nationalities are fundamental units of human society and the most natural agencies for effecting needful reforms and promoting human progress and peace. And this nationalist tendency was reinforced by the contemporary vogue of classicism, which, as one of its characteristics, pointed its devotees to the "republican virtue" and altruistic patriotism of ancient Greece and Rome. Frederick

**Nationalism**

the Great at one moment could boast of his cosmopolitanism, and at the next moment could indite a Greek dialogue (in the French language) in order to show his German subjects why and how they should be supremely patriotic to Prussia. Rousseau, while affirming that all men were equal, urged each nationality to cherish its peculiar traditions and to strive for an independent polity. Herder, one of the most enlightened and humanitarian men of the century, devoted the greater part of his voluminous writings to praise of the principle of nationality.

Some of the new nationalism was purely cultural. But some of it, and from Rousseau's time a rapidly growing proportion, was definitely political. This type of nationalism recognized the "right" of national self-determination, the "right" of individuals to determine the sovereign state to which they would belong and the form of government under which they would live. It was argued that, if this right were fully established, not only would local and group loyalties be merged in a higher, more inclusive, and more rational loyalty to the nation, but each sovereign state, becoming a truly national state, would be emancipated from the dynastic and class bonds which had hitherto weighed upon it and distressed it. It would be enabled to care equally for all its citizens and thereby to confer inestimable benefits upon mankind. To warlike rivalry among despots should succeed a rivalry in good works among free nations. Nationalism, as well as cosmopolitanism, was to be a mark of impending political revolutions.

### 5. ATTEMPTED DESPOTIC APPLICATION OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT

By the second half of the eighteenth century, the Enlightenment, with its varied interests in natural science, social science, natural philosophy, deism, and classicism, was affecting not only middle-class intellectuals and a considerable number of nobles and clergymen, but most of the royal despots on the continent of Europe. These sympathized with many of the intellectual novelties of the age and sought to satisfy contemporary demands for reform in government and society, in church and education. At the same time they conceived of their function as Louis XIV of France—the Grand Monarch, had done, that they, and not their subjects, should effect reform. They would centralize their respective realms. They would be absolute in fact

**"Enlightened" Despots**

as well as in name. They would work hard and conscientiously for the enlightenment and material well-being of their peoples. They would, however, remain despots, and by dictatorial means they would realize their good intentions. Their government would be for the people, but not by the people.

The most persevering and famous of the enlightened despots was Frederick the Great of Prussia. In his youth he had imbibed a taste for the new intellectual developments—the new physical science, the new deistic philosophy, the latest fads in French literature and art and criticism. Then, thanks to the dogged determination of his stern father, he had become something more than a flute-playing, poetizing, sceptical philosopher; he had been forced to familiarize himself with the dull details of statecraft and, curiously enough, had learned to like them and industriously to attend to them.

**Frederick the Great**

By the time he succeeded to the Prussian throne in 1740, Frederick had a clear conviction of his duties and responsibilities. He would secure foreign glory for himself and for Prussia. He would make Prussia the best governed state in Europe. His political ideals he expressed in a book which he wrote in French on the theory of government. "The prince," he said, "is to the nation he governs what the head is to the man; it is his duty to see, think, and act for the whole community, that he may procure it every advantage of which it is capable." "The monarch is not the absolute master, but only the first servant of the state."

During his long reign from 1740 to 1786, Frederick was indeed the first servant of Prussia. He did much for its economic development, especially its agriculture. He encouraged the nobles and other landlords to introduce "scientific" farming, to enlarge the area of cultivation, and to improve the breeding of domestic animals. He fostered immigration and built canals. In accordance with his ideas of discipline, he insisted that the peasants should remain in a condition of serfdom, but he was anxious to lighten their financial burdens; he declared that a man who worked all day in the fields "should not be hounded to despair by tax-collectors."

Taxes were not light by any means, but everybody felt that the King was not squandering the public funds. Frederick was not a man to lavish fortunes on courtiers or mistresses. He diligently examined all accounts. His officials dared not be ex-

travagant for fear of being corporally punished, or, what was worse, of being held up to ridicule by the witty tongue of their royal master.

It was Frederick's financial planning which enabled him to increase his army to 200,000 men and to embark upon the foreign policy of conquest by which Silesia and a part of Poland were won.[1] On the army alone Frederick was willing to spend freely, but even in this department he made sure that Prussia received its money's worth. Tireless drill, strict discipline, up-to-date arms, well-trained officers, and, most of all, Frederick's direction and ability rendered the Prussian army the envy of Europe in the second half of the eighteenth century.

There was nothing, outside of his army, about which Frederick took so much trouble as the administration of justice. Under his auspices, the laws of the land were codified and published in clear and compact form for the information of the public and the guidance of the courts. Torture was abolished in criminal investigations, and other humane reforms were decreed.

In religious matters, Frederick was devoid of the Protestant zeal which distinguished some of his Hohenzollern ancestors. It was part of his "enlightenment" to be sceptical about Christian faith and morals, to doubt the Bible and sneer at clergymen, and to affirm that "all religions must be tolerated and every person allowed to go to heaven in his own fashion." To the scandal of many of his Lutheran subjects, he welcomed Catholics in Prussia and told them that they might build their churches "as high as they pleased and with as many towers and bells"; and he amazed all kinds of Christians by the declaration that "if Turks should come to populate the land, I myself shall build them mosques."

Into the intellectual life of his age—its science and art—Frederick entered heart and soul. He restored and invigorated the Berlin Academy of Science. He read with avidity and appreciation the contemporary accounts of scientific advance and rationalist speculation. He established many elementary schools to spread a knowledge of reading and writing among the lower classes of his subjects. He liked to play his flute while thinking how to outwit Maria Theresa. He delighted in appending facetious comments to official reports and petitions. He enjoyed sitting at table with congenial companions and discussing poetry and the

[1] See above, pp. 316–318, 326.

drama. True, he disliked German literature; he thought the works of Lessing and Goethe vulgar and uninspired. But he was fond of French literature and invited literary Frenchmen, including Voltaire, to visit him.

"Enlightened" despotism was brilliantly exemplified by Frederick the Great of Prussia, and it was at least an ideal for most of his monarchical contemporaries. In the Austrian dominions, Maria Theresa, Frederick's foe in war, was his rival in works of peace. She was not "enlightened" in the Frederician or Voltairean sense; she was fearful of the new critical philosophy, temperamentally averse to radical changes, and devoted to the Catholic religion. But she was benevolent; she thought it a religious duty, if not an evidence of philosophical enlightenment, to do what she could to better the condition of her state and the lot of her subjects. At first with the aid of her husband, the Emperor Francis I (1745–1765), and afterwards with the collaboration of her son, the Emperor Joseph II (1765–1790), Maria Theresa effected some reforms in the hereditary Habsburg lands. She emphasized absolutism in government, reorganized the ministries at Vienna, and otherwise promoted the centralization of the monarchy. She similarly welded the hitherto separate armies of her diverse dominions into a unified "Austrian" army. She suppressed the Jesuits and curtailed the privileges of other religious orders. She was a liberal patroness of musicians and painters and showed her interest in education by reorganizing the Austrian universities and fashioning a system of elementary and secondary schools.

Joseph II, who had been associated with his mother since 1765, became sole ruler of the Austrian empire upon her death in 1780, and thenceforth for ten years he gave unrestrained pursuit to "enlightened" despotism. For Joseph II, unlike Maria Theresa, was very "enlightened." He admired Voltaire and Rousseau. He surpassed Frederick the Great in devotion to reason and reform. "I," he said, "have made philosophy the legislator of my empire; its logical principles shall transform Austria." In his mind, Austria was to be as completely remodeled as any Rousseau might have wished—except, of course, in respect of Rousseau's basic idea of popular sovereignty.

**Joseph II of Austria**

Joseph's religious policy aimed at subjecting the Catholic Church to royal control and purging it of "superstition" and "unreason." He decreed that no papal pronouncements should be

published in his dominions without his authorization; he nominated the bishops; he confiscated church lands. Customary ceremonies were altered. Many monasteries were abolished. The clergy were to be trained in state schools. Protestants and Jews were to be tolerated and given equal rights with Catholics.

His political policies were three in number. (1) He desired to extend his possessions eastward to the Black Sea and southward along the Adriatic, while the distant Netherlands might conveniently be exchanged for near-by Bavaria. (2) He wished to get rid of all provincial assemblies and other vestiges of local independence, and to have all his territories governed uniformly by officials subject to himself. (3) He aimed to uplift the lower classes of his people, and to put down the nobles, so that all should be equal and all alike look up to their benevolent, but all-powerful, ruler.

The first of these policies proved sterile. His designs on Bavaria were frustrated by Frederick the Great, who posed as the protector of the smaller German states. In the Balkan peninsula he undertook a war in 1786, in alliance with Russia, against the Ottoman Empire, and his army captured Belgrade; but after his death, his successor felt obliged to conclude a peace which registered no territorial gain for Austria.

In pursuit of centralized government, Joseph II carried the sacred crown of St. Stephen, treasured by all Hungarians, to Vienna, and abolished the Hungarian Diet. Then, with a stroke of the pen, he decreed a new system of local government for his empire. He divided it into thirteen provinces, each under a military commander. Each province was subdivided into districts or counties, and these again into townships. There would be no more local privileges. Everything was to be managed from Vienna. The army was henceforth to be on the Prussian model, and the peasants were to be forced to serve in it. German was to be the official language throughout the Habsburg realm. This was all very fine on paper, but in practice it was a gigantic failure. The Austrian Netherlands rose in revolt rather than surrender their local laws; the Tyrol did likewise; and angry protests came from Hungary. Local peculiarities and traditions could not be so easily abolished.

Finally, in his attempts to reconstruct society, Joseph came to grief. He directed that all serfs should become free men, able to marry without the consent of their lord, permitted to sell their

holdings, and privileged to pay a fixed rent instead of being compelled to labor four days a week for their lord. Nobles and peasants alike were to share the burdens of taxation, all paying thirteen per cent on their land. Joseph intended still further to help the peasantry, for, he said, "I could never bring myself to skin two hundred good peasants to pay one do-nothing lord more than he ought to have." He planned to give everybody a free elementary education, to encourage industry, and to make all his subjects prosperous and happy.

But the peasants disliked compulsory military service and misunderstood Joseph's efforts in their behalf; the nobles hated him for attempting to deprive them of their feudal rights; the middle classes were irritated by his autocracy and his bungling interference in industry and trade; the clergy preached against his religious policy. When Joseph II was dying (1790), he confessed that, "after all my trouble, I have made but few happy, and many ungrateful." He directed that most of his "reforms" should be cancelled, and proposed as his epitaph the gloomy sentence: "Here lies the man who, with the best intentions, never succeeded in anything."

**Charles III of Spain**

Another and more successful despot was Charles III of Naples (1738–1759) and Spain (1759–1788), who, with the assistance of ministers as "enlightened" as himself, instituted numerous reforms in his realms. He centralized the administration. He reduced the public debt. He patronized science and art. He encouraged "scientific" farming, constructed roads and canals, and fostered manufactures. He suppressed the Jesuits and checked the operations of the Inquisition. He reorganized the army and rebuilt the navy. He improved the administration of the colonies in America and fostered emigration to them from the mother country. During the reign of Charles III, the revenues of Spain tripled, its population grew from seven to eleven millions, its prestige improved abroad, and an unwonted spirit of toleration appeared at home.

**Joseph of Portugal**

Charles's neighbor, Joseph I (1750–1777) of Portugal, shone in the reflected glory of a distinguished minister, Pombal by name, who was both an "enlightened" philosopher and an active statesman. Under Pombal's administration, the royal authority was strengthened at the expense of nobility and clergy and was used to promote education and the

material well-being of the middle and lower classes in Portugal.

Sweden had a similarly "enlightened" despot in Gustavus III (1771–1792); Sardinia, in Charles Emmanuel III (1730–1773); and Tuscany, in Leopold I (1765–1790), a brother of Joseph II of Austria and his successor as Holy Roman Emperor. Even Catherine II (1762–1796) of Russia played at being "enlightened." Only France, among the major powers of the Continent of Europe, lacked an eminent exponent of enlightened despotism, although Louis XVI (1774–1792) did his best to be benevolent.

**Weakness of "Enlightened" Despotism**

Despite its vogue and undoubted benefits, "enlightened" despotism as practiced by Frederick the Great and fellow monarchs in the eighteenth century, possessed certain inherent weaknesses. One was the prevailing *dynastic* character of the European state-system of the age. There had grown up, since at least the sixteenth century, a number of dynastic empires, sprawling over the map of Europe, and dividing or overlapping particular nationalities. This involved such a variety, and usually such a conflict, of demands upon the time and attention of the presiding despots that, no matter how "enlightened" they might be, they could seldom carry any policy of reform to complete fruition.


Associated with this weakness of the dynastic state-system was the unwillingness of the despots to consecrate their chief energy to internal reform. All of them were ambitious to extend their territories and gain prestige abroad, and their consequent wars and conquests often paralyzed their other efforts. No previous period in the world's history was more replete with international conflicts of a selfish and sordid sort than the age of enlightened despotism. It was enlightened despots who conducted such bloody wars as resulted from the seizure of Silesia by Frederick the Great and such shameful intrigues as led to the partition of Poland. And in a few intervening years of peace, not even the wisest and most benevolent despots could make good all the human and material losses of the many years of warfare.

Another grave weakness was the contemptuous attitude of the "enlightened" despot toward his "unenlightened" subjects. He acted on the assumption that he knew what was for the good of his people better than they knew, and he was apt to force reforms on them whether the reforms were popularly desired or not. As

a result, few of his changes were permanent, and popular ingratitude was frequently his reward.

A final weakness of enlightened despotism lay in the fact that its perpetuation depended upon every able sovereign's being succeeded by a sovereign equally able. This seldom happened. Just as Louis XIV had been succeeded in France by the lazy Louis XV, so Charles III was followed in Spain by a stupid boor, Joseph I in Portugal by an insane Queen, and Gustavus III in Sweden by a madman. It seemed to be the general rule that incompetence should succeed ability, that extravagance should waste the fruits of economy, and that corruption should undo reform.


Yet, however much the European despots of the eighteenth century failed to put the Enlightenment into practice, they at least held up as ideals many of the novel reforms in government and society which philosophers of the age advocated, and which were realized by popular revolutions against despotism.



# CHAPTER X

# THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN REVOLUTIONS

## I. OPPOSITION TO DESPOTIC MONARCHY



INGSHIP of despotic, or "absolute," nature had long existed in eastern Europe, especially in the Byzantine and Ottoman Empires. During the late middle age and early modern times it had developed in central and western Europe as a result of popular reaction against feudalism, the vogue of such political theories as Machiavelli's, and the religious upheaval and commercial expansion of the sixteenth century.[1] By the eighteenth century it seemed the well-nigh universal and most natural form of government. Most Europeans took it for granted that their several countries should be ruled by monarchs possessing full right and power, presumably conferred upon them by God, to promulgate laws, administer justice, maintain armed forces, wage war, make peace, impose taxes, regulate trade and industry, and determine the religion and the individual and social privileges of all their subjects. And divine-right monarchy was not only despotic; it now sought to be "enlightened."

**Trend toward "Absolute" Monarchy**

Absolute monarchy prevailed in France under the Bourbons, in Spain under both Habsburgs and Bourbons, in Austria and its dependencies, in Prussia and lesser German states, in Denmark, Portugal, the Two Sicilies, and most of the Italian principalities. Peter the Great clinched its hold on Russia.

In several countries which had previously opposed despotic monarchy, the trend was now toward it. The Dutch Netherlands, for example, after successfully rebelling against their Habsburg sovereign, Philip II of Spain, had established a "republic" in which supreme political power was exercised by a parliament—

[1] See above, pp. 24–27, 41–42, 184.

the States General—and under which there was a high degree of personal liberty and economic prosperity. In time, however, serious friction developed in the Dutch Republic between supporters of the parliament and advocates of a more centralized regime under the Stadholder-Prince of the Orange family. The latter gradually gained ground, as the parliamentary system proved ineffectual against foreign aggression; and by the middle of the eighteenth century the republic was obviously being transformed into an absolute monarchy modeled after that of Prussia.[1]

Early in the seventeenth century the Czechs of Bohemia had rebelled against their Habsburg monarch, Ferdinand II, reasserted the authority of their parliament, and chosen their own King. The rebellion, as we have seen, was promptly suppressed;[2] it only served to precipitate the Thirty Years' War, which in turn contributed to the strengthening of despotic monarchy in all the states of the Holy Roman Empire.

In Sweden, too, a reaction had set in against absolute monarchy after the death of Gustavus Adolphus in 1632;[3] and intermittently for a century and a half afterwards the nobles and burgesses in the feudal parliament, or Estates, constituted the real government of the country. Their chronic factional quarrels,[4] however, and their inability to sustain Sweden's international prestige, enabled the "enlightened" Gustavus III to execute in 1772 a *coup d'état* which reestablished the royal authority.

The most consistent, and at the same time the most unfortunate, opponent of absolute monarchy was Poland. Here, from the sixteenth century, was a political regime, officially styled a re-

[1] The parliamentary government of the Dutch republic reached its highest development under John DeWitt, who served as "grand pensionary of the states of Holland" from 1653 to 1672. The French invasion in 1672 led to the killing of DeWitt by infuriated compatriots and an access of power to the Stadholder, William III, great-grandson of William the Silent. See above, p. 263. After the death of William III in 1702 there was a revival of parliamentary influence, but in 1747, in the midst of new international complications, a cousin of William III was made "hereditary stadholder, captain and admiral-general" as William IV. Thereafter, in fact if not in name, Holland was a monarchy.

[2] See above, pp. 228–230. Immediately following the Thirty Years' War, an attempt was made in France to limit monarchy, but the so-called Fronde was repressed by Cardinal Mazarin. On the Fronde, see above, pp. 252–254.

[3] See above, p. 234.

[4] The principal rival factions in the eighteenth century bore the odd nicknames of "Hats" and "Caps." The former, chiefly aristocratic, were inclined to follow a pro-French foreign policy, and the latter, mainly bourgeois, sought to "appease" Russia. On Gustavus III, see above, p. 424.

public, in which the parliament elected a King as a figurehead for the state and jealously guarded the liberties of nobility, church, and towns. But Poland presented too extreme an exception to the current political trends on the continent of Europe, and was too closely bordered by aggressive countries of exactly opposite regimes. The outcome was the three partitions of Poland in the second half of the eighteenth century.[1] The Polish republic ceased to be and the Polish people were distributed among the despotic rulers of Russia, Prussia, and Austria.

**England an Exception**

The one country which succeeded in reversing the general trend toward absolute monarchy and in establishing semi-popular parliamentary government was the island country of Great Britain. This was achieved in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by a series of domestic revolutions and developments which induced a good deal of radical political speculation on the Continent as well as in England and eventually provided models for turning the era of Enlightenment into one of widespread revolutionary upheaval.

At the beginning of modern times, Britain gave no sign of ability or willingness to play a unique political role in Europe or in the world. In Scotland there were unruly nobles and in England there was a nominal Parliament. But neither kingdom was unique in these respects, and both possessed monarchs who vied with monarchs on the Continent in ambitious despotic designs. Indeed, in England absolute monarchy developed earlier than in France. In the sixteenth century—the very century in which the French sovereigns had to deal with grave civil wars and with serious checks upon their authority—the Tudor rulers of England were rapidly freeing themselves from dependence upon Parliament and commanding the united support of the English nation. From the accession of Henry VII in 1485 to the death of his granddaughter Elizabeth in 1603, the strong hand of the English monarch was laid successively upon the commerce, industry, justice, religion, and finance of the country.[2] These Tudor sovereigns subdued sedition, fostered prosperity, repelled the Armada. They faithfully personified national patriotism, and the English nation, particularly its growing middle class, extolled them.

Yet, despite this despotic tradition of more than a century's

[1] See above, pp. 326–328.
[2] See above, pp. 27–29, 155–160, 219.

duration, England in the seventeenth century witnessed a long bitter struggle between royal and parliamentary factions, the beheading of one King and the exiling of another, and in the end the irrevocable rejection of the theory and practice of absolute monarchy. This happened at the very time when Louis XIV was holding majestic court at Versailles, and all the lesser princes on the Continent were patterning their proud words and boastful deeds after the model of the Grand Monarch.

**The Stuart King James I**

The death of Elizabeth, the last of the Tudors, and the accession (1603) of her cousin James, the first of the Stuarts, marked the beginning of the struggle. When he was but a year old, this James had acquired through the deposition of his unfortunate mother, Mary Stuart, the crown of Scotland (1567), and had been proclaimed James VI in that disorderly and distracted country.[1] The boy who was whipped by his tutor and kidnapped by his barons and browbeaten by Presbyterian divines learned to rule Scotland with a rod of iron and incidentally acquired such astonishing erudition, especially in theology, that the clever King Henry IV of France called him "the wisest fool in Christendom." At the age of thirty-seven, he succeeded to the throne of England as James I.

James was not content, like his Tudor predecessors, to be an absolute ruler in practice; he insisted also upon the complete theory of monarchical absolutism. Such a theory was carefully worked out by the pedantic Stuart King eighty years before Bishop Bossuet wrote his classic treatise on divine-right monarchy for the guidance of the young son of Louis XIV.[2] To James it seemed clear that God had divinely ordained Kings to rule, for had not Saul been anointed by Jehovah's prophet, and had not Peter and Paul urged Christians to obey their masters? As the father corrects his children, so should the King correct his subjects. As the head directs the hands and feet, so must the King direct the members of the body politic. Royal power is thus the most natural and the most effective instrument for suppressing anarchy and rebellion. James I summarized his idea of government in the famous Latin epigram, *"a deo rex, a rege lex,"*—"the King is from God, and the law from the King."

James in England faced certain disadvantages. He was per-

[1] See above, p. 218.

[2] See above, pp. 254–255.


CONTOUR MAP
ELEVATION ABOVE SEA LEVEL (IN FEET)
OVER 2000
1000–2000
500–1000
0–500
SHETLAND ISLANDS
ORKNEY ISLANDS
NORTH SEA
HEBRIDES
HIGHLANDS
GRAMPIAN MTNS.
SCOTLAND
Aberdeen
St. Andrews
Stirling
Glasgow
Edinburgh
ATLANTIC OCEAN
CHEVIOT HILLS
NORTH-UMBERLAND
Newcastle
Carlisle
PENNINE CHAIN
Durham
ULSTER
Belfast
Armagh
CONNAUGHT
IRELAND (ENG.)
BOYNE R.
IRISH SEA
Lancaster
York
MARSTON MOOR
Hull
Dublin
LEINSTER
Chester
Lincoln
Limerick
MUNSTER
Waterford
Cork
WALES
Shrewsbury
Nottingham
Coventry
NASEBY
Cambridge
ENGLAND
Gloucester
Oxford
London
Bristol
Canterbury
Dover
Glastonbury
Portsmouth
DOWNS
Exeter
Plymouth
CHANNEL
ENGLISH
100 MILES
KINGDOMS OF ENGLAND AND SCOTLAND AT THE END OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY
TRM

sonally unpopular. He was regarded as a foreigner, a point emphasized by his Scottish accent. He made the mistake of giving special honors and rewards to Scottish favorites who came with him to England, which he thought of as a land blessed with milk and honey and endowed with unlimited wealth and resources. Though he was not really extravagant, he liked display and appeared wasteful to many of his English subjects, especially the Puritans.

**Medieval Restrictions on Monarchy**

In England, James found certain traditional restrictions on the exercise of royal power. There was the two-house Parliament of Lords and Commons, which dated from the middle ages and had then acquired considerable say about taxation and legislation. The Tudors had handled it by cajolery, bribery, pressure, and popular appeal, and had called it together infrequently. Besides, there was a series of restrictive medieval charters, of which Magna Carta of 1215 was the most important. Though this dealt with medieval feudal problems, some of its wording seemed to guarantee the liberties of Englishmen against royal despotism. There was also the English common law, a collection of customs and precedents built up over centuries by English judges and governing the law courts of the land. Much of this common law was designed to protect the individual and his rights, and there were lawyers who were ready to insist that even the King was bound by it.

**Financial Problem**

In addition, James I faced, though neither he nor his contemporaries were fully conscious of it, an almost insoluble financial problem. The flow of silver from America was forcing up prices all over Europe with startling rapidity.[1] James came to the throne in the middle of this price rise. On the one hand, his revenues were more or less fixed by custom. The King was supposed to live "of his own," that is, on the regular income of the royal estates and dues, together with the usual customs duties. Land and other taxes were voted by Parliament only reluctantly and as emergency measures. Yet, on the other hand, the price of the goods and services needed by the King and his government was going up every year. Either James had to ask Parliament for added grants of money, which that body would give him only in return for increased control over policy, or he must squeeze out the additional income without re-

[1] See above, pp. 86–87.

course to Parliament, a procedure which would violate tradition and seem tyrannical.

From the start, financial difficulties crowded in upon James I. When Parliament refused to grant him additional revenues, he proceeded, on his own authority, to increase the customs duties, to grant monopolies (which interfered with free business), to sell titles, and to solicit "benevolences" (forced loans). Parliament protested against such practices, but its protests only aroused the King's ire and made him more stubborn. His noisiest opponents were imprisoned or sent home with royal scoldings. At length in 1621 the Commoners entered in their journal a "great protestation" against the King's interferences and dictation. This so angered James that with his own royal hand he tore the protestation out of the journal and presently dissolved the intractable Parliament. But the quarrel continued, and James's last Parliament had the audacity to impeach his lord treasurer.

**Religious Conflict**

The political conflict was complicated throughout by a religious conflict. James I approved most heartily of the Anglican Church as established by the Tudor sovereigns Henry VIII and Elizabeth, with its bishops, its ritual, and its tradition of royal supremacy. But many Englishmen, as well as Scotsmen, felt an antipathy or downright hostility to the Anglican Church, which, after all, was in the nature of a compromise between Protestantism and Catholicism. At one extreme, it did not satisfy the dwindling number of Roman Catholics. At the other, it was thought too Catholic by a growing number of Protestants who inclined toward the teachings of Calvin or of even more radical leaders.[1]

Already the Calvinistic Presbyterians were in control in Scotland, while in England, during the reign of Elizabeth, Radical Protestants comprised an influential part of the middle class—the townsmen especially—and many of the lower clergy. They were characterized (1) by a virulent hatred for even the most trivial forms reminiscent of "popery," as they termed the Catholic religion; and (2) by a tendency to place emphasis upon the spirit of the Old Testament quite as much as upon the precepts of the New. Along with austerity of manner, speech, dress, and fast-day observance, they revived much of the fanaticism with which the Israelites had conquered Canaan. They knew neither

[1] See above, pp. 160–163.

self-indulgence nor tolerance for others. Little wonder that Elizabeth had feared men of such mold and used the episcopal administration of the Anglican Church to restrain them. Many of these so-called Puritans remained members of the Anglican Church and sought to "purify" it from within. But restraint only incited the more radical to condemn altogether the existing church organization with its bishops and royal supremacy. Some Englishmen strove to transform the Anglican Church into a Presbyterian Church similar to that in Scotland. Others went further and attempted to create independent religious congregations, quite separate from the Anglican Church; whence they were called Congregationalists, or Independents, or Separatists.

**The Puritans**

These religious radicals, often grouped together as "Puritans," had naturally opposed Elizabeth's enforcement of Anglicanism, but their opposition had then been more latent than open, and it had been stifled. With increasing numbers, however, they seized upon the accession of James I as an occasion for the presentation of a petition for a modification of church government and ritual. In an ensuing religious debate at Hampton Court in 1604 James made a brusque declaration that bishops like kings were set over the multitude by the hand of God, and, as for these Puritans who would do away with bishops, he would make them conform or "harry them out of the land."

The repressive ecclesiastical measures which James I took against the Puritans were rendered doubly abhorrent to them by rumors of "drunken orgies" and vicious living in his royal court. But worst of all was his suspected leaning toward "popery," which Elizabeth had certainly not had. The Puritans had a passionate hatred for Catholicism. They suspected a King whose mother had been a Catholic, whose wife was charged with harboring a priest, a ruler who at times openly exerted himself to obtain greater toleration for Catholics and to maintain the Anglican ritual against Puritan modification. With growing alarm and resentment they learned that a group of Catholic conspirators had plotted to blow up the houses of Parliament (1605), and that in his foreign policy James was decidedly friendly to Catholic princes.

The cardinal points of James's foreign policy—union with Scotland, peace, and a Spanish alliance—were all calculated to arouse antagonism. The English, having for centuries nourished

enmity toward their northern neighbors and perceiving no apparent advantage in close union, defeated the project of amalgamating the two kingdoms of England and Scotland. James's policy of non-intervention in the Bohemian revolt against Austria evoked bitter criticism; he was accused of favoring the Catholics and deserting his son-in-law, the Protestant Elector of the Palatinate.[1] The most hotly contested point was the Spanish policy. Time and time again, Parliament protested, but James pursued his plans, making peace with Spain and negotiating for a marriage between his son Charles and a Spanish princess. Prince Charles actually went to Spain to court the daughter of Philip III.[2]

The strength of the Puritans resided in the commercial middle class. It was this class which had profited by the war with Spain in the days of "good Queen Bess" when many a Spanish prize, laden with silver and dye woods, had been towed into Plymouth harbor. Their dreams of erecting an English colonial and commercial empire on the ruins of Spain's appeared to be doomed by James. By his Spanish policy, as well as by his irregular methods of taxation, James had touched the Puritans in their pocketbooks. The Puritans were grieved to see so sinful a man sit on the throne of England, and so wasteful a man squander their money. They were even hindered in the exercise of their religious convictions. Every fiber in them rebelled.

Now it so happened that the majority of members of the House of Commons—the burgesses from the towns and some of the country squires—were of Puritan conviction or sympathy. Naturally, the mass of Puritans throughout the country supported the claims and pretensions of Parliament, and the parliamentary struggle against the King became not only a defense of abstract political ideals but also a bitter battle in furtherance of Puritanism. Parliamentary traditions were weapons against an oppressive monarch; religious scruples gave divine sanction to an attack on royalist bishops; consciousness of being God's elect gave confidence to the revolutionaries. Everything was in readiness for a supreme political and religious struggle in England when James I died and was succeeded by his son, Charles I (1625–1649).

For a time it appeared as if the second Stuart King would be very popular. Unlike his father, Charles seemed thoroughly Eng-

[1] See above, pp. 228–229.
[2] See above, p. 225.

lish; and his athletic frame, his dignified manners, and his purity of life contrasted favorably with James's deformities in character and physique. Two years before his father's death Charles was jilted by his Spanish fiancée and returned to England amid wild rejoicing to back Parliament in demanding war with Spain. He again rejoiced the bulk of the English nation by solemnly assuring Parliament on the occasion of his marriage contract with Henrietta Maria, sister of Louis XIII of France (and aunt of Louis XIV), that he would grant no concessions to Catholics in England.

**Charles I**

As a matter of fact, Charles simultaneously but secretly assured the French government that he would allow the Queen the free exercise of her religion and would make general concessions to English Catholics. This duplicity on the part of the young King, which augured ill for the harmony of future relations between himself and Parliament, throws a flood of light upon his character and policies. Though Charles was sincerely religious and well-intentioned, he was as devoted to the theory of absolute monarchy as his father had been; and as to the means which he might employ to establish absolutism upon a firm foundation he honestly believed himself responsible only to God and his own conscience, certainly not to Parliament. This fact, together with a certain inherent aptitude for shirking the settlement of difficulties, explains in large part the faults which historians have usually ascribed to him—his ingratitude toward his most devoted followers, his obstinacy which only feigned compliance, and his untruthfulness.

Just before Charles came to the throne, Parliament granted subsidies in expectation of war against Spain, but when the King used up the war-money without showing any serious inclination to open hostilities with Spain, and then demanded additional grants, Parliament gave evidence of its growing distrust by limiting a levy of customs duties to one year, instead of granting it as usual for the whole reign. In view of the increasingly obstinate temper manifested by the House of Commons in withholding subsidies and assailing his worthless favorite, the Duke of Buckingham, Charles angrily dissolved his first Parliament.

**Conflict with Parliament**

The difficulties of the administration were augmented not only by this arbitrary treatment of Parliament but also by the miser-

able failure of an English fleet sent against Cadiz and by the humiliating result of an attempt to relieve the French Huguenots.[1] Meanwhile, a second Parliament was dissolved for insisting on the impeachment of Buckingham. Attempts to raise money by forced loans in place of taxes failed to remove the financial distress into which Charles was falling, and in 1628 he consented to summon a third Parliament. In return for grants of subsidies, he signed the *Petition of Right* (1628), prepared by the two houses. By it he promised not to levy taxes without the consent of Parliament, not to quarter soldiers in private houses, not to establish martial law in time of peace, not to order arbitrary imprisonment.

Even these concessions were not enough. Parliament again demanded the removal of Buckingham, and only the assassination of the unpopular minister obviated prolonged dispute on the matter. The Commoners next attempted to check the unauthorized collection of customs duties, which produced as much as a fourth of the total royal revenue, and to curb "popish" ceremonies in the Anglican Church, but for this trouble they were sent home.

**Personal Rule**

Charles was now so thoroughly disgusted with Parliament that he determined to rule without it. For eleven years (1629–1640), in spite of financial and religious difficulties, he carried on a "personal" as distinct from a parliamentary government.

Without the consent of Parliament, Charles was bound not to levy direct taxes. During the period of his personal rule, therefore, he adopted all sorts of expedients to replenish his treasury. He revived old feudal laws and collected fines for their infraction. A sum of one hundred thousand pounds was gained by fines on suburban householders who had disobeyed a proclamation of James I forbidding the extension of London. The royal courts levied fines merely for the sake of revenue. Monopolies of wine, salt, soap, and other articles were sold to companies for large sums of money; but the high prices charged by the companies increased popular discontent.

The most obnoxious of all devices for obtaining funds was the levy of "ship-money." Claiming that it had always been the duty of seaboard towns to equip ships for the defense of the country, Charles demanded that since they no longer built ships, these

[1] See above, p. 247.

towns should contribute money for the maintenance of the navy. In 1634 each seaboard town was ordered to pay a specified amount of "ship-money" into the royal treasury, and the next year the tax was extended to inland towns and counties. To test the legality of this exaction, a certain John Hampden refused to pay his twenty shillings' ship-money, and took the matter to court, claiming that the tax was illegal. The majority of the judges, who held office during the King's pleasure and were therefore under royal influence, upheld the legality of ship-money and asserted that in times of emergency the King's prerogative was unlimited. The Puritan part of the country rang with protests and Hampden was hailed as a hero.

Opposition to financial exactions continued to go hand in hand with bitter religious opposition. Charles entrusted the conduct of religious affairs to William Laud, a high-church Anglican, whom he named archbishop of Canterbury. Laws against Catholics were relaxed, and restrictions on Puritans tightened. It seemed as if Charles and his bishops were bent upon goading the Puritans to fury, at the very time when one by one the practices, the vestments, and even some of the dogmas of the Catholic Church were being reintroduced into the Anglican Church, when the tyrannical King James was declared to have been divinely inspired, and when Puritan clergymen were forced to read from their pulpits a royal declaration permitting the "sinful" practices of dancing on the green and shooting at the butts (targets) on the Sabbath. So hard was the lot of the Radical Protestants in England that thousands fled the country and established themselves in America.[1]

In his Scottish policy Charles overreached himself. With the zealous cooperation of Archbishop Laud, he imprudently attempted to transform the Calvinistic Presbyterian Church of Scotland into an Episcopal Church, patterned after the Anglican Church in organization and ritual. Thereupon the angry Scottish Presbyterians signed a covenant, swearing to defend their religion (1638); they deposed the bishops set over them by the King and rose in revolt. Failing in a first effort to crush the rebellion in Scotland, the King summoned another English Parliament in order to secure financial support for an adequate royal army. This Parliament—the so-called Short

**Scottish Revolt**

[1] In the decade 1630–1640 some 20,000 Englishmen sailed for the colonies. Most if not all of them had economic as well as religious reasons for emigrating.

Parliament—was dissolved after some three weeks of bootless wrangling. Still unable to check the advance of the rebellious Scots into northern England, Charles in desperation convoked a new Parliament, which, by reason of its extended duration (1640–1660), has been commonly called the Long Parliament. In England and Scotland absolute monarchy faced a crisis—and revolution.

### 2. PURITAN REVOLUTION AND MILITARY DICTATORSHIP

Confident that Charles could neither fight nor buy off the Scots without parliamentary subsidies, the Long Parliament showed a decidedly stubborn spirit. Its leader, John Pym, a country gentleman already famous for his speeches against despotism, openly maintained that in the House of Commons resided supreme authority to disregard ill-advised acts of the upper house or of the King. Hardly less radical were the views of John Hampden or of Oliver Cromwell, the future dictator of England.

**"Long Parliament" and Civil War**

The right of the Commons to impeach ministers of state, asserted under James I, was now used to send to the Tower both Archbishop Laud and Thomas Wentworth, Earl of Strafford, who, since 1629, had been the King's most valued and loyal minister.[1] The special tribunals—the Court of High Commission, the Court of Star Chamber, and others—which had served to convict important ecclesiastical and political offenders, were abolished. No more irregular financial expedients, such as the imposition of ship-money, were to be employed without the sanction of Parliament. The royal prerogative of dissolving Parliament was abrogated, and a "triennial act" provided that Parliament must meet at least every three years.

All the contested points of government were thus decided adversely to the King. But his position was now somewhat stronger. He had been able to raise money, the Scottish invaders had turned back, and the House of Commons had shown itself to be badly divided on the question of church reform and in its debates on the publication of a "grand remonstrance"—a document exposing the grievances of the nation and apologizing for the acts of Parlia-

[1] Strafford was accused of treason, but his execution in 1641 was in pursuance of a special "bill of attainder" enacted by Parliament. Archbishop Laud was put to death in 1645.

ment. Moreover, a rebellion had broken out in Ireland and Charles expected to be put at the head of an army for its suppression. With this much in his favor, the King in person entered the House of Commons and attempted to arrest five of its leaders. He was met with angry protests, and his action precipitated open hostility between him and his House of Commons. The latter now passed ordinances without the royal seal and issued a call to arms. Here was open rebellion. Whereupon, Charles called upon his loyal subjects to suppress it.

To the King's standard rallied most of the nobles, the high-church Anglicans, the Catholics, many country "squires," and all those who disliked the austerity and fanaticism of the Puritans. In opposition to him were a few great earls and a large part of the Puritan middle classes—small landholders, merchants, manufacturers, shop-keepers, especially in London and other busy towns throughout the south and east of England. The close-cropped heads of these "God-fearing" commoners won them the nickname "Round-heads," while the royalist upper classes, not thinking it a sinful vanity to wear their hair in long curls, were called "Cavaliers."

In the Long Parliament there was a predominance of Presbyterians—that group of Puritans midway between the reforming Episcopalians and the radical Independents. Accordingly a "solemn league and covenant" was formed (1643) with the Scottish Presbyterians for the establishment of religious uniformity on a Presbyterian basis in England and Ireland as well as in Scotland. Then the parliamentary army moved against King Charles and defeated him at Marston Moor (1644). At once the Presbyterian majority in Parliament abolished the office of bishop, decreed the removal of altars and communion rails from the churches, and tolerated the smashing of crucifixes, images, and stained-glass windows. Satisfied with their work, the Presbyterians seemed willing to make peace with the King and restore him to his office, provided he would give permanence to their religious settlement.

The Puritan army, however, was growing restive. Oliver Cromwell, an Independent, had organized a cavalry regiment of "honest sober Christians" who were fined twelve pence if they swore, who charged in battle "singing psalms," and who went about the business of killing their enemies in a pious, prayerful, and highly effective manner. Indeed, so successful were Cromwell's "Iron-

sides" that a considerable part of the parliamentary army was reorganized on his plan. The "New Model" army, as it was formed, was Independent in sentiment and sympathy; it was almost as hostile to Presbyterianism as to high-church Anglicanism, and it would agree to no compromise between the King and the Presbyterian majority in Parliament.

**Triumph of Radical Puritans**

The "New Model" army, under the command of Fairfax[1] and Cromwell, persevered in revolution and in vigorous campaigning against the royalists. It defeated Charles I decisively at Naseby (1645) and obliged him to surrender in the following year. Then the leaders of the New Model army turned against the irresolute Presbyterian majority in Parliament. A certain Colonel Pride was stationed with his soldiers at the door of the House of Commons and ordered to "purge" the House of its 143 Presbyterian members. This he did (1648) in soldierly fashion, leaving the Independent minority—some sixty members—to deliberate alone upon the nation's weal. This "rump," or sitting part, of Parliament appointed a "high court of justice" by whose sentence Charles I was beheaded, January 30, 1649. It then decreed England to be a Commonwealth with neither King nor House of Lords.

**Execution of King**

The executive functions, hitherto exercised by the King, were vested in a Council of State, of whose forty-one members thirty were members of the House. The Rump Parliament, instead of calling for new elections, continued to sit as the "representatives of the people," although they represented only a small fraction of the people. England was in the hands of a Radical Puritan oligarchy.

**Suppression of Opposition**

Menacing conditions confronted the revolutionary Commonwealth. In England, unrest and mutiny showed that the execution of Charles I had infused new life into the royalists. In Scotland, outraged Presbyterians joined with Anglicans in flocking to the support of Charles's son, whom they proclaimed as Charles II. In Ireland, the Catholic majority were in open and seemingly successful rebellion. Under these circumstances, the Commonwealth would have perished but

[1] Fairfax, a Puritan nobleman and competent soldier, was commander-in-chief of the parliamentary army until the capture of Charles I. He was opposed to the execution of the King and in 1650 was succeeded in supreme command by Cromwell.

Oliver Cromwell (1599–1658) is the most interesting political figure in seventeenth-century England. Belonging by birth to the class of country gentlemen, his first appearance in public life was in the Parliament of 1628 as a pleader for the liberty of Puritan preaching. When the Long Parliament met in 1640, Cromwell, then forty-one years of age, assumed a conspicuous place. His clothes were cheap and homely, "his countenance swollen and reddish, his voice sharp and untuneable"; nevertheless his fervid eloquence and energy soon made him "very much hearkened unto."

From the Civil War, Cromwell emerged as the chief military leader, the idol of his soldiers, [illegible] but not man. His frequent use of Biblical phrases in ordinary conversation and his manifest confidence that he was performing God's work flowed from an intense religious zeal. He belonged to the Independents, who believed that each local congregation of Christians should be practically free, excepting that "prelacy" (i.e., the episcopal form of church government) and "popery" (i.e., Catholic Christianity) were not to be tolerated. In private life Cromwell was fond of "honest sport," of music and art. It is said that his gayety when he had "drunken a cup of wine too much" and his taste in statuary shocked his more austere fellow Puritans. In public life he was a man of great forcefulness, occasionally giving way to violent temper. He was a statesman of signal ability, aiming to secure good government and economic prosperity for England and religious freedom for Protestant dissenters.

After arbitrarily dissolving the Rump of the Long Parliament (1653), Cromwell and his Council of State broke with tradition entirely by selecting 140 men on the recommendation of Independent ministers to constitute a legislative body or convention. This body speedily received the popular appellation of "Barebone's Parliament" after one of its members, a certain leather merchant, who bore the descriptive Puritan name of Praisegod Barebone. The new legislators were good Independents—"faithful, fearing God, and hating covetousness." Their zeal for reform found expression in the reduction of public expenditure, in the equalization of taxes, and in plans for the compilation of a single code of laws; but their radical proposals for civil marriage and for the abolition of tithes startled the clergy and elicited from the larger landowners the cry of "confiscation!" Before much

was accomplished, "Barebone's Parliament" was induced to "deliver up unto the Lord-General Cromwell the powers we received from him."

Upon the failure of this experiment, Cromwell's supporters in the army prepared an "Instrument of Government," or constitution. By the Instrument of Government—one of the first written constitutions of modern times—a "Protectorate" was established, which was a constitutional monarchy in all but name. Oliver Cromwell, who became "Lord Protector" for life, was to govern with the aid of a small Council of State. Parliaments, meeting at least every three years, were to make laws and levy taxes, the Protector possessing the right to delay, but not to veto, legislation. Puritan Congregationalism was made the state religion.

**The Protectorate**

Although royalists were excluded from the polls, the Independents were unable to obtain a majority in the general election, for they formed a very small, though powerful, minority of the population. The Presbyterians controlled the new Parliament, and with characteristic stubbornness they quarreled with Cromwell, until he abruptly dismissed them (1655). Whereupon he governed as a military dictator, placing England under the rule of his generals, and giving orders to his Parliaments. To raise money he obliged all those who had borne arms for the King to pay him ten per cent of their rentals. While permitting his office to be made hereditary, he refused to accept the title of King, but no Stuart monarch had ruled with such absolute power, nor was there much to choose between James's "*a deo rex, a rege lex*" and Cromwell's, "If my calling be from God and my testimony from the people, God and the people shall take it from me, else I will not part from it."

The question is often raised, how Cromwell, representing the numerically insignificant Independents, contrived to maintain himself as absolute ruler of the British Isles. Three circumstances doubtless contributed to his strength. (1) He was the beloved leader of an army respected for its rigid discipline and feared for its mercilessness. (2) Under his strict enforcement of order, trade and industry throve. (3) His conduct of foreign affairs was satisfactory to English patriotism and profitable to English purses. Advantageous commercial treaties were made with the Dutch and the French. Industrious Jews were allowed to enter England.

Barbary pirates were chastised. In a war against Spain, the army won Dunkirk; and the navy, now truly powerful, sank a Spanish fleet, wrested Jamaica from Spain, and brought home shiploads of Spanish silver.

The death of Cromwell (1658) left the army without a master and the country without a government. True, Oliver's son, Richard Cromwell, attempted for a time to fill his father's place, but he soon lost control of both army and Parliament and abdicated. Army officers restored the Rump of the Long Parliament, dissolved it, set it up again, forced it to recall the Presbyterian members who had been expelled in 1648, and ended by obliging the reconstituted Long Parliament to convoke a new and freely elected "Convention Parliament." Meanwhile, General Monck opened negotiations for the restoration of the Stuart family to the kingship.

### 3. STUART RESTORATION AND THE "GLORIOUS" REVOLUTION

**Charles II and Restoration of Monarchy**

In 1660 King Charles II—the son and heir of the beheaded Charles I—disembarked at Dover. His entry into London was a veritable triumph, "the ways strew'd with flowers, the bells ringing, the streets hung with tapistry, fountains running with wine."

The exuberant enthusiasm which greeted Charles II was not entirely without causes, social and religious, as well as political. The grievances and ideals which had inspired the Puritan Revolution were being forgotten, and a new generation was finding fault with the Protectorate. The simple country folk longed for their maypoles, their dances, and their games on the green; only fear compelled them to bear the tyranny of sanctimonious soldiers who broke the windows of their churches. Especially hard was the lot of tenants and laborers on the many estates purchased or seized by Puritans during the Revolution. Many townsmen, excluded from the ruling oligarchy, found the Puritan government more arbitrary than that of Charles I.

The religious situation was especially favorable to Charles II. The outrages committed by Cromwell's soldiery had caused the Independents to be looked upon as terrible fanatics. Even the Presbyterians were willing to yield some points to the King, if only Independency could be overthrown; and many who had been inclined to Puritanism were now unwavering in loyalty to the

Anglican Church. Anglicanism, from its origin, had been bound up with the monarchy, and it now consistently contributed to a double triumph of kings and bishops. Most bitter of all against the Cromwellian regime were the Catholics in Ireland. It would be long before they could forget the priests whom Cromwell's soldiery had brutally knocked on the head, or the thousands of girls and boys whom his agents had sold into slavery in the West Indies.

This strong royalist undercurrent, flowing from religious and social conditions, makes more comprehensible the ease with which England drifted back into the Stuart monarchy. The younger generation, with no memory of Stuart despotism, and with a keen dislike for the confusion in which no constitutional form was proof against military dictatorship, gave ready credence to Prince Charles's promises of constitutional government.

The experiment in Puritan republicanism had resulted only in convincing the majority of the people that "the government is, and ought to be, by King, Lords, and Commons." The people merely asked for some assurances against despotism—and when a throne was to be purchased with promises, Charles II was a ready buyer. He swore to observe *Magna Carta* and the "Petition of Right," to respect Parliament, not to interfere with its religious policy, nor to levy illegal taxes. Simultaneously, the Anglican bishops and royalist nobles resumed their offices and lands. Things seemed to slip back into the old grooves. Charles II dated his reign not from his actual accession but from his father's death, and his first Parliament declared invalid all the acts and ordinances passed since 1642 which it did not specifically confirm.

**Underlying Conflict**

The supporters of the Restoration of 1660 were no more anxious than were the suppressed Puritans that Britain should be an absolute monarchy. They were royalists, but they were constitutional royalists; they would honor the King but they would make him do their will. In religious matters most of them were upholders of the established church—Anglican in England, or Presbyterian in Scotland; they were inimical to Radical Protestantism and even more so to Catholicism.

Now it so happened that neither Charles II nor his younger brother and heir, Prince James (Duke of York), was in real sympathy with the prevailing political and religious tenets in

Britain. Both Stuart princes, cousins on their mother's side of Louis XIV of France, in whose court they had been reared, were more used to the practices of absolute monarchy in France than to the peculiar developments of parliamentary government in England. And unlike their father, who had been most loyal to the Anglican Church, they had acquired from their foreign environment a special regard for the Catholic Church.

That Charles II (1660–1685) was able to round out a reign of twenty-five years and die a natural death as King of England and Scotland was due not so much to his virtues as to his faults. He was so hypocritical that his real aims were usually concealed. He was so indolent that with some show of right he could blame his ministers and advisors for his own mistakes and misdeeds. He was so selfish that he would make concessions here and there rather than "embark again upon his travels." In fact, selfishness was the basis of his policy in domestic and foreign affairs, but it was a selfishness veiled always in wit, good humor, and captivating affability.

At the beginning of the reign of Charles II, the country gentlemen strengthened their position by securing the parliamentary abolition of the surviving feudal rights by which the King might demand certain specified services from them and certain sums of money when an heiress married or a minor inherited an estate. This action meant the abandonment in England of the feudal theory that land was held by nobles in return for military service, and it consecrated the newer capitalist principle of private property.

The extinction of feudal obligations in the early days of the Stuart Restoration benefited the landlords primarily, but the annual lump sum of £100,000 which Charles II was given in return, was voted by Parliament and was paid by all classes in the form of excise taxes on alcoholic drinks. Customs duties, hearth-money (a tax on houses), and profits on the post office contributed to make up an annual royal revenue of somewhat less than £1,200,000. This was intended to defray the ordinary expenses of court and government but it seemed insufficient to Charles, who was not only prodigal in personal expenditures but wanted extra funds to enable him to bribe members of Parliament and to maintain a standing army. The country squires who had sold their plate for the royalist cause

**Financial**

back in the 1640's and were now suffering from hard times, thought the court was too extravagant. To this feeling was added fear that Charles might hire foreign soldiers to oppress Englishmen. Consequently Parliament grew more parsimonious, and in 1665–1667 claimed a new and important privilege—that of devoting its grants to specific objects and demanding an account of expenditures.

Charles was determined to have money by fair means or foul. A group of London goldsmiths had loaned more than a million and a quarter pounds sterling to the government. In 1672 Charles announced that instead of paying the money back, he would consider it a permanent loan. Two years earlier he had signed the secret treaty of Dover (1670) with Louis XIV, by which Louis promised him an annual subsidy of £200,000 and troops in case of rebellion, while Charles was to join the Catholic Church and to aid Louis in the French wars against Spain and Holland.[1]

In his religious policy, Charles at first had the support of Parliament in curbing Radical Protestantism, for the vast majority of English nobles and squires were now reacting strongly against Puritanism. Some two thousand Puritan clergymen were deprived of their offices by an Act of Uniformity (1662), requiring their assent to the Anglican prayer-book. These dissenting clergymen might not return within five miles of their old churches unless they renounced the "solemn league and covenant" and swore loyalty to the King (Five-Mile Act, 1665). For repeated attendance at their meetings (conventicles), dissenters might be condemned to penal servitude in the West Indies (Conventicle Act, 1664). The Corporation Act of 1661 excluded dissenters from town offices.

Later, however, when Charles II showed that his hostility to Puritanism was conditioned less by love of Anglicanism than by sympathy for Catholicism, Anglicans and Radical Protestants tended to draw together against the royal policy. All Protestant Britain was scandalized in 1672 by the announced conversion of Prince James to the Catholic Church and by the issuance of a "declaration of indulgence" by Charles II, suspending the laws of Parliament which oppressed not only dissenters but also Catholics. At the same time it was rumored that

**Religious**

[1] Charles II gave aid to Louis XIV (see above, p. 263), but he did not formally join the Catholic Church until 1685 when he was on his death bed.

Charles was in the pay of Louis XIV of France, who would aid him in the subversion of Protestantism. British Protestants were thrown into paroxysms of fear.

The "declaration of indulgence" was denounced as a pro-Catholic document and as a serious infraction of parliamentary authority. The royal right to "suspend" laws upon occasion had undoubtedly been exercised before, but Parliament was now strong enough to insist upon the binding force of its enactments and to oblige Charles to withdraw his "indulgence." The fear of Catholicism ever increased. Gentlemen who at other times were quite rational gave unhesitating credence to wild tales of a "popish plot" (1678) and countenanced rabid persecution and judicial murder of several prominent Catholics. In 1679 an Exclusion Bill was brought forward which would debar Prince James from the throne, because of his conversion to Catholicism.

**Whig and Tory Factions**

In the exciting debate over the Exclusion Bill, members of Parliament broke into two factions. One faction, favoring exclusion, was backed by the Puritans and dissenters and was labeled "Whig," a popular word of derision for rebellious Protestants. The other faction, styled "Tory" —the slang word for a "popish" outlaw in Ireland—was more rigidly Anglican and at the same time more moderate in its attitude toward Prince James. The Tories were anxious to preserve the *status quo* in church and state against both Puritans and "papists," but most of all to prevent a recurrence of civil war. In their opinion, the best and most effective safeguard against quarreling earls and insolent tradesmen was the hereditary monarchy. Better submit to a Catholic sovereign, they said, than invite civil war by disturbing the regular succession. In the contest over the Exclusion Bill, the Tories finally carried the day, for although the bill was passed by the Commons (1680), it was rejected by the House of Lords.

In the last few years of Charles's reign the cause of the Whigs was discredited. Rumors spread that they were plotting to assassinate the King and it was said that the Whig nobles who brought armed retainers to Parliament were planning to use force to establish Charles's illegitimate son—the Protestant Duke of Monmouth—on the throne. These and similar accusations hurt the Whigs and help to explain the violent Tory reaction which enabled Charles to rule without Parliament from 1681 to his

death in 1685. As had been feared, upon the death of Charles II, the Duke of Monmouth organized a revolt, but this, together with a simultaneous insurrection in Scotland, was easily crushed, and the Catholic Duke of York was duly seated on the throne as James II.


**James II and Rampant Opposition**

In his short reign of three years James II (1685–1688) succeeded in stirring up opposition on all sides. Like his brother, he claimed the right to "suspend" the laws and statutes which Parliament had enacted; he issued a "declaration of indulgence" in 1687, which exempted both Catholics and Protestant dissenters from punishment for infraction of these laws. He attempted to create a standing army. Contrary to existing statutes, he appointed Catholics to office in the army, in the civil government, and in the universities. In spite of protests, he issued a second declaration of indulgence in 1688 and ordered it to be read in all Anglican churches, and, when seven bishops remonstrated, he accused them of seditious libel. No jury would convict the seven bishops, however, and they were acquitted. The Tories, the party most favorable to the royal prerogatives and upon whom he might have relied, were shocked and alienated by what seemed to them a deliberate attack on the Anglican Church and by fear of a standing army, while the King's disregard of parliamentary legislation, and the favor shown to Catholics, infuriated the Whigs.

So long as Whigs and Tories alike could look forward to the accession on the death of James II of his Protestant daughters, Mary and Anne, they continued to acquiesce in his arbitrary government. But the prospect changed in 1688 with the birth of a son to James II by his second wife, a Catholic. This son, the mass of English Protestants felt certain, would be educated in his father's "popish" and despotic doctrines. Even those who professed to believe in the divine right of Kings and had denied the right of Parliament to alter the succession were dejected at this prospect, and many of them were willing to join with the Whigs in inviting a Protestant to take the throne. The next in line of succession after the infant prince was Mary, the elder of James's two daughters. She was the wife of William of Orange [1]

[1] See above, pp. 265–266. William and Mary were cousins. The former's mother was a sister of Charles II and James II. He was thus a nephew as well as the son-in-law, of James II. See genealogical table on next page.

## STUART AND HANOVERIAN SOVEREIGNS OF BRITAIN



and an Anglican. Upon the invitation of Whig and Tory leaders, William crossed over from Holland to England with an army and entered London without opposition (1688). Deserted even by his army, James fled to France.[1]

A bloodless revolution was thus accomplished and the crown was formally presented to William and Mary by an irregular Parliament, which also declared that James II, having endeavored to subvert the constitution and having fled from the kingdom, had vacated the throne. In offering the crown to William and Mary, Parliament was careful to safeguard its own authority and the Protestant religion by issuing a Declaration of Rights (1689), which, as the Bill of Rights, was speedily enacted into law. This act decreed that the sovereign must henceforth belong to the Anglican Church, thereby debarring the Catholic son of James II. The act also denied the claim of a King to "suspend" laws or to "dispense" subjects from obeying the laws, to levy money, or to maintain an army without consent of Parliament; it asserted that neither the free election nor the free speech and proceedings of members of Parliament should be interfered with; it affirmed the right of subjects to petition the sovereign; and it demanded impartial juries and frequent Parliaments.

**"Glorious" Revolution of 1688**

The Bill of Rights was supplemented by the practice, begun in the same year, 1689, of granting taxes and making appropriations for the army for one year only. Unless Parliament were called every year to pass a Mutiny Act (provision for the army), the soldiers would receive no pay and in case of mutiny would not be punishable by court-martial. At the same time, a popular settlement of the vexed religious question was reached. While existing restrictions on Catholics were tightened and extended, toleration was accorded to Protestant dissenters from Anglicanism. The Toleration Act of 1689 did not go as far as the dissenters desired, but it granted them freedom of conscience and the legal right to worship in public.

Here, then, were the first fruits of the "Glorious" Revolution of 1688. Absolute monarchy was overthrown in Britain. Parliament was entrenched in power. The Protestant character of the state was assured. And the influence and predominence of the British upper classes were firmly established. A new era opened

[1] Risings in favor of James in Ireland and in Scotland were suppressed. In Ireland the famous battle of the Boyne (1690) was decisive.

in the political history of Britain—and, incidentally, in that of the world.

### 4. "LIMITED" MONARCHY AND PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT

For many years after 1688 the government of Great Britain was in the hands of an oligarchy of landed aristocrats (titled nobles and country squires) and of commercial and banking magnates related to the aristocracy by blood or by kindred capitalistic interest. This oligarchy enjoyed social prestige and wielded economic and political power.

**Parliamentary oligarchy**

The social prestige of the parliamentary oligarchy was in part a reward for recent national service. It had long been customary for the mass of English tenant-farmers and agricultural laborers to regard titled noblemen and country squires as superior beings and to honor and follow them accordingly. Then, with the rise of capitalism, it had become customary for all sorts of Britishers to evince a special deference to men of wealth. Now it was precisely these wealthy and titled persons that constituted the parliamentary oligarchy and took leadership in the "Glorious" Revolution and the championship of parliamentary traditions and popular policies against royal absolutism and an unpopular King. What could be more natural than that on the ruins of divine-right monarchy should be erected an aristocratic regime?

However much the British aristocrats employed their regime to promote their own economic interests, they earned and secured the reputation of forwarding policies which were patriotic and popular. To this end they were aided by their factional division into Whigs and Tories, a division which continued throughout the eighteenth century and which enabled one faction to blame the other if anything went wrong, and thereby to stave off popular criticism of the aristocracy as a whole. There were some differences of outlook between Tories and Whigs; the former were more strictly agricultural in economics, more rigidly Anglican in religion, and more zealous in honoring the trappings of royalty, while the latter catered considerably to the commercial classes and to Protestant nonconformists, and boasted particularly of the limits they set to royal pretension. In fact, however, there was little to distinguish the two factions. Both Whigs and Tories were aristocratic; both had participated in the "Glorious" Revolution;

both were devoted to the maintenance of the ensuing parliamentary oligarchy. They debated and quarreled, often with bitterness, but their quarrels were over officeholding rather than over broad principles.

Under the auspices of the oligarchy, the authority of Parliament grew ever stronger after 1689 and that of monarchy weaker. William III (1689–1702) and his sister-in-law Anne (1702–1714) were not "legitimate" hereditary monarchs; they owed the throne to Parliament, which had excluded from it the son of James II. William III, more interested in getting money and soldiers to defend his native Holland against Louis XIV of France than in governing Great Britain, did pretty much as Parliament directed and gave free rein to his ministers in most matters of internal administration. So long as the Whigs held a majority of seats in the House of Commons, William found that the wheels of government turned fairly smoothly if all his ministers were Whigs. On the other hand, when the Tories gained a preponderance in the House of Commons, it seemed expedient to replace Whig ministers with Tories. In this way, the King's ministers—the "cabinet," as they began to be called [1]—came to depend on the majority in Parliament. The parliamentary oligarchy was gaining, as the King was losing, control over the executive as well as the legislative functions of the British government.

**Supremacy of Parliament**

**Cabinet Government**

Queen Anne was more English and more spirited in her assertion of royal authority. She vetoed acts of Parliament and toward the close of her reign she chose a Tory cabinet despite the fact that the parliamentary majority was Whig. On her death, however, the crown passed by act of Parliament [2] to her cousin, the German Elector of Hanover, George I. The accession of the

[1] The word "cabinet" had been applied in the time of Charles II to an inner circle of his ministers ("privy councillors") who had met and advised with him on government policies in a small private room (a cabinet). It was extremely unpopular before the "Glorious" Revolution, but afterwards, when it was identified with an agency of parliamentary government, it acquired great and enduring fame.

[2] The Act of Settlement (1701) repeated the prohibition against the succession of the direct Catholic heirs of James II and prescribed that the crown should pass from William III to Anne and then, failing children of hers, to Sophia of Hanover and her Protestant heirs. Neither William III nor Anne left children, and Sophia predeceased Anne; hence Sophia's son became George I. Sophia was the granddaughter of James I and the daughter of that Calvinist Count Palatine of the Rhine whose election as King of Bohemia had precipitated the Thirty Years' War. Sophia had married the Elector of Hanover. See above, pp. 229, 290.

Hanoverians proved decisive in the history of parliamentary government in Britain.

**Hanoverian Kings**

George I (1714–1727) and his son and successor, George II (1727–1760), were quite German. They were Electors of the German state of Hanover, in addition to being Kings of Great Britain. George I knew no English, and George II spoke it brokenly. In Hanover they were absolute princes and in Hanover were their hearts. From Germany they obtained their wives, their personal favorites, and most of their mistresses. To Britain they were foreigners, suffered to reign (but not to rule) because they represented the Protestant royal succession next in "legitimacy" to the Catholic Stuarts. The Georges enjoyed themselves in Britain after their fashion, but they were too dull-witted and disinterested to master the intricacies of British politics. They left almost all business to the cabinet, and under George I it was usual for the King to absent himself from cabinet-meetings (it should be remembered that he could not understand what was said) and to accept every act of Parliament without exercising the royal veto. All of which tended to establish the omnipotence of Parliament and its cabinet.

In so far as George I and George II concerned themselves with British politics, they favored the Whigs. The Whigs, they knew, were loud-spoken apologists of the Hanoverian succession, while the Tories were suspected of desiring a second restoration of the Stuarts. Certainly, several Tory leaders participated in a vain attempt of the son of James II in 1715 to seat himself on the British throne as James III, and again in 1745 an extreme group of Tories—the so-called Jacobites—took part in a Scottish uprising under the grandson of James II, the dashing "Prince Charlie." In these circumstances, the Whigs were favored by the royal Georges and acclaimed by the militantly Protestant populace of Britain. During the greater part of the eighteenth century the parliamentary majority and the royal ministers were alike Whig.

It was during this period of Whig ascendancy that the office of prime minister (or premier) came into existence. Sir Robert Walpole, an outstanding Whig leader, managed for twenty-one years (from 1721 to 1742) to enjoy the favor of the King and by patronage and bribery to dominate the cabinet and a majority in the House of Commons. Though he disclaimed the title, he was

generally recognized as the "prime" minister—prime in importance, prime in power. Thenceforth it became a tradition under the British Constitution that the crown should appoint the leading figure of the majority-party in Parliament to the position of prime minister—or head of the cabinet—and that all other cabinet ministers should be appointed by the crown on the nomination of the prime minister.

**The Unwritten British Constitution**

There never has been a "British Constitution" in the sense of a single written document. It has always been a set of traditions and practices of government, the resultant of the customs, laws, and usages by which government in Britain has been organized and conducted. The Constitution has developed gradually and has changed through the course of time, especially as the result of the British revolutions of the seventeenth century. By the end of the eighteenth century, however, it had acquired certain characteristics which have since distinguished it and which merit at least a summary review at this point.

The King was still the head of the state, and in law still the ruler of his kingdom. In his name all laws were made, treaties concluded, and officials appointed. Under him both state and church were administered. But in practice (that is, by the Constitution), most of the King's functions were delegated to his "government"—to a premier and cabinet who were not his agents but the representatives of Parliament. His actual authority (that is, his influence with the cabinet) varied according to circumstances and personal factors, but the delegation of functions was fairly complete. The ministers and their subordinates carried on the real business of government. The King "reigned but did not rule."

By the eighteenth century the British Constitution clearly limited the King's power in five important respects. (1) He was deprived of the right to levy taxes. For his household expenses he was granted an allowance, called the Civil List. William III, for instance, was allowed £700,000 a year. (2) The King had no right to make laws on his own responsibility or to prevent laws from being made against his advice. The sovereign's prerogative to veto acts of Parliament still existed in theory, but was not exercised after the reign of Queen Anne. (3) The King had lost control of the judiciary: he might not remove judges from office

even if they gave decisions unfavorable to him; and the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 had provided that anyone who was imprisoned should be told why and given a fair legal trial. (4) The King could not maintain a standing army or make war. (5) The King might not appoint to office or retain in office any minister who did not enjoy the confidence of the parliamentary majority. These restrictions on the royal authority rendered Great Britain a "limited," rather than an "absolute," monarchy.

The powers taken from the King were vested in Parliament. The British revolutions of the seventeenth century had left Parliament with freedom of speech for its members and with full power to levy taxes, to make laws, to remove or retain judges, to control the armed forces, and essentially to determine the policy of the government. Parliament had even taken upon itself to deprive a monarch of his "divine right" to rule, to establish a new sovereign, and to decree that never again should Great Britain have a King of the Catholic faith. More recently, through the elaboration of the "cabinet" and the rise of a "prime minister," Parliament had assumed supreme authority in the nation.

This omnipotent Parliament was supposed to represent the people of Great Britain, but it represented them very imperfectly. As we have already noted, it consisted of two legislative assemblies or "Houses," neither of which could make laws without the consent of the other. One of these houses, the House of Lords, consisted of "lords spiritual" (designated bishops of the Anglican Church), and "lords temporal," or peers (descendants of medieval feudal nobles or heirs of well-to-do persons recently ennobled). Most of the lords were owners of large landed estates, and many of them were heavily involved in commercial and capitalistic enterprises.

**House of Commons**

The House of Commons, though it was more representative in appearance, was hardly less aristocratic. Part of its members, the so-called "knights of the shire," were supposed to represent the country people, and they were elected, two for each shire or county. But a country person could not vote for them unless he had an estate worth an annual rental of forty shillings, and, since the same amount of money would then buy a good deal more than nowadays, forty shillings was a fairly large sum: it debarred all agricultural laborers and many farm tenants. Persons qualified to vote were often afraid to

vote independently, for elections were public and anyone might learn from the poll-book how each man had voted. Frequently an elector sold his suffrage to a rich squire or an ambitious nobleman. The result was that most "knights of the shire" were landed gentry or dependent upon them.

It was likewise with the other part of the members of the House of Commons, the so-called "burgesses," who represented the towns, or "boroughs." Throughout the eighteenth century only such towns were represented as had been represented back in the reign of Charles II, and each, regardless of size, sent two representatives, while a goodly number of newer and rapidly growing towns sent none.[1] Of the boroughs that did send representatives, each had its own method of election. In some towns, election was in the hands of the so-called "freemen" (of course everybody was legally free—"freeman" was a technical term for an hereditary member of the borough corporation); in one town the "freemen" might be few, and in another they might be fairly numerous. In some towns a nobleman or a clique of commercial magnates chose the burgesses without even the formality of an election. In general, the mass of artisans had no say in the choice of members of Parliament. Persons of birth and wealth were in actual control.

Thus Parliament in the eighteenth century was not democratic. It was representative only of a small group of "gentlemen" of the upper and middle classes. Some three hundred sat in the House of Lords, and it has been estimated that fewer than 1,500 controlled a majority in the House of Commons. Parliament was emphatically an oligarchy, and politics under the British Constitution was essentially a gentleman's game. Aristocrats or their protégés occupied the seats in Parliament. A distinguished English statesman of the eighteenth century indicated the position of an aristocratic protégé: "He is sent here by the lord of this or the duke of that, and if he does not obey the instructions which he receives, he is held to be a dishonest man." And no "gentleman" would be dishonest.

[1] Such growing industrial towns as Birmingham, Manchester, Leeds, and Sheffield were unrepresented in the eighteenth century. On the other hand, many a decaying town, or "rotten borough," continued to be represented. Of these, the most notorious were Old Sarum and Dunwich: the latter had been washed away by the sea, and of the former only a lonely hill marked its site; yet the traditional lords of these old places still named their "representatives" in the House of Commons.

So far we have referred to the Parliament and the Constitution sometimes as "English" and sometimes as "British." A word of explanation is needed. The island of Great Britain had long been partitioned between two separate kingdoms—England and Scotland—each with its own King, parliament, and state church. In 1603, the King of Scotland succeeded by hereditary right to the throne of England, and though for some time the two kingdoms retained separate parliaments and distinct churches and laws, Scotland was joined with England under a common King and experienced during the seventeenth century much the same revolutionary vicissitudes. In 1707, during the reign of Queen Anne, the parliaments of England and Scotland passed an Act of Union, whereby the two kingdoms were finally fused into the one kingdom of Great Britain, and the English Parliament at Westminster was transformed into the British Parliament by inclusion of Scottish lords and commoners. Certain peculiarities of Scottish law were retained for the northern part of the consolidated realm, and it was specifically provided that the state church should remain Presbyterian in Scotland and Anglican in England.[1] After 1707 it was strictly accurate to speak of the British, rather than the English, Constitution and Parliament.

**Union of Scotland with England**

The parliamentary oligarchy which we have been describing, dominated England (and Wales) and Scotland. But in addition it claimed ultimate authority over the whole British empire—Ireland and the newer overseas colonies. For the colonies the British government appointed governors, made laws, and levied taxes, in theory at least. Some of the dependencies, especially in America, had local parliaments (or assemblies) of their own; none of them was even nominally represented in the British Parliament at Westminster; and between some of them and the mother-country a good deal of friction developed in the eighteenth century.

As for Ireland, English Kings had begun its military conquest as far back as the twelfth century, and by dint of many efforts and much bloodshed they had eventually brought it into political subjection. Nevertheless the

**Subjection of Ireland**

[1] Accordingly, the poor sovereigns of Great Britain, though they were at the head of the Anglican Church, had to be Presbyterian when they visited Scotland. This was not much of a strain, however, on George I or George II.

majority of Irishmen remained Catholic in religion and "foreign" to Englishmen. Attempts to force the conversion of the mass of natives to the Anglican Church which Queen Elizabeth established as the "Church of Ireland" proved fruitless, and the natives were ever evincing sympathy for foreign foes of England—for Spain or for France. In the seventeenth century they fought for Charles I and James II against the triumphant Puritans and the champions of the "Glorious" Revolution. To curb the Catholic natives, successive British rulers—James I, Cromwell, and William III—settled Protestant Englishmen and Scots in northern Ireland (Ulster) and transferred large landed estates throughout the island to loyal Protestant noblemen. In Ireland, as well as in Scotland, there had long been an aristocratic local Parliament, but since the close of the fifteenth century enactments of the Irish parliament, to be valid, had to be approved by the English Privy Council, and the disbarment of Catholics from it meant that the Irish parliament from the middle of the seventeenth century was dominated by an even narrower oligarchy of noblemen and "gentlemen" than that which dominated the British Parliament.

Thus the supreme political authority in Great Britain and Ireland and the British overseas colonies in the eighteenth century was not an absolute monarch but a parliamentary oligarchy of landlords and commercial magnates. And this oligarchy used its power to increase the international importance and prestige of Britain, and incidentally to forward its own economic interests.

In domestic policies, the oligarchy (particularly its Tory element) naturally favored agriculture and the great landlords. Immediately after the "Glorious" Revolution, Parliament, while increasing the tariff protection of home-grown grain, adopted a new policy of paying to landlords from the national treasury a "bounty," or money premium, for every bushel of wheat which they exported from the country.[1] This policy was continued and developed during the eighteenth century by a series of so-called "corn laws," which were intended to stimulate the growing of grain in Britain, to raise the price of foodstuffs, and thereby to add to the riches of the rural landowners. Similar motives dictated promulgation of a rapidly increasing number of "enclosure acts," privileging this or that nobleman or squire to enlarge his private estate by depriving

**Favors to Landlords**

[1] That is, when wheat was selling for less than 6*s*. a bushel.

tenants of their customary right to common holdings of field and pasturage. Seventy enclosure acts were passed for the benefit of landed aristocrats between 1700 and 1760, and during the first thirty-three years of the reign of George III (1760–1793) 1,355 such acts were passed. The number of acres thus transferred in the eighteenth century from tenants to landlords was at least three million.

**Commercial and Colonial Policies**

At the same time, the parliamentary oligarchy pursued foreign policies calculated to foster British commerce and to extend British dominion overseas. The merchants and shippers who formed an important wing of the Whig party, as well as all patriots, were highly gratified by the course and outcome of the Wars of the League of Augsburg (1689–1697) and the Spanish Succession (1702–1714), in which Britain fought at once against France, its chief commercial and colonial rival, and against Louis XIV, the friend of the Catholic Stuart pretenders to the British throne. From these wars, Britain obtained Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, additional posts in the West Indies, and valuable privileges of trade with Spanish America.[1] The Methuen Treaty (1703), whereby Portugal was closely allied to Britain, was similarly advantageous: it allowed British merchants to sell their wares in Portugal without hindrance; and in return Britain lowered the duties on Portuguese wines, so that "port" supplanted "burgundy" as the favorite stimulant of British gentlemen. Nor was the Union with Scotland (1707) unfavorable to British commerce; it permitted the adoption of uniform trade regulations, tariffs, and excise for all Britain.

Walpole, the Whig Prime Minister from 1721 to 1742, was an apostle of peace and prosperity,[2] particularly the latter. He believed that economic prosperity was the be-all and end-all of statesmanship and that, if British landlords and merchants were prosperous, Britain would prosper. His policy was based on mercantilist ideas and consisted of close application of business methods to public finance, removal of duties on imported raw materials and on exported manufactures, and enlargement of the merchant marine. Because war would necessitate heavy financial expendi-

[1] See above, pp. 266, 275, 348–356.

[2] Walpole was the "best master of figures of any man of his time." While he was deemed the best advocate of the commercial class, he was a great landlord and deeply interested in the "prosperity" of his estates. In 1742 he was ennobled with the title of Earl of Orford.

tures, which might lessen national prosperity, he endeavored to keep peace with foreign powers. For his pacifism, however, he was bitterly assailed by the Tories and by groups of his fellow Whigs, and toward the end of his ministry he was driven by the patriotic clamors of William Pitt into war with Spain (the War of Jenkins' Ear, 1739) and resumption of hostilities with France (the War of the Austrian Succession).[1]

William Pitt was an interesting type of the eighteenth-century parliamentarian. Like many others, he represented the aristocracy of new capitalism, rather than that of medieval lineage. His grandfather, Thomas Pitt, a vulgar and unscrupulous adventurer, known as "Diamond" Pitt, had enriched himself in the service of the English East India Company,[2] and had employed some of his wealth to purchase one of the "rotten boroughs"—that of Old Sarum—and thereby to assure representation for his family in Parliament. William Pitt had ability. He was a brilliant politician, and as an orator he was likened to Demosthenes. He speedily won popular favor by his vehement assaults on graft in public office and by his impassioned pleas for the vigorous assertion of British power in foreign and colonial matters. It was largely due to the national enthusiasm stirred up by Pitt's militarism, imperialism, and moral disquisitions, that Sir Robert Walpole was driven from office and that Britain renewed the struggle with France and Spain for world-supremacy in commerce and colonies. It was Pitt, moreover, who presided over the British cabinet during the decisive period of the Seven Years' War, who sent British gold to Frederick the Great, directed British conquest in America and India, and ensured British supremacy on the high seas.[3] This was the climax of Pitt's career. He was acclaimed by the mass of his fellow countrymen as the personification of British patriotism.

The accession of George III to the British throne in 1760 changed matters somewhat. This George was grandson of the

[1] See above, pp. 317–319, 348–349.

[2] Thomas Pitt had been governor of Madras and acquired his nickname of "Diamond" by selling a diamond of extraordinary size (which he had obtained in India by most questionable means) to the Duke of Orleans, cousin of Louis XIV of France, for something like £135,000. It was mainly by this transaction that the Pitts were enabled to become "gentlemen," influential in finance and politics.

[3] See above, pp. 352–356.

**George III**

George II and great-grandson of the George I who had spoken English badly or not at all, who had been most unedifying in their private morals, who had distrusted the Tories, and who had left the cares and responsibilities of British government to their Whig ministers. George III was born and reared in England; he spoke English—real King's English; his morals were as unimpeachable as Pitt's; he took very seriously the business of kingship; and he actually preferred the Tories, who were obsequious to him, to the Whigs, who tended to patronize him. In other words, George III, unlike his Hanoverian predecessors, was an honorable and patriotic King, popular with the mass of Britishers; and with popular backing and with the help of bribery (the art of which had been highly developed by Walpole and other Whig ministers), he created in Parliament a group of "king's friends," mainly Tory.

George III had no open break with William Pitt. The King disliked the minister but was content to confer upon him the title of Earl of Chatham and to promote him to the House of Lords, where he would be less influential. Gradually George III was able to get rid of Whig ministers, to constitute Tory cabinets, and to take a prominent part in government himself. From 1770 to 1782 his prime minister was Lord North, a Tory after his own heart. George III could now preside at cabinet meetings and give real personal guidance to the conduct of affairs.

Yet even George III showed no intention of undoing what had been accomplished by the "Glorious" Revolution of 1689. He well knew that his family's title to the kingship was derived from it. He was deeply attached to its religious settlement. He fully acquiesced in its political compromise. Like other landlords and gentlemen, he acknowledged the supremacy of Parliament and respected the Bill of Rights. He merely imagined that the parliamentary system would operate best if he and his "friends" had a greater personal part in it.

The British revolution, unique in the Europe of the seventeenth century, had given rise to important political speculation, such as the unavailing defense of absolute monarchy by Thomas Hobbes and the more successful pleas for liberty and parliamentary government by John Milton and John Locke.[1] Locke's political philosophy, in particular, provided a

**British Political Prestige**

[1] See above, p. 408.

reasoned basis for both theory and practice of limited monarchy in Great Britain; and as Britain, under its parliamentary system, forged ahead during the eighteenth century, Locke's critique of absolute monarchy won admiration and inspired imitation among "enlightened" intellectuals outside England. Thus alike by precept and by example, Britain's political revolutions became a very significant element in the age of the "Enlightenment."

True, the British parliamentary system was a compromise. It retained the institution of monarchy, and it denied any share in actual government to the masses. Yet it guaranteed fundamental personal liberties of everybody against despotic and arbitrary rule; its monarchy was strictly limited; and the paramount Parliament was representative, in theory if not in practice, of the British people. The upper and middle classes were directly responsible for government in Great Britain, as they were not under the prevalent despotic regimes on the Continent. They took their responsibility quite seriously and proved that a nation could prosper mightily under free, parliamentary government.

**British Prosperity**

For Britain did prosper in the eighteenth century. Its wealth steadily mounted. Its population, exclusive of emigration to the colonies, almost doubled. Its navy and merchant marine surpassed any other country's. Its trade rapidly expanded. Its industry, beginning to undergo some mechanization, multiplied. Its agricultural advance, thanks to the introduction of large-scale "scientific" farming, with new "rotation of crops" and improved breeding of domestic animals, was envied and emulated abroad. George III was hailed as "Farmer George"; he established a model farm at Windsor, gathered a flock of merino sheep, and experimented with stock-breeding. One of the wealthy farmers of the time, Robert Bakewell, kept open house for British peers (and French and German dukes and Russian princes) who came to inspect his scientific farm—his plough-team of cows, his irrigated meadows, his horse-hoed crops, and, above all, his livestock—his huge black stallion, his bull "Two-penny," and his ram "Two-pounder."

Amid the growing prosperity and prestige of Great Britain, and soon after the accession of George III, the successful termination of the Seven Years' War (1763) raised a financial question. The war cost Britain a considerable sum of money which someone had to pay. In seeking an answer that would not put too

much of a burden on English taxpayers, Parliament and the King unwittingly precipitated another—a third—political revolution. This revolution, unlike the Puritan Revolution and the "Glorious" Revolution, did not take place in England or Scotland. It occurred in thirteen oversea colonies and is known in history as the American Revolution. But its effects on the political evolution of modern Europe—and of the modern world—were even more direct and far-reaching than the British revolutions of the seventeenth century.

### 5. THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

It seemed to George III and the majority of Parliament that British colonists who had benefited from the Seven Years' War should pay a part of its cost. Most of such colonists (some two million) were now settled in the thirteen colonies extending along the Atlantic seaboard of North America from Massachusetts and New Hampshire to South Carolina and Georgia; and they had just been relieved of chronic danger from French neighbors by British conquest of Canada.

**The Thirteen Colonies**

Among the inhabitants of these thirteen colonies Englishmen predominated, and they had naturally brought with them the political ideas and institutions of seventeenth-century England. In the colonies, as in England, the legal system was characterized by the common law and by jury-trials. In each colony was an assembly (or legislature) patterned more or less closely after the English House of Commons; in Virginia, for example, the assembly, or "House of Burgesses," like the English lower House, comprised two burgesses from each town or borough and representatives from the counties. In most colonies, a royal governor headed the administration as a kind of viceroy of the English monarch; and the relations between royal governor and assembly in almost every colony reflected the relations between King and Parliament in the mother-country.[1] A colonial assembly, like the home Parliament, claimed that, without its consent, no direct tax might be imposed and no law passed. Repeatedly a colonial assembly, taking its cue from the home Parliament, would hold up financial appropria-

**English Institutions and Traditions**

[1] Strictly speaking, this statement applies only to the nine colonies which had royal governors and the two (Pennsylvania and Maryland) which had "proprietors." Rhode Island and Connecticut possessed charters permitting them to elect their own governors.

tions in order to compel the royal governor to accept its policies or to appoint officials in whom it had confidence. The British revolutions of the seventeenth century had their counterparts in America.

And in claiming and obtaining rights of self-government the colonists justified themselves on the ground that they were claiming and obtaining the traditional "rights of Englishmen." In a word, the limitation on absolute monarchy and the practice of representative government in the thirteen colonies were by-products of the revolutionary development of the British Parliament in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

But the thirteen American colonies went farther than the mothercountry. Colonial conditions were more favorable than Britain's for the adoption of radical experiments in politics.

(1) The religious situation in America was more favorable to political radicalism. Whereas the majority of Englishmen in the home-country were Anglican Christians, used to bishops, to ritual, and to royal headship of the church, the large majority of Englishmen (and other settlers) in the colonies were dissenters from Anglicanism. There were a few Catholics in Maryland, and a considerable number of Anglicans in Virginia, Carolina, and New York. But the Anglicans in America had no resident bishop and they tended toward "low church" Puritanism, while almost everywhere in the colonies the masses were radical Puritans: Congregational in Massachusetts and Connecticut; Baptist in Rhode Island; Quaker in Pennsylvania; and Presbyterian or Dutch Reformed or some other kind of Calvinist in the middle and southern colonies. This meant that the mass of colonists were especially intolerant of Catholicism and distrustful of episcopacy and that they were far more sympathetic with the principles underlying the Puritan Revolution of Cromwell and his Independents than with the compromise effected by the "Glorious" Revolution of Anglican aristocrats.

**Political Radicalism**

(2) Economic and social conditions in America were also more favorable. In the colonies there was no powerful class of hereditary nobles, such as flourished in Great Britain. New England had been settled by people of the middle and lower classes, aristocrats being conspicuous by their absence; here the shippers and shopkeepers of the towns were influential, and each farmer was an independent landowner rather than the tenant of a feudal lord.

that in Virginia and Carolina, "gentlemen" of aristo- neage had acquired "plantations" and taken up a mode of li.. milar to that of English nobles and squires, but as the plan ions were cultivated by Negro slaves, the aristocracy of the South was based on the subjection of one race to another rather than upon the subjection of some white men to others; and here, as elsewhere in the southern and middle colonies, there was a constant influx of lower-class immigrants who became tradesmen or small-scale farmers. Besides, there was so much unoccupied land on the colonial frontiers that any white man could become an independent landowner by moving on and clearing a farm of his own. The frontiersman was a novel and very important element in British colonial life in America; he learned to be self-reliant and self-assertive; and he emphasized the tendency among colonists to brook no social superior. As William Penn once complained, the colonists seemed to "think nothing taller than themselves but the trees."

(3) Geographical conditions likewise favored political radicalism in America. The colonies were so far away from the mother-country, and communication across the Atlantic was so slow and arduous in the days of sailing vessels, that it was not easy for England to control the details of their government. Moreover, since the colonies on the North American coast were at first considered rather poor and unprofitable, it hardly seemed worthwhile to interfere very systematically with their local affairs. The Stuart Kings were too absorbed in their effort to establish absolute monarchy in England to pay close or continuous attention to its establishment in America. And the succeeding parliamentary regime tended, especially under Walpole, to neglect the colonies. In this way the colonists grew accustomed to managing their own affairs and resented interference by the mother-country.

**Trade Relations**

In one important matter—the matter of commerce—the British Parliament was committed to a policy which involved interference with the colonies. This policy was based on mercantilism, the notion that the government should regulate the commerce of its subjects in such a way as to build up the country's wealth and power. Now the colonists were obviously British subjects, and, according to mercantilist doctrine, they owed a threefold duty to the nation: (1) they should furnish

the mother-country with commodities which could not be produced at home; (2) they should not injure the mother-country by competing with its industries or by enriching its commercial rivals; and (3) they should help bear the burdens of the government, army, and navy.

Some of the resulting regulations of colonial industry and trade were doubtless beneficial to the colonists, but they were made by the British Parliament, without sanction of the colonial legislatures, and in the main they were prejudicial to the economic interests of the colonies. Yet for some time they were tolerated by the colonists for three chief reasons.

In the first place, for many years they had been poorly enforced. During his long ministry, from 1721 to 1742, Sir Robert Walpole had winked at infractions of the law and allowed the colonies to develop as best they might under a policy which has been appropriately described as one of "salutary neglect." During the colonial wars, it had been inexpedient and impossible to insist upon the Navigation Acts, for example; and smuggling became so common that respectable merchants made no effort to conceal their illegal traffic in goods.

Secondly, the colonies would gladly endure a good deal of economic hardship in order to have the help of the mother-country against the French. So long as France was in possession of Canada and French governors at Quebec were sending their Indian allies southward and eastward to burn New England villages, it was very comforting to think that the mother-country would dispatch armies of redcoats to conquer the savages and defeat the French.

Thirdly, the American colonists were too weak and too divided, prior to the second half of the eighteenth century, to make common and effective cause against the restrictions which the mother-country put upon their trade and industry. The thirteen colonies were distinct entities, disparate in origin, in social structure, in religious composition, and in economic activity.

However, with the conclusion of the French and Indian War (the American counterpart of the Seven Years' War) in 1763, conditions were materially changed. The British colonies were no longer menaced by the French. They were growing more populous, more prosperous, and more self-reliant. They were also drawing together and becoming conscious of common interests. Already in 1754 delegates from seven of the colonies held a congress at

Albany to discuss a plan of Benjamin Franklin for federating all thirteen. Although the plan was not adopted, it set colonists to thinking about the advantages of confederation and so prepared the way for subsequent union.

**Parliamentary Taxation and Colonial Opposition**

No sooner was the war ended than George III and his newly appointed prime minister, George Grenville, decided that the thirteen colonies must shoulder part of the costs. For continuing defense of the British empire in America, they estimated that an annual expenditure of £300,000 would be needed, and of this the colonists should pay £150,000. Accordingly, Grenville put through Parliament two special tax levies on the American colonies.

The first was the Sugar Act of 1764. This was an import duty on sugar. The rate was only about a half of what it had been earlier, but the Act was accompanied by drastic measures for its enforcement. British naval officers were charged with putting a stop to the customary practice of smuggling, and magistrates were empowered to issue "writs of assistance" enabling customs collectors to search private houses for smuggled goods. The Sugar Act was expected to yield a third of the amount demanded by the British ministry.

The other two-thirds of the £150,000 were to be raised under the Stamp Act of 1765. Bills of lading, official documents, deeds, wills, mortgages, notes, newspapers, and pamphlets were to be written or printed only on special stamped paper, on which the tax had been paid. The Stamp Act thus bore heavily on newspaper-publishers, pamphleteers, lawyers, bankers, and merchants. These were influential groups in the colonies, and they promptly agitated against the tax. A Boston lawyer, James Otis by name, created the popular slogan, "Taxation without representation is tyranny."

It was argued by colonial lawyers generally that the colonists were true British subjects and that taxation without representation was a flagrant violation of the "immemorial rights of Englishmen." They might be taxed by their own colonial legislatures, in which they were represented, but not by the British Parliament, in which they were not represented.

Opposition to the stamp tax spread like wildfire and culminated in a Congress at New York in October 1765, comprising dele-

gates from nine colonies. The "Stamp Act Congress," as it was called, issued a declaration of rights—the rights of trial by jury [1] and of self-taxation—and formally protested against the Stamp Act.

Parliament might have disregarded the declaration of the Congress, but not the tidings of popular excitement, of mob violence, of stamp-collectors burned in effigy. Moreover, colonial boycotts against British goods—"non-importation agreements"—were effective in creating sentiment in England in favor of conciliation. Taking advantage of Grenville's resignation, a new ministry procured the repeal of the obnoxious Stamp Act in March 1766. While the particular tax was abandoned, a Declaratory Act was issued, affirming the constitutional right of Parliament to legislate for the colonies.

This right was asserted again in 1767 by a brilliant but reckless chancellor of the exchequer, Charles Townshend, who, without the consent of the other ministers, put through Parliament the series of acts which bear his name. His intention was to raise a regular colonial revenue for the support of colonial governors, judges, and other officers as well as for the defense of the colonies. For these purposes, import duties were laid on glass, lead, painters' colors, paper, and tea; the duties were to be collected by English commissioners resident in the American ports; and infractions of the law were to be tried in courts without juries.

The Townshend Acts brought forth indignant protests. Colonial merchants renewed and extended their non-importation agreements. Within a year the imports from Great Britain fell off by more than £700,000. The customs officers were unable or afraid to collect the duties strictly, and it is said that in three years the total revenue from them amounted to only £16,000. Troops were dispatched to overawe Boston, but the angry Bostonians hooted and hissed the "lobsterbacks," as the redcoats were derisively styled, and in 1770 provoked them to actual bloodshed—the so-called "Boston Massacre."

At this crucial moment, King George III chose a new prime minister, Lord North, a Tory gentleman of ability and charm, unfailingly humorous, and unswervingly faithful to the King. Among his first measures was the repeal (1770) of the hated

[1] The right of trial by jury had been violated by British officials in punishing smugglers.

Townshend duties. Merely a tax of threepence a pound on tea was retained, in order that the colonies might not think that Parliament had surrendered its right to tax them. Lord North even made an arrangement with the East India Company whereby tea was sold so cheaply that it would not pay to smuggle tea from the Dutch.

But the colonists would not now yield even the principle of parliamentary taxation.[1] They insisted that were they to pay this tax, trifling as it might be, Parliament would assert that they had acknowledged its right to tax them, and would soon lay heavier burdens upon them. They therefore refused to buy the tea, and on a cold December night in 1773 a number of Boston citizens, dressed up like Indians, boarded a British tea ship, and emptied 342 chests of tea into the harbor.

Boston's "tea-party" brought punishment swift and sure in the famous five "intolerable acts" (1774). Boston harbor was closed; Massachusetts was practically deprived of self-government; royal officers who committed capital offenses were to be tried in England or in other colonies; royal troops were quartered on the colonists; and the province of Quebec was extended south to the Ohio River, cutting off vast western territories claimed by Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Virginia.

The so-called Quebec Act, which authorized this extension of a formerly French province, was particularly important. For in seeking to assure the loyalty of the Catholic French Canadians to Great Britain, it granted to the Catholic Church in Quebec a toleration and even a privileged position which were in sharp contrast with the harsh anti-Catholic laws in Britain and the other British possessions and which evoked special opposition from the Puritan masses in the thirteen colonies.

In the same year (1774) the first Continental Congress of delegates from all the colonies, except Georgia, met in Philadelphia "to deliberate and determine upon wise and proper measures, to be by them recommended to all the colonies, for the recovery and establishment of their just rights and liberties, civil and religious, and the restoration of union and harmony between Great Britain and the colonies." The Congress dispatched a petition to George III and urged the

**Continental Congress**

[1] Despite the fact that the colonists had regularly been paying import duties levied by the British Parliament on molasses and on foreign wine.

colonists to be faithful to the "American Association" for the non-importation of British goods.

Neither King nor colonists would yield a point. William Pitt, now Earl of Chatham, spoke in the House of Lords in behalf of compromise, and Edmund Burke, another eminent Whig, urged conciliation on the House of Commons. But like the King, the majority in the British Parliament were adamant; they knew that the colonial claims were novel and revolutionary and believed that firmness would lead to their withdrawal. As for the colonists, a growing faction among them—the so-called "patriots"—were already fast drifting into actual rebellion. In April, 1775, fighting took place between American colonials and English soldiers at Lexington in Massachusetts. A month later a second Continental Congress, this one representing all the thirteen colonies, addressed a final petition to George III for the redress of colonial grievances and entrusted the command of the combined colonial militias to a Virginia country gentleman, George Washington.

Not all the American colonists were rebellious. A fairly large group, called "Loyalists," or "Tories," remained loyal to the King and did what they could to uphold the British cause in America; and probably an even larger number of colonists were at first indifferent to what went on or undecided as to which cause to espouse. The group of "Patriots," however, were energetic and were determined, if necessary, to defy the British Parliament as well as the British King; and circumstances enabled them to increase in number and gain eventual control of the colonial legislatures and the continental congresses.

**"Loyalists" and "Patriots"**

In the excitement, "Patriots" circulated throughout the colonies many an inflammatory pamphlet. One of the most famous, entitled *Common Sense,* was from the pen of Thomas Paine, a radical Englishman who had emigrated to America and who sympathized with the colonists. The time had come, Paine declared, for the colonies to decide on a "final separation" from England. There was no reason for remaining loyal to the King. Monarchs, after all, had no "divine right" to rule their fellow men. Kings were merely "crowned ruffians." If they had unlimited powers, they were despots; whereas if they were constitutional monarchs, as the King of England was supposed to be, they were useless and expensive figureheads. Paine's pamphlet was published at Philadelphia in January 1776, just at the moment when George III,

turning a deaf ear to all colonial petitions and conciliatory pleas, was calling for troops to crush the rebellion in America.

In such circumstances, *Common Sense* and other similar pamphlets of the time were bought and read by thousands of colonists, who, no longer feeling veneration for the British monarchy or empire, felt justified in fighting for complete independence. What had begun as opposition to taxes at once assumed the character of a political revolution.

**Declaration of Independence**

On July 4, 1776, the Continental Congress took thoroughly revolutionary action. It unanimously adopted a "declaration of independence," which had been written for the most part by an "enlightened" Virginian, Thomas Jefferson, and which expressed principles utterly at variance with those of divine-right monarchy or of any unpopular government. (1) All men—not merely Englishmen—are endowed by their Creator, the Declaration boldly asserted, with certain "unalienable rights," among which are "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." (2) All governments derive "their just powers from the consent of the governed"—a succinct statement of the principle of popular, as opposed to aristocratic, government. (3) Hence it is perfectly justifiable to overthrow a tyrannical government and to establish a popular one, by force of arms if necessary; in other words, there is a "right of revolution." On these bases of unalienable rights, popular sovereignty, and the right of revolution, the declaration concluded that "these united colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and independent states."

In America the declaration of independence was acclaimed by all "Patriots." In New York City they pulled down the leaden statue of King George and molded it into bullets. Everywhere they exiled or silenced the "Tories," revolutionized the several colonial governments, and insisted that the "United States" were no longer a group of rebellious colonies but a belligerent nation entitled to recognition by other nations.

In Great Britain, Parliament and King vied with each other in denouncing the declaration as an act of treason and persisted in viewing the colonists as rebels. In vain did the revolutionary colonists seek the mediation of English Whigs and the cooperation of the French Canadians in Quebec and Nova Scotia. These latter had only recently become British subjects, and it was imagined that they would welcome the opportunity to join in a revolt

against Great Britain. But the French Canadians were Catholic, and they had reason to believe that their religion and their nationality would be safer in the custody of far-away Britain than in that of the nearer and more radically Protestant United States; Quebec and Nova Scotia remained loyal.

It is possible, in the circumstances, that the thirteen colonies might have been reduced to submission within a short time, for many of the well-to-do colonists were opposed to war with England, and the French Canadians were more disposed to fight for Britain than for the British colonists. Even had the "people of the United States" supported the struggle unanimously, they were no match for Great Britain in wealth, population, or naval power. As it was, however, Great Britain allowed the revolution to get under full headway before making a serious effort to suppress it. Then, in 1776, a force of about 30,000 men, many of whom were mercenary German soldiers, commonly called "Hessians," was sent to occupy New York.

**War of American Independence**

Thenceforward, the British pursued aggressive tactics, and inasmuch as their armies were generally superior to those of the colonists in numbers, discipline, and equipment, and besides were supported by powerful fleets, they were able to possess themselves of the important colonial ports of New York, Philadelphia, and Charleston, and to win many victories. On the other hand, the region to be conquered was extensive and the rebel armies stubborn and elusive.

Moreover, the colonists possessed a skilful leader in the person of the Virginia planter who has already been mentioned as taking a part in the French and Indian War. At first, George Washington was criticized for bringing the gravity of a judge and the dignified bearing of a courtier to the battlefield, but he soon proved his ability. He was wise enough to retreat before superior forces, always keeping just out of harm's way, and occasionally catching his incautious pursuer unawares, as at Princeton or Trenton.

One of the crucial events of the war was the surrender of the British General Burgoyne with some six thousand men at Saratoga, in October 1777, after he had invaded New York from Canada. At that very time, Benjamin Franklin was in Paris trying to persuade France to ally itself with the United

States. Franklin's charming personality, his "republican plainness," his shrewd common sense, as well as his knowledge of philosophy and science, made him welcome in the "enlightened" salons of Paris; but the French government, although still smarting under the humiliating treaty of 1763, would not yield to his persuasion until the American victory at Saratoga seemed to indicate that the time had come to strike. An alliance with the United States was concluded, and in 1778 war was declared against Great Britain.

The war now took on a larger aspect. In its scale of operations and in its immediate significance the fighting in the colonies was dwarfed by a world-wide conflict. In the attack upon Great Britain, France was presently joined by Spain (1779). Holland, indignant at the way in which Great Britain had tried to exclude Dutch traders from commerce with America, joined the Bourbons (1780) against their common foe. Other nations, too, had become alarmed at the rapid growth and domineering maritime policy of Great Britain. Since the outbreak of hostilities, British captains and admirals had claimed the right to search and seize neutral vessels trading with America or bearing contraband of war. Against this dangerous practice, Catherine II of Russia protested vigorously, and in 1780 formed with Sweden and Denmark the "armed neutrality of the North" to uphold the protest with force, if necessary. Prussia, Portugal, the Two Sicilies, and the Holy Roman Empire subsequently pronounced their adherence to the Armed Neutrality, and Great Britain was confronted by an almost unanimously hostile Europe.

In the actual operations against Great Britain only three nations figured—France, Spain, and Holland; and of the three the last named caused little trouble except in the North Sea. More to be feared were France and Spain, for by them the British Empire was attacked in all its parts. For a while in 1779 even the home-country was threatened by a Franco-Spanish fleet of sixty-six sail, convoying an army of 60,000 men; but the threat was dissipated. Powerful Spanish and French forces. launched against Great Britain's Mediterranean possessions, succeeded in taking Minorca, but were repulsed by the British garrison of Gibraltar.

On the continent of North America the insurgent colonists, aided by French fleets and French soldiers, gained a signal vic-

tory. An American army under Washington and a French fleet suddenly closed in upon the British general, Lord Cornwallis, at Yorktown, Virginia, and compelled him to surrender in October, 1781, with over 7,000 men. The capitulation of Cornwallis virtually decided the struggle in America, for all the reserve forces of Great Britain were required in Europe, in the West Indies, and in Asia.

Matters were going badly for Great Britain until a naval victory in the Caribbean Sea partially redeemed the day. For three winters an indecisive war had been carried on in the West Indies, but in 1782 thirty-six British ships, under the gallant Rodney, met the French Count de Grasse with thirty-three ships near the group of islands known as "the Saints," and a battle ensued in April, 1782. During the fight the wind suddenly veered around, making a gap in the line of French ships, and into this gap sailed the British admiral, breaking up the French fleet, and, in the confusion, capturing six vessels.


While the battle of "the Saints" saved the British power in the West Indies, the outlook in the East became less favorable. At first the British were successful in seizing the French forts in India (1778) and in defeating (1781) the native ally of the French, Hyder Ali, the Sultan of Mysore. But in 1782 the balance was evened by victories of the French admiral Suffren.

Unsuccessful in America, inglorious in India, expelled from Minorca, faced with revolt in Ireland, and weary of war, Great Britain was ready for peace, but not entirely humbled. It was still secure at home, victorious over the Dutch, triumphant in the Caribbean, and unmoved on Gibraltar. Defeat, but not humiliation, was the keynote of the treaties (1783) which Great Britain concluded, one at Paris with the United States, and one at Versailles with France and Spain.

**Peace Settlement**

By the treaty of Paris the former thirteen colonies were recognized as the sovereign and independent United States of America—bounded on the north by Canada and the Great Lakes, on the east by the Atlantic, on the west by the Mississippi, and on the south by Florida. Important fishing rights on the Newfoundland Banks and the privilege of navigation on the Mississippi were extended to the new nation.

Had it not been for the disastrous battle of "the Saints," the French might have dictated very favorable terms in the treaty of


OREGON TERRITORY ANNEXED IN 1846
LOUISIANA PURCHASE FROM FRANCE IN 1803
ACQUIRED FROM MEXICO IN 1848
PURCHASED FROM MEXICO IN 1853
TEXAS REPUBLIC ANNEXED IN 1845
FLORIDA PURCHAS. FROM SPAIN IN 1819
THE UNITED STATES, 1776-1860
500 MILES
BOUNDARY 1846
GREAT BRITAIN BOUNDARY 1818
BOUNDARY 1783
BOUNDARY 1842
Astoria
San Francisco
Monterey
Los Angeles
MEXICO
CANADA
DAKOTA
WISCONSIN
Boston
New York
Philadelphia
Yorktown
Charleston
Mobile
New Orleans
Galveston
St. Louis
Louisville
Pittsburgh
Chicago

Versailles, but, as it was, France merely regained Tobago in the West Indies and Senegal in Africa, which had been lost in 1763.[1] Better than France fared Spain. By the treaty of Versailles Spain received the island of Minorca and the territory of Florida, which then included the southern portions of what later became the American states of Alabama and Mississippi.

Holland, the least important participant in the war, was not a party to the treaty of Versailles, but was left to conclude a separate treaty with Great Britain in the following year (1784). The Dutch were deprived of commercial stations in India and forced to share with British merchants the valuable trade of the Malay archipelago.

The vital significance of the War of American Independence (1776–1783) lay not, however, in territorial gains of Spain and France or in commercial losses of Holland or even in diminished dominion of Great Britain. It lay rather in the fact that the war assured the success of the American Revolution and, perhaps indirectly but none the less really, dealt a blow both at divine-right monarchy and at aristocratic privilege.

The American Revolution carried the principles of the earlier British Revolutions—the Puritan Revolution and the "Glorious" Revolution—to a more nearly logical conclusion. It got rid not merely of a King, but of kingship itself. It exalted parliamentary, that is representative, government, but it exalted even more the people represented. Far more clearly than the earlier revolutions, it invoked the doctrines of popular sovereignty and national self-determination. The American revolution paved the way for democracy in the United States—and in the world.

**American Democracy**

At first the several state legislatures, which supplanted the colonial assemblies, were not very democratic. The franchise was limited to males and usually to landowners and the more well-to-do classes. Often, too, there was a religious qualification, excluding all except Protestants or a particular kind of Protestant from the privilege of voting. Only men of considerable wealth were eligible for election to important offices. On the other hand, there was no hereditary aristocracy, no House of Lords, and the governors, instead of being appointed by a far-away monarch or minister, were elected by the people or by the legislatures. And

[1] See above, p. 355.

gradually (and relatively rapidly) religious disabilities and property qualifications were abolished.

In the meantime, a central national government was formed for the United States. Here again, the first steps were halting. In 1777 the revolutionary Continental Congress drafted "articles of confederation," but, as finally ratified by the several states in 1781, they provided for hardly more than a loose permanent alliance of thirteen nations. In 1787, however, a firm step was taken. A fairly detailed written constitution was drafted at Philadelphia, welding the thirteen nations into one. While each state was to manage its own local affairs and legislate on some matters, a strong federal government was set up, with wide but specified powers and with agencies of its own: a House of Representatives, chosen by popular vote; a Senate, representing the states; an elected President, to execute the laws; and a Supreme Court, to act as court of last resort. In 1791 this federal constitution was amended so as to guarantee personal liberties, and the provision was inserted, doubtless because of the multiplicity of religions in America, that "congress shall make no laws respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." Almost simultaneously the several states adopted new republican constitutions, most of which contained similar provisions.

**American Federal Government**

In 1789 the federal constitution went into effect, and George Washington became the first President of the United States. Under his guidance and with the assistance of an able group of cooperating statesmen, the novel constitution proved practicable and gathered prestige at home and abroad. This prestige was heightened in 1797 when Washington, having served two terms of four years each without evincing the slightest inclination to make himself a dictator, voluntarily relinquished the presidency and was succeeded in strictly legal manner by a hard-working Massachusetts "patriot," John Adams. Thereafter the presidency continued to be handed on from one person to another, sometimes after most exciting electoral campaigns, but never contrary to constitutional prescription.

Here, then, as a result of the American Revolution, was a nation breaking with many political traditions of the past and exemplifying to the modern world that it could endure and prosper on hitherto untried experiments. The United States was the first

Moreover, the failure of the existing British government to put down the American Revolution, while it temporarily increased the enmity or scorn of many Englishmen for the United States and its experiments, provided ample opportunity for disgruntled politicians and popular leaders in Britain to assail the government and to demand changes in its personnel and policies. As a result of attacks in Parliament and dissatisfaction in the country, George III was obliged in 1782 to part with the Tory cabinet of Lord North and to choose ministers who were more willing to make some concession to popular demands for reform.

Several reforms were promptly effected within the British Empire. The Irish parliament was accorded an almost independent position in 1782, and in 1793 the right to vote for members of it (though not the right to sit in it) was extended to Catholic Irishmen on the same footing as to Protestant Irishmen. Meanwhile, in 1784, the British Parliament created a "board of control" to supervise the government of India and to see that the East India Company did not abuse its privileges.[1]

Within Great Britain, measures looking toward a democratizing of Parliament were proposed by such reforming statesmen as Charles James Fox and the younger William Pitt (son of the Earl of Chatham). But before these measures could be enacted, British attention was diverted to what appeared as a mania of revolution in France.

France was more immediately and profoundly affected by the American Revolution than Great Britain. France had actively aided the rebellion of the British colonies, doubtless for selfish reasons so far as its monarch and his chief ministers were concerned, but with altruistic sympathy on the part of many of its intellectuals and common people. Numerous young Frenchmen, some of them of noble blood, like Lafayette, had sought romantic adventure in fighting beside Washington in the New World and had returned home with romantic enthusiasm about the strength of republican virtue and the beauty of democratic simplicity. Their enthusiasm they communicated to other Frenchmen already prepared by radical philosophers of the Enlightenment to expect speedy progress to some Utopia in which men would be natural, free, and equal. Rousseau's dreams seemed already realized in America. No wonder that a

**American Influence on France**

[1] See above, pp. 357–360.

man like Benjamin Franklin enjoyed an immense popularity in France: he was such a happy combination of "noble savage" and "Chinese sage"! No wonder, too, that Frenchmen, growing critical of the privileged classes and despotic monarchy in their own country, followed with extraordinary interest the revolutionary developments in America.

Moreover, France was faced at the close of the War of American Independence in 1783 with a far graver financial problem than Great Britain had faced twenty years earlier. And the absolute monarchy of France proved far less able than the British Parliament, or the American Republic, to solve financial problems. Public bankruptcy was the result of French war-aid to the United States and it led, only six years later, to the French Revolution.



# CHAPTER XI

## THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

### I. ANTECEDENT CIRCUMSTANCES



RANCE in the eighteenth century possessed industry, commerce, capital, and a middle class, second only to Britain's among European nations, and its peasants on the whole were better off than those of other Continental countries. France, moreover, was the center of the intellectual Enlightenment. Its literature and art were universally prized and imitated. Its scientists and social reformers were numerous and influential. Its middle class, many of its nobility and clergy, and even some of its sturdy farmers and thrifty artisans were imbued with "progressive" ideas.

According to the critical philosophy of the day, French society and politics were in need of reform, though no more so than the society and politics of any other European country. In France, as elsewhere, there was obvious lack of system and "reason." The government was the outcome of haphazard historical growth; it was both arbitrary and chaotic. In the course of time, one set of institutions and officials had been superimposed on another, so that now, in the eighteenth century, while the King was supposed to be an autocrat, he actually depended on a complicated officialdom with ill-defined powers and overlapping jurisdictions. The country had been divided since the middle ages into districts under bailiffs and seneschals whose offices were now purely ornamental. It had long been divided, too, into provinces, some of which had local parliaments or "estates," and all of which had governors. It had been divided, since Richelieu's time, into intendancies under intendants. It was also divided into judicial districts, each with a court or "parlement"; into ecclesiastical districts, each with a bishop or arch-

**Confusion in Government**

bishop; and into educational districts, each with a university. Most towns had town councils, but no two such councils were elected in the same way or possessed the same rights. There was little logic or efficiency in the French government, and its abuses arose less from a constantly exerted despotism than from dilatoriness and arbitrariness. Absolute in theory, it proved, after Louis XIV's time, ineffectual in practice.

Confusion in administration was not the only confusion in eighteenth-century France. There was no simplicity or uniformity in standards of weight and measure, in coinage, tolls, or internal customs-duties. Nor was there any uniformity in law or legal procedure. What was lawful in one town might be illegal in a place not far away. Almost four hundred varieties of law were in force in different parts of France.

To legal and administrative confusion, must be added fiscal confusion. There was no distinction between the King's income and the national income. There was no budget. Money was spent by the King or his agents as fast as it was collected. No adequate accounts were kept, and no official knew the actual condition of the finances. What has been called the tax-system of the monarchy was hardly a system at all; it had grown up, like the political machinery of the state, in a most haphazard manner. The King still obtained some revenue from his personally owned estates and manors, like any landlord. But most of the public revenue came from various kinds of national taxation which had been established at different times in the past: a general poll or head tax; an income tax; a direct land tax; a tax on foreign imports; a tax on the transport of goods between different provinces and towns within France; excise taxes; licensing taxes, etc. The difficulty here was not with the kinds of taxes (most of which are levied nowadays in "progressive" countries), but rather with the modes of assessing and collecting them. They were assessed mainly to the underprivileged classes of peasantry and bourgeoisie, while the privileged classes of clergy and nobility, that is, some of the wealthiest Frenchmen, were largely exempt. Furthermore, instead of collecting taxes direct from the taxpayers, the government would empower private corporations or individuals—the so-called "farmers of the taxes"—to monopolize the collection of certain taxes in particular districts and to retain for themselves a liberal share of what they collected.

With all its confusion and inefficiency, the French government of the eighteenth century was provokingly arbitrary at times. A person who shocked the King or offended an influential nobleman or ecclesiastic might be thrown into prison by royal order (the so-called *lettre de cachet*) and immured there indefinitely without trial. Protestants and other dissenters from the state church were now usually tolerated, but as the older laws against them still remained on the statute-books, they were subjected to repeated annoyances on the complaint of religious fanatics or of persons who merely had a grudge against them. There were also both royal and ecclesiastical censorships, which were invoked at one time or another against almost every "enlightened" writer in eighteenth-century France. These censorships were enforced too poorly and too spasmodically to be effective, but enough to be galling and troublesome.

**Arbitrariness**

In all the foregoing respects and in general conditions, France in the eighteenth century was not very different from other countries on the continent of Europe. Its critical intellectuals were perhaps more numerous and more incisive. Its growing bourgeoisie was perhaps more restless and ambitious. Yet there were two circumstances which were peculiar to France and of ominous significance. First, the French royal family was incompetent. Second, the French state was becoming bankrupt.

Louis XIV, the Grand Monarch, had been the last of the really competent Bourbon Kings of France; he had brains and he worked hard. And he had had the wit to perceive toward the end of his reign how very costly were his wars and his ostentation. As he lay on his deathbed, flushed with fever, he called his five-year-old great-grandson and heir, the future Louis XV, to the bedside and said: "My child, you will soon be sovereign of a great kingdom. Do not forget your obligations to God; remember that it is to Him you owe all that you are. Endeavor to live at peace with your neighbors; do not imitate me in my fondness for war, nor in the exorbitant expenditure which I have incurred. Take counsel in all your actions. Endeavor to relieve the people at the earliest possible moment, and thus to accomplish what, unfortunately, I am unable to do myself."

It was good advice. But it was woefully neglected during the long reign of Louis XV (1715–1774). France continued to participate in all the great international conflicts—the War of the

Polish Election (1733–1738), the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–1748), the Seven Years' War (1756–1763) [1]—with constantly increasing expenditure of men and money, and with losses far exceeding any gain. Though Lorraine and Corsica were obtained by Louis XV, the protracted and costly duel with Great Britain left France a second-rate maritime power, deprived of almost all of its extensive colonial dominion in America and in India.[2]

**Woeful Reign of Louis XV**

Moreover, Louis XV not only lavished money and estates upon a series of pretty-faced, putty-headed mistresses, including Pompadour and du Barry, but too often heeded their shallow advice on political matters. Unlike Britain, where talented members of the upper and middle classes actively participated in government and felt responsibility for it, France presented the spectacle of an irresponsible and selfish nobility, and of a bourgeoisie unable to exercise any real authority. The government, under Louis XV, was one of petticoats more than of talents.

Early in his reign Louis XV had been dubbed Louis the Well Beloved, and to the end he was "beloved" by courtiers who bled him—and the French treasury—white. Versailles remained gay. Its artificial elegance was alluringly depicted by Fragonard. Its fountains played, its minuets were danced, its furniture was gilded. Court ladies painted their cheeks ever more brightly, and butterfly nobles and ecclesiastics spent their fortunes ever more recklessly.

But Versailles was not France. At Paris and in the provinces there was popular grumbling, as taxes went higher and the hope of royal reform receded. Louis XV grew afraid to ride in town or country; peasants saluted him sullenly, and artisans jeered at him; he knew that he was becoming the Well Hated. Yet, "it will surely last as long as I," he cynically said; "my successor may take care of himself."

His successor was his grandson, Louis XVI (1774–1792), virtuous and well-meaning, but lacking in intelligence and willpower. He was too awkward to preside with dignity over the sophisticated court; he was too irresolute to dominate the government. He liked to shoot deer from out the palace window, or to play at lock-making in his royal carpentry

**Louis XVI**

[1] See above, pp. 280, 316–321.

[2] See above, pp. 349–355.

shop. He might have been a good bourgeois; he could not be an enlightened despot.

At first, hopes ran high, for Turgot, friend of Voltaire and contributor to the *Encyclopedia,* was named minister of finance, and reform was in the air. Industry and commerce were to be unshackled, and the tax burden rendered less crushing on the lower classes by transferring a proportionate share of it to the nobles and clergy. Taxes on food were to be abolished. The peasants were to be freed from forced labor on the roads. But Turgot only stirred up opposition. The nobles and clergy were anxious to preserve their exemptions from taxation. Courtiers resented the threatened reduction of their pensions. Owners of monopolies were frightened. Peasants misunderstood the projects. Riots broke out. Everybody seemed to be relieved when, in 1776, Turgot was dismissed.

Turgot had been a theorist; his successor was a business man. Jacques Necker was well known in Paris as a hard-headed Swiss banker, and Madame Necker's receptions were attended by the chief personages of the bourgeois society of Paris. During his five years in office, Necker applied business methods to the royal finances. He borrowed 400,000,000 francs from his banker friends, bettered the collection of taxes, and audited the accounts. In 1781 he issued a report, or "Account Rendered of the Financial Condition," which was acclaimed by business men as the first public revelation of the secrets of the royal treasury.[1]

The disclosures were resented, however, in court circles and particularly by the Queen, Marie Antoinette. She was an Austrian princess, the daughter of Maria Theresa, and in the eyes of the French people she always remained a foreigner—"the Austrian," they called her—and a living symbol of the ruinous alliance between Habsburgs and Bourbons which had been arranged by Madame de Pompadour and had contributed to the disasters and disgrace of the Seven Years' War. Now, when the Queen's friends complained of Necker's miserliness, she demanded his dismissal. Her demand was granted, and Necker was replaced in 1781 by an obsequious new finance-minister, Calonne.

Already France was engaged in still another big war—the War

[1] The *Compte Rendu,* as it was called in France, was not accurate. Necker, in order to secure credit for his financial administration, made matters appear better than they were.

of American Independence (1778–1783).[1] From it, France obtained some revenge for previous defeats by Great Britain, but at what alarming cost! The French treasury, heavily indebted at the beginning of the war, was on the verge of bankruptcy at its close. Calonne could negotiate fresh loans only at ruinously high interest-rates. All questions of reform were obviously centering in the single, simple question of public finance. How to balance expenditure with income? How to restrict the one and expand the other?

**Debt Problem**

As a matter of fact, the expenditure, though wasteful, was not too great for a rich country like France. And the tax burdens might have been eased for the lower classes if the well-to-do upper classes had been made to pay. Successive finance-ministers so advised Louis XVI. Here, however, was the crux of the situation: the upper classes were not minded to surrender any privilege, and the well-intentioned King was most reluctant to compel them.

In 1786 the interest-bearing debt amounted to $600,000,000, the government was running in debt at least $25,000,000 a year, and the treasury officials were experiencing the utmost difficulty in negotiating new loans. Something had to be done. In desperation the King convened (1787) an Assembly of Notables—145 of the chief nobles, bishops, and magistrates—in the vain hope that they would consent to the taxation of the privileged and unprivileged alike. The Notables were not so self-sacrificing, however, and contented themselves with abolishing compulsory labor on the roads, approving the establishment of provincial assemblies, and demanding the dismissal of Calonne, the minister of finance. The question of taxation, they said, should be referred to the Estates General.

A new minister of finance, who succeeded Calonne—Archbishop Loménie de Brienne—thanked the Notables and sent them home. He made so many fine promises that hope temporarily revived, and a new loan was raised. But the parlement of Paris soon saw through the artifices of the suave minister and refused to register royal decrees for further loans or taxes. Encouraged by popular approval, the parlement went on to draw up a declaration of rights and to assert that subsidies could constitutionally be granted only by the nation's representatives—the Estates General. This sounded to the government

**Estates General**

[1] See above, pp. 474–476.

like revolution, and the parlements were abolished. At once there was popular protest; soldiers refused to arrest the judges; and excited crowds assembled in Paris and other cities and clamored for the convocation of the Estates General.

Menaced with revolt, the well-intentioned Louis XVI finally yielded to the clamor. In 1788 he restored the popular Necker to the ministry of finance, and simultaneously summoned the Estates General to meet at Versailles the following May. The Estates General were by no means a novel institution. Though for a hundred and seventy-five years the French monarchs had done without them, they were still, in theory, a legitimate part of the French government. Summoned for the first time by King Philip the Fair as far back as 1302, they had thenceforth been convoked at irregular intervals until 1614.[1] Their organization had always been in three separate bodies, representing by election the three traditional estates, or "orders," of the realm—clergy, nobility, and commoners ("third estate"). Each estate had voted as a unit, and two out of the three estates were sufficient to carry a measure. The function of the Estates General had been advisory rather than legislative, and their recommendations had frequently been ignored or violated by the King. It might prove dangerous in the troubled state of affairs of 1788–1789 to convoke such a public debating body as the Estates General, but it was not revolutionary.

In the winter of 1788–1789 elections to the several estates were held throughout France in accordance with medieval usage. Also, in accordance with old custom and royal request, the electors drafted reports on the condition of their respective localities and recommendations for their representatives and for the government. These reports and recommendations were called *cahiers;* there were many of them, for almost every local group of voters of each of the three estates prepared a *cahier.*

**The Cahiers**

By the time the elections were held and the *cahiers* drafted, it was apparent that the majority of the French people expected from the Estates General a greater measure of reform than their sovereign had anticipated. To be sure, the *cahiers* were not revolutionary in wording. With remarkable uniformity they expressed loyalty to the monarchy and fidelity to the King. In not a single

[1] See above, p. 245.

one was there a threat of violent change. But in spirit most of the *cahiers* reflected the radical political philosophy of the age, that there should be fundamental, rational reforms in government and society. Many of the *cahiers* of the Third Estate were particularly insistent upon the removal of social inequalities and abuses, and emphatic about the need of establishing *national* unity and solidarity. It was clear that if the elected representatives of the Third Estate carried out the instructions of their constituents, the voting of additional taxes to the government would be delayed until grievances had been redressed.

On the whole, it appeared likely that the elected representatives of the Third Estate would heed the *cahiers*. They were educated and earnest men. Two thirds of them were lawyers or judges; many, also, were scholars; only ten could possibly be considered as belonging to the lower classes. A goodly number admired the governmental system of Great Britain, in which the royal power had been reduced and the role of the nation exalted; and most of them followed with interest the contemporary political developments in America.[1]

**Third Estate**

In the early history of the Estates General, the Third Estate had been of comparatively slight importance either in society or in politics, and Philip the Fair had proclaimed that the duty of its members was "to hear, receive, approve, and perform what should be commanded of them by the King." But between the fourteenth and eighteenth centuries the relative social importance of the bourgeoisie had enormously increased. The class was more numerous, wealthier, more enlightened, and more experienced in the conduct of business. It became clearer with the lapse of time that it was more representative of the nation than nobility or clergy. Louis XVI seemed to recognize this by providing that the number of elected representatives of the Third Estate should equal the combined numbers of the First and Second Estates. The commoners naturally drew the deduction from the royal concession that they were to exercise paramount influence in the Estates General of 1789.

The Third Estate, as elected in the winter of 1788–1789, was fortunate in possessing two capable spokesmen, Mirabeau and Siéyès, both of whom belonged by birth or office to the upper classes, but who gladly accepted election as deputies of the un-

[1] See above, pp. 478, 480.

privileged classes. Mirabeau was the son of a bluff old marquis who was not very successful in bringing up his family. The son had been so wild and unruly that his father had repeatedly obtained *lettres de cachet* from the King in order that prison bars might keep the "bad boy" out of mischief. Released several times only to fall into new excesses, Mirabeau found at last in the stirring political events of 1789 an opportunity for expressing his belief in constitutional government and an outlet for his intense energy. From the convocation of the Estates General to his death in 1791, he was one of the most prominent men in France. His gigantic physique, half-broken by disease and imprisonment, his shaggy eyebrows, his heavy head, gave him an impressive, though sinister, appearance. And for quickness in perceiving at once a problem and its solution, as well as for gifts of reverberating oratory, he had no equal.

Less forceful and more doctrinaire was the priest, Siéyès, whose lack of devotion to Christianity and the clerical calling was matched by his zealous regard for the critical philosophy of the day and for the practical arts of politics and diplomacy. It was a pamphlet of his that, on the eve of the assembling of the Estates General, furnished the Third Estate with its platform and program. "What is the Third Estate?" asked Siéyès. "It is everything," he replied. "What has it been hitherto in the political order? Nothing! What does it desire? To be something!"

If the Third Estate—and the Estates General as a whole—were uncertain about what was expected of them, Louis XVI and his ministers seemed more uncertain. Indeed, the most amazing and significant fact about the situation was that the royal government formulated no program. It did not study the *cahiers* or deduce from them any proposals or recommendations to put before the Estates General. In other words, the royal government exercised no leadership, and this gave to the situation a peculiarly chaotic character.

The position of the Third Estate was still officially undefined when the Estates General assembled at Versailles in May 1789. The King received his advisers with pomp and a colorless speech. The only thing which seemed obvious was that Louis XVI intended their business to be financial and their organization traditional. He would have the three estates vote "by order," that is, as three distinct bodies, so that the doubled membership of the

Third Estate would have but one vote to the privileged orders' two. With this view the majority of the nobles and a large part of the clergy, especially the higher clergy, were in full sympathy. On the other hand, the commoners began to argue that the Estates General should organize themselves as a single assembly, in which each member should have one vote, such voting "by head" marking the establishment of true *national* representation in France, and that the assembly should forthwith concern itself with a general reformation of French society and government. With the commoners' argument a few of the liberal nobles, headed by Lafayette, and a considerable group of the clergy, particularly the parish priests, agreed; and it had the support of the bulk of public opinion outside the Estates General. Bad harvests in 1788 had been followed by an unusually severe winter. The peasantry was in an extremely wretched plight, and the cities, notably Paris, suffered from a shortage of food. The increase of popular distress, like a black cloud before a storm, gave ominous weight to the demands of the commoners.

Over the constitutional question, fraught as it was with the most significant consequences, the parties wrangled for a month. The King, unwilling to offend anyone, shilly-shallied. But the uncompromising attitude of the privileged orders and the indecision of the court at length forced the issue. On June 17, 1789, the Third Estate proclaimed itself a *"National Assembly"* and invited the other Estates to join it in the work of national reformation. Three days later, when the deputies of the Third Estate came to the hall which had been set apart in the palace of Versailles for their use, they found its doors shut and guarded by troops and a notice to the effect that it was undergoing repairs.

Then the commoners precipitated a veritable revolution. Led by Mirabeau and Siéyès, they proceeded to a big public building in the vicinity, which was variously used as a riding-hall and tennis court. There, amidst intense excitement, with upstretched hands, they took an oath as members of the "National Assembly" that they would not separate until they had drawn up a constitution for France. The "Oath of the Tennis Court" was the true beginning of the French Revolution. Without royal sanction, in fact against the express commands of the King, the Estates General had been transformed, by a simple proclamation of one of the

**Change of Estates General into National Assembly, 1789**

Estates, into a National Assembly, which assumed the duty of establishing constitutional government in France. The "Oath of the Tennis Court" was the declaration of the end of absolute monarchy and the beginning of popular sovereignty.

What would the King do under these circumstances? The most obvious thing would be for him to suppress the revolutionary commoners by force of arms. But that would not solve his financial problems, nor could he expect the French nation to endure it. It would likely lead to a ruinous civil war. Another line of action appealed to the King; he would try a game of bluff. So he ignored the "Oath of the Tennis Court," and majestically commanded the Estates to sit separately and vote "by order." But the commoners were not to be bluffed. Now joined by a considerable number of clergy and by a few nobles, they maintained their defiant attitude and declared, in the words of Mirabeau, "We are here by the will of the people and we shall not leave our places except at the point of the bayonet." Whereupon, the irresolute Louis XVI gave way. Exactly one week after the scene in the tennis court, he reversed his earlier decrees and directed the three Estates to sit together and vote "by head" as members of a National Constituent Assembly.

### 2. NATIONAL AND DEMOCRATIC SELF-DETERMINATION

By the end of June, 1789, the stage was set for a radical alteration in the traditional political institutions and social structure of France. With the consent of the King, the nobles and clergy were now meeting with the commoners. The Estates General had become the National Constituent Assembly, and its middle-class leaders were looking forward toward the goals of individual liberty, social equality, and democratic nationalism.

Yet, before the Assembly could proceed with its labors, it had to face still another change of front on the part of the King. For, early in July, 1789, a gradual transfer of royal troops from the eastern frontier to the vicinity of Paris and Versailles indicated that Louis XVI was preparing to use force against the Assembly if it should prove too revolutionary. The Assembly at once requested the removal of the troops. The King responded by a peremptory refusal and the dismissal of Necker, the popular finance-minister. Then it was that Paris came to the rescue of the Assembly.

The Parisian populace, goaded by real want, felt instinctively that its own interests and those of the National Assembly were identical. Fired by an eloquent harangue of a young journalist, Camille Desmoulins by name, groups of them rushed to arms. For three days there was wild rioting in the city. Shops were looted, royal officers were expelled, business was at a standstill. On the third day—July 14, 1789—a mob surged out to the east end of Paris, where stood the frowning royal fortress and prison of the Bastille. Although since the accession of Louis XVI the Bastille no longer harbored political offenders, nevertheless it was still regarded as a symbol of Bourbon despotism, a grim threat against the liberties of Paris. The people would now take it and appropriate its arms and ammunition for use in defense of the National Assembly. Its garrison was small and dispirited, provisions were short, and the royal governor was irresolute. Within a few hours the mob was in possession of the Bastille, and the defenders, most of whom were Swiss mercenaries, were slaughtered.

**Attack on Bastille**

The fall of the Bastille was the first serious act of violence in the course of the Revolution. It was an unmistakable sign that the masses were with the Assembly rather than with the King. It put force behind the Assembly's decrees. It also rendered Paris practically independent of royal control, for, during the period of disorder, prominent citizens organized their own government and army. The new local government—the "commune," as it was called—was made up of those elected representatives of the various sections or wards of Paris who had chosen the city's delegates to the Estates General. It was itself a revolution in city government. It substituted popularly elected officials in place of royal agents and delegates of the medieval guilds. And the authority of the commune was sustained by a popularly enrolled militia, styled the National Guard, which soon numbered 48,000 champions of the new cause. It was obvious that, for the first time since the early days of Louis XIV, Paris rather than Versailles was leading France.

The fall of the Bastille was such a clear sign that even Louis XVI did not fail to perceive its meaning. He instantly withdrew the royal troops and again recalled Necker. He recognized the new government of Paris and confirmed the appointment of the liberal Lafayette as commander of the National Guard. He visited Paris

in person, praised what he could not prevent, and put on a red-white-and-blue cockade—combining the red and blue of the capital city with the white of the Bourbons—the new national tricolor of France. Frenchmen still celebrate the fourteenth of July, the anniversary of the fall of the Bastille, as the independence day of the French nation.

For a while it seemed as though radical reform might proceed without further interruption. The freedom of the Assembly had been affirmed and upheld. Paris had settled down once more into comparative repose. The King had apparently learned his lesson. But the victory of the revolutionaries had been gained too easily. Louis XVI might take solemn oaths and wear strange cockades, but he remained in character essentially weak. His very virtues—good intentions, love of wife, loyalty to friends—were continually abused. The Queen was bitterly opposed to the reforming policies of the National Assembly and actively resented any diminution of royal authority. Her clique of court friends and favorites disliked the decrease of the pensions and amusements to which they had long been accustomed. Court and Queen made common cause in appealing to Louis XVI. What was the weak King to do in the circumstances? He was dominated by the court, and the court had no constructive plans.

The result was renewed intrigues to employ force against the deputies and their allies, the populace of Paris. This time it was planned to bring royal troops from the garrisons in Flanders. On the night of October 1, 1789, a supper was given by the officers of the bodyguard at Versailles in honor of the arriving soldiers. Toasts were drunk and royalist songs were sung. News of the "orgy," as it was termed, spread like wildfire in Paris, where hunger was more prevalent than ever. The court and army officers at Versailles appeared to be feasting while the common people of Paris were starving. The latter believed that the presence of additional troops at Versailles would put an end to the independence of the Assembly and continue their own starvation. More excited grew the Parisians.

On October 5 was presented a strange and uncouth spectacle. A long line of the poorest women of Paris, including some men dressed as women, riotous with hunger and rage, armed with sticks and clubs, screaming "Bread! bread! bread!" were straggling along the twelve miles of highway from Paris to Ver-

sailles. They were going to demand bread of the King. Lafayette and his National Guardsmen, who had been unable or unwilling to allay the excitement in Paris, marched at a respectful distance behind the women out to Versailles.

**Removal of Government to Paris**

By the time Lafayette reached the royal palace, the women were surrounding it, howling and cursing, and demanding bread or blood; only the fixed bayonets of the royal troops prevented them from invading the building, and even the troops were weakening. Lafayette at once became the man of the hour. He sent the soldiers back to the barracks and with his own force undertook to guard the royal family. Despite his precautions, it was a wild night. There was continuing tumult in the streets and, at one time, shortly before dawn, a gang broke into the palace and killed several of the Queen's bodyguard.

When morning came, the well-meaning King consented to do what was to prove fatal to him and fateful for the Revolution; he consented to accompany the mob back to Paris. And so on October 6 there was a procession from Versailles to Paris more curious and more significant than that of the preceding day in the opposite direction. There were still the women and a host of people from the slums, and the national guardsmen and Lafayette on his white horse, but this time in the midst of the throng was a great lumbering coach, in which rode Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette and their children. All along the route, the mob shouted "We have the baker and the baker's wife and the little cook-boy—now we shall have bread."

To Versailles the French royal family never returned. The Parisians installed Louis XVI in the palace of the Tuileries, and thenceforth he was virtually their prisoner. Moreover, the National Assembly speedily followed the King to Paris, so that from October 1789 not reactionary Versailles but radical Paris was the center of the Revolution.

The "fall of the Bastille" and the "march of the women to Versailles" were the two picturesque events which in 1789 rendered the National Assembly independent of the King and dependent upon the populace of Paris. Meanwhile, the French people at large were supplying the National Assembly with the impulse for some of its most revolutionary reforms.

Ever since the assembling of the Estates General, ordinary administration of the country had been at a standstill. The people,

expecting change, refused to pay the customary taxes and imposts, and the King, fearful of the National Assembly and of a popular uprising, hesitated to compel tax collection by force of arms. The local officials did not know whether they were to obey the Assembly or the King. In fact, the Assembly was for a time so busy with constitutional questions that it neglected to provide for local government, and the King was always timorous. The July rioting in Paris and the fall of the Bastille were signals for similar action elsewhere; other towns substituted new elective officers for royal or guild agents and organized national guards of their own. Chaos, which had already overtaken the central government of the King, thus overtook his agencies of local government. The royal intendants and governors quitted their posts. The traditional courts of justice, whether feudal or royal, ceased to function. The whole political machinery which Louis XIV had built up, now collapsed under Louis XVI; and no effective, centralized authority immediately took its place.

**Rioting in Country-side**

At the same time the revolutionary action of the townspeople spread to the country districts. In many regions, peasants attacked the *châteaux* of nobles, taking particular pains to destroy feudal or servile title-deeds. In some places, monasteries and residences of bishops were ransacked and pillaged. A few of the unlucky landlords were murdered, and others were driven into the towns or out of the country; some acquiesced in peasant demands and were left undisturbed. The summer of 1789 really ended the "old regime" in France, and the transfer of the central government from Versailles to Paris in October merely confirmed an accomplished fact.

It was one thing to end the "old regime"—to wreck the authority of the King, to trample upon the time-honored privileges of the upper classes, to destroy long-existing institutions. It was another thing to begin a "new regime"—to establish a new government and a new society which should embody the progressive aspirations of the age and at the same time bring order out of chaos. To this difficult task, the National Constituent Assembly devoted its earnest attention throughout its sessions at Paris from October 1789 to September 1791. And, despite factional differences and disturbances within the Assembly and more or less constant pressure upon it by disorderly Parisians, it managed to achieve a high degree of success. Indeed, the work of the National

Constituent Assembly was by far the most constructive and during of the whole revolutionary era.

Leaving out of consideration for the present the frightened royal family, the startled noblemen and clergy, the determined peasantry, and the excited townsfolk, and not adhering too closely to chronological order, let us concentrate our attention upon the National Assembly and review its major acts during those momentous years, 1789–1791.

**Ending Serfdom and Privilege**

The first great achievement of the Assembly was the legal destruction of feudalism and serfdom and class privilege—a long step in the direction of social equality. We have already noticed how in July, while the Assembly was still at Versailles, the royal officers in the country districts ceased to govern and how the peasants destroyed many *châteaux* amid scenes of unexpected violence. News of the rioting and disorder came to the Assembly from every province and filled its members with the liveliest apprehension. A long report, submitted by a special investigating committee on August 4, 1789, gave such harrowing details of the popular uprising as to best the Assembly to prompt action.

While debate was proceeding, one of the nobles—a relative of Lafayette—arose in his place and stated that if the peasants had attacked the property and privileges of the upper classes, it was because such property and privileges represented unjust inequality, that the fault lay there, and that the remedy was not to repress the peasants but to suppress inequality. It was immediately moved and carried that the Assembly should proclaim equality of taxation for all classes and the suppression of feudal and servile dues. Then followed a scene almost unprecedented in history. Noble vied with noble, and clergyman with clergyman, in renouncing vested rights. Serfdom was abolished. Manorial courts were suppressed. Tithes and all sorts of ecclesiastical privilege were renounced. The sale of offices was discontinued. In fact, all special privileges were swept away in one consuming burst of enthusiasm. The holocaust lasted throughout the night of the fourth of August. Within a week the various independent measures were consolidated into an impressive decree "abolishing the feudal system," and the King signed the decree. What many reforming ministers had vainly labored for years partially to accomplish was thus done by the National Assembly in a few days and with

much thoroughness. The so-called "August Days" legalized the dissolution of the traditional class-society of France and the substitution of modern individualist society.

These social changes have sometimes been ascribed to the enthusiasm and magnanimity of the privileged orders. That there was enthusiasm is unquestionable. But it may be doubted whether the nobles were so much magnanimous as terrorized. For the first time, they were genuinely frightened by the peasants, and it is possible that the true measure of their "magnanimity" was their alarm. They may have thought, moreover, that acquiescence in the first demands of the peasantry would merit some compensatory advantages to themselves. At any rate, they soon set to work in the Assembly to modify what had been done, to secure financial compensation,[1] and to prevent the enactment of additional social legislation. Outside the Assembly few nobles took kindly to the loss of privilege and property. A considerable number incited civil war, or, going into exile, sought foreign aid against revolutionary France.

It is not necessary for us to know precisely who was responsible for the "August Days." The fact remains that the "decree abolishing the feudal system" represented the most important achievement of the whole French Revolution. Henceforth, those who profited by the decree were friends of the Revolution, while the losers were its foremost opponents.

**Affirming "Rights of Man"**

A second great work of the Assembly was the proclamation of individual rights and liberties. The old society and government of France were disappearing. On what basis should the new be erected? Great Britain had its *Magna Carta* and its Bill of Rights; America had its Declaration of Independence. France was now given a "Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen." This document, which reflected the spirit of Rousseau's philosophy, and incorporated some of the British and American provisions, became the platform of the French Revolution and exerted ever widening influence on later political thought. A few of its most striking sentences were as follows: "Men are born and remain free and equal in rights." The rights of man are "liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression." "Law is the expression of the general will. Every

[1] It was only in July 1793, almost four years after the "August Days," that *all* feudal dues and rights were finally abolished without compensation.


citizen has a right to participate personally, or through his representatives, in its formation. It must be the same for all." "No person shall be accused, arrested, or imprisoned except in the cases and according to the forms prescribed by law." Religious toleration, freedom of speech, and liberty of the press were affirmed. The people were to control the finances, and to the people all officials of the state were responsible. The Declaration closed with the assertion that, "since private property is an inviolable and sacred right, no one shall be deprived thereof except where public necessity, legally determined, shall clearly demand it, and then only on condition that the owner shall have been previously and equitably indemnified."

**New Arrangements for Local Government**

Another achievement of the National Assembly was the establishment of a new and uniform administrative system in France. The earlier and confusing "provinces," "governments," "intendancies," "parlements," and "bailliages" were swept away. The country was divided anew into eighty-three départements, approximately uniform in size and population, and named after natural features, such as rivers or mountains. Each département was subdivided into districts (cantons) and communes—divisions which have endured in France to the present day. The heads of the local government were no longer to be appointed by the crown; they were to be elected by the people, and extensive powers were granted to elective local councils. Provision was made for a new system of law courts throughout the country, and the judges, like the administrative officials, were to be elected by popular vote. Projects were likewise put forward to unify and simplify the variety of laws which prevailed in different parts of France, but this work was not accomplished until the time of Napoleon.

**Emphasis on National Unity**

Back of all the projects and achievements of the National Assembly was an evident desire to emphasize the national unity of France as well as the popular sovereignty of Frenchmen. Indeed, a sudden spurt of nationalism was one of the most impressive features of the French Revolution. It was at once a consequence of heightened national feeling and an incentive to intense national patriotism that class privileges were swept away and all Frenchmen were treated as equals; that the old provinces were abolished and the new départements set up; that the traditional Estates General were reorganized


FRANCE BY PROVINCES IN 1789
FLANDERS
ARTOIS
HAINAULT
PICARDY
VERDUN
Rouen
Reims
Varennes
NORMANDY
ILE DE FRANCE
Versailles
Paris
Valmy
LORRAINE
Strasbourg
CHAMPAGNE
ALSACE
BRITTANY
MAINE
Orleans
ORLEANAIS
Nantes
ANJOU
TOURAINE
NIVERNAIS
BURGUNDY
FRANCHE-COMTÉ
BERRY
POITOU
BOURBONNAIS
LA MARCHE
LYONNAIS
SAINTONGNE
LIMOUSIN
AUVERGNE
Lyons
Bordeaux
DAUPHINÉ
GUIENNE AND GASCONY
LANGUEDOC
Avignon
PROVENCE
Marseilles
NAVARRE
Toulon
FOIX
ROUSSILLON
CORSICA
FRANCE BY DEPARTEMENTS IN 1795
ANNEXATIONS, 1789-1795
TBM

as the *National* Assembly and its protecting popular army took the name of *National* Guard; that, according to the "Declaration of the Rights of Man," "the principle of all sovereignty resides essentially in the *nation*—no body nor individual may exercise any authority which does not proceed directly from the *nation*."

Nationalism was further exemplified by the eagerness with which the revolutionaries sought to organize systems of national education and national military service, and, even more ostentatiously, by the fervor with which they established and celebrated patriotic rites. If July 14, 1789, was the birthday of French liberty, then July 14, 1790, inaugurated the formal celebration of Franch nationalism. On this day, some 50,000 delegates from all parts of France, including 14,000 national guardsmen, assembled on the military parade-grounds in Paris in the presence of the National Assembly, the King and Queen, and a vast multitude of Parisians; two hundred priests assisted at Mass; 1,200 musicians played; forty cannon were fired; and all the delegates and all the multitude, with upraised hands, took a solemn oath of supreme loyalty and devotion to the fatherland. At this time and thereafter it became fashionable for every city and village throughout France to erect an altar "to the fatherland," to engrave upon it the "Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen," and to conduct patriotic rites before it.

Nationalism not only actuated much of the reconstruction and consolidation within France, but also inspired the French revolutionaries with a novel doctrine in foreign relations—the doctrine of national self-determination. To the patriotic revolutionaries it seemed natural and praiseworthy that any people who wished to be "French" should be incorporated into France, regardless of the provisions of existing treaties and the protests of nominal sovereigns. Thus the National Assembly encouraged the people of Avignon—a city on the Rhône River which had been owned and governed by the Popes since the middle ages—to claim and exercise the right of national self-determination. In 1791, under French auspices and against papal protests, a plebiscite (or popular referendum) was held in Avignon, and, the result being favorable to France, the National Assembly voted to annex the city. Here was the beginning of national plebiscites and of a practice which threatened to revolutionize international relations.

In the meantime, in addition to nationalist policies, another

grave matter was concerning the National Assembly. This was the regulation of public finances. It will be recalled that financial confusion had been the royal reason for the original summoning of the Estates General. Then, in the early days of the National Assembly, the confusion had become chaos: the people refused to pay the old direct taxes; the Assembly, in its passion for national unity and economic liberty, destroyed the complicated old system of indirect taxes; and bankers could not be induced to make new loans. The Assembly, therefore, had to resort to heroic measures in order to save the state from complete bankruptcy, and the heroic measures finally decided upon were at the expense of the Catholic Church in France.

**State *vs.* Church**

Church lands covered about a fifth of the country, and the Assembly resolved to seize and utilize them as security for the issue of paper money—the *assignats*. As partial indemnity for such wholesale confiscation, the state undertook to pay fixed salaries to the clergy. Thus by a single stroke the financial pressure was relieved, the Church was deprived of important resources of its own, and the clergy were made dependent on the new order. Of course, as often happens in similar cases, the issue of paper money was so increased that in time it exceeded the security and brought fresh financial troubles to the state, but for the moment the worst difficulties were tided over.

The ecclesiastical policies and acts of the National Assembly were perhaps the least efficacious and the most fateful achievements of the Revolution. They were motivated in large part by the irreligious and anti-Catholic philosophy of the Enlightenment, but they aroused the opposition of large numbers of sincere and devout Christians. In November 1789, the property of the church was confiscated. In February 1790, monasteries and other religious communities were suppressed. In July 1790, a "civil constitution of the clergy" was enacted, by which the bishops and priests, reduced in numbers, were made a civil body. They were to be elected by the people, paid by the state, and only nominally associated with the "foreign" Pope. In December, the Assembly forced the reluctant King to sign a decree requiring all the Catholic clergy in France to take an oath of allegiance to the "civil constitution."

Pope Pius VI, who had already protested against the seizure of

church property, the suppression of the monasteries, and the interference in Avignon, now condemned the "civil constitution" and forbade the French clergy to take the required oath. Thus the issue was squarely joined. Such as took the oath—the "juring" clergy—were excommunicated by the Pope. Such as refused compliance—the "non-juring" clergy—were deprived of their salaries by the Assembly and threatened with imprisonment. Up to this time, the bulk of the lower clergy, poor themselves and in immediate contact with the peasants, had undoubtedly sympathized with the course of the Revolution, but now their conscience came into conflict with loyalty to the Assembly. Most of them followed their conscience and either incited peasants, over whom they exercised considerable influence, to oppose further revolution, or emigrated from France to swell the number of those who, dissatisfied with the course of events in their own country, would seek the first opportunity to undo the work of the Assembly. On the other hand, a minority of the clergy, led by the Bishop Talleyrand, took the oath of allegiance to the "civil constitution" and attempted to maintain the traditional Catholic worship in France, albeit a national Catholic worship in schism with the papacy. However, the most sincere Catholics could henceforth be counted among opponents of the Revolution.

Amid all these sweeping reforms and changes, the National Constituent Assembly was making steady progress in drafting a written constitution which would clearly define the agencies of government, and their respective powers, in the new limited monarchy. This constitution was completed in 1791 and signed by the King—he could do nothing else—and at once went into effect. It was the first written constitution that any major European country had had and was preceded only slightly in point of time by that of the United States.[1]

**Limited Monarchy: Constitution of 1791**

The Constitution of 1791, as it was called, provided, like the American constitution, for a "separation of powers," that is, that the law-making, law-enforcing, and law-interpreting functions of government should be kept quite distinct as the legislative, executive, and judicial departments, and each should spring, in last analysis, from the will of the people. This idea

[1] The present American constitution was drafted in 1787 and went into effect in 1789, the year that the Estates General assembled. See above, p. 478.

had been elaborated by Montesquieu, and affected deeply the constitution-making of the eighteenth century both in France and in the United States.

The legislative authority was vested in one chamber, styled the "Legislative Assembly," the members of which were chosen by means of a complicated system of indirect election.[1] The distrust with which the bourgeois framers of the constitution regarded the lower classes was shown not only in this check upon direct election but also in the requirements that the privilege of voting should be exercised exclusively by "active" citizens, that is, by citizens who paid taxes, and that the right to hold office should be restricted to property-owners.

Nominally the executive authority resided in the hereditary King. But, while the Constitution of 1791 accorded to the King the right to postpone for a time the execution of an act of the legislature—the so-called "suspensive veto"—it deprived him of any control over local government, over the army and navy, and over the clergy. Even his ministers were not to sit in the Assembly. Tremendous was the decline of royal power in France during those two years, 1789–1791.

This may conclude our brief summary of the work of the National Constituent Assembly. If we review it as a whole, we are impressed by the immense destruction which it effected. No other body of legislators ever demolished so much in the same brief period. The old form of government, the old territorial divisions, the old financial system, the old judicial and legal regulations, the old ecclesiastical arrangements, and, most significant of all, the old conditions of holding land—serfdom and feudalism—all were shattered. The guilds, too, were destroyed; and combinations of workmen were prohibited.

Yet all this destruction was not a mad whim of the moment. It had been preparing slowly and painfully for several generations. It was foreshadowed by the mass of well-considered complaints in the *cahiers*. It was achieved not only by the decrees of the Assembly, but by the forceful expression of the popular and national will. And out of the destruction was emerging the political and social form of the essentially individualist, democratic, nationalist state of a new age.

[1] That is to say, the people would vote for electors, and the electors for the members of the Assembly.

### 3. END OF THE MONARCHY AND BEGINNING OF NATIONAL WAR

Public rejoicing welcomed the formal inauguration of the constitutional monarchy in 1791. Many believed that a new era of peace and prosperity was dawning for France. Yet the extravagant hopes which were widely entertained for the success of the new regime were doomed to speedy and bitter disappointment. The new government encountered all manner of difficulties, the country rapidly grew more radical in sentiment and action, and within a single year the limited monarchy gave way to a republic. The establishment of the republic marked the second phase of the Revolution. Why it was possible and even inevitable may be gathered from a survey of developments in France during 1792, when the Legislative Assembly was in session, especially the outbreak of national war and the "treason" of Louis XVI.

By no means did all Frenchmen accept cheerfully and contentedly the work of the National Constituent Assembly. Of the numerous dissenters, some thought it went too far and some thought it did not go far enough. The former may be styled "reactionaries" and the latter "radicals."

**"Reactionaries"**

The reactionaries embraced the majority of the formerly privileged nobility and the non-juring clergy. Nobles had begun to leave France as soon as the first signs of violence appeared—about the time of the fall of the Bastille and the peasant uprisings in the provinces. Some of the clergy similarly departed when the anti-clerical measures of the Assembly rendered it no longer possible for them to follow the dictates of conscience. Such reactionary exiles, or émigrés as they were termed, collected in force along the northern and eastern frontier, especially at Coblenz on the Rhine. They possessed an influential leader in the King's younger brother, the Count of Artois, and they maintained a perpetual agitation, by means of newspapers, pamphlets, and intrigues, against the new regime.

Nor were the reactionaries devoid of support within France. It was believed that the royal family, now carefully watched in Paris, sympathized with their efforts. So long as Mirabeau, the ablest leader in the National Assembly, was alive, he had never ceased urging the King to accept the reforms of the Revolution and to give no countenance to agitation beyond the frontiers. In case the King should find his position in Paris intolerable, he had

been advised by Mirabeau to withdraw into western or southern France and gather the loyal nation about him. But unfortunately, Mirabeau, worn out by dissipation, died in April 1791.

Only two months later the royal family attempted to follow the course against which they had been warned. Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette, in an effort to rid themselves of the spying vigilance of Parisians, disguised themselves, fled from the capital, and made straight for the eastern frontier, apparently to join the émigrés. At Varennes, near the border, the royal fugitives were recognized and turned back to Paris, which henceforth was for them rather a prison than a capital. Although Louis subsequently swore to uphold the constitution, his personal popularity vanished with his ill-starred flight, and his wife—the "Austrian woman"—was suspected with good reason of being in correspondence with the émigrés and with foreign governments. Marie Antoinette was more detested than ever. The elder of the King's brothers, the Count of Provence, was more successful than the King in the flight of June 1791. He eluded detection and joined the Count of Artois at Coblenz.

Had the reactionaries been restricted to émigrés and the royal family, they would not have been troublesome. They included, however, a considerable number of persons in France. A small group in the Assembly shared their views and proposed the most extravagant measures in order to embarrass the work of that body. Conservative clubs existed among the upper and well-to-do classes in the larger cities. And in certain districts of western France, especially in Brittany, Poitou (La Vendée), and Anjou, the peasants developed hostility to the course of the Revolution. Their strong devotion to Catholicism placed them under the influence of the non-juring clergy, and their provincial feeling made them suspicious of the nationalizing work of the Revolution. Riots occurred in La Vendée throughout 1791 and 1792 with increasing frequency until at length the district blazed into open rebellion against the radicals.

More immediately dangerous to the political settlement of 1791 than the opposition of reactionaries was that of radicals—those Frenchmen who thought that the Revolution had not gone far enough. The leading radicals were drawn from the middle class, which had done most to effect the revolutionary changes of 1789–1791 and had profited most from such changes.

**"Radicals"**

Elated by what they had already accomplished, they were driven on by the King's pusillanimous conduct, by the rising tide of emotional nationalism about them, and by their own idealism to aspire to giving full effect to the precepts of Rousseau and other eighteenth-century philosophers in whose writings they had been reared. Gradually they came to believe that "the people" could be trusted far more than the King, that republicanism was preferable to monarchy, even to constitutional monarchy, and that thoroughgoing democracy was the natural goal of all revolutionary effort. Some especially denounced the distinction between "active" and "passive" citizens. Some desired the rooting out of all survivals of "privilege," particularly the rights still accorded to religion, even to the "juring" clergy. Most of them demanded sterner measures against aristocrats, clergymen, and everybody suspected of sympathy with the "old regime." Some of them, in the growing enthusiasm for individual equality and national unity, began to take a lively interest in the economic lot of the mass of working people in the cities.

Among the proletariat, especially in Paris, there was as much unrest in 1791–1792 as there had been among the provincial peasantry in 1789. To be sure, the urban working class, like the peasants, had been promised certain "rights and liberties," but, while the peasants had been freed from serfdom and enabled to appropriate land from aristocrats, what had been done for the material well-being of urban workers? They had obtained no property. Not even the installation of the King in Paris had given them bread. Now, in 1791, cut off by the provisions of the new constitution from all direct share in the conduct of government, they were led by radical agitators to believe that they had merely exchanged one set of masters for another, and that the Revolution must go on until their own economic grievances were redressed.

In the circumstances, the radical movement in France represented, after 1791, a new alignment. Hitherto there had been a union of the "Third Estate" with "enlightened" nobles like Mirabeau and "enlightened" clergymen like Siéyès and Talleyrand for the benefit of middle class and peasantry. Henceforth there was a union of radical middle-class leaders with and for the urban proletariat. Probably in many instances it was for personal ambition that this or that middle-class politician avowed

his love for "the people" and extolled their "virtue." But in many other instances the motive was undoubtedly altruistic. We can hardly overemphasize the zeal with which numerous middle-class radicals labored after 1791 to bring about a democratic, republican, nationalist millennium in France and on the Earth. They would utilize any class for their unworldly ends, and they instinctively discovered that the proletariat—the common people—could so be utilized.

The radical movement centered in Paris, where now resided the royal family and where the legislature met. Its agitation made rapid headway during 1791 and 1792, by means of inflammatory newspapers, coarse pamphlets, and bitter speeches. It appealed to both middle-class reason and popular emotion. It was backed up and rendered effective by revolutionary "clubs."

These clubs were interesting seats of political and social agitation. Their origin was traceable to the "eating clubs" which had been formed at Versailles in 1789 by various deputies of the Estates General who desired to take their meals together, but the idea progressed so far that by 1791 nearly every café in Paris was a meeting place for politicians and "patriots." Although some of the clubs were strictly constitutional, and even, in a few instances, professedly reactionary, nevertheless the most influential were radical. Such were the Cordelier and Jacobin clubs.

**Revolutionary Clubs**

The former, organized as a "society of the friends of the rights of man and of the citizen," was very radical from its inception and enrolled in its membership some of the foremost revolutionaries of Paris. The Jacobin Club, starting out as a "society of the friends of the constitution," counted among its early members such moderates as Mirabeau, Siéyès, and Lafayette, but subsequently, under the leadership of Robespierre, it was transformed into an organization quite as radical as the Cordeliers. It is an interesting fact that both these clubs derived their popular names from confiscated monasteries where they held their meetings.

From Paris the radical movement radiated in all directions. Pamphlets and newspapers were spread broadcast. The Jacobin Club established a regular correspondence with branch clubs and kindred societies which sprang up in other French towns. The radicals—commonly called the "Jacobins"—were everywhere inspired by the same zeal and aided by a splendid organization.

Of the chief radical leaders, it may be convenient at this point to introduce three—Marat, Danton, and Robespierre. All belonged to the bourgeoisie by birth and training, but by conviction they became mouthpieces of the proletariat. All played important roles in subsequent scenes of the Revolution.

Marat, had he never become interested in politics and conspicuous in the Revolution, might have been remembered in history as a scientist and man of letters. He was a physician, and for skill in his profession, as well as for contributions to the science of physics, he had received an honorary degree from St. Andrews University in Scotland, and for a time he was in the service of the Count of Artois. The convocation of the Estates General turned his attention to public affairs. In vigorous pamphlets he combated the idea then prevalent in France that his countrymen should adopt a constitution similar to Great Britain's. During several years' sojourn in that country he had observed that it was being ruled by an aristocratic oligarchy which, while using the forms of liberty and pretending to represent the country, was devoted to class interests. He made up his mind that real reform must benefit all the people and that it could be secured only by direct popular action. This was the simple message that filled the pages of the *Ami du peuple*—the *Friend of the People*—a newspaper which he edited from 1789 to 1792. With fierce invective he assailed the court, the clergy, the nobles, even the bourgeois Assembly. Attached to no party and with no detailed policies, he sacrificed almost everything to his single mission. No poverty, misery, or persecution could keep him quiet. Forced even to hide in cellars and sewers, where he contracted a loathsome skin disease, he persevered in his frenzied appeals to the Parisian populace to take matters into their own hands. By 1792 Marat was a man feared and hated by the authorities but venerated by the masses of the capital.

**Marat**

Less radical and more statesmanlike was Danton, who has been called "a middle-class Mirabeau." The son of a farmer, he had studied law, purchased a position as advocate of the Royal Council, and acquired, before the outbreak of the Revolution, a reputation as a man of liberal tastes. He was brought to the fore in the early days of the Revolution through Mirabeau's favor, and like his patron he was a person of powerful physique and stentorian voice, a clever debater and a moving

**Danton**

orator. In 1790, in conjunction with Marat and Desmoulins, he founded the Cordelier Club, the activities of which he directed throughout 1791 and 1792 against the royal family and the cause of monarchy. An influential member of the commune of Paris, he was largely instrumental in crystallizing public opinion in favor of republicanism. Danton was rough and courageous, but neither venal nor bloodthirsty.

Less practical than Danton and further removed from the proletariat than Marat, Maximilien Robespierre yet combined such qualities as made him the most prominent exponent of democracy and republicanism. Of a middle-class family, he had been a classmate of Camille Desmoulins in the law school of the University of Paris and had practiced law and been prominent in "enlightened" circles in his native town of Arras. He read Rousseau from cover to cover and believed in the philosopher's doctrines with all his mind and heart. He was sure that they would regenerate France and all mankind. Elected to the Third Estate in 1789, Robespierre took his place with a group of extreme radicals in that body—the "thirty voices," as Mirabeau contemptuously called them. They were unable to exert much influence on the legislation of the time, and Robespierre gradually turned for support to the Parisian populace. He was already a member of the Jacobin Club, which, by the withdrawal of its more conservative members in 1791, came then under his leadership. It proved a most effective instrument for radical propaganda, and Robespierre was its oracle. He was deadly serious and delighted in making long, denunciatory speeches. He was essentially a dreamer, a bit pedantic, and a bit of a fop. While championing the "rights" of the proletariat, he never catered to their tastes; to the last day of his life he retained the knee-breeches and silk stockings of the old society and wore his hair powdered.

**Robespierre**

We are now in a position to understand why the constitutional monarchy floundered. It lacked competent pilots and was bound to strike the rocks of reaction on one side or those of radicalism on the other.

The new government came into being with the first meeting of the Legislative Assembly in October 1791. Immediately its troubles began. Its members were wholly inexperienced in parliamentary procedure, for an unfortunate self-denying ordinance of the retiring Constituent Assembly had prohibited any of its

members from accepting election to the new body. The Legislative Assembly contained deputies of fundamentally diverse views. Moreover, it speedily came into conflict with the King, who vainly endeavored to use his constitutional right of suspensive veto to check its activities. Combined with these difficulties was the increasing popular agitation: a peasant revolt in La Vendée; threats of émigré nobles and non-juring clergy; loud tumults of the proletariat of Paris and of other large cities as well.

**Foreign Opposition to Revolution**

The difficulties of the limited monarchy were complicated by an embarrassing foreign situation. It should be borne in mind that Europe as a whole respected the class-society which the French Revolution attacked, and that every European country, except Great Britain, adhered to absolute monarchy. Outside of France there appeared as yet no such thing as "public opinion," certainly no sign among the lower classes of any opinion favorable to revolution. In Great Britain alone there was a constitutional monarchy, and in the early days of the French Revolution, so long as British statesmen could flatter themselves that their neighbors across the Channel were striving to imitate their political system, they sympathized with the course of events. But when it became evident that the Revolution was going further, that it aimed at a social and democratic leveling, then even British criticism assailed it. At the close of 1790 Edmund Burke published his *Reflections on the Revolution in France,* a bitter arraignment of "mob rule" and a brilliant defense of conservative evolution against radical revolution. Although Burke's book was speedily challenged by Thomas Paine and other radicals, it enjoyed widespread popularity. It was quickly translated into the chief languages on the Continent and was acclaimed by monarchs, nobles, and clergymen. Catherine II of Russia personally complimented the author, and the puppet King of Poland sent him a letter of flamboyant glorification and a gold medal. All over Europe, voices were raised against the French Revolution as a wicked assault upon traditional society and civilization.

Of the monarchs of Europe, several had special reasons for viewing the progress of the Revolution with grave misgiving. The Bourbons of Spain and of the Two Sicilies were united by blood and family compacts with the ruling dynasty of France; any belittling of the latter was likely to affect disastrously the former.

Then, too, the French Queen, Marie Antoinette, was an Austrian Habsburg. Her family interests were in measure at stake. In the Austrian dominions, the visionary Joseph II died in 1790 and was succeeded by another brother of Marie Antoinette, the gifted though unemotional Emperor Leopold II. Leopold skilfully extricated himself from the embarrassments at home and abroad bequeathed him by his predecessor and then turned his attention to French affairs. He was in receipt of constant and now frantic appeals from his sister to aid Louis XVI against the revolutionaries. He knew that the Austrian Netherlands, whose rebellion he had suppressed with difficulty,[1] were saturated with sympathy for the Revolution and that many of their inhabitants would welcome annexation to France. As chief of the Holy Roman Empire, he must keep revolutionary agitation out of Germany and protect the border provinces against French aggression. All these factors served to make him the foremost champion of the "old regime" in Europe and incidentally of the royal cause in France.

Now it so happened that Leopold II found an ally in Frederick William II of Prussia, who had succeeded Frederick the Great in 1786,[2] and who combined gross sensuality with Protestant mysticism in most curious ways. He neglected the military machine which his predecessors had constructed with infinite patience and thoroughness. He lavished money upon favorites and mistresses. In foreign affairs he reversed the policy of Frederick the Great by allying himself with Austria and accepting for Prussia a secondary role among the German states. In August 1791, he joined with the Emperor Leopold in issuing the public Declaration of Pillnitz, to the effect that the two rulers considered the restoration of order and of monarchy in France an object of "common interest to all sovereigns of Europe."

The declaration was only a threat, for the armies of the German allies were not prepared for war, but the very threat of foreign despots to interfere in the internal affairs of France aroused bitter and militant feeling among the mass of Frenchmen, who were patriotic as well as revolutionary.

The prospect of war with the monarchs of Austria and Prussia was quite welcome to several important factions in France. Marie

[1] See above, p. 422.

[2] See genealogical table on p. 295.

Antoinette and her court clique gradually came to the conclusion that their reactionary cause would be aided by war. If the allies won, absolutism could be restored in France by force of arms. If the French won, it would redound to the prestige of the royal family and enable them by constitutional means to recover authority. Then, too, the constitutionalists, the bourgeois party which was led by Lafayette and which supported the settlement of 1791, worked for war. Military success, in their opinion, would consolidate the French people in loyalty to the constitution, and Lafayette aspired to win personal glory as a victorious commander. Finally, the overwhelming majority of radicals clamored for war. To them it seemed as if the liberal monarchy would be completely discomfited by war and that out of it would emerge a republic in France and the general triumph of democratic principles in Europe. Why not stir up all the European peoples against their monarchs? The cause of France should be the cause of Europe. France should be the missionary of a new dispensation.

**Pro-War Factions in France**

The Legislative Assembly, on which depended in last instance the solution of all these vital problems, domestic and foreign, represented several diverse shades of political opinion. Of the 750 members, 350 admitted no special leadership but voted independently on every question according to individual preference or fear, while the others were divided between the camp of "Feuillants" and that of "Girondists." The Feuillants were the constitutionalists, inclined, while in general consistently championing the settlement of 1791, to uphold the royal power—they were the conservatives of the Assembly. The Girondists —so called because some of their conspicuous members came from the département of the Gironde—were the radicals.

**Girondists**

The Girondists were eloquent and intensely patriotic. They were filled with noble, if somewhat impractical, "classical" ideas borrowed from the ancient republics of Greece and Rome. They were eager to discredit Louis XVI and to establish a republic in France. In Brissot, a Parisian lawyer, they had a leader and organizer. In Vergniaud, they had a polished orator. In Condorcet, they had a scholar and philosopher. In Dumouriez, they possessed a military genius of the first order. And in the home of the wealthy and talented Madame Roland, they had a charming salon for political discussion.

In internal affairs the Legislative Assembly accomplished next to nothing. Everything was subordinated to the question of foreign war. Here, Feuillants and Girondists found themselves in strange agreement. Only such extreme radicals as Marat and Robespierre, outside the Assembly, opposed a policy which they feared would give rise to a military dictatorship. Marat expressed his alarms in the *Friend of the People:* "What afflicts the friends of liberty is that we have more to fear from success than from defeat; . . . the danger is lest one of our generals be crowned with victory and lest . . . he lead his victorious army against the capital to secure the triumph of the Despot." But the counsels of extreme radicals were unavailing.

In the excitement the Girondists obtained control of the government and demanded of the Habsburg Emperor that his Austrian troops be withdrawn from the frontier and the émigrés be expelled from his territories. As no action was taken by the Emperor, the Girondist ministers prevailed upon Louis XVI to declare war in April 1792. Lafayette assumed supreme command, and the French prepared for the struggle. Although Leopold had just died, his policy was followed by his son and successor, the Emperor Francis II. Francis and Frederick William II of Prussia collected an army of 80,000 men with which to invade France. The campaign of 1792 was the first stage in a vast conflict which was destined to rage throughout Europe for twenty-three years. It was the beginning of an international contest between the forces of revolution and those of the old order.

**War *vs.* Austria and Prussia**

Enthusiasm was with the French. They felt they were fighting for a cause—the cause of liberty, equality, and nationalism. Men put on red liberty caps, and such as possessed no firearms equipped themselves with pikes and hastened to the front. Troops coming up from Marseilles sang in Paris a new hymn of freedom which Rouget de Lisle had just composed at Strasbourg for the French soldiers—the inspiring *Marseillaise* that was to become the national anthem of France. But enthusiasm was about the only asset that the French possessed. Their armies were ill-organized and ill-disciplined. Provisions were scarce, arms were inferior, and fortified places in poor repair. Lafayette had greater ambition than ability.

The war opened with a series of French reverses. An attempted

invasion of the Austrian Netherlands ended in dismal failure. On the eastern frontier the allied armies under the Duke of Brunswick [1] experienced little difficulty in opening up a line of march to Paris. Intense grew the excitement in the French capital. The reverses gave color to the suspicion that the royal family were betraying military plans to the enemy. A big demonstration took place on June 20. A crowd of market women, artisans, coal heavers, and hod carriers pushed through the royal residence, jostling and threatening the King and Queen. No violence was done, but the temper of the Parisian proletariat was evident.

On July 25, 1792, the Duke of Brunswick, as commander-in-chief of the allied armies, issued a proclamation to the French people. He declared it his purpose "to put an end to the anarchy in the interior of France, to check the attacks upon the throne and the altar, to reestablish the legal power, to restore to the King the security and liberty of which he is now deprived and to place him in a position to exercise once more the legitimate authority which belongs to him." The Duke further declared that French soldiers who might be captured "shall be treated as enemies and punished as rebels to their King and as disturbers of the public peace," and that, if the slightest harm befell any member of the royal family, his Austrian and Prussian troops would "inflict an ever memorable vengeance by delivering over the city of Paris to military execution and complete destruction, and the rebels guilty of such outrages to the punishment that they merit." This manifesto sealed the fate of the French monarchy. It convinced the revolutionaries that French royalty and foreign armies were in formal alliance to undo what had been done.

### 4. TRIUMPHANT JACOBINISM

The French response was the insurrection of August 9–10, 1792. On those days the proletariat and the extreme element among the bourgeoisie of Paris revolted against the constitutional monarchy. They supplanted the legal commune with a radically revolutionary commune, in which Danton became the leading figure. They invaded the royal palace, massacred the Swiss Guards, and obliged the King and his family to flee for their lives to the Assembly. On August 10 a remnant of terror-stricken deputies voted to suspend the King

**Insurrection at Paris**

[1] See above, p. 321.

from his office and to authorize the immediate election by universal manhood suffrage of a National Convention which should prepare a new constitution for France.

From the suspension of the King on August 10 to the assembling of the National Convention on September 20, France was practically anarchical. The royal family was incarcerated in the gloomy prison of the Temple. The regular governmental agencies were paralyzed. Lafayette protested against the insurrection at Paris and surrendered himself to the allies.

Still the allies advanced into France. Fear deepened into panic. Supreme control fell into the hands of the revolutionary commune. Danton became virtual dictator. His policy was simple. The radicals should strike terror into the hearts of their domestic and foreign foes. "In my opinion," said Danton, "the way to stop the enemy is to terrify the royalists. Audacity, more audacity, and always greater audacity!" The news of the investment of Verdun by the allies, published at Paris on September 2, was the signal for the beginning of a massacre of royalists in the French capital. For five days some 2,000 persons were taken from the prisons and handed over by a self-constituted judicial body to the tender mercies of a band of cutthroats. Among the victims were women and children, nobles and magistrates, priests and bishops,—anyone suspected of royalist sympathy.

Meanwhile Danton was infusing new life and spirit into the French armies. Dumouriez replaced Lafayette in supreme command. And on September 20 the allies received their first check at Valmy.

The very day on which news reached Paris that it was saved and that Brunswick was in retreat, the newly elected National Convention, amid the wildest enthusiasm, unanimously decreed "that royalty is abolished in France." Then it was resolved to date from September 22, 1792, Year I of the Republic. A decree of perpetual banishment was enacted against the émigrés, and it was soon determined to bring the King to trial before the Convention.

**France a Republic, 1792**

The National Convention remained in session for three years (1792–1795), and its work constituted the second great phase of the Revolution. This work was essentially twofold: (1) It secured a series of victories in the foreign war, thereby rendering permanent the remarkable social reforms of the first period of the

Siéyès belonged to the Plain. At the outset the Plain voted with the Girondists, but as time went on and Parisians clamored more and more loudly against anyone who opposed the action of their allies, the Mountainists, it gradually saw fit to vote with the extremists.

The first serious question which faced the Convention was the disposition of the King. The discovery of an iron chest containing accounts of expenditures for bribing members of the National Constituent Assembly, coupled with the suspicion of Louis's double dealings with France and with foreign foes,[1] sealed his doom. He was brought to trial before the Convention in December 1792, and condemned to death by a vote of 387 to 334. With the majority voted the King's cousin, the Duke of Orleans, an ambitious radical who had assumed the name of Citizen Philippe Égalité (Equality). On January 21, 1793, Louis XVI was beheaded near the overthrown statue of his predecessor, Louis XV, in the Place de la Révolution (now called the Place de la Concorde). The unruffled dignity with which he met death was the finest behavior of his reign.

**Execution of Louis XVI**

Meanwhile the tide of Austrian and Prussian invasion was rolling away from France. After Valmy, Dumouriez pursued the retreating foreigners across the Rhine and carried the war into the Austrian Netherlands, where a large party regarded the French as deliverers. The French commander entered Brussels without serious resistance, and speedily mastered the whole country. It seemed as though the French would have an easy task in delivering the peoples of Europe from their old regimes.

Emboldened by the ease with which its armies were overrunning the neighboring states, the National Convention proposed to propagate liberty and reform throughout Europe and in December 1792 issued the following significant decree: "The French nation declares that it will treat as enemies every people who, refusing liberty and equality or renouncing them, may wish to maintain, recall, or treat with a prince and the privileged classes; on the other hand, it engages not to subscribe to any treaty and not to lay down its arms until the sovereignty and independence of the people whose territory the troops of the republic shall have entered shall be established, and until the people shall have adopted

[1] After the execution of the King, actual letters were discovered which Louis had dispatched to his fellow monarchs, urging their assistance.

the principles of equality and founded a free and democratic government."

In thus throwing down the gauntlet to all the monarchs of Europe and putting the issue clearly between them and democratic nationalism, the French revolutionaries took a most fateful step. Although some middle-class intellectuals among foreign peoples sympathized with the aims and achievements of the French Revolution, the rulers and upper classes of Russia, Austria, Prussia, Spain, and Great Britain were still deeply entrenched in the patriotism and unquestioning loyalty of the masses. Then, too, the execution of Louis XVI in January 1793 increased the bitterness. In France itself, a royalist reaction precipitated civil war in La Vendée, while Dumouriez, the ablest general of the day, was so disgusted that he followed Lafayette's example and deserted to the Austrians. Abroad, a formidable coalition of revengeful monarchies was formed to overthrow the French Republic. To Austria and Prussia, already in the field, were added Great Britain, Holland, Spain, and Sardinia.

**Extension of Foreign War**

For a brief time the allied armies threatened to overwhelm France; they reoccupied Belgium and the Rhine provinces and took the roads toward Paris. But the republic soon proved itself a more resourceful and efficient government than the monarchy had been. Under the experienced leadership of Carnot, and with the enthusiastic support of his fellow Jacobins, the Convention inaugurated a militarism which was quite novel in the world's annals. In February 1793, a compulsory levy of half a million men was decreed, and in the following August it was enacted that every Frenchman between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five might be drafted for military service. Carnot labored incessantly to render these laws effectual and to organize the new "national" army. He drafted men, silenced complaints, secured extra volunteers, drilled the troops, and hurried them to the frontiers. He prepared plans of campaign, appointed trusty officers, and infused them and their men with fighting zeal. By the end of 1793 he had 770,000 men under arms,[1] and most of them were fanatically attached to the cause of the Revolution. Bourgeois citizens, whose social and financial gains in the earlier stage of the Revolution would be threatened by French defeat, applauded the new

[1] The standing French army prior to 1793 usually numbered a little less than 200,000, and the armies of other European powers were proportionately small.

military measures. Artisans and peasants, who had won something and hoped to win more from the success of the Revolution, were put into the new armies, singing the *Marseillaise* and displaying the banners of "Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity."

In organizing the new armies, Carnot, unhampered by tradition, made several significant innovations. He created the "division" as a military unit. He improved the mechanism of supply in order to make his forces more mobile than their opponents. He detailed members of the government as "deputies on mission" to watch the generalship and movements of the various French armies and to dispatch to the guillotine any suspected or unsuccessful commander. Gradually, a new group of dashing young Republican generals rose to distinction, including Moreau, Pichegru, and Jourdan.

The militarism of Carnot and the Jacobins was based on the revolutionary principle of "the nation in arms." It meant a large army of eager young conscripted citizens in place of a relatively small army of older and more easygoing professional soldiers, and a staff of officers whose position depended on merit rather than on birth. It was itself quite revolutionary. It broke utterly with the military traditions of monarchical France and all the other countries of the time.

**"Nation in Arms"**

In this way France met the coalition which would have staggered a Louis XIV. The country was cleared of foreign enemies. The war was pressed in the Netherlands, along the Rhine, in Savoy, and across the Pyrenees. So successful were the French that Carnot's popular title of "organizer of defense" was magnified to that of "organizer of victory." Of course, it is impossible in our limited survey to do justice to these amazing campaigns of 1794 and 1795. It will suffice to point out that when the National Convention finally adjourned in 1795, the First Coalition was in process of dissolution. The pitiful Charles IV of Spain humbled himself to contract a close alliance with the republic which had put his Bourbon cousin to death. By the separate treaty of Basel (1795), Frederick William II of Prussia gave France a free hand on the left bank of the Rhine and turned his attention to the partition of Poland.[1] William V, the

**Victories Abroad**

[1] See above, pp. 326–328. The absorption of Prussia (and Austria and Russia) in the partitions of Poland in 1793 and 1795 seriously sapped the strength of the coalition against revolutionary France.

Orange Stadholder of Holland, was deposed and his country transformed into a Batavian Republic, allied with France. French troops were in full possession of the Austrian Netherlands and all other territories up to the Rhine. The lifelong ambition of Louis XIV appeared to have been realized by the new France in two brief years. Only Great Britain, Austria, and Sardinia remained in arms against the republic.

Yet the military successes of the republic were achieved at a terrific cost. They aroused an intolerant, militaristic spirit among large numbers of Frenchmen. They made the national army the chief concern and pride of the revolutionaries. Public policies were subordinated to the maintenance of soldiers and the assurance of military triumph. For the recruitment of the army, peasants were taken from fields and shops; and for its financial support, oppressive burdens were laid on French commerce and industry, while plunderings and indemnities were ruthlessly inflicted on conquered lands. No wonder that there was some protest at home, and that abroad the masses as well as the monarchs were filled with dread.

Within France, opposition to Carnot's drafting of soldiers was utilized by reactionary agitators to stir up an insurrection of the peasants in La Vendée in order to restore the monarchy and to reestablish the Catholic Church. Provincial and bourgeois dislike of the radicalism of the Parisian proletariat caused riots and outbreaks in such important and widely separated cities as Lyons, Marseilles, and Bordeaux. With the same thoroughness that characterized their foreign policy, and with even greater sternness, the officials of the National Convention utilized the new militarism to stamp out domestic riots and insurrections. By 1795 all France, except only the émigrés and secret conspirators, had seemingly accepted the republic.

**Suppression of Domestic Dissent**

The explanation of these impressive achievements, whether at home or abroad, lies in the new militarism, and also in the dictatorial central government which the National Convention established.

In the spring of 1793 the National Convention entrusted the supreme executive authority of France to a special committee, composed of nine (later twelve) of its members, who were styled the Committee of Public Safety. This small body, which included

such Jacobin leaders as Carnot, Robespierre, and St. Just, acting secretly, directed the ministers of state, appointed the local officials, and undertook the administration of the whole country. Manifold were the duties it was called upon to discharge. It must conduct foreign relations, supervise the armies, and secure the active support of the French people. Diligently and effectively did it apply itself to its various activities.

"Terrorism" has been the word usually employed to describe the internal policy of the Committee of Public Safety, and the "Reign of Terror," the period of the Committee's chief work, from the summer of 1793 to the summer of 1794. So sensational and sanguinary was the period that many persons have regarded it as the central feature of the Revolution. As a matter of fact, however, the Reign of Terror was but an incident, though obviously an awful incident, in a great political and social upheaval. Because basic new principles and far-reaching reforms were endangered by a host of foreign and domestic enemies, it seemed to the nationalist republican leaders of France that the country must present a united front and that this could be achieved only by terrorizing potential opponents of the new regime.

**The "Terror"**

The chief agencies of the Committee of Public Safety in conducting terrorism were the Committee of General Security and the Revolutionary Tribunal. The former was given police power in order to maintain order throughout the country. The latter was charged with trying and condemning any person suspected of disloyalty to the republic. Both were responsible to the Committee of Public Safety. A decree of the Convention, called the Law of Suspects, rendered liable to arbitrary arrest every person who was of noble birth, or had held office before the Revolution, or had any relation with an émigré, or could not produce a signed certificate of citizenship.

With such instruments of despotism France became revolutionary by strokes of the guillotine.[1] It is estimated that about 5,000 persons were executed at Paris during the Reign of Terror. Among

[1] The guillotine, which is still used in France, consists of two upright posts between which a heavy knife rises and falls. The criminal is stretched upon a board and then pushed between the posts. The knife falls and instantly beheads him. The device was invented by a certain philanthropic Dr. Guillotine, who wished to substitute in capital punishment an instrument sure to produce instant death, in place of the bungling process of beheading with an axe.

others, Marie Antoinette, Philippe Égalité, and Madame Roland suffered death.

The Terror spread to the provinces. Local tribunals were established to search out and condemn suspected persons. The city of Lyons, which ventured to resist the revolutionary government, was partially demolished and hundreds of its citizens put to death. At Nantes, a brutal Jacobin deputy, Carrier by name, loaded unhappy victims on old hulks which were towed out into the Loire and sunk. The total number of those who perished in the provinces is unknown, but it probably surpassed fifteen thousand.

In addition to the arbitrary slaughter of royalists and reactionaries, a sorry feature of the Terror was the wretched quarreling among various factions of the radicals and the destruction of one for the benefit of another. Thus, the efforts of the Girondists to stay the execution of the King and to appeal to the provinces against the violence in Paris, coupled with the treason of Dumouriez, seemed to the Parisian proletariat to mark the alliance of the Girondists with the reactionaries. Accordingly, Parisian workmen, responding to appeals of Marat, revolted on May 31, 1793, and two days later obliged the Convention to expel twenty-nine Girondist members. The assassination of Marat, in July, by Charlotte Corday, a supporter of the Girondists, made matters worse for them; and their leaders, including Brissot and Vergniaud, were guillotined in October 1793. Next, leaders of the Commune of Paris, who had gone to such extreme lengths as to proclaim atheism and suppress all churches in the city, were dispatched in March 1794 by a coalition of the followers of Danton and Robespierre. Then in April, when Danton at length wearied of the Terror and counseled moderation, that redoubtable revolutionary, together with his friend, Desmoulins, was guillotined. Finally, Robespierre himself, after enjoying a brief dictatorship, during which time he vainly endeavored to establish a Rousseau-like "republic of virtue," was sent, in company with St. Just, to the guillotine by the more conservative members of the National Convention in July 1794.[1]

The death of Robespierre ended the Reign of Terror. The purpose of the Terror, however, was already achieved. The Revolu-

[1] July 1794 corresponded in the revolutionary calendar to "Thermidor of the Year II"

tion was preserved in France, and France was victorious in Europe. The Thermidorian Reaction, as the end of the Terror was called, left the National Convention free to resume its task of devising a permanent republican constitution for the country. A few subsequent attempts were made, now by reactionaries, now by extreme radicals, to interfere with the Convention, but they were suppressed with comparative ease. The last uprising of the Parisian populace which threatened the Convention was effectually quelled (October 1795) by a "whiff of grape-shot," discharged at the command of a young captain of artillery, Napoleon Bonaparte by name.

**Thermidorian Reaction, 1794**

In the midst of foreign war and internal dissension, even in the midst of the Terror, the National Convention found time to make many significant contributions to the fashioning of new institutions and new practices. On all occasions, it emphasized the new gospel of nationalism. With the idea of creating a truly national army, it decreed in August 1793, as we have seen, compulsory military service for all able-bodied young Frenchmen. This decree contained the emotional instructions that "the young men shall go to battle; the married men shall forge arms and transport provisions; the women shall make tents and clothing, and shall serve in the hospitals; the children shall turn old linen into lint; the aged shall betake themselves to the public places in order to rouse the courage of the warriors and preach hatred of kings and the unity of the Republic." It was a bit rhetorical, but it foreshadowed what has been known in the twentieth century as totalitarian war.

With the idea of establishing a national school-system, the Convention elaborated plans which had been broached by the National Assembly, and it prescribed that the French language should be the sole language of national instruction throughout the "republic, one and indivisible." Likewise the Convention assumed the arduous task of preparing a single comprehensive code of law for the whole country and adopted certain basic social reforms which were to be included in the code. Imprisonment for debt was abolished. Negro slavery in the French colonies was ended. Woman's claim on property was protected in common with man's. Primogeniture was forbidden; that is, property might not be inherited exclusively by an eldest son or be willed to any one heir, but must be distributed, almost

**Jacobin Legislation**

equally, among all "next of kin." Besides, as a preliminary step toward the reform of commercial law, the Convention established a new and uniform system of weights and measures, the so-called metric system, which not only proved permanent in France but also, on account of its convenience, was subsequently adopted by nearly all civilized nations except the English-speaking peoples.

In matters of religion the National Convention authorized several novel experiments. From the first it attached an essentially religious significance to the principle of nationalism, and at the same time it displayed hostility to traditional Christianity. During the Terror, it not only treated clergymen as suspects but took radical steps to de-Christianize France. It adopted a revolutionary calendar, partly for "scientific" reasons and partly to do away with Sunday observance: the year was divided anew into twelve months, each containing three weeks of ten days ("decades"), every tenth day ("decadi") being for rest, and the five or six days left over at the end of the year, styled "sans-culottides," being national holidays; the names of the months were changed, and the whole calendar was dated from the establishment of the republic, September 22, 1792.

Anti-Christian

At about the same time, the Convention authorized the transformation of churches into temples of reason; several Catholic bishops and priests formally abjured Christianity; and, under the auspices of the Paris Commune, the atheistic "religion of reason" was formally inaugurated in the cathedral of Notre Dame (November 1793). Later, under Robespierre's auspices, the deistic cult of the Supreme Being was officially substituted for the atheistic worship of reason (June 1794).

Still later, after the downfall of Robespierre, the Convention took the attitude that religion was a private, rather than a public, concern and that the state should not attempt to establish or maintain an official religion. While renewing earlier enactments against the "non-juring" clergy, the Convention in 1795 promised toleration to all others and restored many of the church buildings to Christian worship.

During the Terror, moreover, and so long as the Jacobins were in control, the National Convention pursued radical social, even socialist, policies in economic matters. The property of the émigrés was confiscated for the benefit of the state and the lower classes. Persons of wealth, as well

"Socialist"

as clergymen and persons of noble family, were treated as suspects. Large landed estates were broken up and offered for sale in small parcels and on easy terms. Compensation which had been promised in connection with the earlier abolition of serfdom and feudalism was cancelled. "The rich," said Marat, "have so long sucked out the marrow of the people that they are now visited with a crushing retribution." At the same time, to provide public funds, the Convention authorized forced loans, or, as we would say, "capital levies"; and, to keep down the cost of living, it enacted a series of "laws of the maximum," fixing the price of grain and other commodities and likewise the rates of wages. Then, too, catering to the proletarian clamor for equality, the Convention decreed that everybody, without distinction, should be addressed as "citizen." The official record of the expense of Marie Antoinette's funeral was the simple entry, "Five francs for a coffin for the widow of Citizen Capet." Ornate clothing went out of fashion, at least for men, and the silk stockings and knee breeches *(culottes)* of the old regime were generally supplanted by the plain long trousers which had hitherto been worn only by the lowest class of workmen *(sans-culottes)*.

The fall of Robespierre—the so-called Thermidorian Reaction—meant, as we have seen, the end of the Terror. It meant also the decline of the influence of the Parisian populace on the National Convention and the resulting ability of the middle-class members of the Convention to direct the last stage of its activity in accordance with their own economic desires. The law against suspects was repealed, and so were the "laws of the maximum." The Revolutionary Tribunal was suppressed, and the Place de la Révolution was renamed the Place de la Concorde. But while the National Convention thus showed signs of lessening fanaticism and recurring bourgeois spirit, it persevered to the end in its devotion to republicanism and in at least lip service to democracy. By 1795 France seemed to be definitely committed to a republican form of government. This, however, would not be extremely radical, certainly not socialistic.

The National Convention had originally been convoked in 1792 to draw up a new constitution for France. It drew up such a constitution in 1793—a Rousseau-like constitution, republican and very democratic and quite Jacobin—but, by reason of the Terror and the exigencies of foreign war, this "Constitution of the Year

I" was not put into effect. Then, after the Thermidorian Reaction, when the National Convention was more moderate in thought and action, it drafted still another constitution for the French Republic. This went into effect in 1795 and is known as the "Constitution of the Year III." It entrusted the legislative power to two chambers, chosen by indirect and somewhat restricted election: a lower house of 500 members, to propose laws; and a Council of Ancients, of 250 members, to examine and enact the laws. The executive authority was vested in a Directory of five members, who were to be elected by the legislature and who should appoint the ministers of state, or cabinet, and supervise the enforcement of the laws.

**Republican Constitution of Year III**

5. TRANSFORMATION OF THE REPUBLIC INTO A MILITARY DICTATORSHIP

The French Republic, proclaimed in 1792 and provided with a "permanent" constitution in 1795, survived in name until 1804. But its actual duration was even briefer, and its government by the Directory lasted less than four years (1795–1799).

The failure of the Directory was due to two chief causes: first, the lack of efficient government; and second, the rise of militarism and the prestige of a victorious, ambitious general. To both of these causes, reference must be made. The former indicated that a stronger government was needed; the latter suggested what the nature of the stronger government would be.

To consolidate the French people after six years of radical revolutionary upheavals required hard and honest labor on the part of men of distinct genius. Yet the Directors were, almost without exception, men of mediocre talents,[1] who preferred personal gain to the welfare of the state.

The period of the Directory was a time of plots and intrigues. The royalists and reactionaries who were elected in considerable numbers to the legislature were restrained from subverting the constitution only by illegal force and violence on the part of the Directors. On the other hand, the extremists in Paris found a leader in a certain Babeuf, who declared that the Revolution had been directed primarily to the advantage of the bourgeoisie, while the proletarians were still

**Internal Difficulties**

[1] Carnot, the only member of first-rate ability, was forced out of the Directory in 1797.

just as poorly off as ever, and that the latter's salvation lay in a compulsory equalization of wealth and the abolition of poverty. An insurrection of these socialist radicals was suppressed, and Babeuf was executed in 1797.

While both sincere radicals and convinced reactionaries were opposing the unhappy Directory, the finances of the state were again becoming hopelessly involved. "Graft" flourished in the levying and collecting of the taxes and in public expenditures. To the extravagance of the Directors in internal administration were added the financial necessities of armies aggregating a million men. Paris, still in want, had to be fed at the expense of the nation. And the issue of *assignats* by the National Constituent Assembly, intended at first only as a temporary expedient, had been continued until by the year 1796 their total face value amounted to about forty billion livres, and three hundred of them were required to secure one in cash. In 1797 a partial bankruptcy was declared, interest payments were suspended on two thirds of the public debt, and the *assignats* were repudiated. The republic faced much the same financial crisis as had confronted the absolute monarchy in 1789.

In one respect, success attended the Directory; the national army was functioning splendidly and the foreign war was going gloriously. When the Directory assumed office, France was still at war with Austria, Sardinia, and Great Britain. The general plan of campaign was to advance one French army across the Rhine, through southern Germany, and thence into the Austrian dominions, and to dispatch another army across the Alps, through northern Italy, and thence on to Vienna. Of the army of the Rhine such veteran generals as Pichegru, Jourdan, and Moreau were put in charge. To the command of the army operating in Italy, the youthful Bonaparte was appointed.

Napoleon Bonaparte hitherto had not been particularly conspicuous in politics or war. He was believed to be in full sympathy with the Revolution, although he took pains after the downfall of Robespierre to disavow any attachment to the extreme radicals. He had acquired some popularity by skilful expulsion of the British from Toulon in 1793, and his protection of the National Convention against the uprising of the Parisian populace in 1795 gave him reputation as a friend of law and order. Finally, his marriage in 1796 with Josephine

**Rising Fame of General Bonaparte**


Beauharnais, the widow of a revolutionary general and the mistress of one of the Directors, bettered his chances of indulging his fondness for politics and war.

That very year (1796), while the older and more experienced French generals were repeatedly baffled in their efforts to carry the war into southern Germany, the young commander—but twenty-seven years of age—swept the Austrians from Italy. With lightning rapidity, infectious enthusiasm, brilliant tactics, and personal bravery, he crossed the Alps, humbled the Sardinians, and within a year disposed of five Austrian armies and occupied every fort in northern Italy. Sardinia was compelled to cede Savoy and Nice to the French Republic, and, when Bonaparte's army approached Vienna, Austria sued for peace. By the treaty of Campo Formio (1797), France secured the Austrian Netherlands and the Ionian Islands; Austria obtained, as partial compensation, the Venetian Republic, but agreed not to interfere in other parts of Italy; and a congress was to assemble at Rastatt to rearrange the map of the Holy Roman Empire with a view to compensating those German princes whose lands on the left bank of the Rhine were appropriated by France.

The campaign of 1796–1797, known in history as the first Italian campaign, was the beginning of a long series of sensational military exploits which were to rank Napoleon Bonaparte as the foremost soldier of modern times. Its immediate effect was to complete the dissolution of the First Coalition by forcing Austria and Sardinia to follow the example of Spain, Prussia, and Holland and to make a peace highly favorable to the French Republic. Great Britain alone continued the struggle against the Directory.

Another result of the first Italian campaign, almost as immediate and certainly more portentous, was the sudden personal fame of Napoleon Bonaparte. He was the most talked-of man in France. People applauded him. The government feared but flattered him. Schemers and plotters of every political faith sought his support. Alongside of decreasing respect for the existing government was increasing trust in Bonaparte.

It was undoubtedly with a sense of relief that the despised Directors of 1798 assented to a project proposed by the popular hero to transport to Egypt a French expedition with the object of interrupting communications between Great Britain and India. The ensuing Egyptian campaign of 1798 was spectacular rather


FRENCH REPUBLIC IN 1792
ANNEXATIONS IN 1795
DEPENDENT REPUBLICS IN 1799
BATAVIAN REPUBLIC
Amsterdam
ENGLAND
BRUNSWICK
Berlin
PRUSSIA
Antwerp
Cologne
Coblenz
Paris
Valmy
Strasbourg
RHINE R.
SEINE R.
LOIRE R.
Hohenlinden
Vienna
AUSTRIA
HELVETIAN REPUBLIC
Campo Formio
Lyons
Venice
PO
Marengo
Genoa
CISALPINE REPUBLIC
RHONE R.
Avignon
LIGURIAN REPUBLIC
ETRURIAN REPUBLIC
ROMAN REPUBLIC
Toulon
CORSICA
Rome
SPAIN
Naples
SARDINIA
PARTHENOPEAN REPUBLIC
SICILY
THE FRENCH REPUBLIC AND ITS DEPENDENT REPUBLICS IN 1799
300 MILES
TRM

than successful. Bonaparte made stirring speeches to his soldiers. He called the Pyramids to witness the valor of the French. He edified the native Moslems by praising their religion. He encouraged the study of Egyptian antiquities.[1] But his military achievements did not measure up to the colored reports which he sent home. He was checked in Syria, and a naval victory won by the celebrated English admiral, Lord Nelson, near the mouth of the Nile, left Bonaparte's army cut off and isolated in Egypt.

General Bonaparte himself luckily eluded the British warships and returned to France. It was believed by Frenchmen that his latest expedition had been eminently successful; but that in the meantime the work of the Directory had been disastrous, no one doubted. While Bonaparte was away, affairs in France had gone from bad to worse. There were new plots, increased financial and social disorders, and finally the renewal on a large scale of foreign war.

**Directory's Puppet States, and Renewal of War**

After the treaty of Campo Formio, the Directors followed a policy of surrounding France with dependent puppet republics. Even before that treaty, Holland had been transformed into the Batavian Republic, and now pretexts of various sorts were utilized to convert the duchy of Milan, or Lombardy, into a Cisalpine Republic; Genoa into a Ligurian Republic; the papal states into a Roman Republic; the kingdom of the Two Sicilies into a Parthenopean Republic; the Swiss Confederation into a Helvetic Republic. At the same time (1798), the Directory extended conscription for the French army.

In view of the fact that the governments of all the newly established republics were imposed by revolutionary France and utilized to support it, other countries felt themselves increasingly endangered and took steps to stop French aggression. A Second Coalition was formed by Great Britain, Austria, and Russia, and thanks to liberal sums of money supplied by William Pitt.[2] the British minister, they were able to put larger armies into the field.

During 1799 the Second Coalition won repeated victories; the French were driven from Italy; and most of the puppet republics collapsed. It seemed as though Bonaparte's first Italian campaign had been for naught. Possibly the military hero of France had

[1] It was an army officer on this expedition who discovered the famous Rosetta Stone, by the aid of which ancient Egyptian hieroglyphics could be deciphered.

[2] Son of the elder William Pitt who was Earl of Chatham.

himself foreseen this very situation and had intended to exploit it to his own advantage.

At any rate, when Bonaparte sailed for Egypt, he had left his country apparently victorious and honored. Now, when he returned in October 1799, he found France defeated and disgraced. It is small wonder that his journey from the coast to Paris was a triumphal procession. The majority of Frenchmen were convinced that he was the man of the hour.

**Bonaparte's Seizure of Power**

Within a month of his return from Egypt, public opinion enabled the young general to overthrow the government of the Directory. Intriguing with Siéyès, who was one of the Directors, he surrounded the Assemblies with a cordon of troops loyal to himself and on Brumaire 18–19 (November 9–10, 1799) secured by show of force the downfall of the government and the appointment of himself to supreme military command. This blow at the state *(coup d'état)* was soon followed by the promulgation of a new constitution, by which General Bonaparte became First Consul of the French Republic. Thus, within the space of ten and a half years from the assembling of the Estates General at Versailles, parliamentary and popular government in France fell beneath the sword. The predictions of Marat and Robespierre were realized. A military dictator appeared on the scene.

**Ideals of French Revolution**


Yet the advent of military dictatorship did not obscure the deep significance of the French Revolution. A present-day visitor in Paris may still observe on all sides the words *Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité*—Liberty, Equality, Fraternity. These were the words which the revolutionaries spelled out on their public buildings, and which they thought embodied the basic meaning of the Revolution. These words Napoleon Bonaparte did not erase.

"Liberty" implied certain political ideals. The people, and not a despotic monarch, should be sovereign. The individual citizen should possess personal liberties of conscience, worship, speech, publication, and property.

"Equality" signified the abolition of privilege, the end of serfdom, the destruction of the feudal system. It meant that all men were equal before the law and that every man should have an equal chance with every other man in the pursuit of life and happiness.

"Fraternity" was the symbol of the idealistic brotherhood of those who sought to make the world better and happier and more just, and at the same time it became the watchword of a new nationalism.


Political liberty, social equality, national patriotism—these three remained the ideals of all those who down to our own day have looked for inspiration to the French Revolution.



# CHAPTER XII

## NAPOLEON AND THE SPREAD OF REVOLUTIONARY PRINCIPLES

### I. BONAPARTE'S REVOLUTIONARY HERITAGE



N 1799, when General Bonaparte executed his *coup d'état* and seized personal power in France, he was thirty years of age, short, of medium build, quiet and determined, with cold gray eyes and rather awkward manners. He had been born at Ajaccio in Corsica on August 15, 1769, just after the island had been purchased by France from Genoa, but before the French had fully succeeded in quelling a stubborn insurrection of the Corsicans. Belonging to a prominent and numerous Italian family—at the outset his name was written Napoleone di Buonaparte—he had been selected along with sons of other Corsican families to be educated at public expense in France. In this way he received a good military education at Brienne and at Paris.

**Napoleon Bonaparte**

During his youth Bonaparte dreamed of becoming the leader of a movement for Corsican independence, but the outbreak of the French Revolution afforded him a wider field for his ambition. Already an engineer and artilleryman, he threw in his lot with the Jacobins, sympathized at least outwardly with the course of the Revolution, and acquired from the Italian campaign of 1796 the reputation of being the most brilliant general of the French Republic.

How Bonaparte utilized his reputation in order to make himself master of his adopted country has already been related. His success was due in large part to the extraordinary opportunity which French politics at that time offered. But it was due, likewise, to certain qualities of the young general. In the first place, he was

thoroughly convinced of his own abilities. Ambitious, selfish, and egotistical, he was always thinking and planning how he might become world-famous. Fatalistic and even superstitious, he believed that he was a "man of destiny." Then, in the second place, Bonaparte possessed an effective means of satisfying his ambition. He was heir to the militarism of the French Revolution, and he made himself the idol of his conscript soldiers. "He would go to sleep repeating the names of the corps, and even those of some of the individuals who composed them; he kept these names in a corner of his memory, and this habit came to his aid when he wanted to recognize a soldier and to give him a cheering word from his general. He spoke to the subalterns in a tone of good fellowship, which delighted them all, as he reminded them of their common feats of arms."

In the third place, Bonaparte was unscrupulous. Knowing what he desired, he was ready and willing to employ any means to attain his ends. No love for theories or principles, no fear of God or man, no sentimental aversion to bloodshed, nothing could deter him from striving to realize his vaulting but self-centered ambition.

Such was the man who effected the *coup d'état* of 18 Brumaire (November 1799). His first work in his new role was to devise an instrument of government to take the place of the Constitution of the Year III.[1] It concealed his military dictatorship under a veil of popular forms. It provided for three "Consuls," the first of whom was General Bonaparte, and the others named by him. The Consuls appointed a Senate, which decided any constitutional question, and which also selected, from lists chosen by popular voting, a Tribunate and a Legislative Body. The Tribunate discussed proposed legislation without voting upon it; the Legislative Body voted without discussion. Only the First Consul could propose legislation. Bonaparte's constitution for the Consulate was ratified by a popular plebiscite, and became known as the Constitution of the Year VIII of the Republic.

**First Consul of French Republic, 1799**

One reason why the French nation so readily acquiesced in an obvious act of usurpation was the grave foreign danger which still threatened the country. As we have previously noted,[2] the

[1] See above, p. 527.
[2] See above, p. 531.

armies of the Second Coalition in the course of 1799 had rapidly undone the settlement of Campo Formio, and, possessing themselves of Italy and the Rhine valley, were on the point of carrying the war into France. The Consulate had to face essentially the same situation as the Directory had confronted in 1796.

The Second Coalition embraced Great Britain, Austria, and Russia. Bonaparte soon succeeded by flattery and diplomacy not only in securing the withdrawal of Russia, but in actuating the half-insane Tsar Paul [1] to revive against Great Britain an armed neutrality of the North, including Russia, Prussia, Sweden, and Denmark. Meanwhile the First Consul prepared a second Italian campaign against Austria. Suddenly leading a French army through the rough and icy passes of the Alps, he descended into the fertile valley of the Po and at Marengo, in June 1800, inflicted an overwhelming defeat upon the enemy. This success in Italy was supplemented a few months later by the victory of another French army, under Moreau, at Hohenlinden in southern Germany. Whereupon Austria again sued for peace, and the resulting treaty of Lunéville (1801) reaffirmed and strengthened the provisions of the peace of Campo Formio.[2]

**Victorious Peace, 1801–1802**

Great Britain was again isolated, and the Franco-British conflict, which had raged since 1793, was reduced to a stalemate. The British navy held mastery of the seas, thanks to the exploits of Lord Nelson. His battle of the Nile (August 1798) cut off the supplies of the French expedition in Egypt and eventually obliged it to surrender. His bombardment of Copenhagen (April 1801), broke up the armed neutrality of the North. On the other hand, republican France seemed unconquerable on the Continent. Under these circumstances peace was made at Amiens in March 1802. Great Britain promised to restore all its recent colonial conquests, except Ceylon and Trinidad, and tacitly accepted the Continental settlement as defined at Lunéville. The treaty of Amiens was intended to be permanent, but it proved only a truce in the struggle between France and Great Britain.

So far, the Consulate had meant the establishment of an advantageous peace for France. With all foreign foes subdued, with territories extended to the Rhine, and with allies in Spain and the

[1] Paul, the son of Catherine the Great, reigned from 1796 to 1801.

[2] See above, p. 529.

puppet Batavian, Helvetic, Ligurian, and Cisalpine republics, the First Consul was free to devote his organizing and administrative talents to the internal affairs of his country. The Consulate (1799–1804) was the period of Bonaparte's chief and most enduring contributions to the development of French institutions.

Throughout his career Bonaparte professed himself to be the "son of the Revolution," the champion of the ideals of "liberty, equality, and fraternity." It was to the Revolution that he owed his position in France, and it was to France that he claimed to be preserving the fruits of the Revolution. Yet in practice, he trimmed the Revolution by emphasizing equality rather than liberty and by interpreting fraternity in a national, rather than international, sense. "What the French people want," he declared, "is equality, not liberty." In the social order, he maintained the achievements of the Revolution, and recognized no distinction of class. The one order of knighthood which he founded and fostered—the Legion of Honor—was open to any citizen who performed meritorious service, regardless of birth, rank, or religion. But in the political order, Bonaparte's dictatorship was more despotic than the monarchy of Louis XIV.

**Revolutionary Settlement in France**

Bonaparte transferred the local government of départements and smaller districts (arrondissements) from elective officials to prefects and sub-prefects, appointed by himself. Local elective councils continued to exist, but they sat only for a fortnight in the year and dealt merely with the assessment of taxes; they might be consulted by the prefect but they had no check upon him. All mayors of cities and villages were designated by the prefects, or directly by the central government.

This highly centralized administration of the country afforded the people little direct voice in public affairs, but it possessed the advantage of assuring prompt and uniform execution of governmental decrees. In essence it was a revival and perfecting of the system of intendants instituted by Cardinal Richelieu and utilized by Louis XIV.[1] And it was backed up by an efficient police-force, a loyal army, and a rigid press-censorship.

As in administration, so in all his internal policies, Bonaparte displayed the same fondness for national centralization and military dictatorship, at the expense of personal liberty. His reforms

[1] See above, pp. 248–249.

of every description—financial, ecclesiastical, judicial, educational —and even his public works, showed the guiding hand of the dictatorial general rather than the convinced revolutionary.

It will be remembered that financial disorders had been the immediate cause of the downfall both of the absolute monarchy in 1789 and of the Directory in 1799. From the outset, Bonaparte guarded against any such recurrence. By careful collection of taxes he increased the revenue of the state. By domestic economy, by severe punishment of corrupt officials, and by obliging people whose lands he invaded to support his armies, he checked the public expenditures. The crowning achievement of his financial readjustments was the establishment (1800) of the Bank of France.

Another problem which Bonaparte inherited from the Revolution was the conflict between the state and the Catholic Church.

**Concordat with Church**

He was determined to gain the political support of the large number of conscientious French Catholics who had been alienated by the anti-Christian measures of the revolutionaries. After protracted negotiations and against the wishes of French radicals, a settlement was reached in a concordat (1801) between Pope Pius VII and the French Republic, whereby the Pope, for his part, concurred in the confiscation of the property of the Church and the suppression of the monasteries, and the state undertook to pay the salaries of the clergy. The First Consul would nominate the bishops, and the Pope would invest them with their office; the priests would be appointed by the bishops. In this way the Catholic Church was officially restored in France, but it was tied to the national government more tightly than it had been in the time of Louis XIV.[1] So advantageous did the arrangement appear that the concordat of 1801 continued to regulate the relations of church and state in France until 1905.

One of the fondest hopes cherished by the French Revolutionaries was to clear away the confusion and discrepancies of the numerous legal systems of the old regime and to reduce the laws of the land to a simple and uniform national code, so that every person who could read would be able to know what was

[1] Catholicism was recognized by the concordat of 1801 as "the religion of the majority of Frenchmen," but its pre-revolutionary legal monopoly was not restored. Frenchmen might conform with it, or not, as they personally desired. And Bonaparte followed up his toleration and subsidizing of Catholicism by according similar favors to Protestant churches and Jewish synagogues within France.

legal and what was not. The constitution of 1791 had promised such a work; the National Convention had actually begun it; but the preoccupations of the leading revolutionaries, combined with the natural caution and slowness of the lawyers to whom the task was entrusted, delayed its completion. It was not until the commanding personality of Bonaparte came into contact with it that real progress was made. Then surrounding himself with excellent legal advisers whom he literally drove to labor, the First Consul brought out a civil code (1804), which was followed by codes of civil procedure and criminal procedure, a penal code, and a commercial code. The simplicity of these codes commended them not only to France, but to the greater part of Continental Europe. More important, they preserved the chief social conquests of the Revolution, such as civil equality, religious toleration, equality of inheritance, emancipation of serfs, abolition of feudalism and privilege. It is true that many harsh punishments were retained and that the position of woman was made distinctly inferior to that of man, but, on the whole, the French codes long remained a most convenient and enlightened set of laws. Bonaparte was rightly hailed as a second Justinian.

**Code of Laws**

A similar motive and the same enthusiasm actuated the First Consul in pressing forward a national scheme of education. On the foundation laid several years earlier by the revolutionaries was now reared an imposing state system of public instruction. (1) Primary or elementary schools were to be maintained by every commune under the general supervision of the prefects or sub-prefects. (2) Secondary or grammar schools were to provide a special training in French, Latin, and elementary science, and, whether supported by public or private enterprise, were to be subject to control by the national government. (3) *Lycées,* or high schools, were to be opened in every important town, and instruction given in the higher branches of learning by teachers appointed by the state. (4) Special schools, such as technical schools, civil service schools, and military schools, were brought under public regulation. (5) The University of France was established to maintain uniformity throughout the new educational system. Its chief officials were appointed by the First Consul, and no one might open a new school or teach in public unless he was licensed by the University. (6) The recruit-

**National Education**

ing station for the teaching staff of the public schools was provided in a normal school organized in Paris. All these schools were directed to take as the bases of their teaching the ethical principles of Christianity and loyalty to the head of the state. Despite continued efforts of Bonaparte, the new system was handicapped by lack of funds and of experienced lay teachers, so that at the close of the Napoleonic era, more than half of the total number of French children still attended private schools, mostly those conducted by the Catholic Church.

**Public Works**

Bonaparte proved himself a zealous benefactor of public works. With very moderate expenditure of French funds, for prisoners of war were obliged to do a good deal of the work, he improved the means of communication and trade within the country, and promoted the economic welfare of large classes of the inhabitants. In 1811 he could enumerate 229 broad military roads which he had constructed, the most important of which, thirty in number, radiated from Paris to the extremities of the French territory. Numerous substantial bridges were built. The former network of canals and waterways was perfected. The principal seaports, both naval and commercial, were enlarged and fortified, especially the harbors of Cherbourg and Toulon.

Along with such obviously useful labor went considerable embellishment of life. State palaces were restored and redecorated. Monuments were erected. The city of Paris was beautified. The Louvre was completed and adorned with works of art which Bonaparte dragged as fruits of victory from Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands. During the Consulate, Paris was beginning to lay claim to a position as the pleasure city of Europe. Its population almost doubled during the era of Napoleon.

The First Consul hoped to restore the French colonial empire. In 1800 he prevailed upon the Spanish government to re-cede to France the extensive territory of Louisiana west of the Mississippi River.[1] Soon afterwards he dispatched his brother-in-law, General Leclerc, with an army of 25,000 men, to make good the French claims to Haiti. But the colonial ventures of Napoleon ended in failure. In Haiti, Leclerc's efforts to reestablish Negro slavery encountered the stubborn resistance of the blacks, organized and led by one of their number, Toussaint L'Ouverture, a

[1] See above, p. 355.

man of notable military genius. After a determined and often ferocious struggle Leclerc proposed a compromise, and Toussaint, trusting in promises made to him, laid down his arms. He was seized and sent to France, where he died in prison in 1803. The Negroes, infuriated by this act of treachery, renewed the war with terrible barbarity. The French, further embarrassed by the appearance of a British fleet, were only too glad to relinquish the island in November 1803. Meanwhile, expectation of renewed war with Great Britain induced Bonaparte, in April 1803, to sell the entire Louisiana territory to the United States.

**Colonial Failures**


If we except these brief and ill-starred colonial exploits, we may pronounce the First Consul's government and achievements eminently successful. His speedy and victorious termination of the War of the Second Coalition and his subsequent apparent policy of peace redounded to his credit. His sweeping and thorough reforms in internal affairs attracted to his support many and varied classes in the community—the business interests, the bourgeoisie, the peasantry, and many sincere Catholics.

Only two groups opposed Bonaparte's practical dictatorship. One was a party of Jacobins who would not admit that the Revolution was ended. The other was a royalist party which longed to undo the work of the Revolution. But through the untiring efforts of the secret police, headed by a notorious ex-Jacobin, Fouché by name, the opposition of both groups was suppressed or driven underground. Early in 1804 a conspiracy of royalists was ferreted out and its members summarily punished. General Pichegru, who was implicated in it, was strangled in prison soon after his arrest; and Moreau, the ablest French general next to Bonaparte, who was likewise accused of complicity, although he was a staunch Jacobin, escaped a death sentence only by fleeing to America. As a final act of terrorism against the royalists, Bonaparte seized a young Bourbon prince, the Duc d'Enghien, on German soil, and arbitrarily put him to death.

In 1802 Bonaparte was made Consul for life with the approval of a popular plebiscite. Two years later, his subservient Senate proposed that his office be made hereditary and its title changed from Consul to Emperor; and the proposal was ratified by another popular plebiscite. On December 2, 1804, amid imposing ceremonies in the medieval cathedral

**France an Empire, 1804–1814**

## THE BONAPARTE FAMILY



of Notre Dame, in the presence of Pope Pius VII, who had come from Rome to grace the event, General Bonaparte placed a crown upon his own head and assumed the title of Napoleon I, Emperor of the French.

### 2. THE NAPOLEONIC EMPIRE AND ITS TERRITORIAL EXPANSION

The establishment of the Empire was not an outright repudiation of the French Revolution. The principle of popular sovereignty was still recognized. The social gains of the Revolution were still intact. The magic words "liberty, equality, fraternity" still blazed forth on public buildings. The tricolor was still the national flag.

Of course some changes were made in externals. The title of "citizen" was replaced by "monsieur." The republican calendar gradually lapsed. Napoleon's relatives became "grand dignitaries." The revolutionary generals who accepted the new regime were promoted to be "Marshals of the Empire." Old titles of nobility were restored, and new ones created.

The changes in France were reflected in the surrounding puppet states. And in making the foreign alterations, Napoleon took care to provide for his numerous family. For his brother Louis, the Batavian Republic was transformed into the kingdom of Holland. For his brother Joseph, the Parthenopean Republic was changed into the kingdom of Naples. The Cisalpine Republic became the kingdom of Italy with Napoleon as King, and Eugène Beauharnais, his stepson, as viceroy. For his brother Jerome, estates were subsequently carved out of Hanover, Prussia, and other northwest German lands to form a kingdom of Westphalia.

The Consulate had been characterized by domestic consolidation and a policy of peace. The ten years of the Empire (1804–1814) were attended by continuous war. For with opposition crushed in France, with the loyalty of the French nation secured, and with an enthusiastic nationalist army at his beck and call, Napoleon as Emperor could gratify his natural instincts for foreign aggrandizement and glory. He had become all-powerful in France; he would become all-powerful in Europe.

When the Empire was established, war between France and Great Britain, interrupted by the treaty of Amiens, had already broken forth afresh. The struggle had begun in 1793 as a protest of the British monarchy against the excesses of the Revolution,

especially against the French conquest of Belgium, and doubtless the masses of the English nation still fancied that they were fighting against the demon of revolution, now personified by Napoleon Bonaparte. But to the statesmen and influential classes of Great Britain as well as of France, the conflict had assumed a deeper significance. It was an economic and commercial war. The British were mindful of the assistance which France had given to American rebels and were resolved that France should not regain the colonial empire and commercial position which it had lost in the eighteenth century. The British had struggled to maintain their control of the sea and the superiority of trade and industry which attended it. Now, when Napoleon extended French influence over the Belgian and Dutch Netherlands, along the Rhine, and throughout Italy, and even succeeded in negotiating an alliance with Spain, Britain was threatened with the loss of valuable commercial privileges in all those regions and was further alarmed by the colonial projects of Napoleon. In May 1803, therefore, Great Britain declared war. The immediate occasion for the resumption of hostilities was Napoleon's refusal to cease interfering in Italy, Switzerland, and Holland.

**Renewal of Franco-British War**

Napoleon welcomed the renewal of war. He understood that until he broke British resistance all his Continental designs were imperiled and his colonial and commercial projects hopeless. During the year 1803–1804 he made elaborate preparations for an armed invasion of England. Along the Channel coast were gradually collected a host of transports and frigates, a considerable army, and an abundance of supplies. To the French armament, Spain was induced to contribute its resources.

Great Britain replied to these preparations by covering the Channel with a superior fleet, by preying upon French commerce, and by seizing Spanish treasure-ships from America. And William Pitt (the younger), a very embodiment of the Englishman's dislike for things French, headed the ministry of his country. Great Britain had no large armies to put in the field against the veterans of Napoleon, but Pitt spent liberal sums of British money in order to enable the Continental powers to combat the French Emperor. Pitt was the real bone and sinew of the Third Coalition, which was formed in 1805 by Great Britain, Austria, Russia, and Sweden to overthrow Napoleon.

**Third Coalition against France**

Francis II of Austria smarted under the provisions of the treaty of Lunéville, and especially over French predominance in Italy. He had recently added the title of "hereditary Emperor of Austria" to his shadowy dignity as "Holy Roman Emperor," and he was irritated by Napoleon's assumption of an imperial title.

In Russia, the assassination of the Tsar Paul, the crazy admirer of Bonaparte, had called to the throne in 1801 the active though easily influenced Alexander I. In early life Alexander had acquired a smattering of the "enlightened" philosophy of the eighteenth century, its liberalism and its humanitarianism. At bottom, however, he was quite as despotic and militaristic as Peter the Great or Catherine the Great, and he was ambitious to play a commanding role in Europe. The poverty-stricken condition of Russia made it difficult for him to finance his army, but when Pitt offered liberal subsidies, he perceived an opportunity to surmount the one obstacle to his ambition; and Pitt's assurance that Napoleon was the enemy of liberty and humanity provided Alexander with "enlightened" justification for his action. So the Tsar joined his army with Austria's, and in the autumn of 1805 the allies advanced through southern Germany toward the Rhine.

Pitt had done his best to bring Prussia into the coalition, but the Prussian King, Frederick William III (1797–1840), was timid and irresolute, and, despite the protests of his people, was cajoled by Napoleon's offer of Hanover into a declaration of neutrality. The south German states of Bavaria and Württemberg, jealous of Austria, became open allies of the French Emperor.

Before the troops of the Third Coalition could threaten the eastern frontier of France, Napoleon abandoned his projected invasion of Great Britain, broke up his armaments along the Atlantic coast, and, with his usual rapidity of march, hurled his finely trained army upon the Austrians near the town of Ulm in Württemberg. There, on October 20, 1805, the Austrian commander, with some 50,000 men, surrendered, and the road to Vienna was open to the French.

This startling military success was followed on the very next day by a naval defeat quite as sensational and, in the long run, more decisive. On October 21, the allied French and Spanish fleets, issuing from the harbor of Cadiz, encountered the British fleet under Lord Nelson, and in a terrific battle off Cape Trafalgar

were completely worsted. Lord Nelson lost his life in the conflict, but from that day to the close of the Napoleonic era British supremacy on the high seas was not seriously challenged.

Wasting no tears or time on the loss of sea power, Napoleon hastened to follow up his land advantages. Occupying Vienna, he turned northward into Moravia where Francis II and Alexander I had gathered an army of Austrians and Russians. On December 2, 1805, the anniversary of his coronation as Emperor—his "lucky" day, as he termed it—Napoleon overwhelmed the allies at Austerlitz.

The immediate result of the campaign of Ulm and Austerlitz, was the enforced withdrawal of Austria from the Third Coalition. Late in December 1805, the Emperors Francis II and Napoleon signed the treaty of Pressburg. The former ceded Venetia to the kingdom of Italy and recognized Napoleon as its King, and also resigned the Tyrol to Bavaria, and outlying provinces in western Germany to Württemberg. Both Bavaria and Württemberg were converted into kingdoms. By the treaty of Pressburg, Austria lost 3,000,000 subjects and large revenues, and was reduced to the rank of a second-rate power.

For a time it seemed as if the withdrawal of Austria from the Third Coalition might be compensated for by the adherence of Prussia. Stung by the refusal of Napoleon to withdraw his troops from southern Germany and by the bootless haggling over the transference of Hanover, and goaded by his patriotic and high-spirited wife, the beautiful Queen Louise, timid Frederick William III at length ventured in 1806 to declare war against France. Then, without waiting for assistance from the Russians who were coming up, the Prussian army—some 150,000 strong, under the aged Duke of Brunswick—advanced against the 200,000 veterans of Napoleon. The resulting battles of Jena and Auerstädt proved the superiority of Napoleon's army over the Prussian; they marked not only a disastrous defeat but the total collapse of the Prussian army and the destruction of the military prestige acquired under Frederick the Great.[1] Napoleon entered Berlin in triumph and took possession of the greater part of Prussia.

The Russians remained to be dealt with. Winter was a bad season for campaigning in East Prussia, and it was not until June 1807, at Friedland, that Napoleon was able to administer to the

[1] See above, pp. 316–321.

Russians a defeat comparable with those which he had administered to the Austrians at Austerlitz and to the Prussians at Jena. The Tsar Alexander at once sued for peace. At Tilsit, on a raft moored in the middle of the River Niemen, Napoleon and Alexander met and arranged the terms of peace for France, Russia, and Prussia. The impressionable Tsar was dazzled by the striking personality and unexpected magnanimity of the French Emperor. No Russian soil was exacted, only a promise to cooperate in excluding British trade from the Continent. Alexander was given to understand that he might deal as he would with Finland and Turkey. "What is Europe?" exclaimed the emotional Tsar: "Where is it, if it is not you and I?"

**End of Third Coalition: Treaty of Tilsit, 1807**

But Prussia had to pay the price of the alliance between French and Russian Emperors. From it was taken the portion of Poland which was erected into a grandduchy of Warsaw, under one of Napoleon's German allies, the Elector of Saxony. Altogether, Prussia was despoiled of half of its territories and compelled to reduce its army to 42,000 men, and to maintain French troops on its remaining lands until a large war indemnity was paid. Tilsit destroyed the Third Coalition and made Napoleon master of the Continent. Only Great Britain and Sweden remained under arms, and against the latter country Napoleon was enabled to employ both Denmark and Russia.

Early in 1808 a Russian army crossed the Finnish border without any previous declaration of war, and simultaneously a Danish force prepared to invade Sweden from the Norwegian frontier. The ill-starred Swedish King, Gustavus IV (1792–1809), found it was all he could do, even with British assistance, to fight off the Danes. The little Finnish army, left altogether unsupported, succumbed after an heroic struggle against overwhelming odds, and in 1809 Sweden agreed to cede Finland and the Aland Islands to Russia. Thus Sweden lost its grandduchy of Finland, and was permitted to retain a small part of Pomerania only at the humiliating price of making peace with Napoleon and excluding British goods. In the same year Gustavus IV was compelled to abdicate in favor of his uncle, Charles XIII (1809–1818), an infirm and childless old man, who was prevailed upon to designate as his successor one of Napoleon's marshals, General Bernadotte.

The year that followed Tilsit may be taken as marking the height of Napoleon's career. The Corsican adventurer was Emperor of a France that extended from the Po to the North Sea, from the Pyrenees and the Papal States to the Rhine. He was King of an Italy which embraced the fertile valley of the Po and the ancient possessions of Venice, and which was administered by a viceroy, his stepson and heir-apparent, Eugène Beauharnais. Napoleon's brother Joseph governed the kingdom of Naples. His brother Louis and his stepdaughter Hortense were King and Queen of Holland. His sister Elise was princess of the diminutive state of Lucca. The Kings of Spain and Denmark were his admirers, and the Tsar of Russia his ally. A restored Poland was a recruiting station for his army. Prussia and Austria had become second-rate powers, and French influence prevailed in Germany.

**Reorganization of Germany**

It was in Germany, in fact, that Napoleon's achievements were particularly striking. Before his iron touch many of the time-honored political and social institutions of that country crumbled away. As early as 1801 the diminution of the number of German states began. The treaty of Lunéville made imperative some action on the part of the Diet of the Holy Roman Empire in order to indemnify the rulers whose lands on the left bank of the Rhine were incorporated into France, and to grant "compensation" to the south German states. After laborious negotiations, lasting from 1801 to 1803, the Diet authorized the confiscation throughout southern Germany of ecclesiastical lands and free cities. One hundred and twelve formerly independent states lying east of the Rhine were wiped out of existence and nearly one hundred others on the west bank were embodied in France. Thus the number of German states was reduced from more than three hundred to less than one hundred, and the states which mainly benefited, along with France, were Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, and Saxony, all of which Napoleon desired to use as an equipose against Austria and Prussia. In this desire he was not disappointed, for in the War of the Third Coalition (1805) he received important assistance from all four; and each of them was duly rewarded. Bavaria, Württemberg, and Saxony were recognized as kingdoms, and Baden as a grand-duchy.

In 1806, pursuant to Napoleon's wishes, the Kings of Bavaria and Württemberg, the Grand-Dukes of Baden, Hesse-Darmstadt, and Berg, the Archbishop of Mainz, and nine minor princes vir-

tually seceded from the Holy Roman Empire and formed a new "Confederation of the Rhine," under the "protection" of the French Emperor, whom they pledged to support with an army of 63,000 men. Then, following Napoleon's refusal to recognize any longer the Holy Roman Empire, its nominal head, the Habsburg Emperor Francis II, laid down the crown which his ancestors for centuries had worn. The work of a long line of French Kings and statesmen—Francis I, Henry IV, Richelieu, Mazarin, Louis XIV—was thus consummated by Napoleon Bonaparte; and the Holy Roman Empire came to an inglorious end. Its last Emperor had to content himself with his newly appropriated title of Francis I, Hereditary Emperor of Austria.

**End of Holy Roman Empire**

By 1808 all Germany was at the mercy of Napoleon. Prussia was shorn of half its possessions and forced to obey the behest of its conqueror. The Confederation of the Rhine was enlarged and solidified. A kingdom of Westphalia was carved out of northern and western Germany at the expense of Prussia, Hanover, Brunswick, and Hesse, and bestowed upon Jerome, brother of Napoleon. The grandduchy of Berg was governed by the Protector's plebian brother-in-law, Joachim Murat. And, most significant fact of all, wherever the French Emperor's rule extended, there followed the abolition of feudalism and serfdom, the recognition of equality of all citizens before the law, the principles and precepts of the Code Napoléon.

This was the true apogee of Napoleon's power. From the November day in 1799 when the successful general overthrew the Directory down to 1808, his story was a magnificent succession of triumphs of peace and war. Whatever the judgment of his contemporaries or of posterity upon his motives, there can be little question that throughout those nine years he appeared to France and to Europe what he proclaimed himself—"the son of the Revolution."

### 3. NAPOLEONIC MILITARISM, THE "CONTINENTAL SYSTEM," AND NATIONALIST REACTION

The revolutionary military dictatorship which Napoleon established in France and applied to his expanding Empire in Europe began to disclose after 1808 some serious defects. One was the limitation of individual genius. Too much depended upon the

physical and mental strength of one man. Napoleon was undoubtedly a genius, but he was also human. He was growing older, more corpulent, less able to withstand exertion and fatigue, fonder of affluence and ease. On the other hand, every fresh success confirmed his belief in his own ability and whetted his appetite for power until his egotism became mania.

**Personal and Military Defects**

A second defect lay in the nature of the militarism upon which the Napoleonic Empire was constructed. What had enabled the National Convention, back in the days of the Revolution's darkest peril, to roll back the tide of foreign invasion was the introduction of conscription and other devices of a new militarism which Carnot and his fellow Jacobins had then sponsored.[1] It was this new militarism of the French revolutionaries which Napoleon Bonaparte took over, extended, and perfected. He certainly labored to sustain the morale of his army. He talked much of its "mission" and "destiny," and he kept alive its traditions of heroism and duty.

But Napoleon emphasized what was becoming evident in the later days of the Revolution, that the new militarism was essentially tyrannical, that it was less for "defense" than for "offense," and that its ends were glamor and glory for the victors. And as years passed by and the deadly campaigns repeated themselves and the number of patriotic volunteers lessened, the Emperor increasingly resorted to conscription—forcibly taking away thousands of young Frenchmen from productive pursuits at home and strewing their bones throughout the Continent.[2]

Moreover, as the French Empire expanded and other peoples were brought into a dependent or allied position, Napoleon's "Grand Army" was rendered less homogeneous and less effective by the inclusion of Poles, Germans, Italians, Dutch, Spaniards, and Danes. And his extension of the earlier policy of quartering French troops upon the lands of their enemies or their allies, and thereby conserving the resources of their own country, operated to develop hatred for France, the Revolution, and Napoleon. This hatred helped to produce, particularly in Germany and in

[1] See above, pp. 519–521.

[2] The annual conscription rose from 60,000 in 1804 to 1,140,000 in 1813. Altogether, Napoleon conscripted 2,613,000 Frenchmen from 1800 to 1813. As he phrased it, "God marches with the biggest battalions."

Spain, an upsurge of national patriotism among the masses, and to arouse them against the foreign interference and dictatorship of Napoleon.

It was thus the character of the Emperor himself and his military exigencies which, taken in conjunction with the so-called "continental system" and with nationalist uprisings, made Napoleon's Empire but an episode in the story of modern times.

"Continental system" is the term commonly applied to the curious character which the warfare between Napoleon and Great Britain gradually assumed. By 1808 Great Britain was indisputable mistress of the seas, while Napoleon was no less indisputable master of the Continent. The battles of the Nile, Copenhagen, and Trafalgar were to the British what those of Marengo, Austerlitz, Jena, and Friedland were to the French. On one hand the destruction of the French fleet, together with the Danish, Dutch, and Spanish squadrons, effectually prevented Napoleon from invading England. On the other hand, the British army was not strong enough to cope successfully with Napoleon on the Continent. Apparently neither France nor Great Britain could strike each other by ordinary military means, and yet neither would sue for peace.

**Economic Warfare with Britain**

Already in November 1806, Napoleon had launched a special *economic* campaign against Great Britain. Britain, it must be remembered, had become, thanks to the long series of dynastic and colonial wars that filled the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the chief commercial nation of the world: it had a larger number of citizens who made their living as shipowners, sailors, and traders than any other country. Then, too, Britain experienced in the eighteenth century an exceptional advance in large-scale mechanized manufacturing which enabled its industrialists to make goods more cheaply and in greater profusion and to sell them more readily, at lower prices, both at home and abroad. It was against "a nation of shopkeepers," as Napoleon contemptuously dubbed the English, that he directed his new campaign.

To Napoleon's logical mind, the nature of the campaign was plain. Deprived of the command of the sea, he must attack Britain in what appeared to be its one vulnerable spot—in its commerce and industry. If he could prevent the importation of British goods into the Continent, he would deprive his rival of the

chief markets for its products, ruin British commerce and industry, and then secure an advantageous peace. It was a gamble, for Napoleon must have perceived that the Continental peoples might oppose the closure of their ports to the cheaper manufactured articles of Great Britain and to the export of their own agricultural products. But the stakes were high and the Emperor of the French was a good gambler. From 1806 to 1814 the struggle between Napoleon and Great Britain was an economic endurance test. On the one hand, the question was whether the British government could retain the support of the British people. On the other hand, the question was whether Napoleon could rely upon the cooperation of the whole Continent.

**"Continental System"**

The "continental system" had been foreshadowed under the Directory and in the early years of the Consulate, but it was not until the Berlin Decree (November 1806) that the first major attempt was made to define and enforce it. In this decree, Napoleon proclaimed a state of blockade against the British Isles and closed French and allied ports to ships coming from Great Britain or its colonies. The Berlin Decree was subsequently strengthened and extended by decrees at Warsaw (January 1807), Milan (December 1807), and Fontainebleau (October 1810). The Milan Decree provided that neutral vessels sailing from any British port or from countries occupied by British troops might be seized by French warships or privateers. The Fontainebleau Decree ordered the confiscation of any British manufactured goods found in the Napoleonic states.

To these imperial decrees the British government replied with "orders in council" (January–November 1807), which declared all vessels trading with France or its allies liable to capture and provided further that in certain instances neutral vessels must touch at a British port. Thus the issue was squarely joined. Napoleon would suffer no importation of British goods whether by combatants or by neutrals. The British would choke off the sea trade of France and its dependencies. In both cases the neutrals would be the worst sufferers. The effects of the conflict proved far-reaching.

The British by virtue of their sea-power could come nearer to enforcing their "orders in council" than could Napoleon to giving full effect to his imperial decrees. Of course, both had trouble with neutrals. The stubborn effort of Denmark to preserve its

independence of action in politics and trade was frustrated in 1807 when a British expedition bombarded Copenhagen and seized the remnant of the Danish navy. From that time until 1814 Denmark was an ally of Napoleon. Against the Americans, too, who took advantage of the "continental system" to draw into their own hands a large portion of the carrying trade, the British vigorously applied the orders in council, and the consequent ill-feeling culminated in the War of 1812 between Great Britain and the United States.

But on the whole, the British had less trouble with neutrals than did Napoleon. Compared with the hardships which the "system" imposed upon the Continental peoples and the consequent opposition to its author, the contemporaneous distress in England was never acute, and the British nation at large gave steady support to its patriotic Tory government.

Here was the failure of Napoleon. It proved physically impossible for him to apply the "continental system" widely and thoroughly enough to gain his point. In many cases, to stave off opposition, he authorized exceptions to his own decrees. If he could have prevailed upon every Continental state to close its ports to British goods simultaneously and for several successive years and to sacrifice its own foreign trade, he would still have been confronted with a difficult task to prevent smuggling and the bribery of customs officials, which reached large proportions even in France and in the surrounding states that he had under fairly effective control. But to bring all Continental states into line with his economic campaign against Great Britain was a colossal task, to the performance of which he subordinated all his subsequent activities.

We have seen how by the treaty of Tilsit (1807) Napoleon obtained promises from the Tsar of Russia and the King of Prussia to exclude British goods from their respective countries. He himself undertook to enforce the decrees in the French Empire, in the kingdom of Italy, in the Confederation of the Rhine, and in the grandduchy of Warsaw. Brother Joseph did his will in Naples, Brother Jerome in Westphalia, Sister Elise in Tuscany, and Brother Louis was expected to do his will in Holland. The outcome of the war with Sweden in 1808 was the closure of all Scandinavian ports to the British. Napoleon's determination to have his decrees executed in the

**Enforcing the System**

Papal States, as well as his high-handed treatment of matters affecting the Catholic Church in France, brought him into conflict with Pope Pius VII, a gentle but courageous man, who in daring to excommunicate the European taskmaster was summarily deprived of his temporal rule and carried off a prisoner to France, where he resided, heaped with disgrace and insults, until 1814. In 1809 Napoleon formally incorporated the Papal States into the French Empire. And when in the next year Louis Bonaparte gave signs of an intention to promote the interests of his Dutch subjects, even to his brother's detriment, by admitting British goods, he was peremptorily deposed, and Holland, too, was incorporated into the ever-enlarging French Empire.

Meanwhile Napoleon was devoting special attention to the exclusion of British commerce from Portugal and Spain, and political conditions in these countries seemed to favor his designs. For over a hundred years Portugal had been linked in close trade relations with England ever since the Methuen Treaty of 1703.[1] Napoleon, early in his public career, tried, for a time successfully,[2] to break these relations, but it was not until after Tilsit that he entered seriously upon the task. He then formally demanded the adherence of Portugal to the "continental system" and the seizure of all British subjects and property within the kingdom. Prince John, the Regent of the small country, protested, besought Great Britain for aid, hesitated, and finally refused. Already a Franco-Spanish army was on its way to force compliance with the Emperor's demands.

In the court of the Spanish Bourbons was a situation which Napoleon could readily utilize in order to have his way in both Portugal and Spain. On the throne of Spain was seated the aging Charles IV (1788–1808), boorish, foolish, easily duped. His Queen was a coarse sensuous woman "with a tongue like a fishwife's." Their heir was Prince Ferdinand, a conceited young braggart in his early twenties. And their favorite, the true ruler of Spain, if Spain at this time could be said to have a ruler, was Godoy, a flashy adventurer, who was loved by the Queen, shielded

[1] See above, pp. 274, 460.

[2] In 1801, as First Consul, Napoleon prevailed upon Spain to attack Portugal in order to secure the repudiation of the Methuen Treaty and the promise of hostility to Great Britain. This step proved disastrous to Portuguese trade, and in 1804 the Portuguese government purchased from Napoleon a recognition of its neutrality.

The comparative ease with which Napoleon had thus been able to supplant the Spanish Bourbons was equaled only by the difficulty which he and his brother experienced with the Spanish people. Until 1808 the Corsican adventurer had had to deal primarily with divine-right monarchs and their old-fashioned professional armies. Now he was confronted with real nations, inspired by much the same emotional patriotism which had inspirited the French, and dominated by a similar fervor. The Spanish people despised their late King as weak and traitorous; they hated their new King as a foreigner and an upstart. To Spain they were patriotically loyal to the core: priests and nobles made common cause with commoners and peasants, and all agreed that they would not brook foreign interference with their domestic concerns. Spain blazed forth in angry insurrection. Revolutionary committees, or *juntas,* were speedily organized in the provinces; troops were enrolled; and a national reaction was soon in full swing. By August 1808, Joseph was obliged to flee from Madrid and the French troops were in retreat.

**Spanish Revolt and the Peninsular War**

To add to the discomfiture of the French, George Canning, the British foreign minister, promptly promised his country's active assistance to a movement whose significance he clearly perceived. In defiant words he laid down the British policy which would obtain until Napoleon should be overthrown: "We shall proceed upon the principle that any nation of Europe which starts up to oppose a power which, whether professing insidious peace or declaring open war, is the common enemy of all nations, becomes instantly our ally." In August 1808, true to this declaration, a British army under the command of Sir Arthur Wellesley, subsequently Duke of Wellington, landed in Portugal and began cooperation with Portuguese and Spaniards against the French. It was the beginning of the so-called Peninsular War, which, with little interruption, lasted until 1813.

Within three weeks after their landing the British were in possession of Portugal. Roused by this unexpected reverse, Napoleon assumed personal command of the French forces in the peninsula. And such was his vigor that in December 1808 he reinstated Joseph in Madrid and drove the main British army out of Spain. The success of Napoleon, however, was but temporary and illusory. Early in 1809 grave developments in another part of Europe called him away from Spain, and the marshals whom he

left behind quarreled with one another and at the same time experienced to the full the difficulties which Napoleon himself would have encountered had he remained.

The difficulties which impeded French military operations in the Iberian peninsula were well-nigh insurmountable. The nature of the country furnished several obstacles. Farms were poor, settlements sparse, provisions scarce; the French armies found difficulty in following their usual practice of living off the land. Likewise, the succession of fairly high and steep mountain ranges, which cross the peninsula generally in a direction of northwest to southeast, prevented any campaigning on the large scale to which Napoleonic tactics were best adapted, and put a premium upon loose, irregular guerrilla fighting, in which the Spaniards were adepts.[1] In connection with these obstacles arising from the nature of the country must be mentioned the patriotic determination of the native people and the arms and trained commanders furnished by the British.

**National Effort in Austria**

The era of national revolts was dawning, and it was not long before Austria took renewed courage from the Spanish example. Ever since 1792 the Austrian ruler had borne the brunt of the Continental warfare against revolutionary France. Stung by the disasters and humiliations of 1797, 1801, and 1805–1806, Emperor Francis entrusted preparations for a war of liberation to the Archduke Charles and to Count Stadion, an able statesman and diplomat. The immediate results were: first, a far-reaching scheme of military reform, including the adoption of the principle of the "nation in arms" and of the war organization and tactics in use among the French; and secondly, the awakening of a lively feeling of patriotism among the people of German Austria, especially among the Tyrolese, whom the arbitrary act of the French dictator had handed over to Bavaria. In April 1809, while Napoleon was concerned with Spain, Austria declared war, and immediately Archduke Charles advanced into Bavaria. The French Emperor at once turned his main armies from Spain to Austria. He struck the Archduke's forces with his usual lightning rapidity, and within a week's time forced them back upon Vienna. Before the

[1] Napoleonic tactics might have been more successful against a large, well-organized Spanish army, but it should be borne in mind that with the retirement of Charles IV the regular royal army of Spain disintegrated and disappeared.

middle of May, Napoleon was once more in the Austrian capital. But the Archduke Charles remained resolute, and on May 21–22 inflicted such a reverse on Napoleon at Aspern on the Danube below Vienna, that, had there been prompt cooperation on the part of other Austrian commanders and speedy assistance from other states, the Corsican might then have been overthrown. As it was, Napoleon was allowed a breathing spell, and on July 5–6 he fought and won the hard battle of Wagram. Wagram was not a rout like Austerlitz, but it was sufficiently decisive to induce the Austrian Emperor to accept an armistice, and, after the failure of a cooperating British expedition, to conclude the treaty of Vienna or Schönbrunn (October 1809). By the terms of this he had to surrender western Galicia to the grandduchy of Warsaw and eastern Galicia to Russia; to cede the Illyrian provinces to the French Empire; and to restore the Tyrol, together with a strip of Upper Austria, to Bavaria.

The treaty cost Austria four and a half million subjects, a heavy war indemnity, and promises not to maintain an army in excess of 150,000 men and not to have commercial dealings with Great Britain. As an additional pledge of Austria's good behavior, and in order to assure a direct heir to his greatness, Napoleon shortly afterwards secured an annulment of his marriage with Josephine on the ground that it had not been solemnized in the presence of a parish priest, and early in 1810 he married a young Austrian archduchess, Maria Louisa, the daughter of the Emperor Francis II. Even this venture at first seemed successful, for in the following year a son was born who received the high-sounding appellation of King of Rome. But Austria remained at heart hostile.

Meanwhile, nationalist reaction against Napoleon grew apace. In Prussia it reached even more ominous dimensions than in Austria or in Spain. Following so closely upon the victories of Frederick the Great, the disaster of Jena and the humiliation of Tilsit had been a doubly bitter cup for the Prussian people. Prussian statesmen were not lacking who put the blame for their country's degradation upon many of the social and political conditions which had characterized the "old regime" in all European monarchies, and, as these statesmen were called in counsel by King Frederick William III during the years from 1807 to 1813, they wrought a series of internal reforms.




**EUROPE IN 1810**
**AT THE HEIGHT OF THE NAPOLEONIC EMPIRE**

The credit for the Prussian "regeneration" belongs mainly to two remarkable officials, Baron vom Stein and Chancellor Hardenberg, both of whom were influenced by the humanitarian and patriotic "enlightenment" of the eighteenth century. In October 1807, Stein issued at Memel a celebrated "edict of emancipation," which abolished the institution of serfdom throughout Prussia and permitted the ownership of land by peasants and bourgeois as well as by nobles. The Prussian peasants thus became personally free, although as compensation for the land they acquired they were still bound to make fixed payments to their lords in the form of rent. At the same time, all occupations and professions were thrown open to noble, commoner, and peasant alike. In November 1808, Stein established new agencies of local government, in the English manner. He undoubtedly aimed at establishing constitutional limited monarchy in Prussia, but this he was unable to realize. King Frederick William III was immovably opposed to any lessening of royal authority in Prussia.

**Prussian Regeneration**

In 1811 Hardenberg continued the Prussian social reforms by making the peasants absolute owners of part of their holdings and alloting the remainder to the former landlords in lieu of other compensation for their lost feudal and servile dues. During the same period, the army was reorganized by Scharnhorst and Gneisenau; compulsory universal service was extended in imitation of the French, while the condition imposed by Napoleon that the Prussian army should not exceed 42,000 men was practically evaded by replacing each body of 42,000 men by another of the same size as soon as the first had undergone military training. In this way Prussia was prepared for an expected War of Liberation.

Of course Napoleon had some idea of what was happening in Prussia. He protested, he threatened, he actually succeeded late in 1808 in securing the dismissal of Stein. But the redoubtable Prussian reformer spent the next three years fanning the patriotic flame in Austria and thence betook himself to Russia to arouse the Tsar Alexander against Napoleon. Meanwhile, German nationalism burned ever brighter through the exertions of patriotic societies, such as the *Tugendbund,* or "League of Virtue," through the writings of men like Fichte and Arndt, and through noteworthy educational reforms, which, associated with the name of Wilhelm von Humboldt, gave to Prussia the basis of its later

common-school system and the important nationalist university of Berlin (1809).

Meanwhile, too, the warfare in Spain dragged on. In 1812 Wellington with his allied British and Spanish troops won a notable victory at Salamanca, captured Madrid, and drove Joseph and the French to Valencia. In the same year a group of Spaniards, who had learned revolutionary doctrines from the French, assembled at Cadiz and drafted a constitution for what they hoped would be their regenerated country. This written constitution, next in age to the American and the French, became a model for later "liberal" constitutions throughout southern Europe. After a preamble in praise of the "old fundamental laws of this monarchy," it proclaimed the basic principle of the French Revolution: "Sovereignty is vested essentially in the nation, and accordingly it is to the nation exclusively that the right of making its fundamental laws belongs." The legislative power was to be exercised by the Cortes, a single-chamber parliament elected for two years by indirect suffrage. The executive power was to be exercised by the King through his ministers: he was to have only a suspensive veto on the acts of the Cortes. Furthermore, the constitution proclaimed the principles of individual liberty and legal equality and provided for a thorough reorganization of courts, local administration, taxation, the army, and public education. While the framers of the constitution affirmed that "the religion of the Spanish nation is and always will be the Apostolic Church of Rome," they decreed the suppression of the Inquisition and the secularization of ecclesiastical property. That such a radical constitution would be understood and championed forthwith by the whole Spanish people, only an optimist could believe, but, on the other hand, it was certain that the Spaniards as a nation were resolved that the "continental system" and the Bonaparte family must go. They might sacrifice liberty and equality but not national patriotism.

**Liberation of Spain**

At last the defects of the Napoleonic Empire—the character of Napoleon himself, the nature of his army, the "continental system," and the development of nationalist opposition—were painfully in evidence. The drama thenceforth led irresistibly through two terrible acts—the Russian campaign and the Battle of the Nations—to a dénouement in the Emperor's abdication and to a sorry epilogue at Waterloo.

### 4. DESTRUCTION OF THE NAPOLEONIC EMPIRE

A rupture with the Tsar Alexander precipitated the final disasters for Napoleon. A number of events between the celebrated meeting at Tilsit in 1807 and the memorable year of 1812 made a rupture inevitable. Tilsit purported to divide Europe between the two Emperors, but Alexander soon found that his chief function was to help bring all western and central Europe under the domination of the French Empire, while his ambition to enlarge the Russian Empire in eastern Europe was repeatedly thwarted by Napoleon.

To be sure, Alexander wrested Finland from Sweden (1809), but Napoleon's forcing of Sweden into a war with Great Britain (1810–1812), presumably as an ally of Russia as well as of France, prevented the Tsar from extending his territory farther in that direction. Then, too, the revival of a Polish state under the name of the grandduchy of Warsaw and under French protection was a thorn in his flesh, which became all the more irritating, when it was enlarged after the Austrian War of 1809. The Tsar did not take kindly to the ensuing marriage of his ally with a Habsburg archduchess, which seemed to indicate that Napoleon would cooperate more closely with Austria than with Russia. Besides, Alexander's aggressive warfare against the Ottoman Empire was constantly handicapped by French intrigue, so that when the treaty of Bucharest was at length concluded (May, 1812) it was due to British rather than to French assistance that Russia extended its southern boundary to the River Pruth. Finally, the Tsar resented the dethronement of one of his relatives in the German duchy of Oldenburg and the incorporation of the duchy into the French Empire.

**Breach between Napoleon and Tsar Alexander**

All these differences might conceivably have been adjusted, had it not been for the economic breach which the "continental system" ever widened. Russia, at that time almost exclusively an agricultural country, suffered greatly from the stoppage of its trade with Britain, and popular protests and agitation alarmed the Tsar. The result was a gradual suspension of the rigors of the "continental system" in Russia and the eventual return to normal trade relations as they had existed prior to Tilsit. This simple fact Napoleon could not and would not condone. "Russia's

partial abandonment of the continental system was not merely a pretext but the real ground of the war. Napoleon had no alternative between fighting for his system and abandoning the only method open to him of carrying on war against England."

By the opening of the year 1812 Napoleon was actively preparing for war on a large scale against his recent ally. From the Austrian court, thanks to his wife, he secured the promise of a guard of 30,000 men to protect the right wing of his projected invasion of Russia. From the trembling Prussian King he wrung, by threats, permission to lead his invaders across Prussian soil and the support of 20,000 troopers for the left of his lines. A huge expedition was then gathered together: some 250,000 French veterans; 150,000 Germans from the Confederation of the Rhine; 80,000 Italians: 60,000 Poles; and detachments of Dutch, Swiss, Danes, and Yugoslavs; in all, a host of more than 600,000.

Simultaneously the Tsar Alexander made counter-preparations. Through British mediation he made peace with the Turks and thus removed an enemy from his flank. And a series of treaties between himself, Great Britain, and Marshal Bernadotte, who was crown-prince of Sweden and tired of Napoleonic dictation, guaranteed his possession of Finland, assured him of a supporting Swedish army, and in return promised Norway as compensation to Sweden. A Russian army of 175,000 men was mobilized.

In June 1812, Napoleon crossed the Niemen River and began an invasion of Russia. His forces were superior to the Russian in numbers, organization, and equipment. Not daring to give open battle, the Russian forces kept retreating farther inland. In vain Napoleon tried to trap this or that Russian division into a fight. Unable to defeat or capture his foe, he penetrated ever deeper into Russia. Only once, at Borodino, on September 7, did one of the Russian generals, Kutusov, seriously engage a part of the invading army. Both sides lost heavily in the engagement, but the French took possession of Moscow a week later.

**Russian Campaign of 1812**

The very night of Napoleon's triumphal entry, the city was set on fire through carelessness of some natives. Barracks and foodstuffs were alike destroyed; most of the inhabitants fled; and what was left of the city was pillaged by French troops as well as by Russians. The lack of supplies and the impossibility of wintering in a ruined city, compelled Napoleon on October 22 to

evacuate Moscow and retrace his steps toward the Niemen. The Russian forces followed, still not risking major engagements, but harassing the French rear-guard and cutting off stragglers.

The Napoleonic retreat from Moscow is one of the most horrible episodes in history. To the exasperating attacks of pursuing Russians on the rear were added the severity of the weather and the barrenness of the country. Steady downpours of rain changed to blinding storms of sleet and snow. Swollen streams, heaps of abandoned luggage, and huge snowdrifts repeatedly blocked the line of march. The gaunt and desolate country, which the army had ravaged and pillaged during the summer's invasion, grimly mocked the retreating host. Exhaustion overcame thousands of troopers, who dropped by the wayside and beneath the snows gave their bodies to enrich the Russian soil. The retreat became a rout and all would have been lost had it not been for the almost superhuman efforts of the valiant rear-guard under Marshal Ney. As it was, a mere remnant of the *Grande Armée* recrossed the Niemen on December 13, and, in pitiable plight, half-starved and with torn uniforms, re-entered Germany. Fully half a million lives were sacrificed upon the fields of Russia. Yet in the face of these distressing facts, Napoleon egotistically announced to the afflicted French people that "the Emperor has never been in better health!"

For a moment the Tsar Alexander hesitated. His country was freed; and to make peace in the hour of triumph might be of advantage to his country and involve no further risks on his part. But his own longing to pose as the chief figure on the European stage, the deliverer of oppressed nationalities, coupled with the insistent promptings of Baron vom Stein, who was always at his elbow, eventually decided him to attempt the complete overthrow of his rival. Late in December he signed a convention with the Prussian commander, General Yorck, whereby the Prussian army would cooperate with the Russian and Swedish forces, and, in return, Prussia would be restored to the position it had enjoyed prior to Jena. In January 1813, Alexander at the head of the Russian troops crossed the Niemen and proclaimed the liberty of the European peoples. King Frederick William III, amidst the acclaim of his people, confirmed the convention of his general, and in March declared war against Napoleon. The War of German Liberation commenced.

**War of German Liberation**

The events of the year 1813 were as auspicious in the history

of Germany as they were disastrous for the fortunes of Napoleon. Prussia led in the movement to free all the German-speaking people from French domination. From Prussia the national enthusiasm spread to other states. Mecklenburg, which had been the last addition to the Confederation of the Rhine, was the first to secede from it. All northern and central Germany was soon in popular revolt, and the Prussian army, swelled by patriotic enlistments, marched southward into Saxony. Austria, divided between fear of Napoleon and jealousy of the growing power of Russia, mobilized its army and waited.

In these trying circumstances Napoleon acted with accustomed promptness. After arriving in France late in 1812 he hurriedly mobilized a new army, which, with the wreck of the *Grande Armée* and the assistance that was still forthcoming from Naples and southern Germany, numbered 200,000 men. With this he advanced into Saxony, and on May 2, 1813, attacked the allied Russians and Prussians at Lutzen. He defeated them, but was unable to follow up his advantage for want of cavalry. On May 20–21, he gained another fruitless victory at Bautzen.

At this point an armistice was arranged through the mediation of Austria. Metternich, the chief minister of that country, proposed a general European peace on the basis of the reconstruction of Prussia, the re-partition of the grandduchy of Warsaw by Russia, Prussia, and Austria, the re-cession of the Illyrian provinces to Austria, the dissolution of the Confederation of the Rhine, and the freedom of the German ports of Hamburg and Lübeck. But it was a decisive victory, not peace, that Napoleon wanted, and the only reason which induced him to accept the armistice was to gain time for the arrival of re-enforcements from Italy and France. The delay, however, proved fatal to him, for the British government utilized it to conclude new treaties with his Continental foes, assuring them of larger financial subsidies and thereby enabling them to strengthen their armies. The numerical balance of armed force, thus established between the Allies and Napoleon, was tipped against the latter when, in August 1813, Austria, whose peace proposals Napoleon rejected, formally joined the coalition against him.

Napoleon was then in Saxony in command of armies aggregating 400,000 men. Gathering against him in Bohemia, Silesia, and northern Prussia were Austrian, Prussian, and Russian forces of

over 500,000 men. At Dresden, in August, he won his last spectacular victory, against the Austrian army of General Schwarzenberg. But his marshals suffered repeated reverses, and his forces were rapidly hemmed in by the Allies. At Leipzig, on October 16–19, was fought the fateful three-day "Battle of the Nations." Against 300,000 troops of the Allies, Napoleon could use only 200,000, and of these the Saxon contingent deserted in the heat of the fray. It was by military prowess that the Napoleonic Empire had been reared; its doom was sealed by the battle of Leipzig. A fortnight later, with the remnant of his army, Napoleon recrossed the Rhine.

**Battle of the Nations, 1813**

The "Battle of the Nations," following within a year the disasters of the retreat from Moscow, marked the collapse of Napoleon's power outside France. His Empire and puppet states tumbled like a house of cards. The Confederation of the Rhine dissolved, and its princes hastened, with a single exception, to throw in their lot with the victorious Allies. King Jerome Bonaparte was chased out of Westphalia. Holland was liberated, and William of Orange returned to his country as King. Denmark submitted and by the treaty of Kiel (January 1814) engaged to cede Norway to Sweden in return for a monetary payment and Swedish Pomerania. Austria readily recovered the Tyrol and the Illyrian provinces and occupied Venetia and Switzerland. Even Joachim Murat deserted his brother-in-law, and, in the hope of retaining Naples, came to terms with Austria. Only Polish Warsaw and the King of Saxony remained loyal to the Napoleonic alliance; the territories of both were in possession of the Allies.

With the remnant of his defeated army and what young boys and old men he was able to recruit, Napoleon needlessly prolonged the struggle on French soil. At the close of 1813 Austria prevailed upon its more or less willing allies to offer him fairly favorable terms: France might retain its "natural boundaries"—the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees; and Napoleon might continue to rule over a region which would have gladdened the heart of Richelieu or Louis XIV. But it was still victory and not peace upon which the military egotist had set his mind.

Early in 1814 three large Allied armies, totaling 400,000 men, and accompanied by the Emperors of Russia and Austria and the King of Prussia, invaded northern France and converged on

Paris. Blücher with his German troops was advancing up the Moselle to Nancy; Schwarzenberg with the Austrians crossed the Rhine to the south at Basel and Neu Breisach; Bernadotte in the Netherlands was welding Swedes, Dutch, and Prussians into a northern army. Meanwhile, a decisive defeat which Wellington with his army of British, Spaniards, and Portuguese, inflicted upon the French at Vitoria (June 1813) drove King Joseph for the last time from Madrid and in effect cleared the whole Iberian peninsula. The British general then fought his way through the Pyrenees, so that in the spring of 1814 a fourth victorious Allied army in the neighborhood of Toulouse threatened Napoleon from the south. An Austrian army, which was then operating in Venetia and Lombardy, menaced France from yet a fifth direction.

**Allied Invasion of France**

Against such overwhelming odds, Napoleon displayed throughout the desperate months of February and March 1814 the same remarkable genius, the same indomitable will, as had characterized his earliest campaigns. Inflicting a setback on one invader, he turned quickly against a second. Such apprehension did his tiger-like assaults excite among his opponents that as late as February he might have retained the French frontiers of 1792 if he had chosen to make peace. But he would play the game to the bitter end. On March 1, his four chief opponents—Great Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia—concluded the treaty of Chaumont, cementing their alliance for a period of twenty years and agreeing not to make terms without each other's consent nor to desist from war until their arch-enemy was overthrown. Each contracting party undertook to furnish 150,000 men, and Great Britain promised a special subsidy of five million pounds.

Within a month, resistance was broken. Paris surrendered to the Allies on March 31, 1814, and thirteen days later Napoleon signed with the allied sovereigns the personal treaty of Fontainebleau, by which he abdicated his throne and renounced all rights to France for himself and his family, and, in return, was accorded the island of Elba and an annual pension of two million francs for himself; the Italian duchy of Parma was conferred upon the Empress Maria Louisa, and pensions of two and a half million francs were promised for members of Napoleon's family. Another seven days and Napoleon bade his Old Guard an affecting farewell and departed for Elba.

**Abdication of Napoleon**

In his diminutive island empire, hard by the shore of Tuscany, Napoleon Bonaparte lived ten months.

Meanwhile, in France, order was emerging from chaos. In 1793 European sovereigns had banded together to invade France, to restore the absolute monarchy of the Bourbons, and to stamp out the flames of revolution. The most noteworthy significance of the era of Napoleon was the fact that now in 1814 the monarchs of Europe, at last in possession of France, had no serious thought of restoring social or political conditions just as they had been prior to the Revolution. Their major quarrel was not with principles but with a man. The Tsar Alexander was an impressionable prince, familiar with phrases of revolutionary philosophy, and anxious to pose as the arbiter of Europe. Talleyrand, the man of the hour among Frenchmen, who himself had played no mean role throughout the Revolution and under Napoleon, combined with a desire to preserve the frontiers of his country a firm conviction that the mass of his countrymen would not revert to absolute monarchy. Between Talleyrand and Alexander it was arranged, with the approval of the great powers, that in the name of "legitimacy" the Bourbons should be restored to the throne of France, but with the understanding that they should recognize the chief reforms of the Revolution. It was likewise arranged by the treaty of Paris (May 1814) that France should regain the limits of 1792. "Legitimacy" was a brilliant discovery of Talleyrand. It justified the preservation of France in the face of crushing defeat, and, if it restored the Bourbons, it did so as limited, not as absolute, monarchs.

**Restoration of Monarchy**

Louis XVI's "legitimate" heir was his brother, the Count of Provence, a cynical, prosaic, and very stout old gentleman who had been quietly residing in an English country house, and who now made a solemn, if somewhat unimpressive, state entry into Paris. The new King kept what forms of the old regime he could. He assumed the title of Louis XVIII, "King of France by the grace of God." He reckoned his reign from the death of the Dauphin ("Louis XVII") in the year 1795. He replaced the revolutionary tricolor by the lilied white flag of his family. Out of the fullness of his royal authority he granted a "charter" to the French people. But Louis XVIII was neither so foolish nor so principled as to insist upon the substance of Bourbon absolutism. The very charter, which he "graciously" promulgated, confirmed

the revolutionary liberties of the individual and established a constitutional form of limited monarchy for France.

The same month that witnessed the straddle of the French Bourbon between revolution and reaction, beheld the restoration of another Bourbon in the person of Ferdinand VII to the throne of Spain, and the return of Pope Pius VII, amid the enthusiastic shouts of the Romans, to the ancient see upon the Tiber. About the same time Piedmont and Savoy were restored to Victor Emmanuel I, King of Sardinia. Europe was rapidly assuming a more normal appearance. To settle the outstanding territorial questions which the overthrow of Napoleon had raised, a congress of rulers and diplomats met at Vienna in the autumn of 1814.

**Napoleon's Return and Final Defeat, 1815**

Within a few months the unusual calm was rudely broken by the sudden reappearance of Napoleon Bonaparte upon the European stage. It was hardly to be expected that he for whom the whole Continent had been too small would be content in tiny Elba. He nursed grievances, too. He could get no payment of the revenue promised him by the treaty of Fontainebleau; his letters to his wife and little son were intercepted and unanswered; he was treated as an outcast. He became aware of a situation both in France and at Vienna favorable to himself. As he foresaw, the shrinkage of the great French Empire into the realm of old France disappointed many patriotic Frenchmen, and their bitterness was enhanced by the presumption of returning émigrés and the tactless way in which the Bourbon princes treated veterans of the *Grande Armée*. In the circumstances, Napoleon believed he could count upon a renewed loyalty of the French nation. He believed, too, that he might not encounter anew the combined forces of the European powers, for these were angrily quarreling at Vienna over the peace settlement. If some fighting were necessary, the return of French prisoners from Russia, Germany, Great Britain, and Spain would supply him with a larger army than he had in 1814.

On February 26, 1815, Napoleon slipped away from Elba with some 700 men, and, managing to elude the British guardships, disembarked at Cannes on March 1 and advanced northward. Troops sent to arrest him were no proof against the familiar uniform and cocked hat; they threw their own hats in the air amid shouts of *vive l'empereur*. Marshal Ney, the "bravest of the brave," who had taken an oath of allegiance to the restored

Bourbon monarchy and promised Louis XVIII that he would bring Napoleon to Paris in an iron cage, deserted to him with 6,000 men, and on March 20 the Emperor jauntily entered the capital. Louis XVIII, who had assured his parliament that he would die in defense of his throne, was already jogging over the Belgian frontier.

Napoleon clinched his hold upon most of the French people by an astute manifesto. "He had come," he declared, "to save France from the outrages of the returning nobles; to secure to the peasant the possession of his land; to uphold the rights won in 1789 against a minority which sought to reestablish the privileges of caste and the feudal burdens of the last century; France had made trial of the Bourbons; it had done well to do so, but the experiment had failed; the Bourbon monarchy had proved incapable of detaching itself from its worst supports, the priests and nobles; only the dynasty which owed its throne to the Revolution could maintain the social work of the Revolution. . . . He renounced war and conquest . . . he would govern henceforth as a constitutional sovereign and seek to bequeath a constitutional crown to his son."

The Emperor was as wrong in his judgment of what Europe would do as he was right concerning the attitude of France. The statesmen who had been haggling about treaty stipulations at Vienna speedily forgot their differences in the face of the common danger. The four great powers solemnly renewed their treaty of alliance, and with alacrity all joined in signing a declaration. "In violating the convention which established him in the island of Elba, Bonaparte has destroyed the only legal title to his existence. By reappearing in France with projects of disorder and destruction, he has cut himself off from the protection of the law, and has shown in the face of all the world that there can be neither peace nor truce with him. Accordingly the Powers declare that Napoleon Bonaparte is excluded from civil and social relations, and as an enemy and disturber of the tranquillity of the world he has incurred public vengeance. . . ."

To give force to their threats, the Allies prepared another invasion of France. Wellington assembled an army of more than 100,000 British, Dutch, and Germans, and planned to cooperate with 116,000 Prussians under Blücher near Brussels. An Austrian army under Schwarzenberg neared the Rhine. Russia and Ger-

many were alive with marching columns. To oppose these forces Napoleon raised a field army of 180,000 men, and on June 12, 1815, quitted Paris for the Belgian frontier. His plan was to separate his opponents and to overcome them singly. It would be a repetition of the campaign of 1814, though on a larger scale.

How Napoleon passed the border and forced the outposts of the enemy back to Waterloo; how there, on June 18, he fought the final great battle of his remarkable career; how his troops were mowed down by the fearful fire of his adversaries and how even his famous Old Guard rallied gloriously but ineffectually to their last charge; how the defeat administered by Wellington was turned at the close of the day into a mad rout through the arrival of Blücher's forces; all these matters are commonplaces in elementary histories of military science. It has long been customary to cite the battle of Waterloo as one of the world's decisive battles. In a sense this is just, but it should be borne in mind that, in view of the firm determination of almost all Europe, there was no ultimate chance for Napoleon. The Allies could put almost limitless numbers in the field; Napoleon was at the end of his resources. For the conservation of human life, it was fortunate that the first battle of the campaign of 1815 was also its last. Waterloo added military prestige to the naval preeminence which Great Britain already enjoyed and established the reputation of Wellington as victor over Napoleon.[1]

On June 21 Napoleon arrived in Paris, defeated and dejected. That very day the parliament, on the motion of Lafayette, declared itself in permanent session and took over all functions of government. The following day Napoleon abdicated the second time in favor of his son, and the provisional government of France, through the intriguing Fouché, reopened negotiations with the Bourbons. On July 7 the Allies reoccupied Paris, bringing back the flustered old Louis XVIII "in their baggage-train."

On July 15, the day following the anniversary of the fall of the Bastille, Napoleon, who had gone to Rochefort on the French coast, with some vague idea of taking refuge in America, deliv-

[1] An interesting side issue of the Waterloo campaign was the fate of Joachim Murat. The wily King of Naples, distrustful of the Allies' guarantees, threw in his lot with his brother-in-law. His forces were speedily put to rout by the Austrians. He fled to France and later to Corsica, and was ultimately captured and shot. His action enabled still another Bourbon, Ferdinand I, to recover the kingdom of the Two Sicilies.

ered himself over to the commander of a British warship which was lying in the harbor. The British government, however, refused to grant him asylum in England. Instead, he was dispatched on another British warship to the rocky island of St. Helena in the south Atlantic.

**Napoleon's Last Years**

Here he lived five and a half years. He was allowed considerable freedom of movement and the society of a group of personal friends. He spent his time walking on the lonely island, quarreling with his suspicious strait-laced English jailer, Sir Hudson Lowe, and dictating memoirs to his companions. These memoirs, which were subsequently published, were subtly compounded of truth and falsehood. They represented him in the light of a true son and heir of the Revolution, who had been raised by the will of the French people to power in order that he might substantiate the revolutionary ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity. According to himself, he had always been the friend of peace and of oppressed nationalities, the author of blessings which had flowed uninterruptedly upon his people until he had been thwarted by British machinations and the brute force of European despots. Napoleon shrewdly foresaw the increase of popular discontent with the repressive measures which the reactionary sovereigns and statesmen of Europe were almost certain to inaugurate, and resulting disturbances might provide an opportunity for his own son to re-create a Napoleonic Empire. Napoleon carefully inserted in his will the pious request that he "be buried on the banks of the Seine in the midst of the French people whom I have so dearly loved." On May 5, 1821, the first of the modern revolutionary dictators died on the island of St. Helena.

### 5. SPREAD OF REVOLUTIONARY PRINCIPLES

The Napoleonic Empire was comparatively short-lived. But it had tremendous importance in spreading throughout Europe, directly or indirectly, certain novel principles which it inherited from the French Revolution. *Three* are particularly significant.

(1) *Individualism,* the principle that the unit of society and the basis of government is the individual person and not a corporation. Prior to the French Revolution, and from time immemorial, the pillars of society and government had always been such corporate groups as the family, the class (or "estate"), the guild, the university, the church, etc.; and liberties (or privileges)

belonged to corporate groups, rather than to individuals as such. The French Revolution struck a body-blow at the historic corporations, and Napoleon did not resuscitate them. "Liberty" and "equality" were for individuals.

(2) *Secularism,* the principle that religion is a private matter for each individual, and only incidentally a concern of the state. Previously there had always been in every European country some sort of enforced union between church and state; and the church (whether Catholic or Protestant) had usually shared with the state important functions of government, such as conduct of schools, administration of justice, powers of taxation, etc. Both the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Empire served to deprive the church of historic rights and privileges, and, while forwarding religious toleration, to subordinate the interests of religion to those of secular society.

(3) *"Jacobin" nationalism,* the principle that the national state is the highest form of political and social organization and rightfully commands the supreme loyalty of all its individual citizens. Some kind of national sentiment had long existed in Europe and was especially evident during the religious upheaval of the sixteenth century. But until the French Revolution it had been most often identified, at least on the Continent, with monarchical institutions; kings and princes had been the makers of national states and the central objects of popular loyalty. Now, the Jacobin revolutionaries of France invoked a democratic nationalism. With them, sovereignty becomes popular and national. National interests transcend dynastic and all other interests. Citizens are put in national armies and national schools. National flag and anthem supplant royal ensign and hymn. And if Napoleon lacked Jacobin conviction, he did not fail to utilize Jacobin nationalism for his personal ends.

The three foregoing principles were communicated from France to the rest of Europe, during the Napoleonic era, in several ways. In the first place, by means of French territorial expansion, the Netherlands, the Rhineland, and most of the Italian peninsula were subjected to the direct sway of Paris and the immediate jurisdiction of the Code Napoléon. In these areas Dutchmen and Belgians, Germans and Italians became accustomed to a centralized state and an individualist society.

Secondly, the construction of a string of dependent states in

volved revolutionary changes in southern and central Germany, in Naples, and in Spain. In these countries, feudalism and serfdom were abolished, religious toleration guaranteed, and ideas of democratic government and social equality implanted. Though the dependence of such countries on Napoleonic France was brief, it was long enough to communicate to their populations a taste for the new order.

Thirdly, the meteoric flash of Napoleon's success awed even his most consistent enemies; and the more thoughtful among them, such as the Baron vom Stein in Prussia, paid him the high tribute of imitation. The social and political "regeneration" of Prussia (and, to a lesser extent, that of Austria) represented a conscious attempt of the absolute monarchies of central Europe to win the enthusiastic support of their peoples by according them some of the reforms which inspired the French.

Of all the lessons which Europe learned from France during the Napoleonic era, the most common and impressive was nationalism. Frenchmen who paved the way for Napoleon's amazing career and Frenchmen who militantly bore his banners at Lodi and Marengo, at Austerlitz and Jena, at Madrid and Lisbon, at Friedland and Moscow, were effective messengers of the novel principle of Jacobin nationalism. And they evoked a fairly quick response. In part, this was the result of independent agitation of intellectuals in various countries, who, like the French revolutionaries themselves, had been given a nationalist turn of mind by their reading of eighteenth-century philosophy and literature. In part, it was the result of sympathy with the French and imitation of them. In greatest part, no doubt, it was the result of growing antipathy to French aggression and Napoleonic dictatorship.

**Stimulus to Popular Nationalism**

Certainly, Napoleon's forceful interventions in Germany and Spain were prime factors in arousing a lively popular nationalism in those countries. Likewise, both Italy and Poland drew nationalist inspiration from revolutionary France. Napoleon's "kingdom of Italy" brought together, for the first time in history, most of the separate city states in the northern and central portions of the peninsula and stimulated in many of their inhabitants a desire for a united Italy. Simultaneously, the southern (Neapolitan) portion of the peninsula, under the intruded rule of Napoleon's brother-in-law, Joachim Murat, witnessed the rise of the revolu-

tionary secret society of the *Carbonari* ("Charcoal-burners"), which aimed at freeing Italy from foreign control and obtaining constitutional government.

In the case of Poland, Napoleon recognized that its recent partition by Russia, Prussia, and Austria had accentuated national sentiment among its people, and this fact he took into account when he erected the Polish grandduchy of Warsaw (1807). The grandduchy supplied him with money and men, including a notable patriot and general, Prince Joseph Poniatowski, who had fought side-by-side with Kosciuszko in the latter's brave stand against the country's partition in the 1790's, and who in 1812 commanded the Polish forces in Napoleon's tragic invasion of Russia. Another noteworthy patriot was Prince Adam Czartoryski, who had also fought beside Kosciuszko for Polish independence, but who later looked for national deliverance to the emotional Tsar Alexander of Russia, rather than to the dictatorial Napoleon.

The Tsar Alexander prided himself upon his "enlightened" benevolence; and with all his ambitious imperialism, he was peculiarly responsive to the nationalist stirrings of the time. He welcomed such patriots as the German Stein and the Polish Czartoryski to his court. In 1809, when he conquered and annexed the grandduchy of Finland, he assured its people that he would respect their national language and traditions, their customary laws and local parliament; autocrat of Russia as he was, he would be constitutional Grand-Duke of Finland. Similar pledges he made for the eventual reestablishment of a national kingdom of Poland, with himself as its constitutional King. He encouraged the national awakening in Germany, headed the national Russian resistance to Napoleon in 1812, and assumed the leading role in the subsequent liberation of Europe.

Meanwhile, the newer popular nationalism was developing in the Scandinavian countries. In Denmark, it was fostered by French example and by continuing alliance with Napoleon. In Sweden, it represented a reaction first against Russian aggression and later against Napoleonic dictation. In Norway, which had long been joined with Denmark, a group of patriots, influenced by revolutionary principles, demanded and obtained from the Danish King a national administration in 1807 and a national university in 1811. Then, early in 1814, when Norway was taken away from Denmark and promised to Sweden as compensation

for the latter's loss of Finland, the patriots convened a national assembly (the Storting) which proclaimed the country's independence, adopted a liberal constitution, and chose a separate King. At this point, Marshal Bernadotte, the acting King of Sweden, intervened and persuaded the assembly to accept his kingship with the understanding that Norway remain "free, independent, and indivisible."

Even the backward lands of the eastern Mediterranean, within the Ottoman Empire, felt the impact of nationalism. Egypt was particularly affected by Napoleon's expedition of 1798 and the ensuing presence of British forces; Greece, by British occupation of the Ionian Islands; Serbia and adjacent Adriatic coastlands by Napoleon's incorporation of the so-called Illyrian provinces into his Empire. And the war which the Tsar Alexander of Russia waged with the Ottoman Empire from 1807 to 1812 added fuel to nationalist sparks throughout the Balkans.

Prior to the French Revolution, Great Britain was the European country where national patriotism was most highly developed and most broadly disseminated. It was this intense patriotism which kept the British nation superbly united during the protracted and difficult struggle which its Tory government waged with the French revolutionaries and Napoleon almost continuously from 1793 to 1815. The outcome was an enhancing of popular British nationalism. The British people as a whole could henceforth boast of the wisdom of Burke and the statesmanship of Pitt, the heroic exploits of Nelson and Wellington, the enlargement of overseas dominion,[1] the assurance of the freedom of nations on the Continent against French imperialism.

British antagonism to revolutionary France was not shared by a group of "United Irishmen," who, under the guidance of two Protestant lawyers, Wolfe Tone and Thomas Emmet, rose in armed insurrection in 1798. The rebellion was suppressed by English troops, the leaders were executed or exiled, and in 1800, by an enforced Act of Union, Ireland lost all trace of self-gov-

[1] In the course of the struggle Great Britain took from France the West Indian islands of St. Lucia and Tobago (1803) and in the Indian Ocean the island of Mauritius (1810); from Denmark the island of Heligoland (1807) in the North Sea; and from Holland the territories of Ceylon (1795), Guiana (1803), and South Africa (1806). In the Mediterranean, Britain seized Malta (1800) and the Ionian Islands (1809). And during the same period, the British Empire was being expanded in India and Australia. See above, pp. 360–364.

ernment, its separate parliament was abolished, and the country was merged in the "United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland." Subsequently, in 1803, Robert Emmet, a younger brother of Thomas Emmet, raised anew the standard of revolt, but he was quickly overpowered and put to death. Yet the very failure of the revolt only increased popular nationalist unrest in Ireland.

The new nationalism was the one revolutionary principle which became firmly implanted in Europe during the stormy era from 1789 to 1815. It tended to unite and consolidate each of the several peoples, at least of western and central Europe, and to popularize the idea that each should have a strong national state based on popular sovereignty.

The other revolutionary principles—those of individualism and secularism—were divisive, rather than unifying, forces in the several countries. If all Frenchmen were now nationalistic, there remained a considerable number who were convinced that the leveling process of the Revolution, with its abolition of corporate rights and privileges, its subjugation of the Church, and its abrupt break with past tradition, was quite wrong. Henceforth, in these basic matters of government and society, France was split. There were two Frances, one anti-Revolution, and the other pro-Revolution. And likewise in every country where the revolutionary doctrines permeated, there emerged both opponents and advocates of the new individualism and the new secularism, of revolutionary "liberty" and "equality."

**Division between "Right" and "Left," "Conservative" and "Liberal"**

The rival groupings may conveniently be labeled "Conservative" and "Liberal," or "Right" and "Left." [1] It must be borne in mind, however, that these are very loose designations, and that there were different varieties of Conservative and also of Liberal. The former embraced not only extreme "reactionaries" who wanted to put everything back as it was before 1789, but also persons, especially numerous in Great Britain and fairly so in France, who merely sought to "conserve," against Jacobin and other revolutionary "excesses," a constitutional system in harmony with national tradition, such as the oligarchical parliamentary regime in England or the limited monarchy contemplated

[1] The terms "Right" and "Left" are derived from a practice which developed in the French parliament of seating the opponents and critics of revolution on the right of the presiding officer, and its sympathizers on his left.

in the early days of the French Revolution. On the other hand, the Liberals included not only Jacobin extremists, but many persons who believed that the revolutionary principles had been subverted by Jacobin and Napoleonic dictatorship and that they should be applied gradually by an élite of brains and wealth.

Broadly speaking, the general European division between liberalism and conservatism, between "left" and "right," as it appeared in 1815, was social and geographical. The Kings and princes whose sovereignty was questioned; the nobles whose lands and privileges were confiscated or threatened with confiscation; the ecclesiastics whose consciences might be violated or activities abridged: these pillars of the pre-revolutionary era were naturally conservative. On the other hand, most of the bourgeoisie—the professional classes, bankers, traders, manufacturers, and shopkeepers—whose jealousy of the upper classes was sharpened by an ambition to obtain control of national policies and finance; the generality of the Continental universities—professors and students—together with other "enlightened" intellectuals drawn from many walks of life; the workman of the town and many a day-laborer in the fields, who felt that any change might add to the contents of his dinner-pail: these groups, restless under the old order, were naturally liberal.

The peasantry, who comprised the large majority of the continent's population, were swayed between the contending parties: still respectful of authority in state and church, sincerely religious, and innately sceptical of the fine phrases which were on liberal lips, they could at times and in places be reckoned conservative. But there was one important respect in which many peasants doggedly opposed reaction, and that was their attachment to the social achievements of the Revolution—they would be done with feudalism and serfdom, they would own their own lands. Geographically, it should be noted that on the Continent the farther west one went and the nearer to revolutionary France one came, the larger proportion of liberals one found, and that, conversely, the farther east one went and the more remote from France, the larger proportion of conservatives one encountered.

For several years after the overthrow of Napoleon the conservatives enjoyed throughout Europe a preponderant influence. There was a renewed loyalty on the part of patriots to the monarchs who had headed the great national uprisings against

Napoleon. There was a marked revival of Christianity, and particularly of the Catholic Church. Above all, there was universal horror at the bloodshed and wretchedness which the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars had entailed. Thousands upon thousands of human beings, drawn from every nation and from every social class, had been butchered. Famine, pestilence, crime, and indescribable disease—the attendant miseries of war—had walked abroad in every land. Small wonder that prince, priest, and people united in extolling the blessings of peace! With some justice the conservative Austrian statesman, Metternich, could avow that "what the European peoples want is not liberty but peace." To prevent the recurrence of such insurrections as the Revolution had witnessed and of such wars as the career of Napoleon had involved—in a word, to preserve domestic and foreign peace—was a well-nigh universal longing in 1815.

**Temporary Conservative Preponderance**



# PART IV

## POLITICAL AND NATIONALIST UNREST

XIII. CONSERVATIVE REACTION AGAINST REVOLUTIONARY LIBERALISM, 1815–1830

XIV. LIBERAL AND NATIONALIST UPHEAVALS, 1830–1850


XV. ERA OF THE SECOND NAPOLEONIC EMPIRE IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1848–1870

XVI. NATIONALIZING OF CENTRAL EUROPE AND BACKWARDNESS OF EASTERN EUROPE, 1850–1870

# CHAPTER XIII

## CONSERVATIVE REACTION AGAINST REVOLUTIONARY LIBERALISM, 1815–1830

### I. METTERNICH AND THE VIENNA PEACE SETTLEMENT



OVERTHROW of Napoleon and the destruction of his revolutionary Empire were accomplished in 1814–1815 by a coalition of European powers, chief of which were Great Britain, Russia, Prussia, and Austria. Britain had been the most constant and persistent foe of the French Revolution and Napoleon: British statesmanship and British money backed every Continental coalition, including the finally successful one; British arms drove the French from Spain and ultimately defeated Napoleon at Waterloo. Yet Great Britain could hardly have emerged victorious, had it not been for Russia's break with Napoleon in 1812 and for Austria's decisive stand against him on the eve of the "Battle of the Nations" in 1813. It was the combined might of Austria and Russia (and Prussia) which really overwhelmed the Napoleonic Empire.

It was therefore primarily for these powers to arrange the peace settlement. With the doubtful exception of the Tsar Alexander of Russia, all their responsible statesmen were thoroughly conservative. The British government of the time was Tory and especially anxious to conserve traditional institutions, whether at home or abroad, against any recurrence of revolutionary attacks upon them. Though the British monarchy had become strictly limited, it would now cooperate, for common conservative ends, with the absolute monarchies on the Continent. And both Austria and Prussia were ruled by reactionary conservatives. Only Russia had a monarch who professed any liberal principles, but the Tsar Alexander was notoriously unstable and was suspected of employing liberalism as a cloak for Russian ambition and aggression.

In the circumstances, conservatives made the peace settlement, and, by reason of what they did to satisfy the well-nigh universal longing for peace, they enjoyed widespread popularity and power for at least fifteen years afterwards. The era from 1815 to 1830 was an era of conservative reaction.

The outstanding statesman was Count Clemens Metternich. He personified conservatism, as Napoleon Bonaparte had represented the forces of revolution. Between the two, the contrast was striking.

**Metternich**

Metternich, four years younger than Bonaparte, belonged to a noble family which had long been prominent in the Rhineland and in the service of various German princes, including Habsburg Emperors. Attending the university of Strasbourg in his youth, he was disgusted by the mob violence which he witnessed there in the early stages of the French Revolution. After continuing his studies at Mainz, where he had close contact with reactionary French émigrés, and sojourning in England, which was then at war with revolutionary France, he went to Vienna and entered the diplomatic service of the Emperor Francis. He was impressively handsome and possessed of a clever wit, charming manners, and typically "enlightened" interest in natural science. In 1795 he married the granddaughter of the veteran Austrian diplomatist, Prince Kaunitz; [1] and henceforth his rise was rapid. He represented Austria successively in Saxony, Prussia, and Russia. In 1806 he was named Austrian ambassador to France, and during the next three years he contrived to ingratiate himself with Napoleon while awaiting a favorable opportunity for Austria to resume its struggle with the French Empire. He thought he detected such an opportunity in 1809, but the ensuing brief campaign, culminating in the decisive Austrian defeat at Wagram, proved him mistaken.

Nevertheless, in 1809 Metternich was made chief minister of Austria under the well-intentioned Emperor Francis I, and was soon the dominant figure at Vienna. He was distinctly a "realist." Though a convinced foe of Napoleon and of the whole revolutionary movement which the expansion of the Napoleonic Empire was spreading throughout Europe, Metternich was sceptical of such an ideological crusade as the Tsar Alexander was beginning to champion. He wanted a restoration of European peace and

[1] See above, pp. 319–320.

order through a restored balance of power, and he perceived in Russian expansion as great a menace to the European balance of power as in French expansion. Accordingly, from 1810 to 1813 his policy was to play off Napoleon and Alexander against each other. He sponsored the negotiations for the marriage of an Austrian archduchess, Maria Louisa, with the French Emperor. He welcomed the outbreak of hostilities in 1812 between Napoleon and the Tsar, promising to the former the assistance of an army corps of 30,000 men, while assuring to the latter that the Austrian forces would not be employed on the offensive. All the time he was keeping the Austrian army on a war footing and maintaining an armed neutrality, ready to throw his weight upon whichever side might finally be in a position to bestow the greater benefits upon Austria. Such was the success of his well-laid plans that the intervention of Austria was the decisive factor in the battle of the Nations (October 1813) and in the campaign of 1814.[1] Napoleon's Empire collapsed, and Austria became the foremost power among the victorious allies. Metternich was hailed as the most astute statesman of his age. He was deferred to by the Russians and Prussian monarchs. He was fêted by Talleyrand and Louis XVIII. He was given a fulsome welcome on a visit to England. He was named a magnate of the kingdom of Hungary and an hereditary prince of the Austrian Empire.

Metternich was quite aware of the division in Europe between "revolutionaries" and "reactionaries," between "Left" and "Right." He was a "reactionary," and he was thoroughly convinced in 1814–1815 that a strong conservative Austrian Empire should be the pivot of a restored balance of power in Europe and the bulwark against divisive and disturbing forces of revolution. It was Austria which had directed the first external attack against the French Revolution. It was Austria which had administered the final blow to the upstart Napoleon. It was Austria which should use its increased power and prestige to lead Europe back into the unity and peace which had been rudely broken by revolutionary and Napoleonic France.

Metternich's first care in 1814 was to restore, as far as practicable, the political and territorial *status quo* of 1792. The treaty of Chaumont (March 1814), which he helped to negotiate,[2] pro-

[1] See above, pp. 565–567.
[2] See above, p. 567.

longed for twenty years the alliance of the four victorious great powers—Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Great Britain. In May 1814, he signed the treaty of Paris, whereby the four great powers, together with Spain, Portugal, and Sweden, made formal peace with France, restored the French frontiers as they had been before the revolutionary wars, and provided for the holding of a congress of all the European powers to arrange a general peace settlement.

**Congress of Vienna**

It was a recognition of the decisive part played by Austria and of the commanding personality of Metternich that Vienna was chosen as the scene of this international congress. And to Vienna repaired in the autumn of 1814 such an array of titled dignitaries as Europe had never previously beheld in one place. Six sovereigns were there: Tsar Alexander of Russia, curiously mingling idealism with ambition; Emperor Francis I of Austria, polite and cautious; Frederick William III of Prussia, at once timid and obstinate, and quite fascinated by the seeming Christian benevolence of the Tsar; the King of Denmark; the King of Bavaria; the King of Württemberg. Great Britain was represented by the sagacious Lord Castlereagh and the "iron" Duke of Wellington. Alexander was attended by Capo d'Istria (a Greek), Baron vom Stein (the Prussian patriot), Count Nesselrode (of German blood), and Prince Adam Czartoryski (the Pole). Frederick William of Prussia was assisted by Hardenberg and Humboldt. Sweden, Spain, Portugal, the princes of the Netherlands and of Sardinia, and the minor potentates of Germany were all represented. France was represented by the astute and insinuating Talleyrand—ex-bishop, ex-revolutionary, ex-Bonapartist, now agent of the Bourbon Louis XVIII, and French patriot always. And last but not least, Metternich was there, discharging with grace and dignity the obligations which devolved upon him as host of the imposing congress. With the exception of the Tsar, who indulged in fine though vague words in praise of liberalism, all the authoritative spokesmen were staunchly conservative.

The congress was a pageant. In conformity with the best usages of polite eighteenth-century society, the monarchs and their aristocratic ministers and attendants at Vienna splendidly accompanied their negotiations with a profusion of stately banquets, elegant concerts, and formal dances.

But the Congress of Vienna was really not a "congress" at all. Metternich had had the idea that the four victorious great powers—the signatories of the treaty of Chaumont—would decide all matters among themselves and then present their decisions for merely perfunctory ratification by the other powers in congress assembled. But Talleyrand, as subtle a master of diplomacy as Metternich, was resolved that France should not be excluded from the counsels of the great powers. At first, Talleyrand threatened to nullify the program of the "Big Four" by invoking the treaty of Paris in favor of a full and free congress of all the powers, and for this threat he knew he had the backing of Spain, Portugal, Sweden, and the lesser powers. Before long, however, Talleyrand was able to take advantage of a cleavage among the "Big Four"; he played an important role in composing their differences, and in due course was admitted to their counsels. In the circumstances no "congress" was formally held. Informally, negotiations went on steadily at Vienna thoroughout the winter of 1814–1815. Sometimes the negotiations were among the "Big Four"; sometimes, among the eight signatories of the treaty of Paris; sometimes, among the German princes by themselves; and most commonly toward the last, among the "Big Five"—Austria, Russia, Prussia, Great Britain, and France.

**Polish Question**

What caused the early cleavage among the "Big Four"—the thorniest problem with which the "congress" of Vienna was confronted—was the question of the disposition of Poland and Saxony. In 1813, before the Battle of the Nations, the Tsar Alexander had promised Prussia and Austria that he would assure them the destruction of the Napoleonic grandduchy of Warsaw and that they would share with him in the repartition of all Poland. After the battle, however, he changed his mind. Prompted by Czartoryski,[1] he decided that he wanted the whole of Poland for himself; in recognition of the principle of nationality he would reconstitute the old state of Poland; he would grant it a liberal constitution; and he would utilize its resources for strengthening Russia's military and economic position. With this end in view, he proposed that Austria should be compensated by annexations in Italy, and Prussia by the absorption of Saxony (whose King had been Grand-Duke of Warsaw and a most faithful ally of Napoleon). He overran Poland with Russian

[1] See above, p. 575.

troops, and then presented his proposals to the "Big Four" at Vienna. King Frederick William III speedily assented: he liked to defer to the Tsar anyway, and the bait of Saxony was most tempting.

But Metternich, alarmed by the prospect of Russia's permanent intrusion into central Europe, was decidedly hostile, and Castlereagh, distrustful of Russia in general and of Alexander in particular, made common cause with Metternich. A deadlock ensued between Russia and Prussia, on one side, and Austria and Great Britain, on the other; and for a time war seemed imminent among the "Big Four." Eventually, Castlereagh, with Talleyrand's support, arranged a compromise. Prussia got part but not all of Saxony, and the Tsar got the greater part of Poland, though Galicia was retained by Austria, and Posen and the "corridor" by Prussia. Thus the King of Saxony was punished and Poland was re-partitioned, with the largest portion—so-called "Congress Poland"—going this time to the Russian Tsar.

**Vienna Peace Settlement**

As a result of these and other informal negotiations at Vienna, as well as of a considerable variety of special arrangements which had been made elsewhere before the congress, a "Final Act" was signed in June 1815, embodying what is commonly called the peace settlement of Vienna.[1]

**"Legitimacy" and "Compensation"**

The general principle underlying the Viennese settlement was Metternich's. It was the restoration, so far as practicable, of the boundaries and reigning families of the several European countries as they had been prior to the outbreak of the French Revolution and the advent of Napoleon Bonaparte. It was consonant with a restored "balance of power" in Europe and also with the principle of "legitimacy" which Talleyrand was exploiting in order to save France from territorial spoliation and to enable his vanquished country still to play an influential role in the counsels of Europe.

Accordingly, the treaties of Vienna recognized the restoration of the Bourbons in France, in Spain and in the Two Sicilies, of the house of Orange in Holland, of the house of Savoy in Sardinia

[1] The "Final Act" was signed only a few days before the battle of Waterloo. After the second overthrow of Napoleon, a second treaty of Paris, concluded in November 1815, deprived France of the Saar basin and obliged it to restore the art treasures which Napoleon had pilfered from other countries, to pay an indemnity of 700,000,000 francs, and to submit for a term of five years to foreign occupation of its chief fortresses.

and Piedmont, of the Pope to his temporal possessions in central Italy, and of various German princes whose territories had been included in the Confederation of the Rhine. Likewise, Austria recovered the Tyrol and other lands of which it had been despoiled, and the loose Swiss confederation was restored under a guarantee of neutrality.

The principle of "legitimacy" was considerably compromised by the necessity of providing more or less arbitrary "compensations." In the course of the Napoleonic wars, Great Britain appropriated, along with certain French and Spanish trading posts, the important Dutch colonies of Ceylon and South Africa and a part of Guiana.[1] These colonies were confirmed to Britain.

To compensate the Dutch, and to erect a stronger state on the northern frontier of France, the southern (Austrian) Netherlands were joined with the northern (Dutch) Netherlands under the rule of the restored Dutch prince of Orange, now recognized as King of the United Netherlands, despite the fact that nearly two and a half centuries of political separation had augmented the economic and religious differences between the two regions.

To compensate Austria for the surrender of its claims on the southern Netherlands, it was given a commanding position in Italy. The territories of the historic republic of Venice (including the Illyrian provinces along the eastern coast of the Adriatic) and the duchy of Milan (Lombardy) were transferred outright to the Habsburg Empire, and members of the Habsburg family were seated upon the thrones of the small central states of Tuscany, Parma, and Modena.

Sweden, as compensation for the cession of Finland to Russia and of Pomerania to Prussia, secured Norway from Denmark, whose protracted alliance with Napoleon seemed to merit a severe punishment.

Prussia's gains were especially significant. It recovered all the German territories of which it had been despoiled by Napoleon, and in addition it acquired Swedish Pomerania, two-fifths of Saxony, the whole of Westphalia, and most of the Rhineland. These cessions were intended to make Prussia a bulwark against France, but in the long run they did more. They provided it with mineral resources of the greatest economic importance during the ensuing century, and, in conjunction with its surrender of "Congress


[1] See above, p. 362.




# EUROPE AFTER THE VIENNA PEACE SETTLEMENT OF 1815

BOUNDARY OF THE GERMAN CONFEDERATION

500 MILES


FINLAND
Helsingfors
G. OF FINLAND
CRONSTADT
St. Petersburg
Stockholm
Reval
Novgorod
VOLGA R.
Nishni Novgorod
SWEDEN
BALTIC SEA
Riga
Moscow
PRUSSIA
Smolensk
Königsberg
LITHUANIA
NIEMEN R.
RUSSIA
Kiev
UKRAINE
DNIEPER R.
Ekaterinoslav
DON R.
Azov
Lemberg
GALICIA
DNIESTER R.
BESSARABIA
AUSTRIAN
Vienna
Pressburg
Budapest
HUNGARY
Jassy
Odessa
Kherson
EMPIRE
OTTOMAN
EMPIRE
TWO SICILIES
MALTA (BR.)
CRETE (CANDIA)
Beirut
Acre
Jerusalem
Jaffa
MEDITERRANEAN SEA

Poland" to Russia, they tended to transform Prussia from a half-Slavic, thoroughly agricultural state into the leading industrial state of Germany.

As Prussia and the Netherlands were enlarged and strengthened on the northeastern and northern frontiers of France, so the Viennese settlement ratified the enlargement and strengthening of the kingdom of Sardinia on the southeastern frontier of France. To the kingdom of Sardinia, Savoy and Piedmont were restored, and Genoa was added.

In the territorial and constitutional settlement of Germany neither Austria nor Prussia found it advantageous to insist too rigorously upon "legitimacy." Both opposed any restoration of the two-hundred-odd ecclesiastical states and petty principalities which had been suppressed in 1803, and no serious effort was made to resurrect the Holy Roman Empire which had expired in 1806.[1] Baron vom Stein, it is true, urged the unification of all Germany under the supremacy of a single power, but Metternich and the princes of South Germany opposed it, and King Frederick William III of Prussia was hesitant. The outcome was a compromise: the creation of a loose "German Confederation," embracing the thirty-eight remaining states, with a Diet composed of delegates of the reigning sovereigns, presided over by Austria. The member states were left free to manage their own affairs, although they might not enter into alliance with a foreign power either against the Confederation as a whole or against a fellow member. The Confederation was placed nominally under the guarantee of all the European powers, but actually the attitude of the lesser German princes enabled Austria to direct it from the outset.


**German Confederation**

Certain special provisions of the peace settlement reflected the humanitarianism of the eighteenth-century "enlightenment." For example, it included a declaration favoring the abolition of the slave-trade, arrangements for the free navigation of international rivers, and additions to international law.

Altogether, the peace settlement of 1814–1815 was a remarkable achievement. Never before had statesmen been faced with such complex and manifold problems as those created by the revolutionary upheaval which had convulsed Europe continuously from 1792 to 1815. Yet the statesmen at Vienna, in a surprisingly

[1] See above, pp. 548–549.

## THE HABSBURG FAMILY, 1740–1870



after the conclusion of the peace treaties at Vienna, Metternich succeeded by the supplementary treaty of Paris in getting Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia to agree with Austria to cement their wartime Quadruple Alliance and to maintain it as an instrument for guaranteeing the peace settlement. The four powers, thus constituting the "Concert of Europe," mutually pledged themselves to consult together, in diplomatic conferences or "congresses," periodically or whenever peace seemed threatened, and to take common action against any attempted aggression.

**Tsar Alexander and the Holy Alliance**

Meanwhile, however, the idealistic Tsar Alexander advanced a project of his own for preserving peace. He felt that physical force as envisaged by the Quadruple Alliance was not enough. It must be supplemented by a spiritual Christian alliance. Hence, already in September 1815, he induced the pious King of Prussia and the polite Austrian Emperor to form with him a "Holy Alliance," by which the three sovereigns declared their "fixed resolution, both in the administration of their respective states, and in their political relations with every other government, to take for their sole guide the precepts of that Holy Religion, namely, the precepts of justice, Christian charity, and peace, which, far from being applicable only to private concerns, must have an immediate influence on the councils of princes, and guide all their steps, as being the only means of consolidating human institutions and remedying their imperfections." They promised to "remain united by the bonds of a true and indissoluble fraternity, and, considering each other as fellow countrymen, they will, on all occasions and in all places, lend each other aid and assistance; and, regarding themselves towards their subjects and armies as fathers of families, they will lead them, in the same spirit of fraternity with which they are animated, to protect religion, peace, and justice." They consequently recommended to their people, "with the most tender solicitude, as the sole means of enjoying that peace which arises from a good conscience, and which alone is durable, to strengthen themselves every day more and more in the principles and exercise of the duties which the Divine Saviour has taught to mankind."

Alexander was the only statesman who took the Holy Alliance very seriously. Metternich scornfully called it "verbiage," and the Emperor Francis of Austria, while signing it, said he did not

know what it meant: "if it was a question of politics, he must refer it to his chancellor; if of religion, to his confessor." Lord Castlereagh, the British foreign minister, pronounced it "a piece of sublime mysticism and nonsense," and Pope Pius VII complained that it attempted to reduce the Christian religion to "religiosity." Nevertheless, with the exception of the Pope, the Moslem Sultan of the Ottoman Empire, and the British sovereign, all the European rulers, out of deference to the Tsar and doubtless influenced in many instances by the religious revival of the time, endorsed the treaty and formally adhered to the Holy Alliance.

To later liberals the Holy Alliance became the embodiment of a diabolical conspiracy to stamp out individual and national freedom. But such an estimate of its significance is derived from a confusion of terms and is quite mistaken. The eventual failure of the Holy Alliance to ameliorate political and social conditions was due not so much to a want of sincerity in its author or to any criminal character in its purpose, as to the vagueness of its terms and the failure of its signatories to give it more than lip service. It is a fact that the political ideas of the Tsar underwent a profound change, but from the outset Alexander's Holy Alliance, with its idealism, was confused in the popular mind with the more worldly Quadruple Alliance under Metternich's masterful direction.

Both Metternich and Castlereagh were distrustful of the ambitious posing of the Russian Tsar and the large army which he kept on a war footing in Poland. This rendered them all the more anxious to consolidate and strengthen the Quadruple Alliance and to keep Russia within its restraints. Thus in 1818, when France had already discharged its financial obligations to the Allies, two years before the date originally set, and was showing a continuing pacific intent, the first of the projected international congresses of the "Concert of Europe" was convened at Aix-la-Chapelle. It agreed to withdraw the Allied army of occupation from French territory and to admit France to membership in the "Concert" on an equal footing with Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia. The Quadruple Alliance of great powers became a Quintuple Alliance.

After 1818 Metternich perceived less danger to peace from Russia and the Tsar Alexander than from a resurgence of revolu-

tionary liberalism within central and western Europe and its incitement to armed insurrection against the political and national *status quo*. Hence the main problem, for him, became one of suppressing liberalism and revolt within particular countries. About this, however, Castlereagh differed with Metternich. Castlereagh was no friend of revolutionary liberalism, but he thought that the general policing of Europe was beyond the scope and ability of the Concert of great powers and contrary to British interests. He expressed aversion to Allied interference in the internal affairs of the countries on the Continent.

On the other hand, the Tsar Alexander, in his curiously mercurial way, ceased to profess any sympathy for liberalism, and by 1820 he was posing as the strong-fisted custodian of "law and order" and cooperating closely with Metternich. In these circumstances, the subsequent international congresses of the great powers—at Troppau (1820), Laibach (1821), and Verona (1822)—were concerned with plans for suppressing revolutionary outbreaks and combating liberalism. The new principle underlying such plans was agreed to by Metternich, Alexander, and the Kings of Prussia and France, though dissented from by Great Britain, and was embodied in the protocol of Troppau (1820): "States which have undergone a change of government due to revolution, the results of which threaten other states, *ipso facto* cease to be members of the European Alliance and remain excluded from it until their situation gives guarantees for legal order and stability. . . . If, owing to such alterations, immediate danger threatens other states, the powers bind themselves, by peaceful means, or if need be by arms, to bring back the guilty State into the bosom of the Great Alliance."

**Series of Congresses**

Under Metternich and Alexander it thus became the duty of the powers to stamp out revolution, even to the extent of intervention in the domestic concerns of a friendly state. For a time this duty was duly discharged. But before long, as we shall see in the next chapter, it became necessary, through force of circumstances, to refrain from the rigorous execution of the protocol of Troppau. In the meantime, if we would understand the era which marked the stand of conservative Europe against an insurgent liberal Europe, we must give some attention to the thought and culture of the early nineteenth century.

### 3. OLD AND NEW ASPECTS OF EUROPEAN CULTURE

We have explained in an earlier chapter how natural science revolutionized European thought in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, while "classicism" was continuing to influence most European arts.[1] In the early part of the nineteenth century, the advance of natural science persisted, but its influence on thought was conditioned less by the cultural vogue of "classicism" than by that of "romanticism." The rise of romanticism was almost as significant for the nineteenth century as the classical renaissance had been for the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

"Romanticism" had appeared in English literature in the eighteenth century and had almost immediately inspired notable works in French and German literature and likewise in the domain of painting.[2] It was not until after the Napoleonic period, however, that "romanticism" became fashionable and momentous.

"Classicism" remained relatively stable, at least in France, during the eras of the French Revolution and Napoleon. It was one impressive tradition of the old regime which the political and social upheaval did not seem to disturb. The French revolutionaries were strongly under classical influence. All of them had had a classical education, and they loved to think of themselves as modern exponents of the republican virtues of ancient Greece and Rome. They believed that the art which harmonized most perfectly with their own ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity was classical art—not the decorated, elegant rococo adaptation of classical art which had flourished at the court of Louis XV, but the plainer and more rugged [illegible] of "pure classicism" which was architecturally exemplified at Paris by the Panthéon and the Place de la Révolution (Place de la Concorde). Whatever the French revolutionaries did was provided with a setting of rugged classicism—the altars to *la patrie*, the Phrygian liberty caps, the Roman fasces, the layout of the military parade ground (the "field of Mars"). Even the Jacobin vogue of long trousers, if no more "classical" than the knee-breeches of the preceding age, was certainly more rugged; uglier, but plainer.

**Abiding Classicism**

[1] See above, pp. 378–387.
[2] See above, pp. 387–388.

To the classical predilection of the French revolutionaries was soon added that of Napoleon Bonaparte. Napoleon, too, liked the styles of ancient Rome and Greece, and, as we have seen, he was perpetually thinking of himself as a modern Julius Cæsar or Alexander the Great. He addressed the Pyramids as a Greek conqueror might have done, and he called his only son "King of Rome." Besides, it was Napoleon who, by means of his spectacular incursion into Egypt, contributed to the study of Egyptian antiquities and the infusion of a dash of Egyptian art-forms in contemporary "classicism."

The result was that in France, during the Revolution and under Napoleon, the fine arts of architecture, sculpture, painting, and house-furnishing tended to be severely classical, with increasing indication of ancient Egyptian influence. With the classical republican emblems of the Jacobins, Napoleon combined, as his own devices, the Roman imperial eagle and the Egyptian scarab. The Vendôme Column, which he erected at Paris to celebrate his military triumphs of 1805–1806, was modeled after the column of Trajan. The church of the Madeleine in Paris was constructed, in the style of a Roman temple with a majestic Corinthian colonnade, as a Temple of Glory for the Grand Army; it was not put to Christian uses until the restoration of the Bourbons. For Josephine, Napoleon built the château of Malmaison, also in classical style; and the chairs and tables and other furniture with which his palaces were embellished were copied from classical models, with some regard for Egyptian peculiarities, and became fashionable as "Empire" furniture.

The chief French painter of the revolutionary and Napoleonic age was David, who nicely embodied in his canvases the classical spirit of the age. His *Brutus* was appropriately painted in 1789, at the beginning of the Revolution, and he soon became a devoted Jacobin, painting with sympathy the *Oath of the Tennis Court* and the *Assassination of Marat*. As a member of the National Convention, he voted for the death of Louis XVI. Later, he passed into Napoleon's service and left us magnificent "classical" pictures of the Emperor's *Coronation*, of his *Distribution of the Eagles*, and of many of his battles.

Outside France, classicism continued to be exemplified by several important artists. For example, it characterized the sculpture of Canova and Thorwaldsen. Canova, an Italian, was patronized

both by Napoleon and by Pope Pius VII; he carved famous religious monuments and mythological scenes and also statues of Napoleon and Napoleon's favorite sister, the Princess Pauline Borghese. Thorwaldsen, a Dane, was perhaps the most successful of all the imitators of classical sculpture. Throughout the Napoleonic era, he lived in Italy, executing many statues of pagan deities as well as the celebrated tomb of Pope Pius VII in St. Peter's at Rome; afterwards, returning to Denmark, he designed the famous *Lion of Lucerne* as a memorial to the Swiss Guard that perished in defense of Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette.

In England, the tradition of classical portrait painting was maintained by Thomas Lawrence, who succeeded Sir Joshua Reynolds as the fashionable master of the "grand manner." Lawrence painted many of the celebrities of aristocratic Britain during the Tory regime from 1792 to 1815, and, patronized by George III and the Prince-Regent and favored in 1815 with a title of knighthood, he then toured the Continent and depicted the leading reactionary statesmen of the era of Metternich. The collection of Lawrence's works in the Waterloo gallery of Windsor Castle is eloquent of how the dignitaries who attended the Congress of Vienna wished to be remembered, resplendent champions of traditional European civilization.

Classicism was thus the cultural mode of revolutionary France and also the inspiration of several prominent artists of reactionary Europe. Especially in architecture, it continued predominant long after 1815. In London, for example, Roman columns and arches served as models for the chief monuments in celebration of British heroes of the Napoleonic wars—the Wellington Arch and the Nelson monument in Trafalgar Square. In the United States, the same classicism inspired the plans which L'Enfant, a French architect and engineer, prepared for the newly founded city of Washington and the designs of its first public buildings—the Capitol and the White House.

We must not spend too much time on the survival of classicism in the early part of the nineteenth century. For the rise of romanticism was even more characteristic of the period, and romanticism was a newer force in European culture. Its roots were in the eighteenth century,[1] but it was nourished by developments of the revolutionary and Na-

**Vogue of Romanticism**

[1] See above, pp. 387–388.

poleonic eras and brought to rich fruitage in the period of Metternich.

Romanticism represented a reaction against the long dominant classicism. Originally, it took its inspiration from nature rather than from ancient Greeks and Romans and perceived beauty less in artificial domes and columns than in natural mountains and lakes, forests and waterfalls. It also perceived a beauty in natural men, in commonplace things, in everyday happenings. Above all, it stressed feeling and emotion more than reason.

To the rise of romanticism, several novel developments of the revolutionary and Napoleonic eras contributed. One was the disillusionment of many intellectuals concerning the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century. At that time, all sorts of intellectuals—nobles and clergymen as well as commoners—had been sure that the modern age was infinitely more "scientific" and "enlightened" than any preceding age (with the possible exception of pagan antiquity), and that, by the use of human reason, modern men would soon banish superstition and ignorance and usher in a glorious new day of reasoned progress. But then came the terrors of the French Revolution and the horrors of the Napoleonic wars, and they were accompanied by a growing conviction on the part of a considerable number of intellectuals that earlier confidence in human reason had been misplaced. Was there not something other than reason, they argued, that should guide men and which, if followed, would guide them to a happier destiny? Had not feeling and sentiment been woefully neglected and the heart been grievously sacrificed to the head? Was the Age of Enlightenment really superior to the Age of Faith; had not the men of the eighteenth century belittled the Christian middle ages as they had magnified pagan antiquity? And did not men have "duties" as well as "rights"? Persons who answered "yes" to these questions were breaking with the Enlightenment and preparing the way for romanticism.

**Reaction against the "Enlightenment"**

Another development, likewise favorable to romanticism, was the new slant given to philosophical speculation by a famous trinity of German "idealists"—Kant, Fichte, and Hegel. Kant marked the climax of the "natural" metaphysics of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and his political philosophy was essentially that of Rousseau and

**German "Idealism"**

the French revolutionaries.[1] But Kant was also a pioneer in the romantic thought of the early nineteenth century; he emphasized the moral "duties" of man and he stressed the concepts of "spirit" and "will." Fichte followed in Kant's footsteps, so far as basic "idealism" was concerned, but, living in the midst of rising German nationalism, he applied "idealism" to the practical stimulation of patriotic opposition to Napoleon. Hegel was at once idealist and mystic. His eloquent use of semi-scientific, semi-poetic phrases, his constant reference to "spirit"—world spirit, time spirit, national spirit, etc.—his dwelling on "liberty through order," his grandiloquent surveys of history, in which he perceived three stages of human development—from the "oriental" when only the despot is free, through the "classical" when the aristocrat is free, to the medieval and modern "German" when "man as man is free"; all these stirred romantic thought and feeling in his hearers and readers during the era of Metternich. Many "liberals" took hope from Hegel's gospel, and many "conservatives," including King Frederick William III of Prussia, were reassured by it.

Quite different from German idealism was Jeremy Bentham's utilitarianism. Bentham was, of course, no mystic; he never talked about "spirit"; he had no interest in history, and his philosophy was clearly a product of eighteenth-century rationalism and humanitarianism.[2] But Bentham distrusted the French revolutionaries almost as much as the European reactionaries; he had no use for "natural rights"; and the "liberalism" which he espoused was quite different from the compulsion which the Jacobins and Napoleon practiced. While the latter emphasized the collective power of popular sovereignty, Bentham stressed the liberty of individuals under any sovereignty. Bentham lived on after the downfall of Napoleon, foreshadowing the essentially nineteenth-century liberalism which, being a protest against tyranny whether of aristocrats or of democrats, could evoke a ready response from romantic individualists.

Still another and far more important factor contributing to the rise of romanticism was the spread of nationalism during the Napoleonic era. Nationalism then appeared, it will be recalled, in Germany, Spain, Italy, Poland, Norway, and Finland, and was

[1] See above, pp. 409–411.
[2] See above, pp. 412–413.

mightily quickened in France and Great Britain.[1] Everywhere its devotees displayed patriotic emotions and sentiments; usually they extolled the common people of their respective nationalities; and frequently they ransacked historical records to find evidence of their nations' glorious deeds in the past. All these nationalist attitudes and endeavors harmonized nicely with romanticism.

**Romantic Nationalism**

Reference must likewise be made to the marked revival of supernatural religion in the early part of the nineteenth century. The eighteenth century, as we have pointed out,[2] had been, for many intellectuals, a century of "natural religion," of deism and atheism, and of scepticism about supernatural Christianity, Protestant and Catholic; and many of the French revolutionaries had imagined that they could fairly easily blot out Christianity altogether. But while a considerable number of succeeding "radicals" and "liberals" retained an eighteenth-century repugnance to organized religion, and while, therefore, there could be no such universal European acceptance of supernatural Christianity in the nineteenth century as there had been in the middle ages or in early modern times, the fact was obvious in the first part of the new century that a goodly number of intellectuals, as well as a preponderant part of the masses, were recovering faith in supernatural religion and returning to the practice of Christianity. The fact was also obvious that this religious revival was closely associated with the rise of romanticism.

**Christian Revival**

Conservatives particularly turned to Christianity as a bulwark against revolution, and throughout the era of Metternich there was much talk in reactionary circles of the "union of altar and throne." In Britain, since the *Reflections* of Edmund Burke, deism had been losing and pietism had been gaining ground: the established Anglican Church was becoming less "broad" and more "evangelical"; Methodism was growing; and a Catholic revival was imminent. On the Continent, the Tsar Alexander based his Holy Alliance on the "principles" of historic Christianity, and King Frederick William III of Prussia sought to strengthen Protestant Christianity by uniting the Lutheran and Calvinist churches in his realm (1817).

[1] See above, pp. 574–577.
[2] See above, pp. 391–404.

Especially noteworthy was the Catholic revival of the period. Pope Pius VII (1800–1823) won general respect by his dignified resistance to Napoleon and general sympathy by the persecution to which Napoleon subjected him. During his pontificate, moreover, he was well served by an able secretary, Cardinal Consalvi; and he was aided in his work of reconstruction by the general religious revival of the age. In 1814 he recovered Rome and the other temporal States of the Church in central Italy, and in the same year he formally reconstituted the Society of Jesus (the Jesuits) throughout Christendom.[1] With the restored Bourbon King of France he continued the concordat which he had signed with Napoleon Bonaparte in 1802; and with other traditionally Catholic states he concluded similar concordats in the years following 1815. With Protestant Prussia he negotiated a friendly agreement (1821) for the regulation of Catholic affairs in that country. There were numerous conversions of intellectuals during the pontificate of Pius VII,[2] and he almost lived to witness the emancipation of Catholics in Great Britain (1829).

Of course the religious revival was only one phase of the rise of romanticism. Indeed, there were almost as many phases of this new phenomenon as there were individual romanticists. The one thing which they had in common was an emotional reaction against classicism and against the rationalism which in the eighteenth century had been associated with classicism. They differed about everything else. Some were ardently Catholic or Protestant; others were zealously anti-Christian. Some were absorbed in the middle ages; others, in nature. Some were reactionary or conservative; others were liberal or revolutionary. Most were nationalist, though in different ways.

A "romantic" outlook upon life and art had been foreshadowed in the eighteenth century, prior to the French Revolution. In Great Britain, the landscape painting of Wilson and the sentimental novels of Richardson, as well as the homely dialect verse

[1] On the earlier suppression of the Jesuits, see above, p. 402.

[2] In 1817 appeared a famous book in praise of the papacy by a conservative French scholar, Count Joseph de Maistre. De Maistre argued that the Pope was infallible in matters of faith and morals and that the true cure for existing ills was the recognition of the Pope as the supreme and inspired head of all Christian nations. The book created a deep impression, and those who accepted its thesis were commonly called "ultramontanes" ("persons who look beyond the mountains").

of Robert Burns and the make-believe medieval ballads of Thomas Chatterton, had been "romantic." In France, something of the same tendency had been displayed by the affected rustic background of Watteau's pictures and by the writings of Rousseau in praise of nature and liberty and common people.[1]

**Romantic Literature**

On the eve of the nineteenth century, just when Napoleon Bonaparte was establishing his military dictatorship, romanticism blossomed, suddenly and almost simultaneously, in the national literatures of England, Germany, and France. In 1798 two English poets, Coleridge and Wordsworth, published the joint volume of *Lyrical Ballads*. Coleridge sought to show that common human emotions and mystical religious feelings can provide themes for beautiful poetry, while Wordsworth endeavored to prove that commonplace subjects in nature can be used for like purpose. In the same year two Germans, the brothers Schlegel, founded at Jena a special journal, the *Athenæum*, for the propagation of romantic ideas of liberty and revolutionary forms of art. Three years later, in 1801, a disillusioned French nobleman, Chateaubriand, published the highly colored *Genius of Christianity* and the sentimental Indian tale of *Atala*. Fame speedily attached to all these works, and soon the number of romantic poets and novelists (and historians) was legion.

Among the ensuing generation of romantic writers in English, the outstanding names are those of Byron, Shelley, Keats, Sir Walter Scott, and the American James Fenimore Cooper. In German, there were Heine and Uhland; and in French, Madame de Staël, the daughter of the Swiss banker Necker,[2] and, a little later, Victor Hugo. Contemporaneously, an important Russian literature emerged with Pushkin and Gogol, both of whom showed romantic influence.

**Painting**

Painting, like literature, was affected by the new mood. The Spaniard Goya, the greatest and most original of all eighteenth-century painters, lived on into the nineteenth century, and in his terrible depicting of the atrocities of Napoleonic soldiers he appealed to patriotic emotions that were closely related to romanticism. More purposefully romantic were two remarkable English nature-painters, Constable and Turner, and the popular French painter of historic scenes, Delacroix.

[1] See above, pp. 409–411.
[2] See above, p. 486.

**Music**

The romantic movement put an even deeper stamp on musical art than on painting. Undoubtedly the musical genius of the era was Ludwig van Beethoven, who at first was content in his compositions to preserve the classical tradition of Mozart—whom he greatly admired—but he later developed a peculiarly "reflective" style and employed it for various romantic themes. His *Third Symphony* (Eroica), composed in 1804, was in hero worship of Napoleon. His *Fifth Symphony*, composed in 1806 and first played in 1809, was aglow with the new fires of German patriotism. His *Seventh Symphony* was written in honor of the Congress of Vienna and in celebration of the overthrow of Napoleonic despotism.

Romantic music owed its greatness to Beethoven, but a good deal of its immediate popularity to three other Germans—Weber, Schubert, and Mendelssohn. Italian opera, too, during the early years of the nineteenth century turned away from "classical" models and took for themes either the historical novels of contemporary romanticists or the romantic doings of common people of the time.

Three Italians were particularly prominent in the new movement—Rossini, Bellini, and Donizetti. All of them acquired distinction in Italy, and all spent their last years in Paris. The sparkle of Rossini's *Barber of Seville* and *William Tell*, the melancholy sweetness of Bellini's *Norma* and *La Somnambula*, and the fluent melody of Donizetti's *Lucia di Lammermoor* (based on Scott's historical novel) were very popular. Paris, the scene of the operatic triumphs of these Italians, became the capital of European opera.

In fine, it will be noted that during the first three decades of the nineteenth century, while traditional "classicism" retained its supremacy in architecture and sculpture and a considerable hold on painting, a revolutionary "romanticism" was rising and becoming dominant in music and literature and partially so in painting.

During the period Europe was the scene of many an art-bout between "classicists" and "romanticists," and of wordy quarrels among the latter as to whether they should look to nature or to history, just as it was the scene of a veritable epidemic of political conflicts between "liberals" and "conservatives." To this epidemic we may now attend.

### 4. REPRESSION OF LIBERALISM IN CENTRAL EUROPE, SPAIN, PORTUGAL, AND RUSSIA

Metternich, seated in Vienna and presiding over the extensive Habsburg dominions and the peace of all Europe, might listen to the symphonies of Beethoven or the songs of Schubert and read the novels of Scott or the poems of Byron, but he was no romantic and no nationalist. He had scant sympathy with novelties. He prided himself upon being an old-fashioned cosmopolitan European, and he firmly believed that the solidarity and peace of Europe depended upon the maintenance of time-honored institutions and culture.

Metternich was well aware of unrest throughout Europe, not only in the domain of art, but in the realm of political and social thought. He understood that the principles of the French Revolution had infected many of his contemporaries. He knew that a large number of intellectuals and middle-class persons and artisans were calling themselves "liberals" and were disposed to subvert the old order of class-distinctions, established religion, absolute monarchy, and dynastic states, in favor of a new order of social equality, ecclesiastical disestablishment, constitutional monarchy, and national states. He would counteract these liberals. He would conserve the old order.

**Conservative Austria**

Metternich's first and greatest care was to make the Habsburg Empire an example of what a conservative state should be. He would have in it no divisive nationalism and no disruptive liberalism. To check incipient nationalism among its diverse peoples, he jailed their patriot agitators and strategically garrisoned particular parts of the realm with Habsburg regiments of alien nationality: Hungary, with Croatian Yugoslavs; German Austria, with Czechs; Bohemia, with Germans; the Italian provinces, with Hungarians; and Austrian Poland (Galicia), with Italians. To combat the danger of infiltration of revolutionary ideas from abroad, he erected a wall of tariffs and censors around the Habsburg lands. To prevent the rise of liberalism at home, he rigidly supervised the press, strengthened the police, and confirmed the preeminence of conservative ecclesiastics in the schools. Only music escaped his interference.

Next to Metternich's solicitude for the immediate dominions

of the Habsburg crown, was his anxiety so to dominate Italy and Germany as to stamp out any political or social movements which might spread into Austria and tend to undermine the institutions which he championed. And the territorial settlements of 1815 were such as to enable him to exercise the desired domination.

**Germany**

In his relations with the German states, Metternich encountered little trouble. Austria possessed the presidency of the new German Confederation and could always count upon the support of the princes of the smaller states who were instinctively jealous of Prussia. By this means Metternich effectually blocked repeated attempts to fulfill the promise of article XIII of the Confederation's constitution that "a representative form of government shall be adopted in the federative states." In several states of southern Germany, where the tradition of alliance with Napoleonic France kept liberalism very much alive, the princes, it is true, deemed it expedient to grant charters [1] resembling that accorded by Louis XVIII to the French people, and to retain the Napoleonic code of laws, but in almost every case restrictions on the press and the parliament, and arbitrary police activity, kept up a smoldering discontent on the part of liberals; and Metternich used his influence to prevent further reforms.

In northern and central Germany, reaction was sterner. Here, with the exception of the Grand-Duke of Saxe-Weimar, every prince evaded whatever promises of constitutional government he had made during the patriotic period of the War of Liberation. An often-cited case was that of the old Elector of Hesse-Cassel, who, after spending eight years in exile, returned with the phrase, "I have been sleeping these years," and, with the aid of his soldiers in their eighteenth-century powder and pigtails, proceeded to restore the old regime in its entirety. Perhaps King Frederick William III of Prussia had been quite sincere in his promise to grant a charter to his people, but he was a timid soul, easily frightened by the slightest difficulties, and he always considered it an honor to defer to the superior judgment of Metternich and the Austrian Emperor. Besides, Prussia had immediately to deal with the task of improving its finances, bettering its military system, and welding together the new territories which it had

[1] Notably in Bavaria (1818), Württemburg (1817, but soon suspended), and the small Thuringian states.

acquired from the Vienna peace settlement. One notable economic reform was accomplished in 1818 by the abolition of provincial tariffs and the establishment of free trade within Prussia.

Yet within all the German states the spirit of liberalism evoked by the Revolutionary and Napoleonic storms was still alive. Most of the bourgeoisie desired to participate in government, and some of the lower classes wanted social reform. There were patriots in every walk of life who aspired to a united Germany. No coercion availed to stamp out the embers of unrest. Especially in the universities liberalism throve. Students formed secret societies, which, under the names of *Tugenbund* and *Burschenschaft*, made noisy demonstrations that caused uneasiness alike in Berlin and in Vienna. Thus the Wartburg festival in October 1817,[1] which was attended by nothing more dangerous than undergraduate hilarity and a solemn burning, in imitation of Martin Luther, of various odd emblems of the old order, was magnified by Metternich into a rebellion and drew down upon the Grand-Duke of Saxe-Weimar the joint protest of the reactionary powers. Two years later, the assassination of the dramatist Kotzebue, a prominent conservative spy in the service of Russia, by a liberal student named Karl Sand, clinched the matter. Metternich, assured of Prussian aid, convoked a special meeting of German statesmen at Carlsbad to concert action against liberalism.

The result was the promulgation of the famous Carlsbad decrees by the German federal Diet (September 1819). These contained detailed provisions for supervising university professors and students and muzzling the press, forbidding the grant of any constitution "inconsistent with the monarchical principle," and establishing a central committee at Mainz to investigate "the origin and manifold ramifications of the revolutionary plots and demagogical associations directed against the existing constitution and the internal peace both of the Confederation and of the individual states."

**Carlsbad Decrees**

The following years were uneventful in Germany. The Mainz committee, though hampered by the mutual jealousies of some of the princes, proved effective enough in preventing all free expression of opinion, and the official "curators" of the universities kept

[1] The 300th anniversary of the publication of Luther's theses against indulgences (see above, p. 140), and the fourth anniversary of the battle of the Nations (see above, p. 566).

liberal enthusiasts in order. Metternich's conservative hold on Germany seemed complete.

Hardly less complete was Metternich's influence in the Italian states. Not only were Venetia and Lombardy administered as integral parts of the Habsburg Empire, but Austrian princes ruled in the duchies of Tuscany, Parma, and Modena; the Austrian Chancellor was on friendly terms with the papacy; and Ferdinand I, the Bourbon King of the Two Sicilies, reinstated in Naples by an Austrian army, had pledged himself by a secret article in the treaty of 1815 not to introduce methods of government incompatible with those in force in Austria's Italian possessions. In all these states, during the era of Metternich, a system of government which was burdensome when applied in Austria by natives to a traditionally contented populace, was doubly burdensome when exercised in Italy by a foreign power over persons who had drunk of an effervescent revolutionary stimulant imported from France. Victor Emmanuel I, the King of Sardinia, was the only ruler in the peninsula with exclusively Italian interests. But although he was joyfully acclaimed upon his restoration in Turin, he speedily yielded to his own inclinations and to the menacing representations of Metternich; he disavowed French reforms, and restored, as far as possible, conditions as they had been prior to 1789. Officially all Italy was reactionary.

**Italy**

Yet here, too, beneath the surface, liberalism seethed. The mass of peasantry were generally indifferent, but among the educated middle classes, the professional and business men, a demand for constitutional government and national independence grew gradually louder. As in so many other countries, the Italian liberals employed underground means of agitation, and such secret societies as the *Carbonari* and Freemasons conducted a good deal of revolutionary propaganda. The *Carbonari* in Naples and Sicily alone numbered thousands. Against the national and liberal aspirations of these Italians, Metternich used Austrian police and soldiers. The history of his Italian domination is in fact but an alternation of popular riots and military repression.

In 1820 there was a rebellion in Naples against the despotic Ferdinand I. Deserted by his troops, the King subscribed to a constitution modeled after the Spanish instrument of 1812.[1] But hardly had he taken the oath when Metternich, with the eager

[1] See above, p. 561.

support of the Prussian King and the Russian Tsar, convened at Troppau a congress of the European Concert, which denounced revolution, sanctioned the principle of intervention,[1] and called another congress at which Ferdinand should appear. Accordingly at the Congress of Laibach, in the following year, the King formally repudiated his oath and "invited" an Austrian army to march into Naples "to restore order." The campaign which followed was eminently satisfactory to Metternich. Neapolitan opposition collapsed; the constitution was abrogated; and Ferdinand, protected by Austrian bayonets, took savage reprisals. The Two Sicilies gained the reputation of being the most tyrannically governed state in Christendom.

**Suppression of Revolts**

Following closely upon the heels of the Neapolitan insurrection came a revolt in Piedmont. In 1821 soldiers mutinied and seized Turin; King Victor Emmanuel I abdicated in favor of his brother Charles Felix, and named Prince Charles Albert, next in line of royal succession, as Regent. Charles Albert, who was sympathetic with liberalism and hostile to Austria, at once proclaimed a constitution similar to the Spanish document of 1812, but the speedy intervention of Austrian troops enabled Charles Felix to expel the liberal-minded Regent and reestablish the absolute monarchy. Metternich proposed at the international Congress of Verona (1822) to punish Charles Albert by depriving him of the right of succession to the throne of Sardinia and Piedmont, but Charles Felix successfully interposed the doctrine of "legitimacy," and Charles Albert soon manifested conversion to conservatism by enlisting for service against liberalism in Spain.

To understand the situation in Spain, it should be recalled that in 1812, during the national uprising against Napoleon, a group of patriotic liberals had devised a constitutional government based on the revolutionary French constitution of 1791 both in its limitation of the royal power and in its abolition of feudal rights and class distinctions.[2] These liberal Spaniards were mainly middle-class persons—scholars, lawyers, and army officers—particularly influenced by the "enlightenment" of the eighteenth century and by the French Revolution. They had been tolerated by other Spaniards so long as it seemed necessary for the whole nation to present a united front against the

**Spain**

[1] For the Troppau protocol, see above, p. 597.

[2] See above, p. 561.

French. But as soon as peace was attained and the national independence of the country assured and the Bourbon King Ferdinand VII installed at Madrid, the nobles and clergy and other conservatives expressed opposition to the liberal constitution as contrary to Spanish tradition. Taking advantage of this opposition and of the indifference of the mass of the peasantry, the King declared the constitution of 1812 null and void, and abolished the parliament (Cortes).

Surrounding himself with advisors drawn exclusively from officials of the old regime, Ferdinand pursued a thoroughly reactionary policy. The privileges of the clergy and nobility, including exemption from taxation, were reaffirmed. Monasteries which had been suppressed were reopened, and the Inquisition was reestablished. The press was placed under the strictest censorship, and liberals who had assisted in making the royal restoration possible were arbitrarily arrested and banished or thrown into prison.

Ferdinand VII was sadly lacking in any real statesmanship. Instead of steering a middle course between extremist factions and seeking to consolidate the Spanish nation, he threw all his weight on the side of the reactionaries, while against the liberals he took such harsh measures that even Metternich in far-away Vienna, apprehensive of consequences, urged moderation. Instead of striving to repair the injuries inflicted by the Peninsular War and to husband his country's resources, he hampered trade and industry and, in addition, squandered large sums of money upon himself and his favorites. Instead of adopting a conciliatory attitude toward the Spanish colonies in America, which already were maintaining governments practically of their own making, instead of redressing their grievances, and bringing them once more into the bond of a great empire, he sorely neglected them at the outset, and, when it was too late, he endeavored to subjugate them by force of arms. The results of his policy were apparent within five years of his restoration: a Spain hopelessly divided into the two camps of conservatives and liberals, each with its group of irreconcilables; grave scandals and abuses in administration; an army honeycombed with disaffection; a bankrupt treasury; and the American colonies in open, and apparently successful, revolt.[1]

Throughout these five years, liberal agitation grew apace in Spain. Deprived of a free press and of the right of public meeting,

[1] On the revolt in Spanish America, see below, pp. 628–632.

the agitators gravitated to such secret societies as the Carbonari and the Freemasons. The lodges were convenient centers of revolutionary propaganda; and among the irreligious or anti-clerical element of the middle class, the movement spread—and likewise among the army officers—until Spain faced civil war.

In 1819 a mutiny in the army which the King had assembled at Cadiz for the subjugation of the American colonies was the signal for an insurrection which in the first two months of 1820 broke out in Seville, Barcelona, Saragossa, and the Asturias. In March 1820 the frightened Ferdinand gave his royal oath to restore and support the constitution of 1812 and appealed to the liberals in a pompous declaration: "Let us advance frankly, myself leading the way, along the constitutional path." The insurgents took him at his word and laid down their arms.

**Liberal Revolt of 1820**

The King's conversion was merely the reaction of cringing fear upon a cowardly and hypocritical nature. Ferdinand had no serious intention of keeping his pledges, and, although for two years (1820–1822) he was obliged to rule in accordance with the statutes of the newly convened Cortes and under the direction of liberal ministers, he was busied, almost from the outset, in countenancing reactionary revolts against the new regime and in inditing confidential letters to the great powers, especially to his Bourbon cousin, the King of France, imploring foreign aid against the very government which he had sworn to uphold. Success soon crowned his intrigues. The liberals were really a minority, and they fell to quarreling among themselves. In many districts spasmodic riots became chronic and anarchy prevailed, betokening the advent within Spain of a counter-revolution against liberalism.

In the Spanish revolt of 1820, the reactionary powers of Europe perceived a grave danger, despite the fact that they had been disgusted with Ferdinand's impolitic behavior. The Tsar Alexander, who had recently joined Metternich in endorsing the international suppression of liberalism, volunteered, with that sudden and quixotic zeal which characterized his attachment to every newly found principle, to lead a Russian army across Europe in order to reinstate Bourbon absolutism in Spain. But the French King at once conceived a strong distaste for the employment of Russian troops even in his own cousin's cause, for he feared the effect on

the French nation of the reappearance of foreign troops. Metternich, too, was loath to give Russian soldiers any excuse to cross Austrian territories, and he at once sought to moderate the Tsar's enthusiasm. Nevertheless, something must be done. Consequently, in 1822, after protracted international negotiations, the members of the Quintuple Alliance held another Congress, this time at Verona. It was the opportunity of the conservatives then in power in France: they proposed that a French army, acting on a general European mandate, should intervene in Spain. Thus by a single stroke France would be spared the humiliation of having foreign troops cross its borders; a Bourbon King would be reinstated in authority; the cause of conservatism would triumph in Spain; and whatever glory might attend French arms would redound to the credit of conservatism in France. Metternich gladly accepted the proposal. Great Britain alone objected.

**French Intervention**

Early in 1823, acting on the recommendation of the Congress of Verona, the governments of France, Austria, Russia, and Prussia presented separate notes to the liberal ministry of Spain, expostulating on the anarchical conditions in the country and demanding liberation of the King from the restraints which had been imposed upon him. The Spanish liberals naturally refused and protested against what they deemed an unwarranted interference with the purely domestic affairs of their country; and a French army, under the Duke of Angoulême, nephew of Louis XVIII, promptly crossed the Pyrenees.

The French invaders encountered no such difficulties in 1823 as had faced them in 1808. No united nation now opposed them. Indeed, the majority of the Spaniards actually abetted or applauded them, so great was the popular distrust of, or indifference toward, the liberal regime. In May, Angoulême took Madrid, and the liberal ministry and Cortes fled to Cadiz, taking Ferdinand with them as a hostage. From June to October Cadiz was closely besieged by the French. Then the liberals released the King on the understanding that he should grant a general pardon and set up a "moderate government." Ferdinand promised—no man was ever more facile with promises than he—and Cadiz capitulated and the liberals again laid down their arms.

No sooner was the King safe within the French lines than he characteristically annulled his promises and pronounced sentence

of death upon all "constitutionalists." In vain Angoulême counseled moderation and conciliation. Hundreds of liberals were arbitrarily put to death; hundreds more were exiled or jailed. By the time the French expedition withdrew from the country, Ferdinand VII had broken the back of Spanish liberalism.

Somewhat analogous to developments in Spain were those in neighboring Portugal. Here, too, there were recurrent conflicts between liberals and conservatives.

**Portugal**

It will be remembered that when Napoleonic soldiers invaded Portugal in 1807 the Portuguese royal family took refuge in their distant colonial dependency of Brazil[1] and that Great Britain, whose trade relations with Portugal had long been intimate, then intervened, expelling the French and setting up a provisional government at Lisbon. With the reestablishment of general peace in 1815, the Portuguese royal family continued to reside in Brazil, and the British, for reasons primarily commercial, prolonged their military occupation of the mother-country. It was soon obvious that Portugal was being treated as a mere appendage to Great Britain. Patriotic conservatives, who demanded the return of the King and the expulsion of the foreigners, commenced to make common cause with the liberals, who were recruited from much the same classes as in Spain and who had learned the revolutionary doctrines of liberty, equality, and fraternity in much the same way. Lord Beresford, the British governor, crushed several incipient rebellions, but in 1820, during his absence from the country, the Portuguese army, following the example of their Spanish neighbors, overthrew the regency. The liberals thereupon gained the upper hand and promulgated a constitution similar in almost every respect to the Spanish constitution of 1812. The next year King John VI, entrusting the government of Brazil to his elder son, Dom Pedro, returned to Portugal and in 1822 swore obedience to the constitution.

At once the Portuguese conservatives protested and found a leader in Dom Miguel, the King's younger son. In 1823 the King, reassured by the armed support which France was giving to absolute monarchy in Spain, revoked the constitution. Even this concession did not stay Dom Miguel's followers from attacking him, and the united action of the Concert of Europe was required to restore the King. On the death of John VI in 1826, his successor,

[1] See above, p. 555, and below, p. 633.

Pedro IV, granted to the Portuguese people a charter which provided for moderate parliamentary government on the model of the French charter of 1814, and then surrendered his Portuguese crown to his daughter Maria, a little girl seven years of age, on the understanding that she should become the wife of her uncle, Dom Miguel. Accordingly Miguel swore allegiance to Pedro, to Maria, and to the constitutional charter, but on his arrival at Lisbon in 1828 he repudiated his promises and, with the support of the conservative majority in the country, he reigned as sole and absolute King until 1834. Miguel's admiration for Metternich, which he had conceived during a three-years' residence in Vienna, combined with his natural inclination to render his rule in Portugal as tyrannical as that of Ferdinand VII in Spain.

**Russia and Tsar Alexander**

In the big and backward Russian Empire, the Tsar Alexander during the first half of his reign gave some evidences of a liberal disposition. He advised the restored Bourbon King of France to issue a constitutional charter. He confirmed the traditional national liberties and parliamentary authority of his new grandduchy of Finland. He concerted with Czartoryski the reestablishment of a Polish national state with himself as King but with a liberal constitutional government. He listened with apparent sympathy to the pleas of Baron vom Stein for the erection of a united liberal German state. For Russia proper, he toyed with ideas of promulgating a written constitution, abolishing serfdom, and promoting popular education. He actually began the reform of governmental autocracy by creating an advisory council of the Russian Empire, and he effected educational improvement by founding some parish and normal schools, and by reorganizing the universities of Moscow, Vilna, and Dorpat and erecting new ones at St. Petersburg, Kazan, and Kharkov.

After 1815 Alexander's expressions of sympathy for liberalism grew fewer and cooler. Gradually he shifted his enthusiasm from political and social reform to religious revival and military show. And Metternich, while distrustful of Alexander's armaments, never neglected an opportunity to impress upon him the dangers of abetting liberalism. The more he made concessions to revolutionaries, the more they would demand. The more they were allowed to agitate, the more they would incite to disorder and violence. Consequently the only sure means of maintaining that Christian peace and charity on which the mystical Alexander had

set his heart would be for Russia to join Austria in the stern, unrelenting repression of liberalism.

A series of events speeded the Tsar's conversion: a revolutionary conspiracy among the officers of his own bodyguard (1818); the murder of the Russian agent Kotzebue by a German liberal (1819); the assassination of a nephew of Louis XVIII by a French liberal (1820); and insurrections and violences in Italy and Spain. At the international congress of Troppau (1820), Alexander confessed his earlier errors. "To-day," he told Metternich, "I deplore all that I said and did between the years 1815 and 1818. I regret the waste of time, which we must try to retrieve. You have correctly judged the state of affairs. Tell me what you desire and what you wish me to do, and I will do it."

Alexander became even more active than Metternich in devising and encouraging reactionary measures against the liberal movements in Germany and Spain. The Holy Alliance was practically transformed into an organization for policing Europe in the interest of conservatism.

Within Russia, Alexander sharply halted the reforms already begun. Nothing more was heard of constitutional government for the Empire or of the abolition of serfdom. Indeed, during the last years of his reign, Alexander's chief concern was with his army, and for its recruitment and support he was as despotic over the Russian masses and as oppressive as Peter the Great. One result of the Tsar's changed attitude was a deepening disappointment among the little group of liberal intellectuals and especially among young army officers who had learned a good deal of French revolutionary doctrine during their campaigns in western Europe. Secret societies sprang up, and liberal agitation in Russia assumed a character somewhat similar to that in Italy and Spain.

When Alexander died suddenly in December 1825, the new revolutionary societies made an attempt to check the reaction. Opposing the late Tsar's directions that he be succeeded by his second brother Nicholas in preference to his first brother, the erratic Grand-Duke Constantine, they organized a mutiny among the troops quartered in St. Petersburg. "Constantine and Constitution" became the motto of the revolt, but Constantine speedily repudiated his friends, and Nicholas encountered no great trouble in restoring order and

**Failure of Decembrist Revolt**

obtaining general recognition for himself. How superficial as yet was the liberal propaganda in Russia may be inferred from the well-attested fact that many of the mutinous soldiers believed that "Constitution" was Constantine's wife! The ringleaders of this December revolt, who were subsequently known as Decembrists, were severely punished by the new Tsar. Reactionary conservatism was fully triumphant in Russia.

### 5. CONSERVATISM IN BRITAIN AND COMPROMISE IN FRANCE

The conservatism prevalent in most of Europe in the years immediately following 1815 meant a conserving of divine-right absolute monarchy and of privileged class-society as these had existed prior to the French Revolution. But the conservatism which was then exemplified in Great Britain and France was a bit different. In France, while it embraced some absolutist reactionaries of one mind with those in central and eastern Europe, it also included a considerable number of persons who, in more compromising spirit, desired to conserve the form of constitutional government and certain other reforms associated with the first stage of the French Revolution.

**Special Kind of Conservatism in Britain**

In Great Britain, conservatism meant a strict conserving of the nation's political and social institutions of the eighteenth century, but absolute monarchy was not one of these. British conservatives had no thought of restoring the royal absolutism of the Tudors and Stuarts of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. They thought rather of conserving the limited monarchy, the aristocratic Parliament, the titled landed nobility, the established state-church, and the traditional "liberties" of Englishmen. Indeed, the long and eventually successful struggle which Britain waged against revolutionary and Napoleonic France served to strengthen the former's peculiar brand of conservatism among the English masses and thereby to enable the aristocratic Parliament to enact "enclosures," "corn laws," and other legislation tending to increase the economic and political influence of the privileged governing classes.

Among these classes, it was the Tory faction which had conducted and won the war with France; and so great was the prestige which consequently accrued to it, that it remained in control of the British government for some time after 1815, conserving

the institutions and practices of the past and resisting demands for change. Its outstanding leaders now were Castlereagh, Wellington, and the Prince-Regent. From 1811 when hopeless insanity finally overtook King George III, the influence of the crown was exercised by his son, the Prince-Regent, whose rigid support of conservatism was as unwavering as his father's, but whose cynical, sensual immorality was in glaring contrast to his father's domestic virtues.

**Tory Regime**

The accession of the Prince-Regent to the throne on his father's death in 1820 changed the form but not the fact: George IV remained until his death in 1830 the stout advocate of conservatism. In this he was fully supported by Castlereagh and Wellington. Castlereagh, though never technically prime minister, wielded from 1812 till his suicide in 1822 an influence such as few ministers have ever exercised; gifted and affable, he directed the foreign policy and controlled the House of Commons. Wellington, though not in conspicuous civil employment until after Castlereagh's death, contributed the renown of his military exploits and the prestige of his blunt, outspoken personality to upholding as far as possible in England the conservative cause he had so militantly headed on the Continent. Such were the men who guided the destinies of Great Britain for fifteen years after the Vienna peace settlement.

Against the arch-conservatism and class legislation of the Tory government, many-sided opposition arose. There was, first of all, a group of "radicals," who, like William Godwin,[1] entertained elaborate theories of a complete social readjustment, or, like Thomas Paine, were indoctrinated with the teaching of the French revolutionaries, or, like Jeremy Bentham, labored for a "utilitarian" liberty and democracy. This group lived on, despite governmental attempts to suppress it, recruited mainly from dissenting clergymen, small shopkeepers, and self-educated artisans. At one extreme its radicalism appeared in the passionate pleas for liberty and freedom of a Shelley and a Byron, and at the other in the coarse invective of a

**Opposition Groups**

[1] Godwin's chief writing—*The Inquiry Concerning Political Justice* (1793)—taught the perfectibility of man, the inherent evil in every form of government, and the right of every man to the use of the soil. He has been hailed as an early socialist, and, more justly, as the father of modern anarchism. His wife was Mary Wollstonecraft, one of the earliest advocates of feminism. His influence was noteworthy on such men-of-letters as Shelley, Byron, and Bulwer-Lytton.

pugnacious, egotistical pamphleteer like William Cobbett. Of these "radicals" hardly any two were agreed upon a full scheme of reform, but all assailed existing institutions, and most of them advocated political democracy. They were deemed dangerous by the governing classes and patriotic masses of Great Britain, and "radicalism" became almost synonymous with treason.

A second disaffected British faction were the Catholics, who for almost three centuries had been the victims of bigotry and persecution. Reduced to a small minority in England and Scotland, they still constituted a large majority of the inhabitants of Ireland, yet throughout the kingdom they were denied political and civil rights. Few Catholics entertained sympathy for the French Revolution, but in agitating for their own emancipation they found themselves in temporary alliance with the radicals. The Protestant dissenters too, although by no means in such a plight as the Catholics, protested against a government which forced them to pay tithes for the support of the Anglican Church, excluded them from public office, and refused them a university education.

Thirdly, there was criticism of the Tory government and its aristocratic policies on the part of middle-class manufacturers who at this time were beginning to use large-scale machinery and were becoming wealthy and numerous. Jeremy Bentham's political ideas, as well as Adam Smith's economic doctrines, appealed to them, and their cause was even voiced in Parliament by some of the aristocratic (Whig) minority, who used it for political capital against the dominant Tories. Eventually, this class of industrialists was to supply the ablest and most influential apostles of liberalism.

Finally, among the strange allies of British liberalism, were a large number of the poorest and most ignorant urban workmen, whom the use of new industrial machinery threw out of employment. These workmen avenged themselves by engaging in riots—the so-called Luddite[1] riots—and attempting to smash the new

[1] "The name [Luddite] had a curious origin. More than thirty years before there lived in Leicestershire one Ned Ludd, a man of weak intellect, the village butt. Irritated by his tormentors, the unhappy fellow one day pursued one of them into an adjoining house. He could not find the lad who had been mocking him; but in his fury he broke a couple of stocking frames which were on the premises. When the frames were afterwards broken, it was the common saying that Ludd had broken them; and thus Ned Ludd, the village idiot, gave a name to one of the most formidable series of riots of the nineteenth century." (Sir Spencer Walpole.)

machines and destroy the new factories. Such riots ocurred as early as 1811 and reached their climax in 1816; they were sternly suppressed and their leaders put to death. But some of the "radicals" appreciated and sympathized with the plight of the "Luddites," and British workmen gave numerical strength to the radicals' demand for reform.

The conservative Tory Parliament adopted vigorous methods against radicalism. Following an attack on the Prince-Regent in 1817, earlier repressive measures were revived and extended. The right of habeas corpus was withdrawn; arbitrary arrest and punishment were restored, at least temporarily. Likewise, the freedom of the press was restricted; justices of the peace were instructed to issue warrants for the arrest of any person charged on oath with publishing "blasphemous or seditious libels." Prosecutions ensued so thick and fast that Cobbett, in order to avoid arrest and imprisonment, suspended his newspaper—the fiery, twopenny *Political Register*—and, "deprived of pen, ink, and paper," sailed for America.

Then, following a series of mass meetings of protest, one of which, at Manchester, was broken up by royal troops with the killing of six bystanders and the wounding of several others, Parliament enacted in 1819 the so-called Six Acts—the capstone of reaction in Great Britain. The first of these acts forbade the practice of military exercises by unauthorized persons. The second provided for the speedy trial and drastic punishment of offenders. The third empowered magistrates to issue warrants for the search of arms in private houses. The fourth authorized the seizure of seditious or blasphemous libels and the banishment of their authors. The fifth regulated and restricted the right of public meeting. The sixth subjected all publications below a certain size to the heavy stamp duty on newspapers. With the exception of the third and fifth, all these Six Acts were designed to be permanent.

**Repressive "Six Acts"**

Whereupon, a handful of violent radicals formed in London the "Cato Street conspiracy" (1820) to assassinate the whole Tory cabinet. The conspiracy was discovered, and five of its members were hanged.

Presently, however, liberalism and the demand for reform revived and gathered new strength in Britain. Cobbett returned and injected new energy into the "radicals." The Catholics found an

eloquent champion in Daniel O'Connell. The industrial middle classes, growing in numbers, clamored ever more loudly for parliamentary representation and for legislation favorable to the new machine industry; and in their clamors they were backed up by the urban working classes. On the other side, the scandalous domestic difficulties, culminating in an attempted divorce, between the ultra-conservative George IV and his unhappy Queen Caroline reacted in favor of the liberals; and the death of Castlereagh in 1822 transferred the direction of the Tory government to younger colleagues who were less adamant for the *status quo*. Some of these, notably Canning and Sir Robert Peel, were more interested in commerce than in agriculture, more identified with the newer industrial interests than with the traditional landed interests of the old Tory aristocracy; they could afford to compromise with "liberal" demands.

**Demands for Reform**

For example, it was for commercial reasons that Canning, as foreign minister after 1822, emphasized Castlereagh's policy of not cooperating with the "Concert of Europe" in international suppression of liberalism. This did not mean that Canning, any more than Castlereagh, was a liberal in the internal affairs of Great Britain. It did mean, however, that Metternich could not count on British assistance against liberalism on the Continent, and it indicated that even reactionary Tories might be pushed along the highway of liberal reform at home.

In fact, toward the close of George IV's reign, the Tory Parliament adopted some measures of reform. Protestant dissenters were freed from political disabilities (1828), and Catholics were at last admitted to Parliament and to most offices in the government (1829).

In France, meanwhile, the restored Bourbon monarchy represented a compromise. When Louis XVIII regained the throne, for the second time, after Napoleon's final overthrow at Waterloo in 1815,[1] he catered to reactionary conservatism by reaffirming that he ruled by "divine right" and that the national flag should no longer be the revolutionary tricolor but the lilied white flag of the old absolute monarchy.

**Louis XVIII's Compromise**

Simultaneously, however, Louis XVIII sought to appease the

[1] See above, p. 571.

more moderate conservatives and even the liberals. He retained Napoleon's legal and administrative reforms and the Napoleonic institutions of the Legion of Honor, the Bank of France, the concordat, and the system of state-education. He recognized the new imperial nobility as on an equal footing with the pre-revolutionary nobility. He took no step to restore serfdom or feudalism or to undo the nationalist achievements of the French Revolution. He confirmed the constitution, or "Charter," which he had promulgated in 1814 and which enshrined liberal principles of representative government, religious freedom, and civil equality.[1]

**Reactionary Activity, 1815–6**

French ultra-royalists opposed the compromise. They besought the King, now that his clemency had proved incapable of preventing the wretched episode of the Hundred Days, to revoke the Charter, and when he turned a deaf ear to them they wreaked their vengeance on what liberals they could. For several months in 1815 there was a good deal of rioting and bloodshed, which, instigated by the enraged reactionaries, has passed into history under the designation of the "White Terror." Louis XVIII was prevailed upon to proscribe nearly sixty persons who had deserted to Napoleon during the Hundred Days, and it was the irony of fate that the list was drawn up by the same unscrupulous Fouché who had voted for the death of Louis XVI and had subsequently been the right-hand man of Napoleon in ferreting out royalist conspiracies. Thirty-eight of the proscribed were banished and a few were shot, including Marshal Ney. In southern France hundreds of liberals fell victims to reactionary mobs, and an army had to be dispatched to reestablish order and security.

In the midst of the White Terror, elections for the new French parliament were conducted. Many frightened liberals absented themselves from the polls, and the result was the return of a parliament of ultra-royalists, more conservative than the King. The questionable Talleyrand and Fouché were at once turned out of their ministerial posts, and for a year the so-called *chambre introuvable* directed affairs of state in a thoroughly reactionary spirit. Laws were passed shackling the press, excepting several classes from amnesty, creating special courts for trying cases of treason, and repealing the divorce provisions of the *Code Napoléon*. In 1816 Louis XVIII, fearing the effect of his furious

[1] See above, pp. 568–569.

friends upon the country at large, dissolved the *chambre introuvable* and ordered new elections. This time the majority of the representatives proved to be moderate conservatives, loyal to the Charter and the settlement of 1815 and in full sympathy with the conciliatory efforts of the King, while ultra-royalists and liberals constituted small and warring minorities.

**Moderate Conservative Control, 1816–20**

The years of moderate conservative control, from 1816 to 1820, were marked by consistent progress. Reorganization of the public finances was effected. The preparation of an annual budget of estimated expenditure and income, which had been largely farcical under the Napoleonic Empire, now became an important part of the routine work of the Chambers. Loans were floated in order more rapidly to pay off the indemnity to the allied conquerors of France, with such success that, in accordance with arrangements made at the international Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, the last foreign troops were withdrawn from French soil in 1818, and France was once more recognized as a great power with a stable government. A new electoral law assured the preponderance of the bourgeoisie in the Lower Chamber by instituting a comparatively simple system of elections and requiring the payment of a sum of only 500 francs a year instead of 1,000 in direct taxes as a qualification for the exercise of the suffrage. Finally, a generous press law was enacted. Such legislation and the concurrent maintenance of peace were gradually winning the business classes to the support of the restored Bourbon monarchy.

**Ultra-Royalist Control, 1820–30**

The period of liberal legislation was rudely interrupted early in 1820 by the assassination of the King's nephew by a fanatical liberal. The ultra-royalists, who were swept into power on the wave of popular indignation at this outrage, promptly returned, as might have been expected, to a policy of reaction and repression. They suspended the Charter's guarantees of individual liberty. They reestablished a strict censorship of the press. They strengthened the hold of the conservative Catholic clergy on the state educational system. In order to retain their majority in the Chamber, they modified the electoral law, by introducing a highly complicated scheme of election, by giving double suffrage to citizens who paid 1,000 francs annually in direct taxes, and by lengthening the duration of a parliament to seven years. They elaborated a system of

espionage and employed it to root out such secret revolutionary societies as that of the Carbonari, which was spreading from Italy among French radicals. With the approval of Metternich and the Continental powers they sponsored the French military expedition of 1823 into Spain under command of another nephew of Louis XVIII to restore the despotic government of the Bourbon King of that country. Strange irony of fate that French arms, which had so recently carried the message of liberty, equality, and fraternity to the peoples of Europe, should be the weapon of divine-right monarchs in behalf of reactionary conservatism! Yet so unreasoning was the patriotic emotion which accompanied military success that the Spanish expedition actually increased the popular prestige of the ultra-royalists in France. When Louis XVIII died in 1824 the Bourbon dynasty seemed to be firmly reestablished, with reaction in the ascendant.

The leader of the French ultra-royalists ever since the Bourbon restoration had been the Count of Artois, the late King's brother,[1] who now, as next of kin, succeeded to the throne under the title of Charles X. No family history can be more interesting or instructive than that of the three Bourbon brothers who at different times and under varying circumstances were obliged to deal with revolutionary forces in France—Louis XVI, Louis XVIII, and Charles X. The first-named was well-intentioned, religious, but fatally weak and influenced by others, and he lost his life by the guillotine. The second was hard-hearted, unprincipled, but clever and astute, and in the midst of the struggles of irreconcilable factions he rounded out a not inglorious reign of ten years. The last-named had the political misfortune to resemble more closely the first than the second, except that he possessed great strength of will and a dogged determination quite distinctive of himself.

**Charles X**

It had been the Count of Artois who, with Marie Antoinette, had engineered the court intrigues against the Revolution in its early stages. He had headed the emigration of the nobles and clergy when their privileges were threatened by the Revolution; and, on the triumphant return of his family and of the émigrés, he encouraged the ultra-royalists in acts of retaliation. Yet personally he was courteous and kindly and loyal. Principles he had also cherished: union of the altar and the throne; revival of the

[1] See above, p. 505.

institutions of the old regime, political, religious, social, and intellectual; detestation of revolutionary doctrines. "It is only Lafayette and I," he said, "who have not changed since 1789."

With pomp becoming the dignity of an absolute divine-right monarch, Charles X was solemnly crowned at Reims. With the assistance of the ultra-royalist majority in the Chambers he set to work to achieve his purposes. Further restrictions were imposed upon the press. Penalties for sacrilege and blasphemy were made more severe. An indemnity amounting to a billion francs was promised to the émigrés for the confiscation of their lands and privileges during the Revolution. Even a bill tending to undermine equality of inheritance and to reestablish the practice of primogeniture was debated. Surely, Metternich at Vienna could rejoice in the 1820's that even the French, under ultra-royalist auspices, were taking long strides toward the realization of the reactionary program which was defined by a faithful minister of Charles X as "the reorganization of society, the restoration to the clergy of their weight in state affairs, and the creation of a powerful aristocracy surrounded with privileges."



# CHAPTER XIV

## LIBERAL AND NATIONALIST UPHEAVALS, 1830–1850

### I. PRELUDE OF SUCCESSFUL REVOLTS IN THE SPANISH, PORTUGUESE, AND OTTOMAN EMPIRES



URING fifteen years—from 1815 to 1830—there was no change in the Vienna peace settlement and no successful revolt against the conservative regimes which flourished throughout Europe following the overthrow of Napoleon. The revolts of liberals in Naples in 1820 and in Piedmont in 1821 were minor affairs and were easily suppressed. The liberal uprising in Spain in 1820 was more serious, but within three years it was put down by the intervention of a French army acting under a mandate of the Concert of Europe.

During the same period, however, ominous events occurred outside the European Continent—in Britain and in America—and also among Christian subjects of the semi-European Ottoman Empire. Great Britain, while remaining respectably conservative at home, broke with Metternich and the Concert of Europe over the policy of employing foreign forces to repress domestic liberal revolts. George Canning, the British Foreign Minister who succeeded Lord Castlereagh in 1822, sent word to the Congress of Verona,[1] which was then authorizing the armed French intervention in Spain, that "while England was no friend to revolution, she did emphatically insist on the right of nations to set up for themselves whatever form of government they thought best, and to be left free to manage their own affairs, so long as they left other nations to manage theirs."

**British Isolation from European Concert**

This declaration did not alter the decision of the Continental

[1] See above, p. 614.

members of the European Concert—Austria, Russia, Prussia, and France—to intervene in Spain, and Great Britain was not in a military position to prevent the French army from overturning the liberal government there and reestablishing the absolute monarchy of Ferdinand VII. But Britain was in a position, with its naval supremacy, to prevent Metternich and the conservative Concert from applying their policy of intervention to the contemporaneous revolutionary movement in Spanish America.

**Revolt in Spanish America**

A revolution had begun in Spain's colonial empire before 1815. Its roots were fourfold. First, some of the upper-class Spanish colonists had become infected, through reading or travel, with the "enlightened" political philosophy of the eighteenth century and had been inspired by the successful revolt of the English colonies in North America and by the example of the French Revolution with a desire to free themselves from the mother-country and to set up independent republics in Spanish America. Second, the long latent feeling of the native peasants, Indian or half-breed, against their Spanish rulers was exploited by certain leaders among them, who were actuated by humanitarian or radical sentiments and who sought to effect social changes. Third, the troubled conditions in Spain during the Napoleonic era—the quarrel between Charles IV and Ferdinand VII, the conflict between Joseph Bonaparte and the revolutionary juntas, the fighting between French and English—gave rise to disputes concerning the authority of Spanish governors in America and enabled ambitious colonial leaders to direct affairs in Mexico, New Granada, Peru, and Buenos Aires without direct reference to Madrid. Fourth, the Spanish colonists, having become accustomed during the Napoleonic era to free trade with Great Britain, were not minded during the ensuing era to return to the old mercantilist system of Spain and to exclude British goods from their ports; and in such commercial disobedience they were encouraged by British traders and even by the British government.

As early as 1806 colonial patriots in the viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata (Argentina), acting on their own initiative and without assistance from the nominal Spanish viceroy, expelled from Buenos Aires an invading British expedition; while in Venezuela a patriot by the name of Francisco Miranda, who had served under Washington in the War of American Independence and

under Dumouriez in the War of the French Revolution, undertook with British aid to overthrow Spanish rule and create a republic. By 1810, unrest and revolt were widespread throughout Spanish America. In the viceroyalty of New Spain (Mexico), a humble Catholic priest of Indian race, Miguel Hidalgo, led thousands of peasants in an uprising against colonial landlords and Spanish government. In Argentina, the colonial patriots established a local committee (or *junta*) as a provisional government and adopted a blue and white national flag. In Chile, a similar revolutionary *junta* was set up, including an able military leader, Bernardo O'Higgins, the son of a former governor of Chile and viceroy of Peru. In Venezuela and the viceroyalty of New Granada, Miranda resumed his seditious efforts, this time with the zealous cooperation of Simon Bolívar, a young man of an aristocratic family at Caracas who as a student in Spain had imbibed revolutionary and republican doctrines and had taken an oath to "liberate" all Spanish America.

These revolutionary disturbances were at first largely repressed by royalists and conservatives among the Spanish colonists in America. Hidalgo was captured, tried by the Inquisition, and put to death in Mexico in 1811, and another priest, Morelos, who incited a similar insurrection, suffered a like fate in 1815. Miranda was taken prisoner in 1812 and perished miserably in a dungeon at Cadiz four years later. The Chilean *junta* was overthrown in 1814, and O'Higgins fled to Argentina. In the same year, Bolívar was chased out of New Granada and took refuge in Haiti.

Repression only served to fan the flame of discontent and revolutionary activity. To the assistance of the *junta* at Buenos Aires came in 1812 José de San Martín, an unselfish colonial patriot and leader, who had been educated in Spain for an army career and had acquired military experience in the Spanish national war against Napoleon. He overcame conservative opposition, and in 1816 Argentina was proclaimed an independent republic. He then, in cooperation with O'Higgins, carried the struggle against Spain into Chile and Peru. Chile's national independence was secured in 1818. In 1821 Lima was captured by San Martín and Peru's independence was declared. In the meantime, Paraguay asserted its national independence (1811) and entrusted dictatorial powers to José Francia, who aspired to be a Napoleon Bonaparte in his own country.

Meanwhile, too, Bolívar returned to Venezuela (1817); and, with the support of a motley army of Spanish colonials and Indian peasants and a daredevil "foreign legion" of English, Irish, and American adventurers, and by dint of the most amazing feats, he earned his title of "Liberator." Bolívar was instrumental in the creation (1819) of the independent republic of Colombia, embracing New Granada, Panama, Venezuela, and Quito (Ecuador), in the completion of the work of San Martín in freeing Peru (1824), and in the erection of "Upper Peru" into still another independent republic which was named Bolivia in his own honor (1825). The "Liberator" subsequently suffered grievous disappointments from quarrels among his lieutenants and ingratitude among the "liberated," and when he died in 1830 his own state of Colombia was already breaking up into the three separate and quarrelsome republics of Colombia, Venezuela, and Ecuador. Yet his achievements against Spanish rule in America were lasting, and his tomb in his native Caracas is a shrine for all Spanish Americans and for others who cherish liberal principles.

To the successful revolts and revolutions in South America were added changes in other parts of Spanish America. Florida, a prey to domestic disturbances and to attacks by the United States or England after 1810, was ceded to the United States in 1819. Santo Domingo (the eastern part of the island of Hispaniola) rebelled against Spain in 1821 and was conquered by the Negro republic of Haiti (in the western part of the island) in the following year. In Mexico, after the failure of the peasant insurrections of Hidalgo and Morelos, the conservative Spanish colonists took matters into their own hands and established in 1821 an Empire, with Iturbide, an ex-officer of the Spanish army, as Emperor. Simultaneously, the Spanish colony of Guatemala—then embracing all of Central America—revolted and was incorporated in Iturbide's Mexican Empire. This Empire, however, was short-lived. In 1823 a more radical revolution disrupted it: Iturbide was overthrown and executed; Central America seceded and formed an independent union of its own; and Mexico adopted a republican constitution.

Not all Spanish colonists in America were in full sympathy with the principles of revolution, and nowhere in Spanish America were the revolutionary achievements sufficiently radical to redress the social and economic grievances of the lower classes. Moreover,

Congress a celebrated pronouncement, which has since been known as the Monroe Doctrine. "In the wars of the European powers," he said, "in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy so to do. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparations for our defense. With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the allied powers [Austria, Russia, Prussia, and France] is esentially different in this respect from that of America. . . . We owe it, therefore, to candor, and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers, to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies and dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have on great consideration and on just principles acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them or controlling in any other manner their destiny by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States."

**U. S. Monroe Doctrine**

The year following this remarkable declaration by Monroe, Great Britain formally acknowledged the independence of Mexico and Colombia; and its recognition of the independence of the other Spanish-American states was only temporarily withheld. Metternich ruefully abandoned all hope of using the Concert of Europe for the suppression of liberalism beyond the seas, and Spain made no serious efforts to subdue its colonies, although it long delayed full recognition of their freedom. The example of the American and French Revolutions, the ambition of Napoleon Bonaparte, the fatuity of Ferdinand VII, the commercial interests of Great Britain, and the political principles of the United States had combined with the revolutionary efforts of such Spanish Americans as Miranda, Bolívar, and San Martín to supplant the colonial dominion of Spain on the American continents with some ten new republics.

**Success of Rebellion in Spanish America**

Portuguese America, like Spanish America, underwent successful revolution in the era of Metternich, though with a somewhat different outcome. The great expanse of Brazil in South America had been a dependency of Portugal since the sixteenth century, and when Napoleon invaded the mother-country in 1807 the Portuguese royal family betook themselves to Brazil and established their court at Rio de Janeiro. John VI, who assumed the title of "King of Portugal, Brazil, and the Algarves," in 1816, endeavored to quiet the revolutionary unrest which was penetrating Portuguese America from adjacent Spanish America by treating Brazilians as citizens rather than as colonials, by permitting them to trade freely with foreigners, and by introducing reforms in government; and when he returned to Portugal in 1821, he left his elder son, Dom Pedro, as Regent in Brazil. Almost immediately an influential group of Brazilians, incensed by the King's departure and inspired by the contemporary erection of independent states in Spanish America, rebelled against the Portuguese government at Lisbon, and, finding themselves supported by the Regent, proclaimed him Pedro I of the independent Empire of Brazil (1822). The Emperor Pedro promptly granted a liberal constitution, and in 1826 Portugal formally recognized the independence of Brazil. The Brazilian Empire lasted, under its nominally liberal constitution, from 1822 to 1889. It was another instance of revolutionary success at the expense of the reaction associated with Metternich.

**Separation of Brazil from Portugal**

At the very time when in America liberalism was being championed and national independence achieved by Spanish and Portuguese peoples whose original homes had been in southwestern Europe, two peoples of southeastern Europe—Serbs and Greeks—obtained similar successes. One tiny Serb region in the western Balkans—the "Black Mountain," or Montenegro—had never been completely subjugated by the Turks, and its bishop (who was its prince) had been receiving annual subsidies from Russia since the time of Peter the Great. Then in 1804, during the Napoleonic era, a Turkish massacre in the Serb pashalik of Belgrade precipitated a fairly widespread revolt of Serbs. The leader of this revolt was an extraordinary peasant, Karageorge, who, after tending pigs and cows in his youth, had acquired considerable military experience by serving as a volunteer in the Austrian

army during its campaigns against the Ottoman Empire in 1788–1791. He was unlettered, but he possessed bravery and high intelligence. In 1805 Karageorge at the head of an oddly assorted peasant-army drove the Turkish pasha from Belgrade, proclaimed himself the Sultan's prince and commander-in-chief for the whole pashalik, and summoned a Serb parliament (or "skupština"), which laid the foundations for an autonomous Serbia, with a national administration and a national system of schools. He cooperated with the Russians in the war which they waged against the Ottoman Empire from 1807 to 1812, and by the resulting treaty of Bucharest (1812) the Ottoman Sultan, though enabled to reinstate a Turkish garrison in Serbia, was obliged to recognize Karageorge's government and Russia's preponderant influence in Serbia. In the following year, the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Balkans for use against Napoleon permitted the Sultan to reconquer Serbia and drive Karageorge into exile.

**Serbian Revolt against Ottoman Empire**

But the spirit of nationalist revolution was already too deeply imbedded in the Serbs to be exorcised by Ottoman decrees or Ottoman arms. In 1815 Miloš Obrenović, another peasant who had served under Karageorge, headed a savage new revolt, which two years later won from the Ottoman Empire a grudging recognition of Miloš as "supreme prince" of a small but autonomous state of Serbia.

These Serbian developments did not attract much attention at the time. Metternich thought them insignificant, and the Tsar Alexander was indifferent. But soon there were developments among the Greeks in the Ottoman Empire which disturbed both Alexander and Metternich.

The Greeks occupied, on the whole, a superior position among the Christian subjects of the Sultan. Many of them, it is true, were peasants of as lowly a standing as the Serbs, but many others were merchants and traders, controlling a large part of the industrial and commercial activity of the Ottoman Empire, and some enjoyed a practical monopoly of those offices in church and state to which Christians were eligible. In other words, there was an educated middle class among the Greeks. And it was among this educated middle class that a Greek national revival had begun in the time of the French Revolution and Napoleon.

**Greek Revolt**

One of the pioneers of the new Greek nationalism was Adamantios Korais. The son of a merchant of Smyrna, he spent his youth as his father's agent at Amsterdam in the Netherlands and then studied medicine at Montpellier in France. Thereby he became imbued with the "enlightened" philosophy of western Europe, and then, settling at Paris, he sympathetically witnessed the patriotic achievements of the French revolutionaries. If nationalism was good for the French, Korais thought, it must be good for the Greeks, and for years he devoted himself to patriotic propaganda among his fellow countrymen. He urged them, by numerous books and epistles, to believe that they were true descendants of the ancient Hellenes and that they had a cultural mission to perform in the modern world. Incidentally, Korais took the spoken Greek language of his day, purified it of alien words, and made it the literary language of modern Greece.

The cultural nationalism of Korais was reinforced by the political nationalism of another middle-class Greek, Constantine Rhigas. He was successively secretary to the Sultan's Greek governor in Rumania and interpreter for the French consulate at Bucharest. In the latter capacity, he acquired a knowledge of French revolutionary principles and a flaming enthusiasm for them. He composed numerous partiotic verses, including a Greek version of the *Marseillaise*. He founded secret societies and clandestine newspapers to work for Greek independence. He was setting out to enlist aid in France for a Greek uprising when he was apprehended by the Austrian government, handed over to the Turks, and shot (1794), an early "martyr" to the cause of Greek nationalism.

Rhigas and Korais secured followers. In 1814, in the Russian city of Odessa, was founded a Greek revolutionary society, the *Hetairia Philikę,* which resembled the revolutionary *Carbonari* in Italy, and which soon enrolled thousands of members. Then in 1821, while Metternich and the Tsar Alexander were attending the Congress of Laibach,[1] news reached them that Prince Alexander Ypsilanti, the president of the *Hetairia Philike,* had entered the Rumanian provinces of the Ottoman Empire calling for a national Greek revolt and promising aid from Russia. Metternich, alarmed, prevailed upon the Tsar to disown Ypsilanti. The disturbance in the Rumanian provinces of the Ottoman Empire was

[1] See above, p. 597.

quickly suppressed by the Turkish troops, and Metternich had the pleasure of confining the Greek leader in an Austrian prison for seven years.

But this was not the end of Greek revolt; it was only a premature beginning. Hardly was Ypsilanti overpowered in Rumania, when a popular uprising occurred in the Greek peninsula and in the Greek islands of the Ægean. The Turks, this time taken unprepared and slaughtered in large numbers, had recourse to savage reprisals. The Orthodox Patriarch of Constantinople was put to death, and a massacre of Christians was ordered in Macedonia and Asia Minor. Ferocity marked the struggle on both sides. Yet Metternich was obdurate about helping the Greeks. In his opinion they were revolutionaries and rebels against their "legitimate" sovereign, and he cynically remarked that their revolt should be allowed "to burn itself out beyond the pale of civilization."

Nevertheless, the Greek revolt appealed to the imagination and enthusiasm of Europe as nothing else could. Classicists saw in it a revival of the ancient glories of Hellas. Romanticists perceived in it a valorous struggle for national freedom. Liberals beheld in it a popular uprising in behalf of liberty. Conservatives pictured it as the climax of the long series of crusades by Christians against Moslems. Youthful volunteers flocked to the Greek standard from every country of Europe. Delacroix painted sentimental pictures of Greek exploits and sufferings, and Lord Byron gave pen, fortune, and life for the cause of Greek independence.

Popular sentiment, whether liberal or conservative, was overwhelmingly in favor of the Greek insurgents, not only in France and Great Britain, but, even more ominously, in Russia also. Political ambition of the Tsars and a succession of wars had made Russians and Turks hereditary enemies, while community of religion and culture linked the Russian and Greek peoples. Consequently, it was with some difficulty that Alexander, now a most faithful henchman of Metternich, restrained his own subjects from giving aid to revolutionaries and managed until his death in 1825 to steer Russia in "legitimist" channels.

Meanwhile the Greeks, contrary to foreign expectation and despite chronic domestic feuds, were more than holding their own against the Turks. But just about the time of Alexander's death, the Ottoman Sultan, resolving upon a final drastic effort to sub-

jugate his rebellious subjects, called to his assistance Ibrahim Pasha, the son of his vassal, Mehemet Ali of Egypt. Then for three years Ibrahim operated in the Greek peninsula with energy and cruelty. He easily defeated the Greeks in the open field, and, when hostile bands harassed his army, he took revenge by desolating the country and sending thousands of the Christian inhabitants into slavery in Egypt. The resulting indignation throughout Europe decided Alexander's successor, the Tsar Nicholas I, to close his ear to the counsels of Metternich. In July 1827, representatives of Great Britain, France, and Russia signed the treaty of London, agreeing to demand an armistice as preliminary to the settlement of the Greek question; and in October, after the Sultan had refused to accept mediation, the combined fleets of the new allies destroyed the Turco-Egyptian squadron in the harbor of Navarino. The battle of Navarino was decisive in that it rendered hopeless any further efforts of the Turks to suppress the Greek revolt, and also in that it registered a distinct setback to Metternich's policy. Even the ultra-conservative Russian Tsar was backing rebels against "legitimacy."

**Russo-Turkish War, 1828–9**

In 1828 the Tsar Nicholas formally declared war against the Ottoman Empire and the next year a Russian army, with some assistance from Miloš Obrenović and his Serbs, fought its way almost to Constantinople and obliged the Sultan to sign the treaty of Adrianople—a treaty of first-rate importance in the history of the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. By the settlement, the Sultan virtually acknowledged the independence of Greece; confirmed the grant of partial autonomy to Serbia and likewise to the Rumanian principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia; surrendered claims on Georgia and other provinces of the Caucasus to Russia; and recognized the exclusive jurisdiction of Russian consuls over Russian traders in Turkey.

**Independence of Greece**

An international conference in London subsequently fixed the Greek frontier, and in 1832 Prince Otto of Bavaria became the first constitutional King of Greece. The new kingdom embraced only a minority of the Greek-speaking people, but in spite of its diminutive size and of the poverty and political feuds which long afterwards distracted it, it was a very real example of how, even despite Metternich's fulminations, nationalism and liberalism might bear fruit.

## 2. ESTABLISHMENT OF LIBERAL MONARCHY IN FRANCE, BELGIUM, AND THE IBERIAN PENINSULA

To successful revolts in Spanish and Portuguese America and in Serbian and Greek lands of the Ottoman Empire, were added in the 1830's some striking liberal revolutions in western Europe, particularly in France, Belgium, and the Iberian peninsula. There was now a first upsetting of the Vienna peace settlement, and the defection of France, as well as Great Britain, from Metternich's conservative Concert of Europe.

**France**

France since 1814 had been committed to the compromise which the restored Bourbon monarchy had then made between liberalism and conservatism.[1] Under Louis XVIII (1814–1824) the compromise had worked fairly well, but his successor, Charles X (1824–1830), by leaning strongly toward reaction, alienated the influential middle classes (and numerous workmen) and intensified their liberal opposition. Many complained of the heavy property qualifications which excluded them from participation in government. Many criticized the "union of throne and altar" and the favors bestowed upon the Church. Many had a serious economic grievance against Charles X and his ultra-royalist parliament which in 1825 adopted a plan for indemnifying the émigré nobles to the amount of a billion francs for the losses they sustained during the Revolution.

The plan involved the refunding of the entire national debt at a materially lower rate of interest and the paying of the sum thus saved in the form of annuities to "a crowd of traitorous aristocrats." Men of business were henceforth arrayed with Napoleonic veterans and old-line Jacobins against the reactionary policies of Charles X; and in the elections of 1827 the parliamentary majority passed from ultra-royalists to liberals.

For a brief time the King seemed to heed the turn of events by appointing moderates to office, but in 1829, against an adverse vote of the parliament, he entrusted the premiership to Prince de Polignac, one of the former émigrés, a man as obstinate as he was reactionary.

It was now a conflict between the King and his ultra-conservative minister on one side, and the liberal majority in parliament, supported by the bourgeoisie, on the other. In vain did the gov-

[1] See above, pp. 622–626

ernment endeavor to win popularity by intervening in behalf of Greek independence and by sending an expedition to seize Algiers and chastise the Barbary pirates. The parliament simply persisted in voting "lack of confidence" in the ministry and in referring to the rights guaranteed by the Charter of 1814. Liberal newspapers applauded the parliament and attacked the King.

In the spring of 1830 Charles X dissolved the obstreperous parliament, but the new elections returned one even more hostile to reaction than its predecessor. The King replied in July 1830 with the publication of four arbitrary ordinances: (1) the freedom of the press was rigidly restricted; (2) the newly elected parliament, which had not as yet assembled, was dissolved; (3) a new electoral law was promulgated, disfranchising three fourths of the electors; and (4) new elections were called for September.

**Revolution of July 1830**

On the very day of publication of these ordinances, the liberal printers and journalists incited Paris to armed insurrection. After three days of street-fighting against a mere handful of royal troops, who were ill-prepared and feebly led, the Parisian workmen, driven to the barricades by the deliberate closing of the workshops by their liberal proprietors, gained a victory. Charles X abdicated in favor of his ten-year-old grandson, the Count of Chambord, and took refuge in England.

The "July Days" of 1830, with slight bloodshed, put an end to reaction in France. What political system should take its place became at once a subject of heated debate. On the one hand there still survived a republican party, recruited chiefly among students and Parisian workmen, led by Godefroi Cavaignac, and desirous of reestablishing the republic of 1795; it had small support in the country districts or among persons of prominence in Paris. On the other hand were the bourgeois liberals, led by Adolphe Thiers, a journalist, and Laffitte, a banker, and quite willing to accept royalty, provided it should be constitutional rather than absolute and should permit them actually to rule the country; they counted on the sympathy of all Frenchmen who desired "order" as well as "liberty."

An armed conflict between the two parties was at one time imminent. It was averted by the aged Lafayette, who once more appeared on the scene and exerted his influence to persuade the republicans to accept the plan already formulated by the liberal

monarchists. The plan provided for the accession to the throne by popular acclaim of Louis Philippe, Duke of Orleans. This prince was a member of the Bourbon family, but, being the son of that Philippe Égalité [1] who had voted in the Convention for the death of Louis XVI, he was presumed to have no sympathy for traditional Bourbon principles. Louis Philippe had taken an eager part in the Revolution of 1789. He had been present at the capture of the Bastille. He had been enrolled in the Jacobin Club and had held military office under the republic. He had fought at Valmy and in the Netherlands. Quitting France at the time of the Jacobin Terror and his father's execution, he had learned lessons of sturdy self-reliance during a long and adventurous exile in Europe and America. More recently he had made himself popular with the middle class by sending his sons to middle-class schools and by avowing his sympathy with the opinions of Voltaire and Rousseau.

**Liberal Monarchy of Louis Philippe**

Early in August 1830, Louis Philippe accepted the invitation of the parliament to become "King of the French." The revolutionary tricolor at once replaced the white flag of the Bourbons, and the theory of popular sovereignty supplanted that of divine-right monarchy. But the most momentous result of the July Revolution in France was the triumph of the bourgeoisie. It was this class which had shaped the course of the great Revolution of 1789, which had saved its conquests from the Parisian workmen in 1794, and which had felt itself again endangered by the privileged orders from 1815 to 1830. It was the same class which now put a reactionary King to flight, which stilled a revolutionary proletariat, and which definitely seized the reins of government. To the question asked in 1814 whether French political and social institutions were to be restored as they had been before the Revolution, the movement of 1830 constituted a categorical negative.

The suddenness and success of the July Revolution in France sent an immediate tremor throughout Europe. Conservatives were alarmed, and liberals took heart. In the Netherlands, in Germany, in Italy, in Poland, and in Switzerland, the shock of the movement was felt. Confronted with widespread disturbances, Metternich had to abandon all thought of uniting Europe against revolutionary France.

[1] See above, p. 518.

In the southern (Belgian) Netherlands, the revolutionary disturbances produced liberal results. Friction between Belgians and Dutch had been acute since the congress of Vienna had arbitrarily joined them in one state.[1] They had divergent interests and were conscious of separate nationality. The Dutch were traditionally hostile to the French; a majority of them were Protestant; and they were largely engaged in agriculture and commerce. The Belgians, on the other hand, were more French in sympathy, overwhelmingly Catholic in religion, and mainly industrial in occupation. The pig-headed Dutch King, William I, contrived to annoy all classes of his Belgian subjects. He outraged the French-speaking population by imposing upon them Dutch law, language, and officials. He irritated Catholics by placing education under the control of Protestant inspectors. He alienated liberals by restricting the freedom of the press. He angered the business men by forcing them to contribute a disproportionately large amount of taxes toward the interest on the Dutch debt.

**Revolt of Belgian Netherlands**

Matters came to a crisis in Brussels when the success of the Parisian insurrection was appreciated. Barricades were thrown up in the streets, unpopular ministers were assailed, and a national guard was formed. At first the rioters demanded only a separate legislature under the common King. But when they found William stubbornly determined to subdue them, they proclaimed the complete independence of Belgium (October 1830).

International politics at the time favored the Belgian cause. Lord Palmerston, the new British foreign secretary, followed in the steps of Canning as a promoter of advantageous commercial treaties (and consequently as a champion of small nationalities). He recommended to the foreign representatives in London that Belgian independence be promptly recognized. The government of Louis Philippe, itself reposing on a revolutionary basis, was naturally favorable to such a course. On the other hand, Metternich was so occupied with disorders in Italy and Germany, and the Tsar Nicholas with a Polish uprising, that neither could interpose any serious objection; and the Prussian King was duly intimidated by French threats. Under these circumstances an international agreement was reached at London in 1831, whereby Belgium was erected into an independent state, with a constitutional

[1] See above, p. 589.

King in the person of Leopold of Saxe-Coburg.[1] It still required a naval blockade of Dutch ports by the British fleet and the capture of Antwerp by a French military expedition before William I could be induced to surrender Belgium, and it was not until 1839 that he assented to the final treaty of peace and amity. At this time the independence and neutrality of Belgium were guaranteed by all the great powers of Europe —Britain, France, Russia, Austria, and Prussia.

**Independence of Belgium**

The Belgian revolution was a joint achievement of Liberal and Catholic parties, and these continued to cooperate during the next twenty years in maintaining an orderly, parliamentary government in Belgium and in fostering the country's economic development. Indeed, Belgium possessed from the start of its national independence a progressive spirit and an internal stability which furnished an enviable example for liberals throughout western and central Europe. And at least in western Europe, liberalism was now in the ascendant. Its success in Belgium was assured by the support of both France and Great Britain and by their combined hostility to any interference by Metternich and the reactionary powers of eastern Europe.

Liberalism also produced revolutionary developments in the 1830's in the Iberian peninsula. There, however, it was less popular and less successful, becoming involved in warfare between rival claimants to the throne and displaying an acute partisanship conducive to civil strife and military dictatorship.

In Portugal, the immediate effect of the liberal French revolution of July 1830 was to throw the partisans of the reactionary King Miguel into a kind of frenzy which found expression in attacks upon French and English residents in Lisbon; and these were only halted by the arrival of a French squadron. Then in 1831, with British naval and military backing, the King's elder brother Pedro, abdicating as Emperor of Brazil in favor of his son, Pedro II, betook himself to Portugal as head of a liberal movement to oust Miguel and reinstate his own daughter, Maria II, who had been deposed and exiled in 1828.[2]

**"Liberalism" in Portugal**

For two years (1832–1834), civil war raged in Portugal. At

[1] He was an uncle of the future Queen Victoria of Great Britain, and his wife was a daughter of the new French King, Louis Philippe.

[2] See above, pp. 615–616.

first, Miguel, who was favored by the conservative majority of the people, had the upper hand, but eventually, when Spain joined Britain and France against him, he was overcome and expelled from the country. In 1834 Maria II was consequently restored, and with her the liberal constitutional charter of 1826. Hereditary privileges and all monopolies were abolished. Taxes for the support of the Church were repealed. Monasteries were closed and their property was confiscated.

Portugal as a whole was not prepared for these changes. The mass of traditionally conservative peasants were indifferent if not antagonistic. Patriots were resentful of foreign intervention and tutelage. And the native liberals, belonging almost wholly to the middle classes and constituting only a minority of the population, were divided between supporters of the charter of 1826 and advocates of the more radically democratic constitution of 1822.[1] The latter, with the aid of a group of self-seeking army officers, executed a *coup d'état* in 1836; the former, with the aid of a rival group of army officers, executed a counter *coup* in 1842. In fact, the whole reign of Maria II (1834–1853) was characterized by recurrent disorders, and her government, while nominally liberal, was actually a series of military dictatorships.

In Spain, King Ferdinand VII, who had been forcefully restored as an absolute monarch in 1823,[2] continued to rule quite despotically throughout the revolutionary disturbances of 1830–1831 in France, Belgium, and Portugal. But on his death in 1833, Spanish liberals took advantage of a dispute over the royal succession to advance their cause. Ferdinand's heir until shortly before his death had been his brother Charles (Don Carlos), who was equally devoted to absolute monarchy and to the "union of throne and altar." In 1830, however, the birth of a daughter, Isabella, to Ferdinand and his Queen Christina, had led to a royal decree setting aside the Bourbon practice of denying the crown to women and conferring the succession on the infant daughter with her mother as Regent.

Accordingly, Isabella II and Christina were duly proclaimed in 1833, but Don Carlos refused to recognize them, asserted his own claim to the throne, and took up arms against them. Thus began a civil war—the so-called First Carlist War. Don Carlos

[1] See above, p. 615.
[2] See above, pp. 614–615.

found support in the strongly Catholic provinces of Navarre and Biscay and among reactionary conservatives elsewhere. On the other hand, most of the royal army and its leading generals respected the oath of allegiance they had given to the infant Queen; and the Regent Christina, though at heart almost as conservative as Don Carlos, drew the liberals into her camp by making politic concessions to them. In 1834 she granted a constitutional charter, providing for a two-chamber parliament (Cortes) of nobles and commoners with limited advisory powers.

**Civil War and "Liberalism" in Spain**

This did not satisfy the radical liberals or such an army officer as the veteran General Espartero, who had fought valiantly with the British against Napoleon and who was now commander-in-chief against the Carlists. A resulting military *coup* at the royal palace obliged Christina in 1837 to grant a thoroughly liberal constitution based on the one of 1812 [1] and to agree to attacks upon the Church, especially upon the monasteries. The immediate effect of the anti-religious campaign was to intensify conservative opposition and to strengthen Carlist resistance, which was overcome only in 1840 by military assistance from Great Britain and France and by recognition of the traditional rights of local self-government of Navarre and the Basques.

Hardly was the Carlist War ended when the Regent Christina sought to return to a conservative policy and to curb the Cortes. General Espartero at once turned his troops against her, compelled her to seek refuge in France, and established, in the name of the young Queen Isabella, a virtual dictatorship (1841) that aggravated the attack upon the Church by confiscating its property. But two years later, Espartero was in turn deposed and driven into exile in England by a conservative uprising directed by another army officer, General Ramón Narvaez, whose practical dictatorship lasted, with a brief interruption, until 1848.

Throughout the personal reign of Isabella II (1843–1868), some form of constitutional government was retained in Spain (as in Portugal under Maria II), but it was rendered largely illusory by chronic court intrigues, military *coups*, and deep divisions among the Spanish people. Perhaps the most notable differences between the situation before and after 1830 were (1) that foreign interference changed from the reactionary Concert of Europe to

[1] See above, p. 561.

the liberal Western powers of France and Britain, and (2) that liberalism took on a definitely anti-religious and military character in Spain and Portugal and thereby made for bitter domestic conflict in both countries.

### 3. LIBERALISM IN OPERATION IN BRITAIN AND FRANCE

Prior to 1830, the Tory government of Great Britain, while upholding the constitutional settlement of 1689, had pursued conservative policies in domestic affairs and resisted all demands for any liberalizing reform of Parliament. These demands, growing gradually stronger after 1815, were voiced by such "radicals" as the philosopher Jeremy Bentham and the economist James Mill; but the effective strength of British liberalism lay with the waxing numbers and wealth of middle-class factory owners, like Richard Cobden and John Bright, who were profiting from the newer industrial machinery and obtaining influence over the workmen in such factory towns as Manchester, Birmingham, Sheffield, and Leeds, which already were large cities but which as yet had no representation in Parliament.

In the late 1820's, a few of the governing Tories, notably Canning and Sir Robert Peel, did sponsor certain "liberal" measures, such as lowering the tariffs, recognizing revolutionary governments in Latin America, refusing cooperation with Metternich's international police system, freeing Protestant dissenters from political disabilities (1828), and emancipating Catholics (1829). But the Tory party as a whole was adamant against any general parliamentary reform, and its leader, the Duke of Wellington, declared in 1830, with pugnacity worthy of the victor of Waterloo, that the existing regime was "perfectly satisfactory."

In this year, however, occurred at Paris the July Revolution, substituting for the aristocratic government of Charles X the bourgeois government of Louis Philippe. There were immediate repercussions in Britain. Outside Parliament, the demand for reform grew noisy and menacing; inside Parliament, some of the Tories showed signs of fear. The Duke of Wellington blustered and then resigned as prime minister. Earl Grey formed a Whig ministry and introduced a reform bill in the House of Commons. Upon the defeat of this bill by the Tory majority early in 1831, the House was dissolved, new elections were held, and Grey obtained a Whig

**Demand for Parliamentary Reform**

majority. He then put a second reform bill through the House of Commons, but it was defeated by the Tory majority in the House of Lords. Then, upon the refusal of King William IV [1] to create enough Whig peers to change the majority in the upper house, Grey resigned and the Duke of Wellington undertook to form a Tory ministry. He promised to scrap the reform bill and coerce its supporters.

"Radicals" and factory owners organized demonstrations in the industrial cities and stirred up the masses against the government. In the disquieting circumstances the Duke of Wellington regretfully abandoned his attempt to form a hostile ministry; his Tory associates in the House of Commons were a minority; and some of them were very timid. Consequently, Earl Grey and the Whigs returned to power in May 1832, with a definite though most reluctant pledge from King William IV that, if necessary, he would nominate enough new peers to assure the passage of the reform bill by the House of Lords. The necessity did not actually arise, for the Tory Lords yielded, somewhat ungraciously, and the reform bill received the royal assent in June 1832.

**Reform Act of 1832**

By the Reform Act of 1832 two important changes were made in the system of parliamentary elections in Britain. (1) Certain boroughs containing fewer than 2,000 inhabitants—the so-called "rotten boroughs"—were entirely deprived of representation in the House of Commons, and boroughs with a population of from 2,000 to 4,000 were deprived of one of their two seats. Of the seats thus taken away from small towns, some were alloted to the more populous English counties and others to large industrial cities, including Manchester, Birmingham, Sheffield, and Leeds. (2) The qualifications for voting were simplified and made uniform in all the counties and similarly in all the boroughs. This did not mean universal suffrage; property qualifications, though slightly reduced, were still retained. And supplementary to the Reform Act, which affected parliamentary elections, was a Municipal Corporations Act of 1835 that gave the industrial middle class a preponderance in the election and control of local town government.

The central fact about these electoral changes was that they

[1] William IV succeeded his brother, George IV, in 1830 and reigned until 1837, when he was succeeded by his niece, Queen Victoria.

registered the passing of the political monopoly which the agricultural and commercial aristocracy had exercised since 1689. The British government was still an oligarchy, but the oligarchy now included not only agrarian aristocrats and commercial magnates but factory owners and the middle class generally. It could be expected to serve industrial as well as agricultural interests, and gradually to liberalize public policies.

In the first parliamentary elections under the Reform Act, the Whigs, with the backing of the new voters, won a victory; and then, as the grateful Whigs supported certain liberal demands of their new allies, they began to call themselves "Liberals." Thus it befell that in the 1830's the Whig party was transformed into the Liberal party, which now embraced a right wing of tolerant aristocrats (the old Whigs), a central group of ambitious industrialists, and a small left wing of doctrinaires (the Radicals). The handful of Radicals in the reformed Parliament displayed democratic and anti-ecclesiastical tendencies and were frequently critical of the aristocratic Whigs, but, inasmuch as they were far more critical of the aristocratic Tories, they were content to remain in alliance with the Liberal party and usually to follow its Whig leadership.

**Shift of Political Parties: Liberal and Conservative**

On the other hand, the Tory party underwent an alteration after the Reform Act. The mildly "liberal" element in it which had sponsored minor reforms in the late 1820's was strengthened by the discomfiture of the Duke of Wellington and the widespread reaction against his ill-starred opposition to parliamentary reform. Now that the reform was accomplished, the Tories found a new leader in Sir Robert Peel, himself a factory owner, who accepted the Reform Act as "final" and began to seek among the more "conservative" members of the new electorate a broader basis of support for the Tory party. Not all the Tories were enthusiastic about Peel, and some were belligerently opposed to policies which he advocated. Yet as time went on, almost all of them were willing to drop the somewhat discredited name of "Tory" and assume the more alluring label of "Conservative." In this way the Tory party was transformed, during the 1830's, into the Conservative party. Its right wing was still thoroughly agrarian, devoted to the interests of agriculture and of the Anglican Church, but its left wing, becoming permeated with industrial capitalism,

was not unwilling to cooperate on occasion with the industrial group of the Liberal party.

Between Conservatives, mainly landlords, and Liberals, mainly industrialists, a kind of balance of political power was thus effected in Britain. The new industrialists could not have their way about everything, and the old landlords certainly could not. The balance, of course, was not always even; on the whole, after 1832, it tipped most of the time in favor of the Liberals.[1] Yet for many years there was no thought on the part of the majority of Liberals, any more than on the part of the Conservatives, of altering the Reform Act of 1832 in a democratic direction. On the contrary, Liberals and Conservatives alike argued that the reformed regime of 1832 was the most perfect political system which the world had ever known.

Without sacrificing what was traditional, the regime now harbored what was novel. While continuing to let landlords and country gentlemen "represent" all the agricultural and rural population, it enabled the well-to-do middle class to "represent" all the industrial and urban population. It was "representative" without being democratic, substantial and evolutionary without being revolutionary or demagogic. Altogether, it was, to the upper and middle classes, a happy compromise. And so acceptable was it to the British nation at large that the political compromise of 1832 lasted until 1867, or throughout the first half of the long reign of Queen Victoria. It thus earned the nickname of the "Victorian Compromise."

**"Victorian Compromise"**

A few Radicals in Parliament and a number of urban workmen outside Parliament were not satisfied with the Reform of 1832 and the ensuing "compromise." They regarded it as only a first step which should be succeeded by other steps along a democratic path. Urban workmen, discovering that the Reform did not perceptibly increase their wages or shorten their hours of labor or even assure employment to them, came to believe that these benefits might somehow be procured if the Reform were radically extended so that the masses as well as the classes would have some direct say in Parliament. By 1838 a group of workmen, with the support of middle-class Radicals, were demanding a "People's Charter," guaranteeing: (1) universal manhood suffrage; (2) annual election of Parliament; (3)

**Chartist Movement**

[1] Liberals headed cabinets 1832–1841, 1846–1852, 1853–1858, 1850–1866.

equal electoral districts; (4) vote by ballot; (5) removal of property qualifications for members of Parliament; and (6) payment of salaries to members of Parliament.

For a time, these "Chartists" conducted an energetic agitation in the industrial centers of the country, holding mass meetings and drawing up petitions to present to Parliament. In Parliament, however, Liberals and Conservatives united to reject the petitions and to sanction military preparations of the ministry for putting down any revolt, while presently the Chartist leaders fell to quarreling with one another, and their followers split on the question of employing violence. After 1842, the Chartist movement declined in numbers if not in noise. Of the noise enough remained in 1848, when another revolution occurred at Paris and when at London the Chartists prepared to present a "monster petition" to Parliament, to arouse the aged but still courageous Duke of Wellington and bring him to the defense of the British government with regular troops and 170,000 special middle-class constables. It was the last exploit of the "Iron Duke," and the end of the "People's Charter." By this time the mass of British workmen were more concerned with free trade and trade unionism. Almost another twenty years had to elapse before they would seriously reassert democratic demands.

The Chartist movement did not amend the Reform of 1832. Nor did it divert Parliament from legislating according to the desires of that middle class whom the Reform had enfranchised. The idealistic desires of the reformed Parliament appeared in two important measures of 1833. One was the abolition of Negro slavery throughout the British Empire, accompanied with financial compensation from the public treasury to persons who thereby were deprived of private property. The other was the inauguration of a system of subsidizing private (church) schools from the public treasury, with a view to spreading "liberal knowledge" and "sober piety." [1] Besides, steady progress was made throughout the 1830's and 1840's with humanitarian legislation, reforming the penal law, abolishing brutal sports, prescribing a more merciful treatment of debtors, creating a governmental bureau of public health, and bettering the civil service.

**Liberal Legislation**

[1] The subsidy at first was very modest—£20,000 a year from 1833 to 1839 and not much increased until after 1846.

More strictly economic motives prompted the enactment of a significant poor law in 1834. This law was an amendment of the statute which since the reign of Queen Elizabeth had prescribed the treatment of pauperism in England. It transferred the administrative direction of poor relief from local officials, who might be too charitably disposed and too prodigal with taxpayers' money, to a national commission which would be "scientific." It assigned to public workhouses all paupers who could work, and it provided that, in giving money to persons who were too old or too infirm to work, the officials should be guided by the principle that the condition of such persons must be kept worse than the condition of the lowest class of laborer living without relief.

Similar economic motives actuated middle-class agitation for the abolition of restrictions on trade, especially for the repeal of the "corn laws." If import duties were done away with, manufacturers could procure raw materials, such as cotton, more cheaply and sell finished wares more profitably. If the protective tariff on grain were abolished, the free importation of cheap foodstuffs would reduce the cost of living in Britain and enable the manufacturers to pay lower wages and obtain larger profits. As early as 1820 the leading merchants of London had petitioned Parliament to substitute a system of complete free trade for the long-prevailing system of tariff protection; and in the decade before the Reform Act of 1832, even the Tory government had experimented with a "sliding scale" of grain tariffs. But however willing English landlords might be to lower duties on certain raw materials which they did not produce and on occasion to make concessions to foreign grain, they were adamant against any drastic change in the "corn laws," from which they profited directly. Landlords constituted a majority of the Tory, and later of the Conservative, party; and Whig members of the Liberal party seemed more devoted to their economic interests as landlords than to the philosophical doctrine of free trade.

**Repeal of Corn Laws**

In 1838, the same year in which the Chartist movement was launched by workmen, factory owners organized an Anti-Corn-Law League, "to convince the manufacturers that the corn laws were interfering with the growth of trade, to persuade the people that they were raising the price of food, and to teach the agri-

culturist that they had not even the solitary merit of securing a fixed price for corn." With the executive genius of Richard Cobden, with the passionate oratory of John Bright, and with the financial backing of other interested industrialists, the Anti-Corn-Law League conducted vigorous propaganda throughout the country. Mass meetings were held in all the cities; pamphlets were distributed in quantities; petitions were drawn up and presented to Parliament.

Nature assisted the free traders. In 1845 rain badly damaged the wheat crop in England and a blight ruined the potato crop in Ireland. Irish peasants died of famine by the tens of thousands,[1] and English workmen had to pay dearly for the bare necessities of life. Popular clamor for the political objects of the "People's Charter" was speedily drowned in popular clamor for the economic demands of the Anti-Corn-Law League, and there were members of Parliament who, deaf to the former, were attentive to the latter.

Since 1841 the Conservatives had had a majority in the House of Commons, and their leader, Sir Robert Peel, had consequently been prime minister. Peel, it should be remembered, was not a landlord but a manufacturer, and in 1846, against the protests of the majority of his own party, but with the applause and votes of Liberals, he passed through Parliament a bill repealing the corn laws and establishing free trade in grain. The Anti-Corn-Law League had won its battle, and its leader, Richard Cobden, was rewarded by his grateful fellow-manufacturers with a purse of £80,000. As for Peel, his conduct cost him the leadership of the Conservative party, and with it the premiership. The Conservatives split into two hostile groups, the majority agrarian, and the minority—the so-called "Peelites"—industrially minded, while the Liberals returned to power and gave free rein to the advance of industrial liberty. In 1849 the Navigation Acts[2] were repealed.

British foreign policy during the liberalizing period from 1830 to 1848 represented a blend of pacifism, distrust of Metternich's Concert of Europe, and militant patronage of liberal

[1] The population of Ireland declined from 8,500,000 in 1845 to 6,500,000 in 1851. This means that more than two million Irishmen died or emigrated during the period of the "great famine."

[2] See above, pp. 339, 467.

revolutionary movements abroad wherever these promised to enhance British prestige and extend British trade. Britain cooperated closely with the liberal monarchy of Louis Philippe in France. It actively abetted the liberal movements in Greece, Belgium, Portugal, and Spain, and strongly sympathized with those in Italy.

**Liberal Foreign and Colonial Policies**

British liberalism of the period also involved a new attitude toward the overseas British Empire, at least toward the predominantly English-speaking part of it. The same liberals who championed free trade and the abolition of Negro slavery were inclined, by their economic beliefs and their humanitarian impulses, to look with favorable eye upon the self-reliance of colonists and to feel that it should not be hampered by economic or political interference from the mother-country. Some Englishmen, notably Cobden and Bright, went so far as to assert that Britain had no further use for an empire, that it was an anachronism in an age of free trade, that it was a luxury requiring undue financial expenditure for its administration and protection and a standing danger to international peace, and that consequently it should be dissolved. Few Englishmen went as far as this, but, whatever the governing classes may have thought about the matter, their support of the repeal of tariffs and navigation acts by Parliament actually served to assure to the British Empire quite a different economic basis from what had obtained at the time of the American Revolution in the eighteenth century. And almost simultaneously with cessation of economic interference with colonies, the mother-country began to surrender its political control over some of them.

The beginning was made in North America. Here, in addition to the maritime colonies of Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island, there had been, since 1791, the two separate colonies of Lower Canada (centering in Quebec and overwhelmingly French) and Upper Canada (north of Lake Ontario and largely British), each with an assembly elected by the inhabitants and a governor sent out from Britain and empowered to veto acts of the assembly. Alike in Upper Canada and in Lower Canada, conflicts were chronic between governor and assembly, especially over the responsibility of officials; and in Lower Canada the conflicts were the more acute by reason of the fact that the assembly was French while the governor was

English. At length in 1837 a rebellion broke out in Lower Canada and spread to Upper Canada. The rebellion was easily crushed, but it called attention to Canadian grievances and induced the British government to send over, as High Commissioner, Lord Durham, an ardent Liberal, who was anxious not only to "pacify" Canada, but to introduce liberal reforms in its government.

Upon Lord Durham's recall to Britain in 1839 he published a lengthy report, containing a recommendation of epochal significance in the history of the British Empire. It was that in each of the Canadian colonies self-government should prevail in almost all matters (except the conduct of foreign affairs). The royal governor should be a figurehead, like the King in England; the local laws should be enacted by a colonial parliament and executed by a colonial prime minister and cabinet responsible to the majority in the local parliament.

In 1846 the British Parliament acquiesced in the appointment of Lord Elgin, the son-in-law of Lord Durham, as governor of Canada and in the policy which he then pursued of giving full effect to his father-in-law's recommendations. In 1849, Canadian self-government was formally recognized by Parliament.

**France under Liberal Monarchy Bourgeois**

In France the revolution of July 1830, like the Reform Act of 1832 in Britain, shifted political control from aristocracy to middle class, from conservatism to liberalism. Louis Philippe (1830–1848) was rightly dubbed the "bourgeois King," and from the circumstances of its origin, it was natural that his government should be bourgeois, and its policies liberal. The form of government was consciously modeled after Britain's: a King who would reign but not rule; a parliament, theoretically representing the nation, but actually chosen by a small minority of the people; and a ministry, responsible to the parliament. The franchise was so restricted by property qualifications that no workmen and few peasants could vote.

Members of parliament were elected by 250,000 individual owners of large property (industrial or agricultural). This meant in France, where the old landed nobility had already lost much of its wealth and prestige, that the governing oligarchy was even more bourgeois than in Britain.

The chief minister of Louis Philippe at the outset was a banker, and he was succeeded by Casimir-Périer, who, in associa-

tion with a brother, operated mines, textile factories, a sugar refinery, a distillery, and a foundry. Casimir-Périer defined the policy of Louis Philippe's regime as that of the "just mean." The era of revolution, he said, was over. Henceforth, evolution would proceed very gradually and always legally along the lines of the compromise which had been attained. Conserving the constitution which vested political power in persons of wealth and brains, the government would pursue liberal policies in economic matters. In foreign affairs the government would be pacifist and favorable to liberal movements abroad. Though Casimir-Périer died prematurely in 1832, the principles enunciated by him remained the guiding star of French government during the whole reign of Louis Philippe.

The chief ministers of the "bourgeois monarchy" after 1832 were François Guizot and Adolphe Thiers. Both were middle-class persons, ambitious, aggressive, and markedly "self-made"; both wrote voluminous histories, and both were "liberal." Guizot was a devout Calvinist (Huguenot), a bit cold in reasoning and speech, but heartily devoted to the virtues of individual thrift and international peace. Severely critical of popular movements, such as the one in his own country in 1793 which had been irreligious, bellicose, and socialistic, and which had put his father to death, he was an unqualified admirer of the political, economic, and religious institutions of middle-class "liberal" England.

Thiers was something of a freethinker and more of an opportunist. He acquired wealth by marriage and was trained in politics by Talleyrand. Distrustful of the masses from whom he had risen, temperamentally hostile to arbitrary government, and rationally attached to the liberal philosophy of the eighteenth century, he yet had a romantic predilection for "great men" in history, especially for Napoleon Bonaparte. Thiers was the leading minister from 1832 to 1836 and prime minister in 1840. Guizot was minister of public instruction from 1832 to 1839 and chief minister from 1840 to 1848.

The regime of Louis Philippe encouraged industry. It fostered the importation of machinery from England and the erection of factories and foundries in France. It commissioned an English company to construct a railway from Paris to Le Havre, and it planned a whole network of railways which should radiate from Paris. It guaranteed the cost of these public works but handed

them over, as soon as they were built, to private companies for profitable operation. It refrained from any undertaking which could be called "socialistic" and constantly appealed to private initiative. The King set an example by simple living and by investing the income of his numerous family in stocks and bonds, preferably British.

*Laissez-faire* was the governmental policy in respect of manufacturing and wealth-making. There was no interference by the state, and no serious interference by trade unions. Guilds and other combinations of workmen had been banned back in 1791, and the ban on them (and on collective bargaining) was retained and enforced in the name of "freedom of contract."

The government, being liberal, promoted education, and, under the guidance of Guizot, an important school act was passed in 1833. While leaving the Church free to conduct elementary schools, it strengthened state control of higher schools, and required all educational institutions to teach "internal and social peace." The number of schools was increased, but attendance upon them was not made compulsory. In religious matters, the government tried to be neutral. The concordat, which Napoleon Bonaparte had concluded with Pope Pius VII in 1801,[1] was retained; and, under it, the state continued to nominate the bishops and pay the salaries of the Catholic clergy. But the bourgeois monarchy would treat all religions alike; in 1831 it formally put Judaism on an equal footing with Christianity and paid the salaries of Jewish rabbis just as it supported Catholic priests and Protestant pastors.

In commercial policy, the bourgeois monarchy was not so liberal. Political economists advocated free trade, and it was endorsed by some merchants, wine-growers, and silk-manufacturers. Generally speaking, nevertheless, mechanized industry in France was "infant industry"; and seemingly unable to compete on equal terms with the lusty machine industry of Britain (or Belgium), many French industrialists and French bankers (who were now supplying most of the capital for French industry) arrayed themselves against any change in the existing protectionist system. These prosperous bourgeois had their way with the government of Louis Philippe. Hence, during the period there was no French legislation comparable with Britain's corn-law repeal.

[1] See above, p. 538.

In foreign (and colonial) matters, the July monarchy wavered between a liberal desire to promote peace and a more traditional anxiety to uphold "national honor." Louis Philippe was on friendly personal terms with Queen Victoria; and Guizot, like most French economists and industrialists, was very pro-English. In the main, therefore, French foreign policy was directed in harmony with Britain's. In concert with Britain, France helped to establish the independent kingdom of Belgium, to find a liberal monarch for the new national state of Greece, to aid liberal factions in Spain and Portugal, and to maintain the *status quo* in the Near East against the Russian Tsar on the one side and the Sultan's pasha of Egypt, Mehemet Ali, on the other.[1]

Louis Philippe, if "liberal" and "pacifist," was sensitive to the dynastic and colonial traditions of the French monarchy.

**Acquisition of Algeria**

In respect of colonial policy, he fell heir to an important question which had been posed just before the July Revolution of 1830. His predecessor, Charles X, had dispatched an expeditionary force across the Mediterranean against Algiers, whose ruler (or "Dey") had neglected to settle a dubious financial claim of two French citizens and had added insult to injury by striking the French consul on the face with a fly-slapper. The French force had only occupied Algiers and exiled the Dey, when at Paris the reactionary Charles X was succeeded by the liberal Louis Philippe. What should the French government do with the territory of the deposed Dey—not merely the city of Algiers but the extensive surrounding country of Algeria?

For several years Louis Philippe's government hesitated. From 1834 to 1839 it seemed committed to a policy of confining French occupation to Algiers and certain other coast towns. Gradually, however, the King authorized the penetration of the interior by

[1] See above, p. 637. The Ottoman Empire, in a weakened condition following its defeat in Greece, was menaced by an army of Mehemet Ali which overran Syria and Asia Minor and by armed intervention of the Tsar Nicholas I in ostensible protection of the Sultan. Through Franco-British cooperation, an arrangement was made in 1833 whereby the Tsar withdrew his forces and Mehemet Ali added Syria to his governorship of Egypt. In 1840 a temporary cleavage between the Western powers resulted from French support of renewed rebellion by Mehemet Ali, while Britain joined Russia and Austria in support of the Sultan. France, however, soon gave way and agreed to a general settlement, under which the troublesome Mehemet Ali surrendered Syria but became "hereditary governor" of Egypt and practically independent of the Ottoman Empire.

French army officers; and when in 1839 a brave and resourceful native, Abd-el-Kader, proclaimed a "holy war" and aroused his fellow tribesmen against the French, Louis Philippe sent an army of 100,000 men to repress Abd-el-Kader and conquer Algeria. The ensuing struggle was protracted and destructive. Not until 1847 was the Moslem leader caught and Algeria pacified. But then it was finally a French possession, and some 40,000 French colonists were already settled in it. The acquisition of Algeria was the first step in rebuilding a French colonial empire.

In respect of dynastic ambitions, Louis Philippe was a worthy successor of the Bourbons of the old regime. Of his large family, he married one of his daughters to King Leopold I of Belgium and another to the King of Württemberg. He also planned to re-establish dynastic ties between the sovereigns of France and Spain, and in 1846, in the face of British opposition, he married one of his sons to the sister (and at that time the heiress) of Queen Isabella II of Spain.

Basically, the liberal monarchy of Louis Philippe had no such popular support, and hence no such stability, as its prototype in Great Britain, It satisfied Guizot and some wealthy industrialists of the middle class, but there were not so many of these in France as in Britain, and its opponents were numerous and impatient of the compromises and gradual evolutionary processes which were habitual to most Englishmen. In France, at least five groups were highly critical, if not openly hostile.

**Opposition to Louis Philippe's Government**

(1) *Legitimists* comprised many persons of the old nobility, a considerable part of the Catholic clergy, some peasants (especially in Brittany), and certain intellectuals. They were still attached to the social and political institutions of the old regime, and they regarded Louis Philippe as a usurper and his government as "revolutionary" and quite too bourgeois. They regretted the deposition of Charles X, and after his death in exile in 1836 they looked upon his grandson, the Count of Chambord, as the legitimate King of France.

(2) *Republicans* were to be found among radical commoners, peasants, and artisans who cherished recollections of the democratic republic of 1792. They criticized the form of Louis Philippe's government for being monarchical and undemocratic and its politics for being in the interest of the moneyed class

rather than popular and national. They lacked organization and leaders, but the growth of the urban proletariat consequent upon the development of mechanized industry added to their numbers.

(3) *Socialists* emerged as a left wing of the Republicans. Some followed Louis Blanc, a popular agitator, in demanding that the state should foster cooperative factories and guarantee a living wage to all workers. Others followed Proudhon, a radical revolutionary, in calling for the destruction of private property and all authoritarian government and the establishment of a wholly new order on the basis of voluntary cooperation. The Proudhonians —or Anarchists, as they began to be styled in the 1840's—were a small but extremely radical group. The disciples of Louis Blanc put their faith in a democratic republic. As Blanc explained: "To the able-bodied citizen the state owes work; to the aged and infirm it owes aid and protection. This result cannot be obtained except through a democratic power."

(4) *Catholics* tended to be critical of the bourgeois monarchy of Louis Philippe. Some of them wanted a restoration of the "legitimate monarchy." Others were "liberal," accepting the revolutionary principles of popular sovereignty and individual liberty, but usually distinguishing between "true Catholic liberalism" and the "false liberalism" of Louis Philippe's government. Some of these urged social legislation in behalf of the working classes, including the restoration of guilds. Others evinced an enthusiasm for "Christian democracy." Most Catholics, whether "liberal" or "reactionary," disliked Guizot and particularly the restrictions which he put upon the freedom of Catholic education.

(5) *Bonapartists,* who cherished the memory of Napoleon and lauded his achievements at home and abroad. They particularly scoffed at the bourgeois monarchy's anxiety for "peace at any price," its subservience to England, its indifference to national glory.

### 4. CONTINUING REPRESSION IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

Liberal successes in the 1830's were confined to western Europe —to Britain, France, Belgium, Spain, and Portugal. Reactionary conservatism remained dominant in central and eastern Europe; and though both France and Britain had now irretrievably withdrawn from the conservative Concert of Europe, Metternich

could still count on the cooperation of the three great powers of Austria, Prussia, and Russia for the repression of liberalism in their respective spheres of influence.

So firm was Metternich's hold on the whole Austrian Empire that the revolutionary disturbances of 1830 at Paris and Brussels evoked no echo at Vienna, Prague, Budapest, Venice, or Milan. There was, it is true, a reverberation in parts of Germany, and in Italy outside of his immediate jurisdiction, but in these areas Austrian power and prestige were speedily employed to still the noise and safeguard conservatism.

**Germany**

In Germany, rioting by groups of liberals in 1830–1831 scared the King of Saxony, the King of Hanover,[1] and the Elector of Hesse into promulgating constitutions similar to the French Charter of 1814. But before long, Metternich's assurances dispelled the alarm of these German princes: the Elector of Hesse and the King of Hanover annulled the concessions they had made, and the King of Saxony, though not revoking the constitution, entrusted its execution to ministers who were staunchly conservative.

**Italy**

Of the Italian states, both Naples and Piedmont, which had suffered the discomfiture of Austrian intervention in 1821, now remained quiet, but liberals in the central states, counting on the support of the new French King, Louis Philippe, rebelled against their autocratic and foreign rulers. In the Papal States they raised a new tricolor of Italian democracy and nationalism (the red, white, and green, which subsequently became the flag of the kingdom of Italy) and readily shook off (1831) the temporal rule of the newly elected Pope Gregory XVI. There were similar outbreaks in Parma and Modena against the Habsburg sovereigns, who, thinking discretion the better part of valor, betook themselves hurriedly to Vienna. Austrian troops were promptly rushed into Italy: the former governments were easily reestablished, and many revolutionaries were hanged. Louis

[1] Hanover, it should be borne in mind, had been joined in a "personal" union with Great Britain since 1714; that is, the "limited" King of Great Britain had been "absolute" Elector (then King) of Hanover. In 1833 King William IV of Great Britain promulgated a constitution for Hanover in his capacity as King of this German state. On his death in 1837, however, the "personal union" was dissolved. Victoria became Queen of Great Britain, but, being a woman, she was precluded from reigning in Hanover. Her uncle became King of Hanover and utilized the occasion, and Metternich's backing, to annul the constitution which William IV had granted.

Philippe, who had grandly declared not only that he would refrain from meddling in the affairs of other countries, but that he would not permit other powers to intervene, merely stationed a French garrison in the papal town of Ancona.[1]

**Reactionary Russia**

The Russian Tsar Nicholas I (1825–1855) was a convinced and forceful reactionary. Unlike his predecessor, the Tsar Alexander, he had never entertained any sympathy for liberalism, and the Decembrist revolt against him at the time of his accession [2] only strengthened his horror of revolution. He did lend aid in 1827–1829, as we have seen, to the revolutionary Greeks, in cooperation with Great Britain and France against the wishes of Metternich, but Nicholas's conduct in this matter was dictated not by any sympathy for liberty or the principle of nationality but simply by a realistic pursuit of traditional policy—the expansion, at Turkish expense, of the influence of Russia and the Orthodox Church.

The true attitude of the Tsar Nicholas toward liberalism and nationalism was unmistakably evidenced in 1830–1831, when the inhabitants of his constitutional kingdom of Poland took arms in behalf of those principles. It was almost inconceivable that a Russian absolute monarch could be a Polish constitutional King, and since the accession of Nicholas I difficulties had increased. In November 1830, the spread of a rumor that the Tsar intended to use his Polish regiments to coerce France and put down the Belgian insurrection, inspired a mutiny at Warsaw. Rebellious Poles killed several objectionable Russian officials, expelled Nicholas's viceroy, the Grand-Duke Constantine, and proclaimed the independence of their country. Nicholas at once dispatched a Russian army against Poland, and the ensuing war lasted from January to September, 1831. The Poles fought gallantly, but their defense was paralyzed by lack of munitions and by factional feuds, and they were eventually overwhelmed. In vain they appealed for foreign assistance. The fact that both Austria and Prussia had Polish subjects rendered these powers hostile to an independent Poland, and in the circumstances neither Louis Philippe of France nor the British government did anything more than to

**Repression in Poland**

[1] This French force, which gave umbrage to both Pope and liberals, was withdrawn in 1838.

[2] See above, pp. 617–618.

expostulate with the Tsar concerning "atrocities" of the Russian army.

Nicholas inflicted exemplary punishment upon the Poles. He abrogated the liberal constitution which Alexander had granted in 1815 and incorporated the "kingdom of Poland" as a conquered province in the Russian Empire. He put hundreds of Poles to death and exiled other hundreds. He filled the land with Russian soldiers and sought in every way to extirpate Polish nationalism.

Thus it transpired that in 1831, while France and England were conniving at successful rebellion in Belgium, the Tsar Nicholas of Russia, with the approbation of Austria and Prussia, was mercilessly suppressing rebellion in Poland. One result was a proposal by Nicholas that Russia, Austria, and Prussia should form a close alliance for the support of absolute monarchy against the two powers, France and Great Britain, which had "the courage to profess aloud rebellion and the overthrow of all stability." The proposal was quite acceptable to Metternich and Francis I of Austria and to Frederick William III of Prussia, and it bore fruit in the secret treaty of Berlin (1833), whereby the three great powers reaffirmed their brand of conservatism as the unalterable basis of their policy and agreed to recognize the right of any independent sovereign to call to his aid any other independent sovereign "in cases as well of trouble within his state as of dangers threatened from without."

Emperor Francis I, dying in 1835, left instructions to his son and successor, Ferdinand I, to "displace nothing of the foundations of the edifice of the Austrian state; rule, and change nothing!" Ferdinand I was weak-minded, but Metternich, though aging, was strong-minded, and so long as Ferdinand reigned and Metternich ruled, the injunctions of Francis were dutifully observed throughout the Habsburg dominions.

The Prussian government was similarly reactionary. King Frederick William III's only memorable novelty was his part in effecting a tariff-union *(Zollverein)* of most of the German states. He had done away with tariff barriers between the provinces of Prussia in 1818, and by 1833 agreements had been reached by him with other German rulers for the abolition of tariffs between the several states.[1] The *Zollverein* was

**Prussia and the Zollverein**

[1] The *Zollverein* in 1833 embraced all the German states except Austria, Hanover, Oldenburg, and the three Hanseatic "free cities" of Hamburg, Lübeck, and Bremen.

later praised as an important economic step toward the political unification of Germany, but at the time its nationalist implications were not perceived by its Prussian author, who thought only of the financial benefits which could accrue to his conservative landowning nobility from the free circulation of agricultural products within Germany. Frederick William III was succeeded on the throne of Prussia in 1840 by his son, Frederick William IV, a romantic and histrionic Hohenzollern, whose fervent Protestantism and whose devotion to class distinctions and divine-right monarchy were matched by his emotional hatred of France and its Revolution. Frederick William IV could carry forward the principles of conservatism with a beating of drums and a fanfare of trumpets which the more realistic Metternich always avoided.

**Scandinavia**

In northwestern Europe, conservatism seemed enduring. Neither in Sweden, to whose throne the French Marshal Bernadotte succeeded in 1818 as Charles XIV, nor in Denmark, whose King Frederick VI (1808–1839) had been a most loyal ally of Napoleon, did liberalism become significant during the entire era of Metternich. Charles of Sweden possessed a strong personality, but he early put aside his French and revolutionary traditions and grew increasingly distrustful of liberal ideas and apprehensive of any political or social change. He tolerated a theoretically liberal constitution in his "kingdom of Norway," but in Sweden he sedulously conserved the royal authority, the medieval four-chambered estates, the old distinctions among social classes, and the religious monopoly of the Lutheran state-church. It was likewise in Denmark until 1848. In Holland, too, King William I, after the loss of Belgium, continued in the old way, stubbornly resisting demands for reform and sharing political power only with the commercial aristocrats of the pre-revolutionary States General.

**Nicholas I and Pan-Slavism**

Of all opponents of revolution and reform, Nicholas I of Russia was the boldest and most determined. During the thirty years of his reign he acted energetically to prevent liberal ideas from germinating spontaneously within his extensive realm or from being transplanted from abroad. He enforced an extremely strict censorship of the press. He devised an expensive system of passports, which made it difficult for Russians to visit foreign countries or for aliens to enter Russia. He established an elaborate secret police to discover and

punish sedition. While doing everything in his power to quarantine his Empire against Western liberalism, he promoted the spread and intensification of what he termed Eastern conservatism by encouraging the so-called "Slavophile" intellectuals of his day to preach a peculiar form of Pan-Slavism—the doctrine that Russia is the natural leader and champion of all Slavic peoples and that Russia is different from, and superior to, the rest of Europe in being a holy ark of political autocracy and religious orthodoxy.

### 5. THE REVOLUTIONARY TIDAL WAVE OF 1848

**Liberal Agitation in Central Europe**

Despite the reactionary Triple Alliance of 1833 among Russia, Prussia, and Austria, and despite its repressions and all the precautions of Metternich, the liberals in central Europe steadily increased in number and underground activity. Some were heirs of the "enlightenment" of the eighteenth century. Others were sympathizers with the French Revolution or beneficiaries of the activity of Napoleon Bonaparte. Still others were drawn to liberalism by British example, by the liberating spirit of patriotic uprisings against Napoleon, by romantic yearnings for novelty, or by personal hostility to traditions and regulations which cramped the career of one's self or one's class. Most such persons were middle-class intellectuals, though they found allies among humanitarian landlords, among "progressive" clergymen, and, perhaps more naturally, among professional men and urban dwellers generally.

By 1847 liberal aspirations were voiced openly and widely throughout central Europe. In Prussia, where King Frederick William IV was consolidating the various local and provincial Diets into a "United Landtag" for the whole kingdom, the third estate of this body at its first meeting declared that it should be transformed into a parliament, assembling regularly and sharing with the King in legislative power. In Switzerland, radical liberals in the Protestant cantons employed force to break up a special federation of seven Catholic cantons—the so-called "Sonderbund," which had been formed for defensive purposes in 1845—and to oblige them to adopt liberal constitutions, expel religious orders, and consent to a closer union of all the Swiss cantons. In Italy, liberal reforms were instituted by a new Pope, Pius IX, and by the "enlightened" Duke of Tuscany. In Lom-

bardy, which was a province of the Habsburg Empire, Italian liberals, resenting the tobacco monopoly of the Austrian government, boycotted the cigar shops and at Milan participated in "smoking riots" against Austrian soldiers who ventured to smoke in public.

In Hungary, liberal agitation was becoming acute. Here it was less the work of urban intellectuals (or industrialists) than of patriotic landlords who utilized it to emphasize Hungarian separateness from Austria and their own solidarity with the middle classes and peasant masses of the Hungarian nation. In 1847 Francis Déak, a country squire, trained lawyer, and able statesman, united various factions in the Hungarian Diet in support of demands which expressed the current ideas of liberals not only in Hungary but elsewhere in central Europe: constitutional government, with a parliament elected by individual taxpayers (rather than by traditional social classes) and with a ministry responsible to the parliament (rather than to the monarch); freedom of the press and of assembly; religious liberty; equality of civil rights regardless of class; revocation of monopolies and of exemptions from taxation; abolition of serfdom with financial compensation to landowners.

Central Europe was already receptive to a tidal wave of revolutionary liberalism which swept over it in 1848. The wave was set in motion by occurrences in France, where popular opposition to the monarchy of Louis Philippe found vent in his sudden dethronement and the spectacular proclamation of a republic.

**Democratic Agitation in France**

In the last years of Louis Philippe's reign, his prime minister Guizot, in order to maintain the "liberal monarchy" against its varied and numerous foes, resorted to quite illiberal measures. He manipulated elections and employed bribery to secure a majority in parliament. He censored the press and limited the right of free assembly. By 1848 his office was assuming more the character of a dictatorship than of a parliamentary ministry.

In 1847 advocates of democratic reform, estopped by the censorship from press propaganda, began to voice their demands at large banquets which they held at Paris; and republicans and socialists, who attended, imparted a revolutionary tone to the proceedings. In alarm, the government prohibited a "monster banquet" which was scheduled by the reformers for February 22

1848. This prohibition was the last straw. It precipitated revolution.

On the day appointed for the banquet, angry workmen and reckless students crowded the Place de la Concorde, shouting for reform. On the next day, as the tumult continued and spread, Guizot ordered national guardsmen to restore quiet, but the guardsmen, instead of obeying orders, were soon joining in the popular cry, "Down with Guizot," and Guizot resigned from the ministry. The rioting might have stopped here, had not a detachment of soldiers, guarding Guizot's residence, rashly fired on a crowd of boisterous demonstrators, killing twenty-three and wounding thirty others. Next morning beheld the streets of Paris ominously barricaded by workmen and placarded with signs: "Louis Philippe massacres us as did Charles X, let him go join Charles X." Like the prudent man he had always been, Louis Philippe tarried only long enough to abdicate in favor of his grandson, the Count of Paris, and then took refuge in England, the asylum of superfluous French royalty.[1]

**Parisian Revolution of February 1848**

The count of Paris was ignored, and a "provisional government" installed itself at the city hall in Paris. It was a composite body, including a Catholic leader, a Jacobin republican, and Louis Blanc, the socialist. What would it do? All its diverse members agreed that monarchy had failed—both the Orleans-Bourbon rule of Louis Philippe and the earlier Legitimist Bourbon rule of Charles X—and that consequently a republic was the only practicable form of government for France. So the leaders proclaimed France a republic—the second republic in the country's history.

**Second French Republic**

The "provisional government" decreed the election of a National Assembly by direct and universal manhood suffrage, opened the national guard (hitherto reserved to the middle classes) to all citizens, and undertook to assure work to everybody by creating national workshops, as Louis Blanc demanded, and by creating a special commission to elaborate a program of social reform. The "national workshops" did not function as Louis Blanc desired. He had contemplated a system of cooperative industrial associations established and guaranteed by the state and managed by the

[1] Louis Philippe died in England in 1850. He did not have the pleasure (or discomfort) of mingling there with his cousin whom he had supplanted in 1830, for Charles X had died in 1836.

workmen which would manufacture goods and supplant private industry. But in the emergency of 1848 there was not time to build up such a system and give it a fair trial, and in any event there was too much opposition from private business men. The result was that the provisional government contented itself with putting unemployed Parisians to work on certain public improvements at Paris and paying them two francs a day from the national treasury. "National workshops" were thus only a name for a government subsidy. Yet from February to May 1848, there was the utmost enthusiasm in Paris on the part of socialists and radicals. "Liberty trees" were planted. The red flag was unfurled as the national flag. The principle of private property was openly and hotly assailed.

A different turn was given to the Second French Republic by the election of the National Assembly at the beginning of May 1848. It was a democratic election in which not only the Parisian populace participated but also the mass of peasants and the middle and upper classes all over France. The large majority of these, though quite unsympathetic with any restoration of Louis Philippe and willing to sanction a republican form of government, were anxious that the republic should be "conservative," that it should respect private property and cease to waste national funds on Parisian "ne'er-do-wells." One of the first things which the Assembly did, when it met at Paris in June 1848, was to get rid of the so-called "national workshops."

The withdrawal of the government subsidy to workmen, and the resulting economic distress in the poorer quarters of Paris, precipitated a rebellion at the capital. Workmen again built barricades in the narrow streets, while the Assembly entrusted dictatorial power to General Cavaignac. Cavaignac, resolute and proudly honest, called out regular troops and bourgeois national guards in overwhelming force to crush the working-class rebellion. The archbishop of Paris lost his life in a futile attempt to avert bloodshed. For three days—the terrible "June days" (June 24–26, 1848)—sanguinary street fighting went on in Paris. Eventually order was restored. Some of the rebels were shot, and 4,000 were transported to penal colonies overseas. Socialism as an organized movement was stamped out. Louis Blanc, threatened with prosecution, fled to England, and Proudhon was jailed.

With assurance of untroubled continuity to its labors, the

National Assembly during the summer and autumn of 1848 laid foundations for the Second French Republic in conformity with wishes of its moderate elements. Emphasis was put upon "the family, rights of property, and public order." At the same time, concessions were made to Catholics by promising educational changes in harmony with their desires; to humanitarian liberals by abolishing Negro slavery in the colonies, decreeing the freedom of the press, and doing away with capital punishment for political offenses; and to Jacobin democrats by restoring the tricolor and the *Marseillaise* as national symbols and by adopting finally a republican constitution. The constitution of 1848 provided for a President to be elected for four years by universal manhood suffrage and for a legislature elected similarly. The President would choose his own cabinet, as in the United States, but he might not veto an act of the legislature and he would be ineligible for reelection.

**Spread of Revolution**


Meanwhile, the tide of revolution, starting in France, was flooding all central Europe. In little more than two weeks after the February day of 1848 when Louis Philippe fled the revolutionary storm in Paris, even Metternich was fleeing a similar storm in Vienna.

**Austria**

On March 13, a turbulent mob of students and workmen demonstrated in the streets of the Austrian capital, and menacing crowds collected about the imperial palace and the residence of the prime minister. As the sympathies of the city police were clearly with the populace, Prince Metternich, now old but still very courtly in his blue swallow-tail coat, requested the Emperor Ferdinand I that, "since his presence was no longer required," he should "be allowed to resign." His residence was already sacked and burning. On March 14, 1848, an elderly "Englishman" and his wife secretly and hurriedly departed from Vienna for London.

By the time that Metternich reached London a little more than a month later, revolutionary liberalism, which he had always detested and long repressed, was sweeping Austria, Hungary, Bohemia, Italy, Germany, Denmark, and the Dutch Netherlands. So widespread and so simultaneous were its manifestations in central Europe that it is difficult to tell a clear and accurate story of them. We shall try to summarize them, country by country.

At Vienna, promptly after the flight of Metternich, the Em-


200 MILES
RUSSIA
RUSSIAN EMPIRE
PRUSSIA
EMPIRE
OTTOMAN
Lemberg
Czernowitz
BESSARABIA
MOLDAVIA
BUKOVINA
GALICIA
Tarnow
Cracow
CARPATHIAN MTNS
Munkacs
TRANSYLVANIA
Hermannstadt
Debreczin
SLOVAKIA
HUNGARY
Budapest
Pressburg
Breslau
SILESIA
Troppau
Olmutz
MORAVIA
Königgrätz
Prague
BOHEMIA
Pilsen
SAXONY
Vienna
AUSTRIA (LOWER)
Linz
AUSTRIA (UPPER)
LAKE BALATON
Temesvar
BANAT
WALLACHIA
SERBIA
SLAVONIA
Gratz
STYRIA
Agram
CROATIA
BOSNIA
HERZEGOVINA
MONTE NEGRO
Nuremberg
BAVARIA
Munich
Salzburg
CARINTHIA
Klagenfurt
Laibach
CARNIOLA
Fiume
Innsbruck
TYROL
Trieste
ISTRIA
DALMATIA
ADRIATIC SEA
VENETIA
Verona
Venice
Milan
LOMBARDY
Custozza
SWITZERLAND
Bologna
PAPAL STATES
Florence
TUSCANY
MODENA
PARMA
Novara
PIEDMONT
Genoa
Rome
Naples
NAPLES (TWO SICILIES)
FRANCE
CORSICA (FR.)
THE AUSTRIAN EMPIRE IN 1848

June 1848, a Pan-Slavic Congress, consisting of Czech, Slovak, Polish, Yugoslav, and Russian delegates, to concert measures which might assure liberal self-government to the Slavic peoples, especially those within the Habsburg Empire.

**Italy**

In Italy, a revolt had begun within the kingdom of the Two Sicilies even before the February Revolution at Paris, and already, in January, King Ferdinand had been forced to accept a liberal constitution. Immediately after the revolution in France, King Charles Albert of Sardinia-Piedmont (the Italian state nearest to France and most independent of Austrian influence) promulgated a liberal constitution—the *Statuto,* March 4, 1848—which provided for a parliament elected by taxpayers, for ministerial responsibility, for the suppression of feudal survivals and the guarantee of individual liberties. Then, with the collapse of Metternich's power at Vienna and the ensuing confusion in Austrian affairs, the tide of liberal (and national) revolution rolled over Italy. At Milan, the populace, after five days of street fighting, expelled the Austrian General Radetzky with his 18,000 troops and cheered for the transfer of Lombardy from Austria to the kingdom of Sardinia. At Venice, the townspeople under the leadership of Daniel Manin, a patriotic liberal, drove out the Austrian officials and garrison and proclaimed the restoration of the independent Venetian republic.

In order to satisfy the national aspirations of Italian liberals and to expel Austrian troops from the four strongly fortified towns (the so-called Quadrilateral) which they still held in northern Italy, King Charles Albert of Sardinia declared war against Austria (March 1848). To his army of 60,000 men were soon added detachments from the Two Sicilies, the Papal States, Tuscany, and Lombardy. It seemed, in the enthusiasm of the moment, that Italy would obtain both national independence and liberal government.

**Germany**

In Germany, the most sensational upheaval (outside the Habsburg Empire) was in Hohenzollern Prussia. Here, the theatrical King Frederick William IV was astounded when his "beloved" Berliners, in imitation of the Viennese, took to rioting and erecting barricades (March 1848). To allay the excitement, he promised to reconvene the United Landtag as a Prussian parliament and to forward plans for German national union; but when crowds of workmen and students flocked to the

palace square to applaud him, they were received with musket-shots from his royal guardsmen. Again, resort was had to barricades and street fighting, in which two hundred citizens lost their lives. The King then displayed a change of heart. He called off the troops, appointed a liberal ministry, convoked a Constituent Assembly, and, donning a scarf with revolutionary colors of black, red, and gold, he paraded the streets of his capital. In ecstasy over the popular acclaim which now attended him, he wrote to the indignant Tsar Nicholas of Russia in fulsome praise of "the glorious German revolution." The Assembly, which was to draft a constitution for Prussia, met at Berlin in May. It was overwhelmingly liberal.

In the smaller German states, liberals came to the fore. In Bavaria, they compelled King Louis I, who had treated the constitution of that state rather cavalierly, to abdicate in favor of his son, Maximilian II, who swore to observe and liberalize the constitution. In Baden, Württemberg, Saxony, and most of the other states, the princes were frightened into appointing liberal ministers and agreeing to constitutional government and freedom of the press.

Beyond the confines of Germany, the revolutionary tidal wave reached Denmark and the Dutch Netherlands. In Denmark, King Frederick VII acceded to the demand of liberal rioters at Copenhagen by pledging himself (March 1848) to convoke a constitutional convention. The convention was elected and met in October, and the constitution which it drafted, providing for a parliament in part elected by middle-class taxpayers, was accepted and promulgated by the King in June 1849. In the Netherlands, King William II put himself at the head of the liberal movement and sanctioned in October 1848 a constitution under which the States General became a parliament, elected directly by well-to-do individuals.

**Denmark and Netherlands**

Liberalism involved nationalism; and with the apparent triumph of liberalism throughout central Europe, and with liberal ministries directing the policies of Austria, Prussia, and the other German states, it was but natural that steps should be taken to transform the loose "German Confederation," which had been created in 1815 by the princes and afterwards conducted as an agency of Metternich's reactionary policy,[1] into a close union,

[1] See above, pp. 608–610.

which would be both national and liberal. In April 1848, responding to popular demands and to instructions of the new governments of the several states, the Diet of the German Confederation at Frankfurt [1] authorized the popular election of a German National Assembly to devise a new federal government for the whole of Germany. Elections were duly held, and liberals obtained a large majority. The Assembly met at Frankfurt in May. The Diet of the previous German Confederation ceased to function. And the new Assembly, reflecting the national enthusiasm and liberal aspirations of the time, proclaimed a national German Empire, selected a temporary administrative head in the person of a liberal Habsburg prince, Archduke John of Austria, and prepared to draft a constitution.

**German National Assembly at Frankfurt**

From the outset, it was assumed by the majority in the National Assembly at Frankfurt that the new Germany, like the old, would include Austria—not the whole Austrian Empire, but the German part; that it would be a federation; that the central government would be monarchical and parliamentary, with one of the German princes (preferably the ruler of Austria, and, failing him, the ruler of Prussia) as Emperor, with a parliament consisting of a chamber representing the states and another chamber representing the people, and with a ministry responsible to the parliament; and that, against encroachments of government, whether state or federal, there should be a clear statement of individual liberties.

To write all these assumptions into a constitution and to get necessary support for them from both the German people and the German princes, was a difficult task, at which the Frankfurt Assembly labored for a year. After protracted debates, and in the midst of delicate negotiations about the headship of the contemplated national federation (whether it should be the Austrian or the Prussian monarch), the Assembly adopted a declaration of the "Fundamental Rights of the German Nation." This was a classic expression of the European liberalism (and liberal nationalism) of the middle of the nineteenth century. In a sense it marked the revolutionary flood-tide of 1848.

[1] Frankfurt on the Main was an old "free city." It had been a "capital" of the Holy Roman Empire, and after 1815 it was the meeting-place of the Diet of the German Confederation.

## 6. EBBING OF THE TIDE IN CENTRAL EUROPE

The revolutionary commotion of 1848 in central Europe was primarily an urban and middle-class affair. The cities spoke first and spoke loudly in behalf of liberalism. Then, in due course, the countryside spoke—less noisily but with greater weight —and the countryside was more devoted to traditional usages than to abstract liberty. Despite some recent industrialization, the large majority of the population of Germany, Italy, and the Austrian Empire still lived in rural communities, worked in the fields, distrusted townsfolk, and deferred to landlord, pastor, and government official. Most landlords and clergymen were hostile to revolutionary change; and the staff of government officials which had been growing in numbers and efficiency, and likewise the regular army officers, were not used to an unstable parliamentary ministry. Moreover, the urban population did not give united and continuous support to revolution. Cleavage appeared early between middle class and workmen, between "moderates" and "radicals," and the more the latter rioted, the greater was the willingness of the former to sacrifice "liberty" to "order and security." Besides, patriotism, which was emphasized by liberals, was a sentiment which could be—and was—utilized by conservatives to wean the masses, urban as well as rural, from revolution. In the circumstances, it should occasion no great surprise that most of the long-acknowledged "pillars" of conservative society and government, recently toppled over, were soon propped back into their customary places.

**Liberal Weakness**

The first serious setback to the liberal movement in central Europe was in Bohemia. Here, in June 1848, the Austrian governor and army commander, Prince Windischgrätz, angered by fresh Czech rioting at Prague, in which his wife was killed, acted swiftly to restore "order." His troops, with the sympathetic cooperation of the German element in the province, subdued Prague, dispersed the Pan-Slavic Congress, and overthrew the revolutionary government. Liberal reforms were revoked, and Bohemia was placed under martial law.

**Anti-Revolutionary Success in Bohemia**

The next important setback was in Italy. Here, the army of Charles Albert of Sardinia had already been weakened by the withdrawal, in May, of the auxiliary troops of the Pope and the

King of the Two Sicilies. Both of these Italian sovereigns had become alarmed by the "excesses" of the revolutionaries and the continuing disorders in their states. Pope Pius IX repudiated war as a means of obtaining national unity, while the recall of Neapolitan troops enabled King Ferdinand to abrogate the constitution which he had granted and to restore absolutism in the Two Sicilies. In July 1848, the Austrian army under General Radetzky, reenforced from the Tyrol, decisively defeated the Italian army of Charles Albert at Custozza. Charles Albert felt obliged to agree to an armistice, and Radetzky reoccupied Lombardy.

**In Italy**

This setback to Italian liberty and unity incited Italian extremists to frantic endeavors. At Rome a liberal minister was assassinated; Pope Pius IX fled, thoroughly disillusioned and in fear of his life; and in February 1849 a republic was proclaimed under the leadership of Mazzini. Radical republicans likewise got the upper hand at Florence and at Naples and transformed Tuscany and the Two Sicilies into dictatorial republics. Charles Albert, threatened with a similar republican outbreak in the kingdom of Sardinia, renewed the war with Austria, but in March 1849 suffered a second and quite overwhelming defeat at Novara at the hands of Radetzky. Forced then to conclude an humiliating peace with Austria, Charles Albert abdicated in favor of his son, Victor Emmanuel II, while the victorious Austrian army was free to move against the revolutionary republics.

In May 1849, the King of the Two Sicilies and the Grand Duke of Tuscany were restored to their respective thrones, and Venice, which had been blockaded by land and sea, capitulated to the Austrians. As for Rome, the President of the French Republic, in response to pleas of French Catholics and in order to prevent Austria from becoming too powerful in Italy, sent thither a French military force, which overthrew Mazzini's republic at the end of June 1849 and reinstated Pope Pius IX. By midsummer of 1849 all Italy was again under traditional control.

Meanwhile conservatives had triumphed in Austria—which was the main reason for the culminating Austrian restoration in Italy

**In Austria**

The success of General Windischrätz in Bohemia in June 1848 and the first success of General Radetzky in northern Italy in July heartened the conservatives in Austria and revived the drooping spirits of the Emperor Ferdinand at

Innsbruck. It was apparent that armies under loyal commanders could shortly be employed to overawe the revolutionary liberals at Vienna. It also became apparent that developments in Hungary might contribute to a similar end. The revolutionary Hungarian government at Budapest, under the leadership of Louis Kossuth, was nationalist as well as liberal; while it was outraging the Emperor and Austrian conservatives by its "radical" and separatist tendencies, it was arousing the active opposition of its numerous non-Magyar subjects by refusing to grant their demands for national autonomy, and by taking steps to "Magyarize" them. These anti-Magyar nationalists, many of them "liberals," found a militant champion in Joseph Jellačic, a Croatian soldier and patriot. Pointing out to the Emperor at Innsbruck how the Croats (and other Slavs in the Habsburg Empire) could be counted upon to make common cause with Austria against Hungarian pretensions, Jellačic was appointed governor of Croatia and commissioned (September 1848) to attack Hungary with a Slavic army, which would be reenforced by the imperial German garrison from Vienna.

The liberals at Vienna, sympathizing with the liberals at Budapest, vainly sought to prevent the dispatch of the imperial garrison to the aid of Jellačic. A mob hanged the minister of war and despoiled the armory. But upon Vienna converged two Austrian armies—that of Windischgrätz from Bohemia and that of Jellačic from Croatia—while to the assistance of the Viennese "rebels" an Hungarian army marched. Jellačic defeated and turned back the Hungarians, and on the last day of October Windischgrätz beat down the resistance at Vienna and occupied the city in force. A score or so of radical leaders were executed, and the liberal government of the Austrian Empire was supplanted by a ministry headed by Prince Felix Schwarzenberg, soldier and diplomat, brother-in-law of Windischgrätz, and a thorough conservative.

Schwarzenberg's first important act, after assuring order in German Austria as well as in Czech Bohemia,[1] was to prevail upon Emperor Ferdinand I to abdicate in favor of his eighteen-year-old nephew, Francis Joseph, and to get the new Emperor

[1] The Czechs, it should be remembered, were Slavs; and they showed a readiness to support any Austrian government which should espouse the cause of fellow Slavs against "oppressive" Hungarians. Thus, even liberal Czechs rallied to Windischgrätz and Schwarzenberg and ceased to create trouble for them in Bohemia.

to annul the liberal c nmitments which the old one had made. He allowed the Austr. n constitutional convention to continue its debates for several m nths longer, but he ignored the document which it prepared anc eventually repudiated any idea of a liberal constitution.

The second important act of Schwarzenberg was to direct an energetic offensive against the Hungarian revolutionaries. To the support of Jellačic, already invading Hungary with a Croatian army, he sent Windischgrätz with a German (and Czech) army. Kossuth, the Magyar leader, replied by proclaiming the independence of Hungary (April 1849) under a republican form of government and by stirring the masses to fiercely patriotic resistance. For a time Kossuth's forces held the invading armies at bay, but Schwarzenberg successfully besought aid from the Russian Tsar Nicholas I, who was anxious to ensure the suppression of revolution in central Europe and to check the danger of another uprising in Poland. By August 1849, the combined armies of Austria and Russia were in complete control of Hungary. The republic collapsed, Kossuth fled, other revolutionaries were slain or exiled, and the liberal constitution was abrogated. Hungary was again ruled as an Austrian province.

**In Hungary**

The successive victories of reaction in the Habsburg Empire—in German Austria itself and in its dependencies of Bohemia, Italy, and Hungary—could not fail to exert a profound influence on the course of events in Germany. Next to Austria, the most important German state, we know, was Prussia; and the traditional governing classes of Prussia were as hostile to liberalism as were those of Austria. In Prussia, landlords and Protestant clergymen and military and civil officials were particularly influential with King Frederick William IV and also with the masses of the rural population and with many conservatively minded individuals in the cities, and by the summer of 1848 they were regaining confidence in their ability to do what their fellows in Austria were doing.

**In Prussia**

Two developments in the late summer of 1848 moved Frederick William IV to defy the liberals who had been in control of the Prussian government since March. One was foreign pressure on him to terminate the war which, on the request of the National Assembly at Frankfort and in accord with patriotic sentiment throughout Germany, he had been waging with Denmark over

the duchies of Schleswig-Holstein.[1] The other was the pressure on him from conservatives within Prussia to halt the work of the Prussian Constituent Assembly whose liberal majority was voting to abolish the nobility, to make the King a mere figurehead, and to dispatch a Prussian army to the assistance of the revolutionaries at Vienna.

In the autumn of 1848 Frederick William IV acted. He supplanted his liberal ministry with an ultra-conservative one under the leadership of Count Brandenburg, and at the same time he utilized the troops whom he withdrew from Schleswig-Holstein to overawe the Constituent Assembly and the populace at Berlin. Finding that these actions elicited no serious tumult, he presently dissolved the Assembly and drafted a constitution of his own, under which the chief political power would remain in the hands of the King and his ministers, though on certain matters—as a sop to liberalism—he would consult with a parliament representing the upper classes and the wealthiest part of the middle class.

**Failure of Frankfurt Assembly**

The conservative triumph in both Prussia and Austria left the liberal majority in the German National Assembly at Frankfurt in an embarrassing situation. In a desperate hope that the Prussian King's romantic attachment to nationalism might outweigh his aversion to liberalism, they provided in the constitution which they finally adopted in April 1849 that the head of united Germany should be an hereditary Emperor and that he should be none other than the King of Prussia.

Frederick William IV hesitated. He was enamored with the prospect of national unity and eager to enhance the prestige of Prussia and the Hohenzollern dynasty. But he had no stomach for the liberal constitution which came with the imperial crown

[1] These duchies, on the peninsula between Denmark and Germany, had long been ruled by the King of Denmark, though Schleswig was half German and Holstein was peopled almost wholly by Germans and after 1815 was a member of the German Confederation. In March 1848, German liberals in the duchies attempted a revolt against King Frederick VII of Denmark, while the King attempted to make Schleswig an integral part of Denmark. The German Confederation thereupon commissioned Prussia to go to war with Denmark, and thus it befell that "liberal" Prussia fought "liberal" Denmark over a national problem. Soon, however, Prussia was faced with threats from Great Britain, France, and Russia, signatories of the treaty of 1815 guaranteeing Schleswig and Holstein to the King of Denmark, that unless the war was stopped they would intervene on the Danish side. A truce was concluded at Malmoe in August 1848, and Frederick William IV withdrew his troops.

from the Frankfurt Assembly—it came from the "gutter," he said. He was well aware that any assumption of an imperial title by him would evoke jealous opposition from the Kings of Bavaria, Württemberg, Saxony, and Hanover, and especially from the Habsburg Emperor of Austria. And he received ominous expostulations from the Tsar Nicholas of Russia. In April 1849, Frederick William ended the period of uncertainty by repudiating the Frankfurt constitution and refusing the imperial crown.

In mad protest against the obvious failure of the Frankfurt Assembly, extremist groups tried in May 1849 to dethrone princes and set up republics in various parts of Germany. These had an even briefer duration than the contemporary republics in Hungary and Italy. They were speedily and sternly suppressed by Prussian troops. Surviving German republicans and German extremists were jailed or exiled; many found refuge across the Atlantic in the United States.

Frederick William IV, though now a bitter foe of liberalism, was still haunted by the dream of creating a German union under Prussian (and Hohenzollern) leadership. Accordingly, after the collapse of the Frankfurt Assembly and the suppression of republican rioting, he invited the other German states except Austria to form a new and close union under his presidency, with a council representing the princes and a parliament representing the nation. Seventeen of the lesser states accepted the invitation, and the parliament of the proposed "German Union" met at Erfurt in March 1850. By this time, however, Austria was in a position to follow up the triumph of conservatism at home with forceful reassertion of its hegemony in Germany. Schwarzenberg, the Austrian minister, demanded abandonment of Frederick William's project and the reestablishment of the German Confederation as it had been from 1815 to 1848—with Austria included, with the Austrian Emperor as "president" of a Diet of princes, with no popular parliament, and with little real power.

Frederick William IV hesitated to go to war about the matter. He knew that the south German states would ally themselves with Austria, and he feared lest Russia would do likewise. Eventually he gave way and with Schwarzenberg signed a treaty at Olmütz in November 1850, stipulating for the dissolution of the "German Union" under the presidency of Prussia and for the restoration of the "German Confederation" under the presidency

of Austria. The restored Diet at Frankfurt, consisting of personal agents of the several princes and obeying identical instructions from the conservative governments of Austria and Prussia, formally repealed the "Fundamental Rights of the German Nation" and directed a special commission to purge any state constitution of "revolutionary novelties."

The revolutionary wave of 1848 was spent. The reactionary regime which Metternich had previously personified was now, in 1850, almost as perfectly personified by Schwarzenberg. This nobleman was rewarded, as his predecessor had been, with the title of "Prince." In the name of the Emperor Francis Joseph, he dominated the extensive Austrian Empire. Through the "presidency" of the German Confederation, he dictated to the lesser German states and even to Prussia. By means of Austrian troops and Habsburg dynastic relationships, he controlled most of the Italian states.[1]

**Some Liberal Gains**

Yet the revolutionary tidal wave of 1848 left some liberal deposits in central Europe. In the Austrian Empire, the abolition of serfdom was lasting; and some form of constitutional government survived in Sardinia, Switzerland, Holland, Denmark, and Prussia. Only one of these was democratic—that of Switzerland—and few were really liberal. In Sardinia, the liberal statute which was issued by King Charles Albert in March 1848, was retained by Victor Emmanuel II despite Austrian protests. It rendered Sardinia the only constitutional and liberal state in Italy during the 1850's.

The Dutch constitution which King William II granted in 1848 and the Danish constitution which King Frederick VII finally promulgated in 1849 were somewhat less liberal than the Sardinian, in that they did not make the royal ministers responsible to the parliaments which were set up. On the other hand, all three constitutions were equally liberal with the British in that they imposed property qualifications for the exercise of the suffrage and thereby restricted parliamentary representation to the upper and middle classes.

In this latter sense, the Prussian constitution which Frederick William IV decreed in 1850 was "liberal." It pretended to base

[1] Schwarzenberg did not long enjoy the preeminent position which he had earned, for he died in 1852. But his policies were continued by other Austrian ministers during the 1850's.

the choice of the lower chamber of the Prussian parliament on the principle of universal manhood suffrage, but by means of a complicated three-class system of indirect election it limited membership to landlords and wealthy bourgeois. It remained the royal charter of Prussian government from 1850 to 1918.


Such were the enduring achievements of the Revolution of 1848 in central Europe. They may appear slight in comparison with the noise and confusion which liberalism (and nationalism) made in that year from Sicily to Schleswig and from Holland to Hungary. We must remember, nevertheless, that the noise and confusion were out of proportion to the number of liberals. There can be no doubt that in central Europe, generally speaking, liberalism was discredited by its manifold failures in 1848, and during the ensuing decade liberal actors were rarely seen on the public stage. Yet, behind the scenes, liberalism was not dead. Its following, indeed, grew ever more numerous. And if the liberals of the 50's and 60's were less vocal than the liberals of 1848 had been, they were, indirectly and in the long run, more influential. We shall speak further of liberalism in central Europe when in the following chapters we discuss important national developments.



# CHAPTER XV

## ERA OF THE SECOND NAPOLEONIC EMPIRE IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1848–1870

### I. HEYDAY OF LIBERALISM AND ROMANTICISM



THE most remarkable figure in western Europe from 1848 to 1870 was the restorer of a Napoleonic Empire in France, Prince Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, a nephew of the great Napoleon. He was less of a genius than his uncle, but he too was an heir of revolution; and although he exercised a curious kind of personal dictatorship, he posed as an advocate of democracy and supported much of the liberalism that had come to the fore in western Europe in the 1830's and 1840's. He was certainly no such reactionary as the Tsar Nicholas I in Russia, or Metternich and Schwarzenberg in Austria, or Frederick William IV in Prussia.

Nor was there, in the era of Louis Napoleon, any such setback to liberalism anywhere in western Europe as resulted from the failure of the revolutionary upheaval of 1848 in central Europe. What successes remained from that upheaval were almost exclusively in the West—in France, Switzerland, Holland, and Denmark, and in Sardinia, the westernmost state of Italy.[1] There was steadily broadening liberalism in Great Britain and also in Belgium. It permeated Sweden and continued on its troublesome course in Spain and Portugal. Indeed, so far as western Europe was concerned, the conflict between conservatism and liberalism, between reaction and revolution, between "Right" and "Left," which had featured the first decades of the nineteenth century, was largely resolved by mid-century in favor of the latter.

**Liberal Western Europe**

[1] See above, pp. 664–666, 679.

That western Europe, in this respect, was ahead of central Europe, and far ahead of eastern Europe, is attributable to two main factors. One was the greater influence of revolutionary tradition and achievement. The English Revolutions of the seventeenth century and the American and French Revolutions of the eighteenth century had occurred in the West and produced there, together with the liberating spirit of the "Enlightenment," the deepest and most abiding effects. And the individualism and secularism and nationalism stemming from those revolutions were especially characteristic of mid-nineteenth-century liberalism.

The second factor was the earlier and more intensive industrialization of the West. While central and eastern Europe was still overwhelmingly agricultural, mechanized factories and large-scale mining and railway transportation were rapidly developing in Great Britain and spreading thence to Belgium, France, and other regions in the West. Here, consequently, the growth of industrial cities and of urban middle classes was most marked; and it was particularly conducive to liberalism.

**Nature of Mid-Century Liberalism**

What was meant by "liberal" in the middle of the nineteenth century? A century later the word came to be used very loosely and vaguely to describe a variety of individual attitudes, some of these in logical contradiction to others. But during the decades from 1830 to 1870 it referred to a fairly specific and coherent body of doctrine having intellectual, economic, political, and international significance. Intellectually, it meant freedom of thought, an extolling of natural science and technology, and a tendency to treat religion as a purely personal affair and to deprive the churches of any privileged position in society. In economics, it stood for individual initiative, for freedom of occupation and profession, for freedom of trade, for freedom of contract between employer and worker, and for unrestricted competition in business. As such, it involved hostility to economic privileges of the agricultural classes, to tariff protection, to guilds and trade unions (in so far as these inspired strikes or otherwise interfered with freedom of contract), and to governmental regulation of commerce or industry.

In politics, liberalism regarded the ideal state as a "passive policeman," not concerning itself actively with the affairs of its individual citizens, but merely preserving order, protecting private property, fostering some popular education, and promoting some

public works. It likewise aspired to a government which would be constitutional, representative, and parliamentary, in which the propertied middle class would predominate, and under which individual liberty would be large and taxation small. In international affairs, liberalism was avowedly pacifist, condemning war as morally injurious and financially burdensome; and for the sake of thrift, as well as of peace, it was critical of imperialism of the mercantilist kind and sought to reduce expenditure for armaments. Yet about these matters it was more vocal than effective. It generally endorsed the principle of national self-determination and displayed a militant sympathy with efforts of "oppressed" peoples to win national independence and constitutional government for themselves; and this frequently meant in practice a resort to war and even a glorification of it. The nationalistic wars in which liberals of central Europe engaged in 1848–1849 indicated an underlying difficulty in liberal ideology which only increased during the next thirty years.

**Dissent from Liberalism**

Throughout western Europe, where liberalism was continuously in the ascendant from 1830 to 1870, it still had to face various forces of dissent. Some were forces of a conservative "Right"; others, of a democratic "Left" more radical than orthodox middle-class liberalism. Altogether, five different kinds of dissent may be noted; and gradually each of the five contributed something to an evolution of the theory and practice of liberalism as it existed in 1850.

(1) *Agrarian Dissent.* This came from landlords, usually titled noblemen and country gentlemen, who had long been in the habit of owning large agricultural estates, patronizing the peasants who were their tenants or laborers, serving as officers in the army or civil administration of a monarch who was normally a great landlord like themselves, and receiving from state and church many marks of favor and distinction. Landlords were apt to oppose liberalism. They objected to its economics, which preferred industry to agriculture, the factory town to the rural village, the individual to the class, competition to cooperation. They objected to its politics, which tended to put the urban middle class into power under the "revolutionary" banner of popular sovereignty and through novel constitutional limitations on monarchy and aristocracy.

(2) *Religious Dissent.* It should be borne in mind that parallel

with the development of liberalism went a noteworthy revival of Christianity. The intellectual class, which in the eighteenth century had been impregnated with scepticism about any supernatural religion, now furnished numerous apologists for Christianity, both Catholic and Protestant, and many of the bourgeoisie as well as of the nobility resumed worship in their traditional churches.[1] The majority of the bourgeois churchgoers seem to have managed to be "religious" and "liberal" at the same time, and many clergymen, particularly among the Radical Christian sects in Britain and among the Calvinist churches of Holland, Switzerland, and Hungary, were sincere supporters of political and economic liberalism.

But many Christian clergymen and lay believers were opponents of liberalism in one way or another. Some of the opposition was to the "un-Christian" implications of economic liberalism —its materialism, its selfishness, its neglect of the poor. Other opposition, especially marked on the Continent, was to the political aspects of liberalism. Some Christians thought it not democratic enough; others thought it too democratic; and Christians of diametrically opposite views on what should be the form of modern government were prone to agree that the "liberal state" was not a "Christian state." Pope Gregory XVI (1830–1846) issued several encyclicals against "liberalism," and in political conviction and action he was ultra-conservative. His successor, Pius IX (1846–1878), was at first, as we have seen, rather favorably disposed toward political liberalism, but after his first practical experience with revolutionaries at Rome in 1848 he condemned the new "liberalism" and found fault with "modern progress."[2] Individual Catholics went on being democratic or even liberal, but the weight of authority in the Catholic Church, like the weight of opinion in the Lutheran Church (and to a lesser extent in the Anglican Church), was in formal opposition to mid-nineteenth-century liberalism.

(3) *Democratic Dissent.* While political liberalism was assailed from the "Right," it was attacked from the extreme "Left" by radical advocates of democracy. A large part of this democratic radicalism, especially on the Continent, was a heritage from the

[1] See above, pp. 603–604.

[2] Papal condemnations of "liberalism" were resumed in a celebrated *Syllabus of Errors* which Pius IX issued in 1864.

eighteenth century—from the political philosophy of Rousseau, from the American Revolution, and, most specifically, from the Jacobinism of the First French Republic. As such, it was reinforced in the first half of the nineteenth century by the growing romantic concern of intellectuals with the "people" and the "nation." Its apostles were usually liberal in general philosophy, but they constituted a left wing of the liberal movement. Alike as humanitarians, romantics, and logicians, they were impelled to teach that the doctrine of popular sovereignty justified, not a parliamentary franchise limited by property qualifications, as most liberals contended, but universal manhood suffrage. Some went so far as to condemn limited monarchy along with limited suffrage and to espouse republicanism as well as democracy.

As mechanized industry developed, it gave rise to an urban proletariat, with democratic aspirations. This meant that after 1830 the earlier philosophical democracy was supplemented and reoriented by a democratic movement among workmen for social ends not wholly in keeping with economic liberalism.

(4) *Socialist Dissent.* In response to the trend of thought among "radical" proletarians, "socialist" movements appeared in the 1840's: utopian cooperative socialism; the state socialism of a few of the Chartist leaders in Britain and of Louis Blanc, with his "national workshops," in France. Most of these socialist movements were unimpressive in immediate achievement. Louis Blanc's, which secured the largest popular support of any, was wiped out in blood during the "June days" of 1848.[1] Yet, in contradiction to the ideal of "individualism" entertained by liberals, an ideal of "socialism" entered permanently into European consciousness. And it became usual to link "socialism" with political democracy.

It must be emphasized, however, that prior to 1870 "socialism" did not signify a definite or detailed program. Karl Marx did expound as early as 1848 the particular socialism which was to make a big stir in the last decades of the nineteenth century; but prior to 1870 relatively few persons knew anything about Marx or Marxian socialism. "Socialism" was then a very general word, connoting in the popular mind almost anything which was manifestly opposed to "individualism." As such, it was anathema to doctrinaire liberals, but not necessarily so to benevolent aristocrats or even to bourgeois humanitarians.

[1] See above, p. 666.

(5) *Nationalist Dissent.* Nationalism—the idea that each nation should be united and free and strong and should command the supreme loyalty of all its citizens—had received a powerful stimulus from the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars. It entered into the creed of liberals, with their doctrine of the right of national self-determination. But it also became, especially after 1830, increasingly popular alike with democrats of the extreme "Left" and with conservatives of the "Right"; and many of these proved more intensely nationalistic than the liberals. They complained of the latter's professed pacifism, their "cowardly" foreign policies, and their tendency to deprecate the military virtues, to reduce armaments, and to neglect imperialism.

**Heydey of Romanticism**

The heyday of liberalism in western Europe, in the mid-nineteenth century, coincided, appropriately enough perhaps, with the heyday of romanticism. This cultural movement, which had emerged in the latter part of the eighteenth century and the first decades of the nineteenth, had then been a novelty, subordinate in most of the arts to the continuing vogue of classicism.[1] Now it became the norm of European culture and the chief inspiration of literature and all the arts (with the possible exception of architecture).

Romanticism now, as previously, was a many-sided movement, especially befitting an era of developing personal and national liberty. The two things on which all romantics agreed were: (1) that sentiment and emotion should be prized as guides to what is "true"; and (2) that the "beautiful" should be sought in departure from classical models. Aside from these, however, there was wide diversity. Some romantics turned to the "natural" for what was true and to the "primitive" for what was beautiful. Others turned to the "historical," and frequently to the "medieval." Still others found inspiration in an imaginary utopia of the future or in an exciting quest for "freedom" in the present. A few took to cultivating art just for "art's sake," and a larger number seemed to entertain a fondness for revolution for the sake of revolution, or for reform for the sake of change. Finally, patriotic emotions entered freely into the complex.

Most of the literature of the period was romantic in one way or another. The outstanding English poet was Alfred Tennyson, who sang the glories of the new industry, the coming of perpetual

[1] See above, pp. 387–388, 600–606.

peace on the heels of free trade, the heroic virtues of English patriotism, the noble courtly exploits of such legendary medieval characters as King Arthur, Sir Galahad, and the Lady of Shalott. No wonder that the classes and the masses read his verse with avidity, and that Queen Victoria (and the Prince-Consort Albert) admired him and made him poet laureate.

**Literature**

Contemporary with Tennyson were such romantic novelists as Thackeray, Charles Reade, George Eliot, and Dickens, in England; Victor Hugo, George Sand, Dumas, and Balzac in France. Charles Dickens is particularly noteworthy in this respect. He was the humorous, sympathetic portrayer of the whole lower middle class of the England of his time. He was very English in his patriotism, in his affection for good old national customs, and in his distaste for religious non-conformity. He was quite radical in his zeal for the reform of justice and education and in his denunciation of the oppression of the poor by the rich, of the weak by the strong. He loathed selfish individualism, but he was sufficiently under the spell of current liberalism to represent the most unfortunate of his characters as becoming wholly fortunate through the simple device of emigrating from England to the colonies.

Victor Hugo is similarly noteworthy. He was the son of a French general in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, and began his literary career in the shadow of Châteaubriand, writing romantic poetry about the twilight and the leaves of autumn, and also a play about Cromwell. Then, in 1830, he brought out his famous romantic drama of *Hernani,* the production of which on the Paris stage led to riotous demonstrations on the part of its classicist critics. Hugo wrote several other dramas, but he achieved his greatest fame by his novels, which dealt with the characters and actions of common people. Hugo was an intellectual liberal and a political democrat; he did not like the bourgeois monarchy, and, though a fervent panegyrist of Napoleon I, he was contemptuous of Prince Louis Napoleon and exiled himself from France during the latter's ascendency.

Greater than Hugo or Dickens in the portrayal of individual character was Honoré de Balzac. He started as an admirer and imitator of Sir Walter Scott, but his powers of observation were greater and his interests were different; and he soon showed a genius of his own in depicting all sorts of second-rate persons

among the French bourgeoisie of his day. The numerous volumes of Balzac's *Human Comedy* constitute a panorama of the vices and weaknesses, the stupidities and foibles, of the middle class in the 1840's, when mechanized industry was permeating France and influencing the public policies of the liberal monarchy.

Even in faraway illiberal Russia, romanticism was exemplified by two great novelists. (1) Turgeniev, a contemporary of Dickens and Hugo, was melancholy and pessimistic; he wrote with pathos of abuses in Russian society, and his masterpiece, *Fathers and Children* (1862), treated of the revolutionary agitation which was then developing in Russia. (2) Dostoievski, still more romantic, liked common people and perceived much good in the midst of poverty and evil. He was patriotic and thought the Russian peasantry superior to every other class in society. His famous *Crime and Punishment* appeared in 1866.

During the same period flourished the poet Adam Mickiewicz—the national poet of nineteenth-century Poland. Mickiewicz dealt in his verse with the medieval prowess of Polish arms, the good old customs of Polish nobles and gentlemen, and the natural beauty of Polish skies and forests. He was an intense patriot and, becoming professor of Slavic literature at the Collège de France in 1840, he devoted his last years to nationalist propaganda. He died in 1855 at Constantinople, where he was assembling a Polish "legion" to fight with France and England against Russia in the Crimean War.

**Painting**

Of all the era's decorative arts, that which reached the highest perfection and showed the most consistent romanticism was painting. Delacroix, the French painter, and Constable and Turner, the English painters, had already, just prior to 1830, departed radically from classical traditions and established new fashions in subject-matter and form.[1] Classical traditions, of course, survived; they were utilized by other French painters to tie the era of Louis Napoleon with the era of the great Napoleon—and with that of Louis XIV. Nevertheless, from 1830 Delacroix symbolized the predominant element in French painting, and in the painting of other countries also.

Portrayal of historical scenes, in bright colors and with plenty of emotion and action, became one of the outstanding features of romantic painting. Most of the historical scenes so portrayed were

[1] See above, p. 605.

of patriotic import. Some had to do with a nation's supposed advance in the past toward political liberty; many, with episodes in the lives of national heroes or anecdotes of a people's military prowess. There was a big demand for such pictures. The newer parliament buildings, innumerable government edifices of every kind, and the enlarged museums, all must be filled with canvasses depicting the great and glorious feats of a country's past.

A special feature of romantic painting was the poetic portrayal of nature. Its master was the Frenchman Corot. Of a well-to-do bourgeois family, he was wealthy and fortunate, so generous and kindly to others that in his old age he was popularly called "Papa Corot," and his fame has not lessened with the lapse of time. His landscapes were charming in composition and dreamlike in detail, and he inspired a notable school of landscape painters—the so-called Barbizon school. This included Millet, who in such well known paintings as "The Sower" and "The Angelus," combined with love of the land a deeply religious feeling for the dignity of the lowliest human beings and their labor.

Quite a different sort of artist was Honoré Daumier. He was the "man about town," with an eye for the ridiculous and occasionally for the sublime in city streets, in railway stations, in the haunts of the urban multitude, which he portrayed with as much vigor and in as varied moods as the contemporary Barbizon school portrayed the countryside. Some of Daumier's chief work was in lithography rather than painting, and took the form of caricature. Of the art of caricature he was a supreme master, and with it he did what Dickens and Balzac were doing in their novels. He depicted, *in extenso* and with ludicrous extravagance, the foibles of the bourgeoisie, the corruption of law courts, and the incompetence of blundering and "unpatriotic" middle-class government. Besides, though he was more of a "realist" than a "romantic," he mercilessly caricatured the surviving classicism which, in his opinion, still held modern art in fetters.

France, it will be observed, was the seat of the best and most distinctive painting (as well as sculpture) of the era from 1830 to 1870. Indeed, there was almost no distinguished painting during the era in Italy, Spain, Germany, or the Netherlands—countries which in earlier periods had been important centers of pictorial art. In all these countries, there was now a good deal of historical painting, but it was imitative and second-rate.

Only in England was there a "school" of painting of some independent distinction. It was the "Pre-Raphaelite brotherhood," and it was even more romantic than the contemporary French painters. It included Burne-Jones, Rossetti, and Holman Hunt, and aimed to ignore all "classical" development in art since the time of Raphael, to go back for inspiration to Giotto and Fra Angelico, and to be as medieval as possible in theme and style.

In England, as in France, the art of caricature was highly developed. Probably the most famous English caricaturist of the era was George Cruikshank. Satirical capital came to him from every public event and from extensive private observation—from army, court, parliament, church, low life and high life, the humors of the common people and the follies of the governing classes. He provided noteworthy humorous illustrations for many books, including Dickens' *Oliver Twist*. Cruikshank also devoted his talents to a campaign against "the demon rum" and in behalf of "total abstinence," a campaign which was developing at the time in English-speaking countries, thanks in part to an idealistic surge of evangelical Christian sects toward "sober piety," and in part to an equally romantic conviction on the part of Radical capitalists (such as John Bright) that, if money were not spent on "drink," poverty could be cured.

**Music**

Music during the era from 1830 to 1870 was thoroughly romantic. It everywhere sounded a patriotic note. National anthems were written, folk songs were discovered (or invented) and enshrined in concertos. Operas—and most other musical forms—were no longer accounted "European," as the music of Mozart and Bach, or even Beethoven, had been, but "German," or "French," or "Italian." French composers, for example, were expected to express French character, to treat of French subjects, or, if they employed other subjects, to deal with them in a "French manner." Opera in particular became a national institution, and the size and sumptuousness of opera houses an object of rivalry among national governments.

Chief musical composers of the era were Chopin, Gounod, Berlioz, and Bizet in France; Liszt and Richard Wagner in Germany; and Verdi in Italy. Verdi's *Trovatore* (1853) won him fame as a sensationally tuneful and dramatic musician; and *Aida*, his most grandiloquent opera, full of rich "local color," was written at the request of the Egyptian ruler and was first

produced at Cairo in 1871 just after the opening of the Suez Canal.

Even in architecture, the most conservative of the arts, romanticism inspired a "Gothic revival," a seeking of models, not in the domes and columns of classical antiquity, but in the pinnacles and pointed arches of the middle ages. In England, it was exemplified most strikingly in the rebuilding of the palace at Westminster, with the houses of Parliament, which was accomplished, under the guidance of Sir Charles Barry, between 1840 and 1860. It was also exemplified at Manchester, the center of the cotton industry and of economic liberalism, by the court house and the town hall; and at London by the national law-courts.

**"Gothic" Architecture**

In France the "Gothic revival" was championed by Viollet-le-Duc, a native of Paris and an especially appreciative reader of Victor Hugo's *Notre Dame de Paris*. He became a distinguished architect, scientist, and scholar, and was employed by the successive French governments of Louis Philippe and Louis Napoleon to "restore" many a medieval building which had fallen into decay or ruin. One of Viollet-le-Duc's major achievements was the restoration of the Gothic cathedral of Notre Dame at Paris; another was the preparation of a monumental *Dictionary of French Architecture from the 11th to the 16th Century*, which guided other architects in making Gothic designs.

The "Gothic revival" did not succeed in really dominating European architecture. It was more in the nature of an incidental supplement to prevailing classical traditions. These traditions, nevertheless, underwent some modification under romantic influences, so that the "classicism" of the era from 1830 to 1870 was "eclectic," varying from country to country and frequently embodying peculiar features which were not strictly classical but which were supposed to represent a special "national" culture.

For example in France, especially with the advent of Louis Napoleon, there was a pronounced tendency among French architects to resuscitate the "empire style," with its imperial Roman (and Egyptian) solemnity, and to invest it with a profusion of baroque detail. To achieve this end, Louis Napoleon had the assistance of a great "city planner." Baron Haussmann, who spent years of hard work

**Empire Style and Household Arts**

and huge sums of money in laying out parks and broad boulevards in Paris, rendering the whole city a suitable setting for public monuments. Likewise, Louis Napoleon had the service of an excellent architect, Charles Garnier, whose luxurious opera house at Paris was at once the crowning glory of the Second French Empire and the inspiration for much subsequent "French" architecture.

Household arts received special stimulus from a number of contemporary developments. One of these was the mechanizing of industry, which expedited mass production of furniture, ornamental iron fences and park benches, and jig-saw woodwork for porches and railings, cornices and doorways. Still another was the improving means of communication and trade throughout the world, with a resulting increased flow of diverse art-objects from the most distant lands to European homes, in the "parlors" of which were set up "what-nots" to accommodate the "curios." Finally, note should be taken of the growing fashionable influence of the middle class, especially of middle-class ladies, who were apt to be both staid and industrious. They were romantically staid. They chastely wrapped themselves in yards of crinoline and lace flounces, and their long hooped skirts and carefully balanced curls required them to walk primly. Likewise they were industrious. They plied their needles in embroidery and "fancy" sewing; they became amateurs at painting and stenciling and adepts at making artificial flowers of wax or tinfoil; they worked hard to be decorous in appearance and behavior. And they were appropriately sentimental. They easily heaved sighs and shed tears; they could readily "swoon"; and their favorite wood was black walnut.

**History**

In the scholarship of the era, historical interests held first place. There was new and widespread curiosity about the middle ages, about the continuously developing nature of government and society and culture from "primitive" men through antiquity and the middle ages down to recent times. There was ubiquitous enthusiasm about the past of one's nationality, its old tribal organization, its medieval evolution, its historic language and literature, its historic manners and customs. There was also notable emphasis on "scientific method," on the collecting and critical editing of source-materials and on the objective narrating of events.

This meant that historiography of the nineteenth century not only was richer and more plentiful than that of the eighteenth century; it was also different in kind. It was less "rational" and more pragmatic in spirit. It was less cosmopolitan and more national in scope. Generally speaking, too, it was more "scientific," more intent on telling what really happened than on teaching a philosophy.

But if the method of the newer historiography was increasingly "scientific," the use to which it was put, the subject-matter with which it dealt, was inspired less by the older rationalism than by the newer romanticism. Much the same romantic stimuli as directed the fancy of artists toward the national, the medieval, the local, and the popular guided contemporary scholarship toward the same goals.

Only in the field of economics was the prevailing scholarship neither historical in method nor nationalist in implication. Here the rational tradition of the eighteenth century, enshrined in the economic liberalism of Adam Smith and the French Physiocrats, was peculiarly potent, and the developing industrialism seemed to point rather to cosmopolitanism than to nationalism. Hence, while the period from 1830 to 1870 abounded in economists, most of them belonged to the so-called "classical school" who neglected history in favor of *a priori* reasoning and minimized national peculiarities in their advocacy of free trade. Yet even in the realm of political economy, some scholars and writers rejected the teachings (and method) of the predominant "classical school" and gradually evolved "national" or "historical" schools.

**Economics**

A pioneer of "national economics" was Friedrich List, a German who lived for several years in the United States and, returning to his native land, took a leading part in promoting railway construction. His *National System of Political Economy* maintained that no two peoples were in the same stage of economic development and that each government should pursue such economic policies (including tariff protectionism) as would contribute most to national well-being.

When we associate in our minds the patriotic implications of the scholarship and art which we have outlined in the present section, we shall not be surprised to find that nationalism in deed as well as in thought was an outstanding attribute of the era

from 1830 to 1870. Cultural nationalism paved the way for the advance of popular, political nationalism, and as this advanced step by step it inspired more nationalism in scholarship and art. Under the joint influence of cultural and political factors, and in the midst of a reviving militarism, nationalism conquered "liberals" and "conservatives" and took possession of Europe. It mastered and eventually supplanted the "Victorian Compromise" in Great Britain. It dominated the Second French Empire. It soon permeated central Europe and fashioned national states in Italy, Germany, and Hungary.

### 2. BROADENING OF BRITISH LIBERALISM

British liberalism had won a notable political victory in the parliamentary reform of 1832. It continued to be the main inspiration of the period of the "Victorian Compromise," [1] which roughly synchronized with the career of Louis Napoleon in France, and which proved for Britain a period of peaceful, prosperous evolution. Industrialization advanced steadily. National wealth multiplied. Commerce rapidly expanded. The lot of industrial workers was gradually improved, without lessening the profits of industrial capitalists.

**Mid-Victorian Age**

Thanks, moreover, to the mounting demand for agricultural products and to the increasing use of agricultural machinery, the profits of landlords were not perceptibly diminished by the repeal of the corn laws. No wonder that British Conservatives showed liberal leanings and British Liberals displayed conservative tendencies, and that both cooperated to support and maintain the "Victorian Compromise."

Manufacturers and landlords, the joint guardians of the Compromise, were alike a sober and optimistic oligarchy. They dressed themselves in frock coats, long trousers, and high hats, all preferably black, and accentuated their gravity by wearing "mutton-chop" whiskers. They walked with precision and took seriously their heavy responsibility of setting the masses a good example in manners and morals, including the economic morality of making as much money and spending as little as they could. They talked earnestly about statistics and were as eager for "retrenchment" as for "reform." Perhaps because they were so sober and prosaic in outward demeanor, they were inclined to be

[1] See above, p. 648.

poetical in mind and impulsive of heart. They read Tennyson with abandon. They looked with favor on medieval architecture. They felt a noble sympathy for the very word "liberty." Any nation aspiring to liberty, any Negro longing for liberty, was bound to evoke the compassion of knights-errant among British landlords and industrialists. And a close second to "liberty," as their favorite word, was "progress." To them there was obvious "progress" in machinery, in individual fortunes, in national well-being.

So solid and so popularly respected was the upper- and middle-class regime, and so promising were its evolutionary liberal reforms, that, with the exception of an ineffectual demonstration of democratic Chartists in London[1] and a brief disturbance in Ireland, the year 1848 passed off quite uneventfully in Great Britain and with no echo of the upheaval of that year in France and central Europe. In 1851 the first international exposition of the fruits of industrial progress was held under the huge expanse of a machine-made "crystal palace" in Hyde Park, London, with Queen Victoria and her faithful prince-consort, the mechanically minded Prince Albert, in conspicuous attendance. During the 1850's, furthermore, Parliament abolished almost all of the remaining tariff duties, and, by retrenchment in expenditure and regular imposition of direct income taxes, put Britain's internal fiscal system, as well as its commercial relationship with the outer world, squarely on the basis of economic liberalism. In 1860 Richard Cobden had the satisfaction of representing the Liberal government of Britain in the negotiation of a free-trade treaty with France.

Progress was also made in extending the liberal principle of colonial self-government from Canada[2] to other parts of the British Empire. The principle was applied by 1850 to Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island; in 1855 to Newfoundland; and in 1859 to British Columbia. In Australia, it was embodied in constitutions for New South Wales, Victoria, and Tasmania in 1853, for South Australia in 1856, and for Queensland in 1859. In New Zealand, which was formally annexed in 1840, it was fully established in 1856.

**Colonial Self-Government**

[1] See above, pp. 648–649.
[2] See above, pp. 652–653.

In South Africa, the grant of self-government was delayed by conflict between British immigrants and earlier Dutch (Boer) settlers. The Boers bitterly resented the abolition of Negro slavery by the British Parliament in 1833, and a large number of them, making a "great trek" in 1836–1840 out of Cape Colony and northward across the Vaal River, established the two Dutch republics of Transvaal and Orange River Free State, whose independence was recognized by Great Britain in 1852 and 1854 respectively. To British Cape Colony, self-government was granted in 1872.

Meanwhile, agitation had been growing in Canada for some sort of colonial union. The outcome was a series of resolutions adopted by a convention at Quebec in 1864, which served as a basis of the British North America Act passed by the British Parliament in 1867. It provided for a close federation of Quebec (Lower Canada), Ontario (Upper Canada), New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia, to be known as the Dominion of Canada, with a governor-general (appointed by the British government and exercising only nominal power), a federal parliament (Senate and House of Commons), and a ministry responsible to the parliament, and with certain local powers granted to the several "provinces" within the Dominion.[1]

The expanding British empire in India also underwent an important political change. It had long been governed by the English East India Company,[2] but the Company's monopolistic policies evoked the criticism of British Liberals, and early in 1857 popular unrest in India was turned into rebellion by the circulation of a story, subsequently admitted to be true, that British army officers were forcing their native troops, the so-called sepoys, to use cartridges greased with the fat of cows and pigs. This was revolting to the religious masses of India, for the cow was sacred to Hindus, and Moslems might not touch pork. In May a native cavalry regiment, rather than use the sacrilegious cartridges, mutinously left their barracks and galloped off to the ancient imperial city of Delhi to offer the Grand Mogul—the surviving symbol of the once great Indian

**Indian Empire**

[1] To the four original "provinces" within the Dominion of Canada were soon added Manitoba (1870), British Columbia (1871), and Prince Edward Island (1873). Newfoundland did not join until 1948.

[2] See above, pp. 357–360.

Empire of the Moguls—their services in driving out the British. Quickly the mutiny became general throughout the Ganges provinces and central India. At Cawnpore hundreds of European residents and British soldiers were massacred. At Lucknow the British garrison was closely besieged by a host of mutineers, and at Delhi the Grand Mogul came out of seclusion and asserted his rights.

The British government rushed reinforcements to India, and these, with the aid of loyal native regiments and superior armaments, recaptured Delhi, Lucknow, and Cawnpore, and stamped out the rebellion. Many sepoys were shot. The feeble old Mogul was exiled to Rangoon, and his sons were put to death. Yet the Indian Mutiny sealed the doom of the English East India Company.

An act of the British Parliament in 1858—the Better Government of India Act—deprived the Company of its political powers and provided that supreme control of Indian affairs should be vested in a cabinet minister (the secretary of state for India), assisted by a small council sitting in London, while the actual British administration in India should be directed by a viceroy, appointed by the British government and residing at Calcutta.

Despite some anti-imperialist talk on the part of advanced English liberals like Cobden and Bright, and despite an almost revolutionary change of governmental policy in respect of colonies, there was no actual disruption or diminution of the British Empire. It was quite as far flung in 1870 as it had been in 1815. Indeed, its vast Indian possessions were more numerous and more firmly cemented in 1870 than ever before.

In international relations, British liberals were generally pacifist. Most of them looked optimistically forward to a day when the adoption of liberal constitutions and free trade by other countries would usher in a golden epoch of world peace. There was no such British hostility to Louis Napoleon Bonaparte as there had been to the first Napoleon. Indeed, the virtual alliance which Britain had had with France under Louis Philippe,[1] was maintained during most of the period of the Second Napoleonic Empire. The two countries joined in the one international armed conflict which the British liberal government waged—the Crimean War of 1854–1856—and this, from Britain's

**British Foreign Policy**

[1] See above, p. 656.

standpoint, was a defensive war, to safeguard the Ottoman Empire and trade routes to India against a renewed threat of Russian aggression.[1]

In the 1860's liberal Britain evinced displeasure at the French Emperor's dictatorship and his ambitious activities in Italy, Mexico, and Germany. But the British government, while continuing to be ostentatiously sympathetic with liberal and national movements on the European continent, and even, under Lord Palmerston, to be occasionally truculent, observed neutrality in the later wars in which the Second French Empire was engaged. The government was not strictly neutral in the American Civil War (1861–1865); it favored the southern states by allowing them to fit out armed commerce raiders in British ports. Yet even here it did not actively intervene. Its international policy could already be described as one of "splendid isolation."

**Palmerston**

The outstanding British statesman in the period of the "Victorian Compromise" was Viscount Palmerston, and he was notably compromising. A proprietor of Irish lands, he was English by birth and feeling. A loyal Tory at the outset, and secretary of war under a Tory prime minister from 1809 to 1828, he drifted in the wake of Canning into an espousal of a "liberal" foreign policy and into alliance with the Whigs. Appointed foreign minister by Earl Grey, and serving in that role from 1830 to 1841 and again from 1846 to 1851, he proved himself a liberal by his support of revolutionaries on the Continent, and at the same time alarmed many of his fellow liberals in Britain by his warlike threats. It was the business of modern Britain, as of ancient Rome, he proclaimed, to protect with its strong arm the lives and property of its citizens everywhere.

Lord Palmerston, if something of a scandal to staid Liberals, was rather refreshing to most Englishmen. These enjoyed his impulsive conduct of foreign affairs, especially as it did not actually bring war, and they delighted in his dandified appearance, his unruffled buoyancy, and his irrepressible gaiety. He was immensely popular, and prime minister of the Liberal government almost continuously from 1855 until his death in 1865. Liberal as he was in name, and popular as he was in fact, Palmerston remained throughout his long life a statesman of the aristocratic type, "liberal" in sentiments, convinced of the "march of progress,"

[1] See below, pp. 714–715, 767.

but devoted to the "Victorian Compromise" and entirely opposed to democracy.

Another Liberal statesman came into prominence during the last two decades of the "Victorian Compromise"—William Ewart Gladstone. He was of the commercial, rather than the landed, aristocracy. At first he had been regarded as the rising star of the Conservative party, but by supporting Sir Robert Peel in the repeal of the corn laws he alienated himself from the main body of his party. Joining the "Peelites," as the free-trade faction of the Conservative party was called, he became more and more critical of "Tory reaction" and favorable to "liberal" ideas. He was Chancellor of the Exchequer as a "Peelite" from 1852 to 1855, and as a full-fledged Liberal in the Palmerston ministry from 1858 to 1865. An important work Gladstone did during the 1850's and 1860's in transforming the taxation system of Britain from a protectionist to a free-trade basis, and the facility and eloquence with which he presented long columns of figures in the House of Commons, together with his obvious anxiety to effect "retrenchment" in governmental expenditure, endeared him to the economically minded. But Gladstone had qualities which endeared him to wider circles. He was a flaming sort of person in speech and sympathy, a gifted orator and a robust humanitarian. He was deeply attached to the Anglican Church and to the social aspects of the "Victorian Compromise," but he was no standpatter. His liberalism was ever growing, and he occasionally hurried a bit to keep pace with "progress." He was an excellent politician.

**Gladstone**

Over against Palmerston and Gladstone must be set an astonishing "radical" who became a Tory and rejuvenator of the Conservative Party—Benjamin Disraeli. Disraeli was not altogether proper to the "Victorian Compromise." His grandfather was a Jewish immigrant from Venice, who made a handsome fortune in London, but this fortune Benjamin's father employed, not to promote any particular industrial enterprise, but to satisfy a taste for literature and a longing for "respectability." The Disraeli family joined the Anglican Church and purchased a country estate when Benjamin was a boy. Yet the boy, as he grew to manhood, displayed qualities which shocked respectable folks. He appeared at dinner parties in green velvet trousers and canary-colored waistcoat, with curled hair and much jewelry.

**Disraeli**

He spoke with wit, and when, in 1831, he turned his attention to politics, he assailed the rising liberalism. Only after repeated failures did he get into the House of Commons in 1837, and there, as a Tory, he was long eclipsed by Sir Robert Peel. His main achievement in the early 1840's was the writing of two novels—*Coningsby* and *Sybil*—which exposed social ills of the day and preached the gospel that Tory aristocrats should take the lead in social reform and thereby bind the masses to the traditional institutions of Britain—the crown, the nobility, the Anglican Church.

Sir Robert Peel's "betrayal" of agricultural interests by his repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 gave Disraeli his political opportunity. He forced Peel out of office and out of the Conservative party. While the party was thereby weakened, and its titular leadership passed to the phlegmatic Earl of Derby, Disraeli assumed its real leadership in the House of Commons. Then, with such astuteness did he use his talents in Parliament and in the country that gradually he revivified the Conservative party and rendered it a fairly formidable opposition to the dominant Liberals. In 1852 and again in 1858 Disraeli served as Chancellor of the Exchequer in fleeting Conservative ministries headed by Lord Derby, but his budget speeches were not as convincing as Gladstone's; they contained fewer figures and more paradoxes. Disraeli's forte was not finance; it was personality and an appeal to things which the "Victorian Compromise" neglected but which the British nation never wholly forgot.

The death of Lord Palmerston in 1865 removed the popular symbol and central support of the "Victorian Compromise," and stimulated democratic agitation—by trade unionists, by Radicals, and by politicians, both Liberal and Conservative, who hoped by forwarding it to draw new electors to the support of their respective parties. Gladstone promptly proposed an extension of the franchise. The proposal was not radical enough to please the left wing of the Liberal party, but it was too radical to be acceptable to the right wing. The latter combined with the Conservatives to reject the proposal and overthrow the ministry (1866).

Little popular interest had been aroused by Gladstone's very moderate proposal for reform, but when it was rejected by Parliament and a Conservative ministry was formed, excitement was stimulated by Radical agitators who claimed that the installation

of the Conservative ministry was a declaration of war against democracy and the working classes. Trade unionists cooperated in organizing a (democratic) National Reform League, and when the cabinet sought to prevent the League from holding a big mass-meeting at London by locking the gates of Hyde Park, an immense mob defiantly threw down the railings. Alarmed by the prospect of further violence, Lord Derby, the Conservative prime minister, authorized Disraeli to introduce a reform bill in the House of Commons. This, as first presented, was even more moderate than Gladstone's, but Disraeli accepted radical amendments which his opponents presented in the hope of embarrassing him, and thus he came to sponsor the relatively democratic Reform Act of 1867. The Act was not thoroughly democratic; voting in Britain was still limited by property qualifications. Yet it was an important step toward democracy. It almost doubled the electorate and practically enfranchised the working classes in the industrial cities. Henceforth the British government, while remaining predominantly aristocratic in personnel, became increasingly democratic in method and policy.

**Democratic Reform of 1867**

Despite the fact that the Reform Act of 1867 was sponsored by the Conservative party, the majority of workmen whom it enfranchised gave their first suffrages, in 1868, to the Liberal party. They distrusted Disraeli, the Conservative leader, and they were less sympathetic with a party traditionally identified with the landed aristocracy and the Anglican Church than with the party especially favorable to industrial progress, to freedom of trade, and to non-conformity in religion. In 1868, therefore, the Liberal party returned to power, with a cabinet under the premiership of Gladstone and with a parliamentary majority comprising a group of "Whig" aristocrats, a larger number of strictly "liberal" industrialists, and some "radicals" like John Bright.

This first Gladstone ministry—this first "democratic" ministry—lasted from 1868 to 1874. It stuck to the Liberal tradition of "peace and retrenchment," economizing on expenditures and obtaining necessary revenues from free-trade budgets, and pursuing a pacific policy in foreign and colonial affairs. It responded to demands of the newly enfranchised workmen by putting through Parliament an Education Act (1870), providing for a system of state schools, and a Trade Union Act (1871), legalizing trade unions and empowering them to hold property and conduct

"peaceful" strikes. It also grappled with a very serious situation in Ireland.

**Relations with Ireland**

Ever since the sixteenth century, when England and Scotland became Protestant and the bulk of Irish people remained Catholic, there had been grave abuses and recurrent insurrections in Ireland. Successive British governments, in attempting to dominate the country and make its inhabitants Protestant, had settled Scots and Englishmen in Ireland (most thickly in the northeastern province of Ulster) and treated them as a kind of "British garrison," with a privileged position in politics, religion, and economics. The native Irish had been heavily penalized. They had been denied any participation in the local Irish parliament, and afterwards, until 1829, in the British Parliament. They were persecuted for adherence to the Catholic Church and compelled to pay tithes for the support of a Protestant "Church of Ireland" modeled after England's. And, deprived of independent farms and of opportunities in industry, most of them were reduced to eking out a precarious existence as day laborers in towns or as tenants on the estates of "foreign" landlords.

In vain, a group of "United Irishmen" had revolted in 1798; the revolt was sternly repressed, and in 1800, by the Act of Union, Ireland was completely incorporated into the "United Kingdom," and its local parliament was supplanted by the "United" Parliament at London.[1] In 1829 Daniel O'Connell did secure political rights for Irish Catholics,[2] but he labored in vain to bring about a peaceful repeal of the Act of Union and the establishment of Irish home rule; he was imprisoned in 1843. Then in 1848 a group of radical Irish republicans—the "Young Ireland" society—attempted an uprising in imitation of the revolutions of that year in France and central Europe. The uprising was speedily put down, and its leaders were executed or exiled.

One of the participants in the revolt of 1848 who managed to escape was John O'Mahony. About 1858 he organized in the United States another society of Irish nationalists, the "Fenian Brotherhood." It was a secret society, whose members took an oath of allegiance to the "Irish Republic" and a vow of strict obedience to their officers, and it adopted a national "republican"

[1] See above, pp. 576–577.
[2] See above, pp. 621–622, 645.

flag—a tricolor of green, white, and orange. It never gained much hold on the Irish peasantry and was opposed by the Catholic clergy. It gained, however, a fairly large following among Irish emigrants in urban centers of the United States, Canada, and Australia, and in British cities such as Liverpool, Glasgow, and London. Irish-American "Fenians" made an alarming but unsuccessful military raid on Canada in 1866, and in the following year the British government had to employ troops to suppress Fenian riots in Lancashire, while in Ireland itself Fenian agitators, returning from America and England, committed a series of depredations which caused panic among Irish landlords and anxiety in the British government.

In the midst of the Fenian troubles, Gladstone and his Liberal ministry adopted a twofold policy in respect of Ireland. On the one hand, they would repress disorder and destroy "Fenianism." On the other hand, they would seek to appease the "native Irish" by redressing two of their major grievances, the one religious and the other economic. Accordingly, Gladstone carried through the British Parliament in 1869 a measure for disestablishing and disendowing the Protestant "Church of Ireland" and putting it on an unprivileged legal equality with the Catholic and Presbyterian Churches in Ireland. Then in 1870 followed an "Irish Land Act," which forbade landlords to raise agricultural rents at will or arbitrarily to evict a peasant without compensating him for whatever improvements he had made. The religious reform was effectual, but the agrarian reform was not. The Land Act merely sanctioned a principle of agrarian reform and gave currency to the slogan of the "three F's"—fair rent, fixity of tenure, and free sale. It did not adequately apply the principle, and it aroused the hostility of landlords and the hope of peasants without disarming the one or satisfying the other. The Irish problem remained to vex future British governments and disturb the broadening British liberalism of the time.

### 3. LOUIS NAPOLEON BONAPARTE AND THE SECOND FRENCH REPUBLIC

Contemporary with the Victorian Compromise in Great Britain was the romantic career of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte. He represented in France a curious compromise between liberal democracy and forceful dictatorship. And, by his activities at home and abroad, he impressed his name upon the whole era from 1848 to

1870 and rendered it an era of transition for western (and central) Europe from pacific liberalism to militant nationalism.

**Prince Louis Napoleon**

Louis Napoleon was the son of Louis Bonaparte, brother of the Emperor Napoleon, and of Hortense Beauharnais, daughter of the Empress Josephine and step-daughter of Napoleon. He was born in Paris in 1808, and his uncle, then at the height of his power, stood sponsor for him at baptism and inscribed his name in the family register of the imperial Bonapartes. With the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy in 1815, the Bonapartes were exiled from France, and Prince Louis Napoleon was taken by his mother to Switzerland. He attended school at Augsburg (in southern Germany) and was instructed in military science by a Swiss general. Brought up to regard the tradition of his family as identical with that of the French Revolution of 1789, the youthful Bonaparte would have gone to Paris in 1830 and there claimed the fruits of the overthrow of Charles X, had not the middle-class government of Louis Philippe been formed too quickly.[1] As it was, he joined in Italy the revolutionary society of the Carbonari and participated in the insurrection of 1831 in the Papal State. The uprising, as we know, was suppressed,[2] and Louis Napoleon, taken prisoner by Austrian soldiers, was released only through his mother's tearful entreaty. He then intrigued simultaneously with French republicans and Polish patriots, but the watchfulness of Louis Philippe on one hand, and the firm action of the Russian Tsar on the other, imposed on Louis Napoleon the necessity of wielding the pen rather than the sword.

In a series of writings which culminated in the *Napoleonic Ideas* (1839), he set forth his political doctrines. The Napoleonic Empire, he declared, had been the perfect realization of the principles of 1789. It had rested upon a foundation of national sovereignty. It had been solidified, directed, and rendered glorious by its "cæsarism," that is by entrusting power to an Emperor whose success depended upon his ability to promote the public welfare and to retain popular support. Such, according to Louis Napoleon, had been the aims of the first Napoleon and such would be his own aims in endeavoring to reestablish the Empire in France.

These writings of Prince Louis Napoleon presented a falsely

[1] See above, pp. 639–640.
[2] See above, p. 659.

idealized picture of the First Empire, but they fitted neatly with the "Napoleonic legend," which the great Napoleon had begun to spin on sea-girt St. Helena before his death in 1821,[1] and which was afterwards elaborated by romantic French writers like Victor Hugo and Adolphe Thiers. The liberal monarchy of Louis Philippe (1830–1848) actually fostered the memory of Napoleon. It replaced the lilied white flag of the Bourbons with the tricolor which Napoleon's armies had borne. It removed from the Vendôme column, which Napoleon had erected at Paris to commemorate the victory of Austerlitz, the fleur-de-lis with which the restored Bourbons had topped it, and fittingly substituted an iron statue of the "little Corporal." The same government dedicated the magnificent Napoleonic Arch of Triumph at Paris (1836); and Louis Philippe paid the crowning tribute to the Napoleonic legend when he had the bones of the Emperor ceremoniously brought back from St. Helena (1840) and interred under the stately dome of the Invalides, just as the great national hero and exile had willed, "on the banks of the Seine among the people whom he had so dearly loved."

Twice during the reign of Louis Philippe, Louis Napoleon attempted to take personal advantage of growing Bonapartist sentiment in France. The first time, in 1836, he appeared at Strasbourg and called upon its garrison to help him reestablish the Napoleonic Empire; he was speedily arrested and expatriated across the Atlantic to America. The second time, in 1840, landing at Boulogne with the declaration that the Emperor's bones should rest only in a "regenerated France," he was condemned to life imprisonment. In prison, he wrote another book, the *Extinction of Pauperism,* promising, as the cornerstone of his projected regime, the material prosperity of the whole nation. It would be his business, he said, to assist capitalists by opening up new fields of industrial enterprise, to help peasants by stimulating agricultural production, and to aid urban workmen by providing them with abundant employment. Thereby, under a national democratic Empire, everybody would profit and poverty would eventually disappear.

Prince Louis Napoleon was lucky. In 1846 he contrived to escape from prison, in the guise of a workman, and to make his way to England. Two years elapsed, and then his opportunity

[1] See above, p. 572.

came with the revolution of February 1848 at Paris—the overthrow of the bourgeois monarchy, the flight of Louis Philippe, and the proclamation of the Second French Republic.[1] Louis Napoleon, this time, refrained from any demonstration in behalf of reestablishing the Empire, and so as not to "embarrass" the Republic, he ostentatiously remained in England. He was thus aloof from the fighting at Paris in June 1848 and could not be blamed by "radicals" for their bloody suppression. At the same time, the offer of his services to the aged Duke of Wellington, then gallantly overawing the British Chartists in London,[2] bespoke a respect for "law and order."

In the circumstances, the name of Prince Louis Napoleon presented itself as a common symbol to Frenchmen of diverse political opinions—to radicals and reactionaries, to democrats and liberals, and, above all, to the patriotic emotions of all classes. In June 1848, he was elected to the National Constituent Assembly, and in December he was raised to the presidency of the Second Republic by an overwhelming popular majority.[3] At the close of the eventful year, he took the oath "to remain faithful to the democratic republic; . . . to regard as enemies of the nation all those who may attempt by illegal means to change the form of the established government."

**President of Second French Republic**

As President of the Second French Republic (1848–1852), Prince Louis Napoleon pursued policies which were calculated to heighten his personal popularity with different elements in the nation. While he praised the urban workmen and prevailed upon the Assembly to enact in their favor a scheme of voluntary old-age insurance (1850), he was especially solicitous for certain measures advocated by bourgeois Liberals and by conservative Catholics. On one hand, industrial interests were promoted. On the other hand, a French military expedition was dispatched to Rome (1849) to reinstate Pope Pius IX in the temporal sovereignty from which the revolutionary movement of the preceding year had deposed him; and an educational act of 1850—the so-called Falloux law—restored the privileges which the Catholic

[1] See above, pp. 664–666.

[2] See above, p. 649.

[3] He polled five and a half million votes, as against one and a half million cast for General Cavaignac.

police activity prevented the spread of counter-agitation. And the most vocal critics of the President, such as Adolphe Thiers and Victor Hugo, were seized and hustled out of the country. In the circumstances, the French people decided, in December 1851, by 7,500,000 votes against 640,000, to empower Louis Napoleon to prepare a new instrument of government for the Second Republic.

In January 1852 the new constitution was promulgated. It retained republican forms, and specified that universal manhood suffrage should be employed in electing a legislature. Its chief departure from the constitution of 1848 was in respect of the President and his powers. His term of office was lengthened from four years to ten. He would appoint a Council of State, which would draft all bills to be considered by the legislature, and a Senate, which might revise existing laws and propose new ones and which alone might interpret the constitution. The President, moreover, would appoint all military and civil officers; and the democratic legislature was subordinated to him. It might not initiate legislation or amend bills presented by him, and it might not interfere with his choice of ministers.

The year 1852 marked the transformation of France from Republic to Empire. Louis Napoleon, still nominally President of the Second Republic, put his effigy on the national coins and restored to army and national buildings the gilt eagles and other insignia of the Napoleonic Empire. He made state tours through the provinces, speaking honeyed words to peasants, to artisans, to capitalists, to rich and poor, to reactionaries and revolutionaries, to believers and agnostics. And his reward was speedy and complete. On December 2, 1852, he became in name what he already was in fact, and was proclaimed, with the sanction of a new plebiscite, Napoleon III, Emperor of the French.[1] The republican constitution of 1852 became, with necessary minor alterations, the new imperial constitution.

**Emperor Napoleon III**

### 4. THE SECOND NAPOLEONIC EMPIRE AND ITS SUCCESSES

The Second Empire, according to Napoleon III's initial declaration, was to be "the final flower of the French Revolution," and the Emperor himself was to be "the beneficent motive force of the whole social order." For eighteen years (1852–1870) the

[1] He took the title of "Napoleon III," in recognition of the "right" of Napoleon I's son to reign as "Napoleon II." The son had died at Vienna in 1832.

Empire lasted; and during this period Napoleon was the central figure in France, and France was the chief power in Europe.

In internal affairs, Napoleon III proved himself, for several years, a consummate "politician," a clever manipulator of public opinion, and an adroit harmonizer of seemingly conflicting philosophies. He organized an effective secret police; he controlled the press; he dominated the legislature and the whole governmental system, local as well as national; [1] and he jailed or exiled his outspoken enemies. But while he ruled with a strong arm, he endeavored to make his rule acceptable to both "radicals" and "conservatives." On the one hand, he preserved universal manhood suffrage, however illusory it might be in practice, as the foundation of his government; he frequently boasted that his Empire rested upon popular sovereignty.

**Domestic Policies**

On the other hand, he fascinated many conservatives by the brilliance of the imperial court which he reestablished and maintained. In the drawing-room and over the tea-cups, Napoleon III was more at home than his uncle had been; and his marriage in 1853 with Eugénie, Countess of Montijo, a Spanish lady, gave him an Empress whose beauty and charm rendered the French court once more the focal point of European styles and fashions.

The Second Empire, in its economic policies, was notably liberal. Economic liberalism was taught in the French universities and applied to legislation in the interest of the industrial middle classes. Governmental regulation of private business was steadily lessened. The introduction of machinery and the organization of industrial corporations were facilitated. A system of savings banks was established. Tariffs were gradually lowered, and in 1860 Napoleon III negotiated with Richard Cobden an Anglo-French commercial treaty facilitating trade between the two major powers of western Europe. Moreover, the Emperor sponsored an extensive program of public works as indirect means of stimulating industry and providing employment. In particular, large sums of money were spent on constructing broad boulevards and magnificent public buildings (including the imposing opera

[1] In the elections to the national legislature, the government paid the expenses of "official candidates," that is, of those who were acceptable to Napoleon III, while "opposition" candidates had to pay their own expenses. Moreover, the electoral machinery was almost completely in the Emperor's hands.

house) in Paris, under the supervision of the Emperor's devoted friend, Baron Haussmann, and making the French capital the most beautiful and attractive city in the world. Many were the private fortunes made or swelled during the Second Empire. And for several years, the well-to-do middle classes, who were the chief beneficiaries, were loyal to Napoleon III.

Napoleon III, unlike Louis Philippe, was not so engrossed in economic liberalism and the cause of the industrial borgeoisie as to ignore the sentiments and demands of the growing industrial proletariat in France. It was for the working class, he affirmed, that his government of cheap bread, public works, and holidays existed. He liked to be called the "Emperor of the workers." One of his laws permitted laborers to form societies for collective buying and selling (1863). Another partially legalized trade unions and recognized for the first time the right to strike (1864). A third extended workmen's voluntary insurance, with state guarantees, to death and industrial accidents (1868).

Of the French peasantry, especially of the numerous peasant-proprietors, Napoleon III was also mindful. He recalled frequently to them his devotion to the principle of private property, his interest in their vineyards and wheat fields, and the prosperity which was assured them by his improvement of transportation and his enlargement of markets. He also took pains to cater to the traditional religious convictions of many of the peasants, as well as of persons of the upper classes. Napoleon III was not deeply religious, but his Empress was, and he recognized the political desirability of enlisting Catholics in support of his government.

For the first time since the advent of the first Napoleon, it seemed as though France had a government which would rise superior to the strife between "Left" and "Right" and reconcile their divergent interests, political, social, and intellectual. In fact, the words which Napoleon III addressed to the French people on one of his trips across the country just prior to his assumption of the imperial dignity, appeared peculiarly prophetic of his achievements in domestic policy. "I would conquer," he had said, "for the sake of religion, morality, and material ease, that portion of the population, still very numerous, which, in the midst of a country of faith and belief, hardly knows the precepts of Christ; which, in the midst of the most fertile country of the world, is

hardly able to enjoy the primary necessities of life. We have immense uncultivated districts to bring under cultivation, roads to open, harbors to construct, rivers to render navigable, canals to finish, and our network of railways to bring to completion. . . . This is what I understand by the Empire, if the Empire is to be reestablished. These are the conquests which I contemplate, and all of you who surround me, who, like myself, wish the good of our common fatherland, you are my soldiers."

In another part of the same speech, the prospective Emperor had sought to allay a fear which might haunt equally the economic liberal and the pious Christian. "There is, nevertheless, one apprehension, and that I shall set at rest. A spirit of distrust leads certain persons to say that the Empire means war. I say the Empire means peace. France longs for peace, and if France is satisfied, the world is tranquil. Glory is rightly handed down hereditarily, but not war." This part of the prophecy was not fulfilled. In foreign affairs, Napoleon III was not as fortunate as in domestic policies. The Second Empire, whatever he meant it to be, involved war—several colonial wars and three European wars.

Napoleon III was pacific at heart. He was a product of mid-nineteenth-century liberalism and romanticism. He lacked the martial zeal of the born soldier and he had an un-Napoleonic aversion to the smell of gunpowder and the sight of bloodshed. He liked to display arms, but he hesitated to use them.

Yet, this same Napoleon III was impelled to war by the circumstances of his rise to power and by the nature of the policy he chose to follow in order to retain power. He was a nationalist *par excellence*. It was his nationalism—and his name—which attracted the French masses to him after they had gotten rid of the "unpatriotic" bourgeois monarchy; which raised him to the post of President and then of Emperor; and which led him to obscure factional differences behind a showy front of national solidarity. If factions quarreled within France, or if one grumbled because he was temporarily favoring another, he was quick to perceive that he might silence the grumbling and stop the domestic squabbling, at least for a time, by embarking the nation on a foreign enterprise. Besides, his nationalism—and his romanticism—made him the object of constant pleas for active assistance in forwarding the freedom and

**Nationalist Foreign Policy**

unity of "oppressed" nationalities in Europe. Liberal patriots throughout the continent looked to him for support, as reactionary sovereigns had formerly looked to Metternich; and he imagined that by supporting nationalism abroad he might secure for France "compensations" of territory and prestige which would heighten patriotic pride at home and strengthen his Empire.

**Rebuilding a Colonial Empire**

One forceful policy, short of European war, appealed to Napoleon III from the outset, and that was the rebuilding of an overseas colonial dominion for France. He injected new vigor into the administration of the remnants of the old empire—Martinique and Guadeloupe in the West Indies, Cayenne on the Guiana coast of South America, Senegal in western Africa, and the trading posts in India. He did not hesitate, as Louis Philippe had done, about annexing the whole of Algeria to France: [1] he completed its pacification in 1857; he established a permanent civil government for it in 1858; and under the governorship of one of his ablest generals, Marshal MacMahon, Algeria became the most important dependency of France.

In the meantime, the Emperor was sending out naval expeditions to appropriate islands in the Pacific; New Caledonia, the most noteworthy, was acquired in 1853. In 1856 France joined Great Britain in a military demonstration against China, and after four years of spasmodic fighting, culminating in an allied advance on Peking, the Chinese government agreed by the treaty of Tientsin (1860) to open several ports to European trade and to protect Christian missionaries in the interior. South of the Chinese Empire—in the peninsula of Indo-China—Napoleon III laid the foundation of French dominion; he avenged the murder of French missionaries by sending punitive expeditions into Annam and Cochin-China (1858) and by erecting a French protectorate over Cambodia (1863). In 1863, also, he initiated, alike for commercial and religious motives, a French intervention in Mexico, which was not so fortunate and of which we shall presently say more. Yet despite the disastrous outcome of the Mexican enterprise, the Second Empire witnessed the rehabilitation of the French as colonizers and traders on a scale second only to the British. The real restorer of the French colonial empire was, indeed, Napoleon III.

In Europe, Napoleon III began his reign by most pacific protestations, which served to reassure the great powers that they could

[1] On the preceding French occupation of Algeria, see above, pp. 639, 656–657.

safely suffer a Napoleon to sit once more on the throne of France. And so careful was the Emperor to harmonize the foreign and commercial policies of France with those of Britain that for some years he could count on a virtual alliance with the country which had been most stubbornly hostile to the first Napoleon. Against one power in Europe, however, Napoleon III was arrayed almost from the outset. That Power was Russia, then ruled by the most reactionary sovereign on the Continent, the Tsar Nicholas I. The Tsar, ever the foe of revolution and democratic principles, distrusted the upstart Emperor of the French and most grudgingly recognized his title and government. Not only was Napoleon III personally piqued by the Tsar, but the French people disliked Tsarist Russia: business men found fault with its tariff restrictions and economic backwardness; Catholics complained about its religious intolerance; liberals inveighed against its autocracy and its oppression of the Poles.

**Hostility to Tsarist Russia**

Quarrels at the holy places in Palestine between Catholic and Orthodox monks provided the spark for igniting the train of ill-feeling between France and Russia. The Tsar, as the champion of Orthodox Christianity, denounced the Sultan for failure to preserve peace at the holy places and demanded that he recognize the "right" of Russia to a protectorate of Christians within the Ottoman Empire. But Napoleon III promptly pointed out that such a "right" would violate the long-established treaty rights of France to the protection of Catholics, and called upon the Sultan to resist Russian "aggression." The Sultan gladly complied with the French Emperor's request, for he well knew that the Tsar Nicholas had been describing him as the "sick man of Europe" and proposing to Great Britain a partition of the Ottoman Empire.

Napoleon III was aware that in a war with Russia he would have the solid support of the French nation and the sympathy of all liberals throughout Europe—Polish, Italian, even German. He could also count on active British assistance. British liberals were pacific in theory, but they were vehemently anti-Tsarist. Many of them, together with the British masses, shared the fear of the British government of the day that a Russian protectorate over Christians in the Ottoman Empire would be speedily followed by Russian appropriation of European Turkey, and that Russia, ensconced at Constantinople, would be an infinitely graver menace than the Turks to British communication with India and to British

trade in the eastern Mediterranean. So, despite some opposition from Cobden, Bright, and other radical pacifists, and considerable divergence of counsel within Parliament and the ministry, Great Britain backed France in the demand for the preservation of the Ottoman Empire. The Franco-British cause was espoused, moreover, by the little kingdom of Sardinia, for reasons of its own which will be indicated later.[1] The Austrian government preserved a troubled neutrality, wavering between a desire to repay Russia for its recent help in putting down the Hungarian revolt of 1849[2] and a lively apprehension of Russian territorial expansion. King Frederick William IV of Prussia alone was "benevolent" toward Tsarist Russia, but he was in no mood to complicate affairs in Germany by going to war with France and Britain.

**Crimean War and Paris Peace Congress**

War began between the Ottoman and Russian Empires in 1853; it was joined, on the Ottoman side, by France and Great Britain in 1854 and by Sardinia in 1855. The struggle, confined mainly to military operations in the peninsula of the Crimea, including a protracted siege of Sevastopol, has been known in history as the Crimean War. There were many evidences of unpreparedness and bungling on both sides. The Russian military machine proved corrupt and inefficient and might have been disposed of fairly quickly, had not the Allies been almost equally inefficient in providing arms, food, and sanitation. There was some severe and heroic fighting, but sickness and starvation wrought more havoc than bullets.[3] In 1856 Russia sued for peace. The Crimean War had cost half a million lives and two billion dollars.

At Paris, Napoleon III's capital, a congress of European powers arranged a general peace settlement. Russia agreed to respect the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, to renounce any claim to a protectorate over its Christian inhabitants, and no longer to build or maintain warships on the Black Sea. Simultaneously Russia joined with the other powers in creating an international commission to supervise the free navigation of the Danube. It also sur-

[1] See below, p. 739.

[2] See above, p. 676.

[3] Some improvement in camp sanitation and in the health of soldiers resulted, in the latter part of the war, from the devoted labors of the famous English nurse, Florence Nightingale, "the angel with the lamp." It was about one of the heroic episodes of the Crimean War that Tennyson, whose romantic patriotism could outweigh his romantic pacifism, wrote the *Charge of the Light Brigade.*

rendered a strip of Bessarabia.[1] These results of the Crimean War were not very startling. But at any rate, Russia was checked; the Ottoman Empire was preserved; Great Britain felt safer; and Napoleon III was cheered by returning veterans and acclaimed by French patriots and foreign liberals.

**Napoleon III and Italy**

While the Congress of Paris was in session, the delegate from Sardinia—the masterful Cavour, of whom we shall soon take special note—was already urging Napoleon to aid Sardinia in expelling Austria from the peninsula and creating a free and united state for the Italian people. The Emperor was receptive: his uncle had erected a "kingdom of Italy"; he himself had been a *Carbonaro;* the Bonapartes had Italian blood in their veins; Austria had given no active assistance to France in the Crimean War; a war with Austria for the unification of Italy would be popular with French liberals; and Napoleon III might get some tangible "compensations" for French effort. Yet the Emperor hesitated: an Austrian war was risky in view of Austria's repeatedly displayed prowess; a united Italy might prove to be a strong and perhaps dangerous rival to France in the Mediterranean; and—most alarming consideration—many French Catholics were heeding the protests of the Pope against any Italian unification which might deprive him of his temporal power.

To Napoleon III, it was soon obvious that whatever he did he ran the danger of antagonizing one or the other of the major French groups on whose united support he had hitherto relied. If he championed Italian national unity, the Catholic "Right" would be disaffected; if he held aloof, the Liberal "Left" would be disappointed. Good politician as he was, he postponed decision, until an attempt on his life in January 1858 by a crazed Italian, Orsini by name, stung him into action. He would remove the grievance of potential Italian assassins and cater to the liberal patriots of France and the world. He would temporarily risk the reproaches of Pope and French Catholics.

At an "accidental" meeting between Napoleon III and Cavour at Plombières in July 1858 an informal agreement was reached,

[1] Bessarabia, lying on the Black Sea between the Dniester and Pruth rivers, was peopled largely by Rumanians. It had been acquired by Russia in 1812 (during the Napoleonic War) and a part of it was now, in 1856, reincorporated in the Rumanian principality of Moldavia, under the nominal suzerainty of the Ottoman Sultan.


whereby France would help Sardinia drive the Austrians from Lombardy and Venetia and would sanction the formation of a single north Italian state; in return, Sardinia would cede to France the Alpine duchy of Savoy and the Mediterranean port of Nice. To cement the alliance, Prince Victor Napoleon, cousin and next of kin (after the infant Prince Imperial) to the Emperor, would marry the daughter of King Victor Emmanuel II of Sardinia. Then Sardinia began to mobilize.

In April 1859, the Austrian government presented an ultimatum to Sardinia, demanding immediate demobilization. The rejection of the ultimatum was the signal for the outbreak of war, which, with Austria on one side and France and Sardinia on the other, lasted from April to July 1859, and constituted the first successful step toward Italian liberation and union. French troops entered Piedmont, where they were received with enthusiasm and were joined by the Sardinian army. The Allies then advanced into Lombardy: the victory of Magenta early in June, which delivered Milan to them, was shortly followed by that of Solferino; and the Austrians fell back upon their strong fortresses in Venetia.

**War with Austria**

The successes of the Allies inflamed Italian nationalism and led to popular demands for the incorporation of the states of central Italy, including the Papal State, in a united Italy under the King of Sardinia. This was more than Napoleon III had bargained for. In attempting to obtain Lombardy and Venetia for Sardinia, he was inspiring a far more extensive Sardinian expansion, which threatened serious trouble for him. For French Catholics naturally attributed the nationalist movement in the Papal State to their own Emperor's sacrilegious intervention in Italy, and an influential French bishop branded Napoleon as "the modern Judas Iscariot." Other considerations worried the Emperor. Prussia was mobilizing along the Rhine. The Austrian armies, entrenched in Venetia, were being reinforced. French losses were comparatively heavy.

Consequently, the Emperor of the French, without previously informing Cavour, stopped short in July 1859, and concluded at Villafranca an armistice with the Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria, whereby Lombardy would be ceded to Sardinia, Venetia would remain Austrian, the princes in central Italy would be reinstated, and the Pope would become president of an Italian


SWITZERLAND
FRANCE
AUSTRIA
HUNGARY
SAVOY (to Fr. 1860)
Nice (to Fr. 1860)
KINGDOM OF SARDINIA
CORSICA (Fr.)
LUCCA (to Tusc. 1847)
PAPAL STATES
SARDINIA
Cagliari
TYRRHENIAN SEA
Marsala
Syracuse
ITALY
1859-1870
200 MILES

federation. It was now the turn of Italian patriots and French liberals to assail Napoleon as a traitor. Loud were their protests. King Victor Emmanuel, left in the lurch by his powerful ally, felt obliged to accede to the truce, but Cavour denounced it and resigned his office. The terms of the truce of Villafranca were confirmed by the treaty of Zürich in the following November between France and Austria.

Napoleon, however, had not reckoned with the resolution of Italian patriots. Under the influence of radical leaders and with the connivance of the Sardinian government, the inhabitants of the duchies of central Italy and of part of the Papal State would not hear of any Italian federation under the Pope or of the reinstatement of their former rulers; they held plebiscites and voted to join the kingdom of Sardinia. At first Napoleon III categorically refused to recognize such an exercise of the "right of national self-determination." Presently, however, Cavour, who had swallowed his pride and returned to his post, persuaded the Emperor to change his mind. By the treaty of Turin, signed in March 1860, between Napoleon III and Victor Emmanuel II, Sardinia ceded to France both Savoy and Nice, just as if Napoleon had carried out the original bargain and freed Italy "from the Alps to the Adriatic," and, in return, France recognized Sardinia's annexation not only of Lombardy but also of the duchies of Tuscany, Parma, and Modena, and of the papal province of Romagna.

**Annexation of Savoy and Nice**

In accordance with the treaty of Turin and with the wish of their inhabitants expressed through plebiscites, Savoy and Nice were annexed to France—or, as Napoleon III said, "restored to France." For they had belonged to the First French Republic and to the First Napoleonic Empire and had been handed over to Sardinia by the Vienna peace settlement of 1815. Now, in 1860, they were back in the Second Napoleonic Empire. They represented tangible gains for France from Napoleon III's intervention in Italy.

Not only in Italy, but also in Rumania, Napoleon III advanced the cause of liberal nationalism. The Rumanian people inhabited the provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia in the Ottoman Empire; Bessarabia in the Russian Empire; and Transylvania in Habsburg Hungary. Like the Italians (and French), they spoke a language derived from

**Napoleon III and Rumania**

Latin, and their leaders aspired to national unity and independence. The French Emperor became interested in them during the Crimean War, and following the defeat of Russia he insisted upon writing into the Paris peace treaty of 1856 provisions for "home rule" of the two Rumanian provinces in the Ottoman Empire and for the transfer of a part of Bessarabia from Russia to Moldavia.

Then in 1858, on the eve of his intervention in Italy, Napoleon III prevailed upon the great powers and the Ottoman Sultan to permit Moldavia and Wallachia to elect their own parliaments and choose their own reigning princes, though with the proviso that the two provinces should not be united. This proviso the Rumanian leaders promptly obviated by having both provinces choose one and the same Prince, Alexander Cuza. And in 1861–1862 Napoleon III showed his continuing concern with Rumania by persuading the powers to recognize Prince Cuza and agree to the fusion of the two provincial parliaments into a single national parliament. It was an important step toward the creation of a united Rumanian nation.

### 5. DECLINE AND FALL OF THE SECOND EMPIRE

Meanwhile, difficulties for Napoleon III were increasing within France. For eleven years, from 1848 to 1859, remarkable success had attended his appeals to all sorts of Frenchmen—rich and poor, radical and conservative, religious and irreligious—to unite in "one great national party." But his intervention in Italy split the "national party." French Catholics blamed him for going too far; French Liberals abused him for not going far enough. After 1859 the breach between these important factions widened, and the Emperor's efforts to keep his grasp on both, for a time grotesque, ended in tragedy.

**Domestic and Foreign Difficulties**

In 1860, to appease the Liberals, Napoleon made a show of "liberalizing" his government. He permitted the legislature to discuss his policies and criticize his ministers. He removed some of the restrictions on the freedom of speech both inside and outside the legislature. He authorized the full publication of parliamentary debates. Simultaneously, to appease the Catholics, he declared his firm determination to uphold the temporal sovereignty of the papacy and never to allow the Italians to appropriate Rome. But on neither side were these concessions wholly satisfactory.

Besides, Napoleon III's intervention in Italy and his annexation of Savoy and Nice tended to isolate him internationally and to earn him the reputation abroad of being an ambitious and unscrupulous schemer. To earlier Russian enmity were now added Austrian ill will, Italian disaffection, Prussian jealousy, and British suspicion. At the same time the example the Emperor had given of championing Italian nationalism was not lost on nationalists elsewhere, and appeals of these for French aid seriously complicated his foreign policy. He did succeed, by peaceful diplomatic means, in aiding the Rumanians in 1861–1862. But he signally failed to help the Poles in 1863.

**Failure in Poland**

In this year, Polish patriots, stirred by recent nationalist events in Italy and Rumania, rose in revolt against Russia and appealed to Napoleon III for assistance. He was sympathetic. France was the traditional ally of Poland, and Poles had fought for the first Napoleon. Why should not the third Napoleon, the friend of oppressed nationalities, assist the Poles? French Liberals urged him to do so because the Poles were fighting for the liberal principle of self-determination, and French Catholics besought him to do so because the Poles were a Catholic people. It was clear that in this case he would have the united support of the French people. Yet the general European situation was now against him. He knew that if he went to war with Russia on behalf of its rebellious Poles, he would find Prussia and Austria, because of their own Polish populations, in alliance with Russia against him, and that such a big war could only be calamitous to France and to Napoleonic fortunes. So he contented himself with filing a feeble protest with the Tsar about "atrocities"; and as Great Britain did likewise, the Poles were left, despairing and unfriended, to be overwhelmed by Russian soldiery. As Napoleon III stood helplessly by, French Liberals and French Catholics alike heaped reproaches on him.

**Failure in Mexico**

It was in large part for the purpose of restoring the prestige which he was conspicuously losing at home from his Italian and Polish policies that Napoleon III launched a far-away Mexican adventure. The opportunity was afforded by troubled conditions in the republic of Mexico and by the American Civil War which seemed to preclude the United States from interfering with his project. In Mexico, chronic ill feeling between the poor half-breed or Indian peasantry on one

hand and the wealthy land-owning Spanish-Americans on the other had been exploited by rival chieftains, of whom one faction championed conservatism in religion and politics, while the other advocated violent radicalism. In 1861, after a protracted struggle, Benito Juarez, a radical leader and full-blooded Indian, overthrew a conservative government and inaugurated a drastic ecclesiastical "reform" in the country. Religious communities were suppressed and all ecclesiastical property was confiscated. The Juarez government also repudiated the public debts which its predecessor had contracted.

Ostensibly to protect French owners of Mexican bonds, Napoleon III then turned his eyes across the Atlantic. At first he merely negotiated an agreement with Spain and Great Britain—countries likewise affected by the Juarist repudiation of debts—for joint seizure of Mexican customs houses until satisfaction of the debts should be obtained. Within four months financial adjustments were made satisfactory to Great Britain and Spain, and the forces of these powers were withdrawn. But the French tarried. In the autumn of 1862 Napoleon dispatched to Mexico an army of 30,000 French veterans, who, with the aid of a constant stream of reinforcements from France, captured Mexico City in June 1863 and drove Juarez into the mountain fastnesses of the north. Instead of annexing the country outright to France, Napoleon preferred to control it indirectly. He prevailed upon the Archduke Maximilian, brother of the Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria, to become "Emperor of Mexico" (1864), and supported him with French soldiers, in the expectation that he would undo the anti-ecclesiastical work of Juarez and grant economic concessions to Frenchmen.

But "the great idea of his reign," as Napoleon termed it, proved disastrous. From the outset, Maximilian's position in Mexico was precarious. Many Mexicans who had no special liking for the radical Juarez preferred him to a "foreign" Emperor. The French troops, on whom Maximilian relied, were unaccustomed to the guerrilla warfare waged against them and were handicapped by the nature of the country and the lack of transportation facilities. Then, too, the ending of the Civil War in the United States (1865) enabled the American government to reassert the Monroe Doctrine and add very real threats to its protests. Whereupon, the French Emperor faced about and gradually recalled his

expeditionary forces. Mexico was finally evacuated in February 1867; and Maximilian, who was gallant or foolhardy enough to remain, was soon captured and shot, and the victorious Juarez was reinstalled.

The Mexican enterprise proved a veritable boomerang against Napoleon III. The restoration of Juarez involved in Mexico the enforcement of anti-Catholic legislation and the annulment of numerous profitable franchises recently acquired by French financiers. In France, the natural result was a redoubling of criticism of the Emperor by both Liberals and Catholics.

Such criticism came to be shared generally by Frenchmen, as these beheld how the Emperor's failure in Mexico contributed to the waning of French prestige in Europe. At the very time when some of his best troops were fighting across the ocean, a vigorous and resourceful Prussian statesman, Otto von Bismarck, was perfecting plans for the expulsion of Austria from Germany and the establishment of a national state under the Hohenzollern King of Prussia. Important reforms were effected in the Prussian army between 1862 and 1866, without parallel reforms in the French army. In 1865 Bismarck had an interview with Napoleon at Biarritz. The Prussian statesman knew how to work upon the French Emperor's romantic attachment to the principle of nationality, upon his personal vanity, and upon his desperate readiness to clutch at any chance to obtain a little glory for France and the Napoleonic dynasty. The Emperor did not oppose Bismarck's scheme for a joint attack of Prussia and Italy on Austria and for a closer union of the states of north Germany with Prussia. He was vaguely given to understand that France might seek "compensation" toward the Rhine —perhaps Belgium or some of the Rhineland. And he doubtless imagined that the parties to the impending struggle in Germany would be so evenly balanced as to render subsequent French intervention easy, decisive, and highly gainful.

**Failure to Profit in Germany**

The German war came suddenly in 1866, with Prussia (and Italy) arrayed against Austria (and several smaller German states). Of the general significance of the war, we shall treat at greater length in the next chapter. Here it suffices to remark that the war was short and decisive—so short that it is known as the "Seven Weeks' War" and so decisive that Austria was obliged to cede Venetia to Italy and (more important for our present pur-

poses) to yield the hegemony of Germany to Prussia. Prussia annexed some of the lesser German states, brought the others north of the Main River into a compact "North German Confederation" under Prussian domination, and contracted defensive alliances with the remaining and nominally independent south German states.

Napoleon III got no "compensations" for France. In vain he intrigued to obtain Belgium. In vain he besought Bismarck's kind offices to help France get the Rhenish Palatinate. For a time he thought he might at least secure Luxemburg. This was a small grandduchy adjacent to Belgium on the northern frontier of France; since 1815 it had been a member of the German Confederation and had been governed by the King of the Netherlands and garrisoned by Prussia. Early in 1867 the French Emperor negotiated with the Dutch King for the purchase of the grandduchy; the King was willing, but Bismarck objected. As Napoleon was not prepared for war, he could only refer the matter to a conference of the powers signatory to the treaties of Vienna under which the status of Luxemburg had been fixed and to abide by the arrangement accordingly reached at London (May 1867). The Prussian garrison was to be withdrawn and the grandduchy released from any formal tie with Germany, but the King of the Netherlands was to retain his sovereignty and Luxemburg be neutralized and put under international guarantees.

Napoleon III was aging. He was tired and sick. Distrust of him was widespread throughout Europe, and disaffection was growing within France. Here, especially after 1867, many conservatives who had previously supported or acquiesced in the Second Empire regarded with increasing favor the prospect of bringing about another royalist restoration. Simultaneously, many middle-class liberals underwent a conversion to republicanism and gave leaders and strength to a party which hitherto had been struggling along against Napoleon III with the aid only of a few doctrinaire radicals and of groups of ill-organized workmen.

**Political Opposition at Home, and Napoleon's Acceptance of Liberal Constitution**

The domestic danger to the Second Empire was disclosed by the parliamentary elections of 1869, which, despite governmental manipulation, returned fifty royalists and forty republicans. To maintain his throne, Napoleon III at once made liberal concessions. He promised to abandon the practice of paying the election

expenses of "official" candidates for the legislature. He agreed to recognize the responsibility of his ministers to the legislature. And he appointed as prime minister Émile Ollivier, who had been a liberal royalist critic of the Napoleonic regime but who now seconded Napoleon III's scheme for establishing a "Liberal Empire."

Through the collaboration of Ollivier and Napoleon III, a new "liberal" constitution was drafted for the Second Empire. It might partially conciliate the liberal royalists, but hardly the republicans. These, in fact, redoubled their subversive agitation, with ominous results apparent in the plebiscite of May 1870. Although over seven million votes were cast in favor of the new constitution, not all of them could be reckoned as endorsements of the Empire. Besides, one and a half million votes were cast against the constitution, and nearly two million voters absented themselves from the polls.

**French Opposition to a Prussianized Germany**

On one matter it was still possible for any French government to command the almost unanimous support of Frenchmen. That was the matter of the political unification of Germany under Prussian auspices. French Liberals detested Prussia as a reactionary power. French Catholics disliked Prussia as an intolerantly Protestant state. French patriots—the mass of Frenchmen—were jealous and fearful of the sudden emergence on their northeastern frontier of a strong state, more populous and perhaps more powerfully armed than their own. For centuries, a disunited Germany had been of advantage to France. Would not a united Germany be a grave menace?

Napoleon III had no stomach for a war with Prussia. He was broken in health. He was troubled, rather than reassured, by his recollections of his wars with Russia and Austria and his expedition in Mexico. And he was aware of the inauspicious appearance of the international scene. The Russian Tsar had not forgotten the French Emperor's part in the Crimean War, and was distinctly pro-German. The Austrian Emperor, if humiliated by Prussia, had first been humbled by France. The Italian King could feel no enthusiasm for a former ally who had "betrayed" the cause of Italian freedom and who, by keeping troops at Rome, still prevented the fruition of Italian unity. British statesmen now thoroughly distrusted Napoleon III and British public opinion was pronouncedly hostile to him. Even Bavaria and other south German states, which had been traditional allies of France, were

suspicious of the French Emperor and in alliance with Prussia. To wage war with Germany would be a big gamble for Napoleon III. Yet just such a gamble seemed to be the only recourse left to him, if he would check the growing opposition to himself in France and the waning prestige of France in Europe. If the gamble were successful, if France won the war and prevented Prussia from consolidating Germany, French hegemony would be insured and the Napoleonic Empire maintained.

Bismarck, the Prussian statesman, believed that a Franco-German war was inevitable and that the defeat of France was prerequisite to the completion of German freedom and unity.[1] He therefore worked for war. And, in the midst of mounting patriotism on both sides of the Rhine, a pretext of war was not long lacking. It was supplied by Spanish liberals, who, having precipitated a revolution in their country (1868) and deposed Queen Isabella II, were seeking a new sovereign. After receiving more or less polite refusals from several European princes, the Spanish liberals offered the crown to Prince Leopold Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, a cousin of the King of Prussia. Prince Leopold was not eager for Spanish adventures and at first declined the offer; but Bismarck, who scented the possibilities of the situation, procured a renewal of the invitation and its acceptance by the Hohenzollern prince.

**Crisis over Spain**

Napoleon III, urged on by his wife and his ministers, professed to see in the Hohenzollern acceptance a projected union of Germany with Spain reminiscent of the sixteenth-century empire of Charles V. He addressed strong protests to the Prussian and Spanish governments; and on July 12, 1870, it was announced in Madrid that Prince Leopold of his own accord had revoked his acceptance of the Spanish crown. Here the business might have ended, but the French Emperor was pressed by his advisors to utilize the occasion to administer a diplomatic defeat to Prussia. Hence the French ambassador at Berlin was instructed to obtain a pledge from the King of Prussia that he would never permit a Hohenzollern to become a candidate for the throne of Spain. The ensuing interview of the ambassador with the Prussian King, then at the famous watering-place of Ems, was indecisive; and when the persistent ambassador requested another interview, the King stated that he was leaving Ems that night and could not receive

[1] The German side of the matter is given below, pp. 756–757.

him. The news of this rebuff was telegraphed by the King to Bismarck, who after consulting the military chiefs and satisfying himself that Prussia was prepared for war, communicated the dispatch to the public press—not, however, in the original form in which he had received it from the King but in a form so edited as to convey the impression to Germans that the Prussian King had been insulted by the French ambassador and to Frenchmen that their ambassador had been insulted by the Prussian King. The telegram was calculated to have the effect, in Bismarck's cynical words, "of a red rag on the Gallic bull."

**Franco-Prussian War**

The report of the Ems interview, published in Paris on July 14, 1870, the French national holiday, threw France into a paroxysm of anger and a frenzy for war. Napoleon III that night acquiesced in the popular demand and in the counsel of his ministry, and decided on war. The next day the French parliament, with but ten dissenting votes, authorized a formal declaration of war against Prussia. The third—and last—of the European wars of the Second Empire began.

The Empire entered the Franco-Prussian War (1870–1871) with enthusiastic shouting, but with little else. Foreign sympathy was largely on the other side, and foreign allies were conspicuously lacking. For a few days Napoleon III imagined that Austria and Italy might join him. But his unwillingness, in the face of Catholic opposition within France, to withdraw the French garrison from Rome deprived him of any bargaining power with King Victor Emmanuel II of Italy; and veiled threats from the Russian Tsar convinced the Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria that he should await actual French victories before casting his lot against Prussia. So far as the other German states were concerned, they promptly joined Prussia—to the delight of Bismarck and the chagrin of Napoleon.

Nor was the French army prepared for the war. While the Prussian military machine was operating with precision and effectiveness, the French soldiers were slowly mobilized, badly led, and hopelessly outnumbered. The outcome could not long remain in doubt.

Early in August 1870, Marshal MacMahon, who had been hurriedly recalled from Algeria to command the French army near Strasbourg, suffered such reverses at the hands of the invading Germans that he was obliged to evacuate the greater part of

Alsace and fall back upon Châlons. On August 18, another French army under Marshal Bazaine was defeated by the Germans (under Moltke) in a bloody battle at Gravelotte (in Lorraine) and shut up in the fortress of Metz. In the emergency, Marshal MacMahon counseled Napoleon III, who had just joined him at the front, to order a general retirement of the French armies upon Paris, where they could be concentrated, reinforced, and properly prepared to give decisive battle to the Germans. But when the Emperor wired the plan to the Empress, whom he had left as Regent at Paris, she wired back that a general retreat would mean the overthrow of the Empire and that he should go forward at once to the relief of Metz. So Napoleon and Marshal MacMahon, with heavy hearts, moved their inferior forces down the Meuse River, endeavoring to find a place where they might cross and thence drive back the Germans. At Sedan, almost down to the Belgian border, they made the despairing attempt, September 1–2, 1870. Outnumbered and finally encircled, they surrendered themselves with 81,000 men, having lost in killed and wounded about 25,000. The battle of Sedan terminated the first phase of the Franco-Prussian War.

**French Defeat at Sedan, and End of Napoleonic Empire**

The battle of Sedan also ended the Second Empire. On September 4, 1870, when it became generally known in Paris that Napoleon III, together with the main French army in the field, was a prisoner of the Germans, a self-appointed group of republicans, among whom Léon Gambetta was conspicuous, proclaimed at the city hall the deposition of the Emperor and the establishment of a republic—the Third French Republic. The Empress Eugénie with her son fled to England, and a "government of national defence" was hastily constituted to rule France until peace could be restored and the nation consulted on the permanent form of government. About what this should be, there was a difference of opinion among Frenchmen—between republicans and royalists, between radical "socialist" republicans and moderate "liberal" republicans, between "legitimist" royalists and "liberal" royalists—but there was a consensus of opinion that the Empire had finally failed and that the Napoleonic dynasty was permanently deposed. The Second Empire had done much for the internal development of France, but its foreign policy, after securing transient glory from the Crimean

and Italian wars, had led to the frightful year of 1870 and the disaster of Sedan.

Of the second phase of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871, the phase following Sedan, we shall speak elsewhere.[1] Here we may note the last chapter in the personal career of Napoleon III. He was released from his German prison at the close of the war (1871) and joined his wife and son at Chislehurst in England. He protested against the verdict of the French National Assembly that he was "responsible for the ruin, invasion, and dismemberment of France," and he penned some apologetic pamphlets. But his cause was too hopeless and he was too ill. He died in 1873. His son—the Prince Imperial, "Napoleon IV"—entered the British army and met an early death fighting Zulus in South Africa in 1879. The Empress Eugénie long survived husband and son; she outlived by two years the triumph of republican France over imperial Germany in 1918. But there was no renewal of the extraordinary fortune which had enabled the romantic nephew of Napoleon Bonaparte to rule France from 1848 to 1870.

### 6. DEVELOPMENTS IN SMALLER COUNTRIES OF WESTERN EUROPE, AND THE SPANISH REVOLUTION OF 1868

In the smaller countries of western Europe, the period from 1848 to 1870 was marked by considerable industrialization, with corresponding growth of the middle classes in number and influence, and by various degrees of compromise between liberalism and conservatism. Belgium was most advanced industrially and most progressive politically. It had an able King in Leopold I (1831–1865), who conscientiously supported liberal constitutional government, and a notable statesman in Charles Rogier, who headed the Liberal party and was prime minister almost continuously during the period. Rogier sponsored in 1849 an extension of the parliamentary suffrage through a lowering of property qualifications and climaxed his promotion of business interests with the establishment of a national bank. Gradually, and faster after the accession of Leopold II in 1865, opposition of the Catholic party to Rogier and his Liberals gained ground. It was joined by most of the Flemish people, who comprised about half of the country's population and

**Belgium**

[1] See below, pp. 757–760.

were mainly agricultural and staunchly Catholic, and who objected to the favoritism which the Rogier government showed to the French-speaking Walloons, to the middle classes generally, and to advocates of anti-religious measures. In 1870 the Liberals met defeat in parliamentary elections, and the Catholic party supplanted them in office. This, however, involved in Belgium no reaction against constitutional government.

The constitutions which Holland and Denmark obtained from the revolutionary upheaval of 1848 [1] were more conservative than Belgium's, and the Kings of both countries retained a good deal of actual control. Denmark fought two wars with Germany over the duchies of Schleswig-Holstein: one in 1848–1849, which was stopped by the diplomatic intervention of Russia, France, and Great Britain; the other in 1864, which resulted in the loss of the duchies to Denmark and their incorporation in Prussia.[2] In the case of Holland, special attention was devoted to the improvement and strengthening of colonial administration in the Dutch East Indian empire and its more intensive economic exploitation.

**Denmark and Holland**

In Sweden, the Bernadotte dynasty, despite its revolutionary origin,[3] was ultra-conservative. Oscar I (1844–1859), like his father, the Napoleonic marshal, was strong willed and quite opposed to any transformation of the old Swedish Estates General into a modern liberal parliament, and in his conservatism he was backed by army and nobility. He did feel obliged to respect the liberal constitutional government of his separate kingdom of Norway,[4] and to cater sufficiently to the liberal Western powers of France and Great Britain to secure from them, in 1855, a promise that they would assist Sweden against any attempted Russian aggression. He also, in the interest of his country's growing commerce and industry, adopted in 1857 a policy of free trade, involving an *economic* liberalism similar to Britain's.

**Sweden**

Oscar's brother and successor, Charles XV (1859–1872), was as conservatively minded, but less resolute and more romantic. Under the guidance of his chief advisor, the gifted Baron Louis de Geer, he eventually gave heed to popular clamor and in 1866

[1] See above, pp. 671, 679.
[2] See above, pp. 676–677, and below, pp. 746–747, 751.
[3] See above, pp. 547, 576.
[4] See above, pp. 575–576.

consented to political reform in Sweden, whereby the four-chambered Estates were supplanted by a bicameral elective parliament of liberal type.

**Portugal**

In Portugal, the form of liberal parliamentary government was maintained throughout the reigns of the two sons of Maria II [1]—Pedro V (1853–1861) and Louis I (1861–1889). But the Liberals who directed it were unpopular by reason of their anti-religious policies, their obvious and sometimes abject dependence on Great Britain, and their mismanagement of public finances; and only a series of practical military dictatorships kept them in power. Some of the opposition was reactionary; some was radical and revolutionary. Among the latter emerged in the late 1860's a republican group seeking the overthrow of the monarchy. The one constructive achievement of the period was in the colonial field. Here, slavery was abolished, and the coastal colonies of Mozambique and Angola in Africa were expanded inland and Portuguese emigration to them was fostered.

**Spain and Revolution of 1868**

Spain experienced an extraordinary amount of misgovernment during the period. Queen Isabella II (1833–1868) was impulsive, unreliable, and grossly immoral. Paying lip service to liberal principles, she actually relied on court favorites and army generals. Though some show of constitutional government was kept up, essentially dictatorial power was exercised by General Narvaez from 1845 to 1854 and by General O'Donnell from 1858 to 1863. Narvaez was stoutly conservative: he promulgated a constitution in 1845 which drastically restricted the one of 1837; [2] and he made peace with the Church by a concordat of 1851 providing for the restoration of ecclesiastical properties and the payment of state salaries to the clergy. Liberals joined with disgruntled Conservatives to effect his overthrow in 1854 and to convoke a Constituent Assembly, but the democratic constitution which this body adopted only led to renewed strife and the eventual dictatorship of General O'Donnell.

O'Donnell, somewhat like Napoleon III in France, tried to surmount domestic difficulties by embarking the nation on foreign adventures. He waged war with Morocco (1859–1860) and won popular acclaim and a title of nobility by his capture and annexation of Tetuan. He reestablished, temporarily, Spanish dominion

[1] See above, pp. 615–616, 642–643.

[2] See above, p. 644.

over Santo Domingo. And in 1862, in concert with Napoleon III, he dispatched to Mexico a Spanish force under General Prim. But Prim, on his own initiative, soon withdrew the expeditionary force, and the Queen's approval of his action brought about the disgrace and temporary retirement of O'Donnell.

During the next five years, affairs in Spain went from bad to worse. Financial troubles and court scandals multiplied. Popular unrest quickened. The parliament (Cortes) was impotent, and Queen Isabella's regime now depended entirely upon strong-armed generals still loyal to her. General Narvaez was in control from 1864 to 1865, and General O'Donnell again from 1865 to 1866. General Prim, who had become convinced that the Queen must be dethroned, led a revolt in 1866: it was repressed; Prim escaped abroad; and Narvaez once more, and for the last time, took charge.

In 1868 the deaths of both O'Donnell and Narvaez afforded an opportunity for a revolution in Spain. There was no one else to ensure the loyalty of the army to the Queen. In September the fleet at Cadiz mutinied, and General Prim, returning from exile *via* Gibraltar, put himself at the head of a rebellious army. Some slight resistance was speedily overcome, and on the last day of the month Isabella II, deserted by her troops, hurried over the Pyrenees and took refuge in France.

Prim promptly called for the democratic election of a Constituent Assembly to determine the future form of government. The election returned a majority of liberal monarchists, a sprinkling of reactionaries, and a surprisingly large minority of radical republicans, including some socialists. In 1869 the Assembly adopted a new constitution, guaranteeing the usual individual liberties and providing for a popularly elected parliament and for a King to be strictly "limited" as in Great Britain.

For such a King, General Prim then began a difficult and protracted search. At length, after several princes had declined his invitations, including Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern (whose candidacy was the occasion for the Franco-German War [1]), Prince Amadeo of Savoy, the second son of King Victor Emmanuel II of Italy, agreed to become a candidate, and the Spanish Assembly, by a close vote, accepted him. He should have known

[1] See above, p. 725.

that his would be a troubled reign. Both reactionaries and republicans were actively hostile to him. The liberal monarchists who were supposed to favor him were so split up into quarrelsome factions as to render their favor not very helpful; and the masses, largely indifferent to politics, eyed him askance as a foreigner. It was an ill omen that General Prim was assassinated on the very day in December 1870 when King Amadeo landed in Spain.



# CHAPTER XVI

## NATIONALIZING OF CENTRAL EUROPE AND BACKWARDNESS OF EASTERN EUROPE, 1850–1870

### I. CREATION OF A UNITED ITALY



IBERALISM had stimulated the revolutionary upheaval of 1848 throughout central Europe—Italy, Germany, and the whole Austrian Empire.[1] Its devotees, chiefly among the middle classes, had attempted to accomplish two things: (1) to establish in each state a constitutional parliamentary government, with guarantees of personal liberty; and (2) to create for each nationality, whether Italian, German, Hungarian, Czech, or Croatian, a unified national state. The upheaval, as we know, soon subsided without achieving its major goals. The liberals of the time in central Europe proved too few and too divided, and their nationalism clashed at crucial moments with their liberalism. In 1850, conservatism, and even reaction, reigned anew in almost every part of central Europe.

**Spread of Liberal Nationalism**

Yet throughout the area liberalism remained the creed of a considerable minority, and during the two decades from 1850 to 1870 this minority increased in numbers and influence with the development of railway construction, the extension of machine industry, and the consequent growth of urban population. Moreover, many a conservative came to share the nationalist aspirations of liberalism, and sizable groups of conservatives began to perceive the need or advantage of effecting some sort of compromise with liberal political principles, similar to that already effected in western Europe. It would be a compromise of essentially evolutionary character which might hold radicalism in check and stave off violent domestic revolution. In other words, the era of the Second

[1] See above, pp. 663–664, 667–680.

French Empire (1852–1870) was marked in central Europe by a widening acceptance of the nationalistic features of liberalism and a weakening of reactionary conservative opposition to its political features.

Of all the countries of central Europe, liberalism was most persistent and effective in Italy; and Italy was the first to surmount the failure of 1848 and to achieve a united national state. The Kingdom of Sardinia, about which the new national state was built, had acquired a typically liberal constitution in 1848,[1] and the most influential patriots in the peninsula, no matter how they might differ about the ideal form of national government, were agreed that its practical substance should be liberal. This was the conviction of the group of playwrights, poets, and novelists who contributed to an Italian literary revival —the *Risorgimento*—and to the spread of patriotic ardor among literate Italians. A common liberalism likewise characterized the foremost Italian champions of political union, though at first these were divided into three factions on the question of the form of national union.

**The *Risorgimento***

One faction, radically liberal, was republican. Its chief exponent was Joseph Mazzini, a native of Genoa and the son of a university professor. As a young man he had joined the revolutionary society of the *Carbonari* and been jailed and then exiled for participating in one of its riots. In 1831 he projected a new and non-secret organization—"Young Italy"—which, composed of intellectuals under forty years of age, should conduct an incessant campaign among all classes of Italians for the purpose of instilling in them the duty of liberating their country and unifying it under a popular "Roman Republic." At least 50,000 young men were enrolled in Mazzini's "Young Italy," and, though its republicanism proved ineffectual, the patriotic and liberal ideas in back of it became a major factor in Italian developments from 1831 to 1870.

**Republican Party**

The most celebrated disciple of Mazzini was Joseph Garibaldi, a native of Nice, who as a sailor in the royal Sardinian navy was attracted to "Young Italy"—its nationalism and republicanism, and especially its incentive to heroic feats in which by temperament he revelled. Condemned to death for participating in a mutiny on his warship, he escaped and fled to South America,

[1] See above, p. 670

where he enlisted in an "Italian legion" and for fourteen years fought valiantly in revolutionary wars on that continent.[1] Returning to Italy, a romantic figure in a red shirt, he led a volunteer army of 3,000 personal followers in the Sardinian war of 1848 against Austria, and in Mazzini's struggle of 1849 against the Pope. Following the dismal failure of this last venture, Garibaldi took refuge in the United States (at New York), where, first as a candlemaker and afterwards as a trading skipper, he managed to amass a small fortune. In 1854 he returned once more to Italy, awaiting a new opportunity to strike for national liberty.

**Papal Party**

A second faction, seeking to reconcile traditional religion with modern liberalism, was led by Vincent Gioberti, a Piedmontese priest, who, like Garibaldi and Mazzini, lived many years in exile but, unlike them, was never a republican. His chief book, the *Moral and Civil Primacy of the Italians* (1843), urged a confederation of existing Italian states, each provided with a liberal constitution, and all presided over by the Pope. A considerable number of upper-class persons, including patriotic members of the Catholic clergy, shared Gioberti's dream, and for a brief time Pope Pius IX had appeared to sympathize with it.

**Royal Sardinian Party**

The third faction, and the one which eventually predominated, was that of liberal royalists, particularly those who looked for leadership to the kingdom of Sardinia.[2] This state included the fertile and progressive district of Piedmont, which, of all districts in Italy, was first affected by the new industrialization, and in which, consequently, the bourgeoisie and some of the nobility were most naturally devoted to liberalism and in the best economic position to promote nationalism. In 1848, as we have learned, the Sardinian King, Charles Albert, acceded to liberal demands by establishing free constitutional government within his state and going to war with Austria.[3] Sardinia, we

[1] Victories of Garibaldi in 1846 helped to assure the independence of republican Uruguay from monarchical Brazil.

[2] It must be borne in mind throughout this section that the words "Sardinia" and "Piedmont" are both used to designate the state in northwestern Italy ruled by the royal family of Savoy, whose head, since 1720, had been officially entitled "King of Sardinia." Technically, Sardinia and Piedmont were different areas of one state—the former being an island and the latter being the mainland about Turin. See map on p. 717, above.

[3] On the liberal Sardinian constitution of 1848, see above, p. 670; and on the war of 1848–1849 with Austria, see above, pp. 670, 673–674.

know, was crushed by the weight of Austrian arms, and Charles Albert despairingly abdicated in the dark days of 1849. Yet Sardinia's liberal constitution remained, and so too did the memory of Sardinia's efforts for national liberation.

If royal Sardinia had failed against Austria, Mazzini had failed even more egregiously with his Roman republic of 1849. He had demonstrated that the Italian masses were not really with him; that they were too steeped in monarchical traditions to support his radical republicanism. By his "excesses" at Rome, moreover, he had alienated the order-loving middle class, disgusted the clergy, and helped to transform Pope Pius IX from a liberal patriot into a conservative protected by French troops. Republicans there were in Italy after 1849, but they were a dwindling party among intellectuals and workmen. Mazzini, living in exile, engaged ever more in vain plots and conspiracies. And Garibaldi showed an ever greater willingness to subordinate his own republican sentiments to the practical task of creating a united Italy.

Even more striking than the decline of republicanism was the collapse of Gioberti's scheme for a federal union of the Italian states under the Pope. Pius IX, on whom the scheme depended, repudiated it after the overthrow of Mazzini's Republic and the restoration of the Papal State. He called on Italian Catholics to resist the "encroachments" of Sardinia and on foreign Catholics to help him retain his temporal sovereignty at Rome. There was sympathetic response to his pleas among foreign Catholics, especially in France, and French troops were kept at Rome by Napoleon III. In Italy, however, Pius IX found that he had to deal with patriots as well as with Christians, and that a large number of his fellow-countrymen who acknowledged the spiritual supremacy of the Bishop of Rome were bent on disregarding his political counsels and on cooperating in the unification of Italy.

Two personalities in the Sardinian government of the 1850's made significant contributions to the liberal royalist cause. One was King Victor Emmanuel II, who succeeded his father, Charles Albert, in 1849. Alone of all the Italian princes, he retained the constitution which had been granted in 1848; and in the eyes of all patriots he gained favor by doing so in the face of persistent Austrian protests. Victor Emmanuel, moreover, had several qualities which won him wide popularity: his sober common-sense,

his soldierly bearing, his loyal support of his ministers, and his bluff manners which earned him the title of "the honest King."

The other was Count Camillo di Cavour. Born in 1810, the very year that Metternich became chancellor of Austria, and belonging to a noble Piedmontese family, Cavour was to acquire fame as the foremost liberal nation-builder of the nineteenth century. In his teens, while he was serving in the Sardinian army, he imbibed liberal ideas, which an extensive reading of English authors and a subsequent sojourn in Great Britain confirmed. Indeed, the liberalism which Cavour espoused was that of contemporary England: individualism; material progress; a king who would reign without ruling; and a parliament which would represent the educated classes and promote liberty in political, ecclesiastical, intellectual, and economic matters.

**Cavour**

During the reign of Charles Albert (1831–1848), Cavour took no part in government. He helped to manage his family estates. He traveled and studied. He interested himself and many of his fellow nobles in the new English industrial machinery. He became a director of steamship and railway companies, of factories and banks. He became part owner and joint editor of a famous journal, *Il Risorgimento,* which urged upon Sardinia constitutional reform and leadership in the national cause. After the grant of the constitution and the accession of Victor Emmanuel II, Cavour came rapidly to the fore in Sardinian politics. Entering the cabinet in 1850, he became prime minister and minister of foreign affairs in 1852; and at these posts he remained, with but one brief interruption, until his death in 1861.

As premier, Cavour strove to promote the material welfare of his state in accordance with English liberal models. Tariffs were lowered. The building of factories and the importation of machinery were encouraged. Roads were improved and railways constructed. The public budget was reorganized, and the taxes, though increased, were more equitably distributed. At the same time, Cavour sought to lessen the influence of the Church in Sardinia and to restrict its privileges. He expelled the Jesuits from the country and suppressed many monastic establishments. His ideal, he said, was "a free Church in a free State," but in practice he subordinated the Church to the State.

Cavour directed liberal reforms in Sardinia at the very time when other parts of Italy were in the throes of reaction against

the revolutionary upheaval of 1848–1849. Pope Pius IX was now pursuing an ultra-conservative policy in the Papal State in central Italy. In southern Italy, a despotic sway was exercised by the Bourbon King of the Two Sicilies, Ferdinand II (1830–1859), who was nicknamed "King Bomba" in reference to the bombardments which he decreed against towns that offended him and who kept some 30,000 political prisoners in filthy jails. In the three duchies of north-central Italy—Tuscany, Parma, and Modena [1]—the local governments were more benevolent but quite arbitrary. In the important lands of northern Italy east of Piedmont—Lombardy and Venetia—an Austrian governor carried out instructions from ultra-conservative ministers at Vienna. In all these regions, a growing number of native Italians were infected with a revolutionary spirit, but they appeared powerless to act. Austria maintained large garrisons in the provinces of Venetia and Lombardy, which it owned outright; and thence it could dispatch troops to support its ally, the King of the Two Sicilies, or to safeguard the Dukes of Tuscany, Parma, and Modena, all of whom were related by family ties to the Habsburg Emperor of Austria. Outside Sardinia, the one state in Italy not directly protected by Austrian soldiers was the Papal State, and this was guarded by French soldiers.

In the circumstances, Italian liberals and patriots turned ever more expectantly, during the 1850's, toward Sardinia, toward its King and his prime minister. Sardinia could set an example of liberal government, but could it free and unite all Italy? It had failed to do so and had been terribly beaten by Austria in 1848–1849. It was still comparatively weak, and its population aggregated less than five million. The national task before it was difficult and seemingly impossible.

**Cavour's Plan for Unifying Italy**

Cavour, however, was not easily disheartened. Reforms within Sardinia, in his mind, were but a prelude to a far more ambitious plan—the political union of the entire Italian peninsula under Victor Emmanuel II—and the greater the obstacles to it, the more dogged was Cavour's determination to surmount them. He cooperated with the King in

[1] In addition to the six nominally "independent" Italian states mentioned in the above paragraph—Sardinia, the Two Sicilies, the Papal State, Tuscany, Parma, and Modena—the infinitesimal republic of San Marino still survived from the middle ages. It still survives as an enclave in united Italy.

reorganizing the Sardinian army and improving its discipline. He had mysterious conversations with Garibaldi. He patronized secret societies which aimed at binding together throughout Italy the scattered elements of resistance to Austrian control. Above all, he utilized his diplomatic talents to enlist foreign aid for Sardinia.

Cavour's first significant step in foreign policy was to cause diminutive Sardinia in 1855 to join France and Great Britain (and the Ottoman Empire) in the Crimean War against Russia. He expected Austria to side with Russia in this war, and in joining France and Britain he counted on their support against Austrian rule in Italy. The persistent neutrality of Austria rendered abortive this part of his scheme, but Cavour had the satisfaction of reaping other rewards which he had foreseen. Sardinia gained the sympathy of liberals all over western Europe, and Cavour was enabled to attend the peace congress at Paris (1856) and there denounce Austrian rule.

His next step was to cement the alliance between Sardinia and France, for he had made up his mind that French assistance would be most practicable in expelling the Austrians from Italy. The difficulties were great, and only in July 1858 was an agreement reached between Cavour and Napoleon III. France would cooperate in "freeing Italy from the Alps to the Adriatic," in driving the Austrians from Lombardy and Venetia and sanctioning the union of these provinces with Sardinia. In return, Sardinia would cede to France (subject to confirmation by plebiscite) the border duchy of Savoy and the border city of Nice. It still required a nice exercise of Cavour's diplomatic talents to pick a quarrel with Austria in such a way that to the world at large Sardinia and France would appear justified in fighting a war. Finally, in April 1859, the Austrian government was led to present an ultimatum to Sardinia, demanding immediate demobilization of its army. The rejection of the ultimatum was the signal for the beginning of hostilities.

**Alliance with France and War with Austria**

The war between Sardinia and France, on one side, and Austria, on the other, lasted only from April to July 1859. Its course and its significance for France and for the fortunes of Napoleon III have already been sketched.[1] We know that the Allies won notable victories at Magenta and Solferino, and that the French Emperor stopped short and made peace with Austria before he had fu

[1] See above, pp. 715–718.

filled his promise to "free Italy from the Alps to the Adriatic." In fact he fulfilled only half of his promise: he turned over Lombardy (including Milan) to Sardinia, but he left Austria in possession of Venetia (including Venice). Cavour and other patriotic Sardinians were bitterly disappointed by Napoleon's "betrayal." [1]

**Sardinia's Annexation of Lombardy and the Duchies**

Yet the French Emperor had enabled Sardinia to annex Lombardy and thereby to double its area and population, and simultaneously his military intervention had incited in central Italy a patriotic outburst which Cavour could reasonably expect to utilize for additional annexations to Sardinia. The defeat of Austria left the rulers of the duchies of Tuscany, Parma, and Modena without their customary foreign support, and against the rioting of their subjects they could not stand. Wherefore they abdicated and fled, while revolutionary governments took charge of the respective duchies and petitioned for their union with Sardinia. In parts of the Papal State, likewise—at Bologna and throughout Romagna, for example—rioting occurred against the Pope and in favor of the Sardinian King. Cavour responded by sending commissioners to administer all these regions of north-central Italy in the name of Victor Emmanuel.

After protracted negotiations, Cavour and Napoleon III arrived at a new agreement in March 1860. Napoleon consented to the annexation of the duchies and papal Romagna by Sardinia. Cavour paid the Emperor's price by surrendering Savoy and Nice to France.

Close upon the heels of the unifying movement in northern and central Italy came a similar movement in the south, the credit for whose guidance belongs, however, less to Cavour or Victor Emmanuel than to Garibaldi. The tyranny of the Bourbon Kings of the Two Sicilies was notorious; Ferdinand II, the infamous "Bomba," was succeeded in 1859 by Francis II, but the change of sovereign meant little change of system. The very next year groups of Sicilians, aroused by the stirring events in northern and central Italy, rose in revolt. Forthwith, Garibaldi assembled at Genoa a volunteer army—the celebrated "redshirts"—in preparation for a filibustering expedition in aid of the Sicilian rebels. As the governments of Sardinia and

**Conquest of Sicily and Naples**

[1] Cavour was so angry that he resigned his office. However, he continued to advise Victor Emmanuel unofficially and soon formally returned to office.

the Two Sicilies were at peace with each other, it was the duty of Cavour as the responsible minister of the former to prevent the use of the Sardinian port of Genoa as a base of attack against the latter. But Cavour was willing to sacrifice the obligations of international law to Italian expediency. While openly he threatened the "redshirts" with arrest, secretly he intimated to Garibaldi that the expedition might proceed.

Garibaldi left Genoa with his picturesque volunteers in May 1860, and was received by the Sicilian revolutionaries with enthusiasm. Within three months he was master of the island. Thence he crossed over to the mainland and in September took possession of Naples. Francis II, deserted by many of his own troops and unable to procure Austrian soldiers, retired with a small force to the fortress of Gaëta. Garibaldi's swift and almost complete conquest of the kingdom of the Two Sicilies exalted him to the position of a popular idol, and for a time it appeared as though he might become a republican dictator.

To offset the danger of an Italy divided between a royalist north and a republican south, Cavour and Victor Emmanuel then decided that Sardinia should actively intervene. A Sardinian army invaded the Papal State, defeated the papal troops, and passed on into the Neapolitan territory, besieging Francis II at Gaëta and joining the Garibaldian volunteers at Naples. Cavour, despite the protests of Pope Pius IX, announced Sardinia's appropriation of the whole Papal State except Rome and its immediately surrounding territory (September 1860), and in November Victor Emmanuel II rode side by side with Garibaldi through the streets of Naples amid the bravos of the populace. Garibaldi was a republican, but he was more a patriot; for the sake of national unity, he put aside personal preference and turned over the Two Sicilies to his King. A plebiscite confirmed Garibaldi's action. The surrender of Gaëta and the exile of Francis II in February 1861 removed the last internal obstacle to the union of Sicily and Naples and the major portion of the Papal State with the already enlarged Sardinian kingdom.

**Partition of Papal State**

There were no serious external obstacles. Austria was in no position, since its recent military reverses, to play its traditional role as protector of separate Italian states; it was now concerned far more vitally with Germany and Hungary than with Italy. British public opinion was favorable to Italian unity, and Palm-

erston, the British foreign minister, was on the best of terms with Cavour. Only the French Emperor might make trouble. Napoleon III, however, was too worried about the situation in France to pursue any consistent policy about Italian affairs. He contented himself with strengthening the French garrison at Rome and warning Sardinia not to trespass on what remained of the Papal State.

Thus it befell that within the two years from 1859 to 1861 all the disparate Italian states, except Rome and Venetia, were politically united under Sardinia's patriotic King and a liberal constitution. Sardinia, with its previous population of barely five million, was enlarged into an Italian state with a population of twenty-two million. The Sardinian parliament was transformed into an Italian parliament, and on March 17, 1861, Victor Emmanuel II dropped the title of King of Sardinia and assumed that of King of Italy. Less than three months later Cavour died, a victim of his own restless energy, but his ambitions were already largely realized. Most of Italy was united, and the new Italian regime was liberal.

**Kingdom of Italy**

### 2. CREATION OF A NATIONAL PRUSSIAN GERMANY

Throughout Germany, especially in Prussia, the Italian developments of 1859–1861 had a profound influence. German liberals, who had been depressed and silenced after their fiasco of 1848–1849, were heartened to speak out anew in behalf of liberal institutions in the several German states and in behalf of a close union of the German people. Moreover, the weakness which Austria displayed in 1859 convinced many Germans that only Prussia could be the standard-bearer of German unity, and that, just as Sardinia had unified Italy by forcing Austria out of the peninsula, so Prussia could unify Germany by forcing Austria out of the German Confederation.

This latter conviction was entertained not so much in the South German states or by liberals as in Prussia and by conservatives. Conservatives had dominated Prussia since 1849—not only the King and his ministry but also the nominally "liberal" parliament which had been provided for in the Prussian constitution of 1850.[1] Prussian conservatism remained strong, but while it combated the political and economic doctrines of liberals, it appropriated

[1] See above, pp. 679–680.

their patriotic ardor and applied it against Austria. Austria had humiliated Prussia in 1850 and compelled King Frederick William IV to agree to the reestablishment of the German Confederation which was loose and weak and presided over by Austria.[1] What a blow that had been to the pride of Frederick William and all good Prussians!

Now, however, Austria was weakening; and the hopes of Prussian conservatives, as well as of German liberals, expanded. On the eve of Austrian defeat in Italy, the direction of Prussian affairs passed from the romantic, volatile Frederick William IV to his prosaic and soldierly brother, William.[2] William was not brilliant, but he possessed qualities which endeared him to the governing classes of Prussia. He was industrious and honest, rigidly conservative, deeply religious, and fully convinced of the divine right of kingship. Above all he was a soldier; in military matters he had an absorbing interest which recalls the Hohenzollerns of the eighteenth century. As soon as he was in power, William began a reform of the Prussian army. He chose as its chief of staff the gifted General Helmuth von Moltke, and in 1859 he appointed a remarkable organizer, Albrecht von Roon, as minister of war. William then zealously backed the recommendations of Roon that steps should be taken forthwith to extend the principle of compulsory military training, so that 63,000, instead of the prevailing 40,000, young men should be conscripted annually.

**William I of Prussia**

The King and his conservative advisers were eager for military reform, but the lower house of the Prussian parliament was less so. This body was responsive to the liberal sentiment which was then resurgent among the middle classes of Prussia. The liberal leaders were not acutely hostile to military reform as such, but they were anxious to make Prussia a constitutional monarchy with responsible parliamentary government, and they believed that by holding up the financial appropriations for military reform they could compel the King to acquiesce. With the liberals in the lower house combined enough moderates and conservatives of pro-Austrian proclivities to embarrass the King and his ministers. At first, the parliament authorized a temporary trial of the reform,

[1] See above, pp. 678–679.

[2] Frederick William IV went insane in 1858 and died in 1861. William was Prince-Regent from 1858 to 1861, and King as William I from 1861 to 1888.

but in 1861 it refused further appropriations. Whereupon, the King dissolved the lower house and ordered new elections, but the result was a majority for a new political party—the Progressive—consciously patterned after the British and Italian liberal parties and resolved to make the King pursue liberal policies and submit to real parliamentary government. The Prussian parliament was now definitely arrayed against King William and his conservative ministers. There was resolution on both sides, and an open conflict between them.

**Bismarck, Forceful and Conservative**

The *impasse* was broken through by a statesman whom Roon prevailed upon King William to appoint as his chief minister in 1862. The statesman was Otto von Bismarck, and the policy which he would pursue he announced to the Prussian parliament promptly and a bit ominously: "Not by speeches and majority resolutions are the great questions of the time decided—that was the mistake of 1848 and 1849—but by iron and blood."

Bismarck belonged, like Roon, to the country gentry, still the most influential social class in Prussia, whose members for centuries had divided their attention between their own landed estates and the public service, military or civil, of their Hohenzollern sovereigns. Born in the manor-house at Schönhausen, some forty miles west of Berlin, in 1815, the year of the Congress of Vienna, he was brought up to combine the aristocratic traditions of his class with the enthusiastic patriotism stimulated by Prussia's role in the overthrow of the first Napoleon. As a young man he acquitted himself but illy at the universities of Göttingen and Berlin, and was dismissed from the civil service for "deficiency in regularity and discipline." His marriage in 1847 with the pious daughter of a neighboring landlord steadied him and confirmed his attachment to the Lutheran state church and to ultra-conservative principles.

During the revolutionary upheaval of 1848–1849 Bismarck consistently defended the existing Prussian state against the liberals. He offered to bring his peasants to Berlin to protect Frederick William IV, and, when the King promised the grant of a Prussian constitution, Bismarck voted in a minority of two against returning thanks. He scoffed at the efforts of the Frankfurt Assembly to unify Germany on a platform of constitutional liberties and rejoiced at the refusal of Frederick William to take the imperial

electoral system, they might have a majority in the parliament, they did not necessarily have one in the country at large. He knew, too, that they were not likely to resort to violence in a state where there was no tradition of successful revolution and where the masses were habitually deferential to King, aristocracy, and army. So far as the other German states were concerned, he would temporarily flout their liberalism and their pro-Austrian sentiment and act on the assumption that most of their citizens, like most Prussians, would not care, in the long run, how a German national state was achieved so long as it was achieved. Bismarck's estimate of the situation proved correct. To the undoing of his Progressive opponents, patriotism was a more basic attribute of the mass of Prussians (and eventually of other Germans) than liberalism, and the reformed Prussian army—splendid machine as it was—served as a safeguard against revolution.

The reformed army could also be used—and this was Bismarck's basic interest in it—to create a national German state in which Prussia would occupy the chief position. This undoubtedly would involve a war with Austria, for the Habsburg Emperor would not voluntarily surrender the German primacy which his ancestors had held for centuries. With the reformed army, however, Prussia should be able to beat Austria as decisively as Austria had been defeated by Sardinia and France. One might regret to be obliged to exclude German Austria by force of arms from the contemplated German nation; but it was the price which Bismarck would gladly pay for the establishment of a national Prussian Germany. An excuse for using the Prussian army against Austria, he soon detected in a reopening of the dispute with Denmark over the duchies of Schleswig-Holstein.

It will be recalled that these duchies, ruled by the King of Denmark and peopled mainly by Germans, had been a bone of contention in 1848 between Germany and Denmark; that Prussia had then championed the German cause; and that, through the diplomatic intervention of other great powers, a compromise was arranged in 1852 highly favorable to Denmark: the duchies were not to be incorporated in the kingdom of Denmark, but the King of Denmark would remain their sovereign.[1] Now in 1863, following the death of Frederick VII of Denmark, his successor, Christian IX, responded to patriotic demands of his Danish subjects by

[1] See above, pp. 676–677.

accepting a new constitution which, contrary to the arrangement of 1852, unified the political institutions of Denmark and the duchies. The German response was an opposing wave of patriotic agitation and combined threats from Austria and Prussia, neither of which would be outdone by the other in bidding for leadership of the German cause. Christian IX refused to budge. And in 1864 ensued a brief war between Denmark on one side and Austria and Prussia on the other. The Danes, unable to obtain foreign help and overborne by force of numbers, were obliged to submit in October 1864 to the terms of the treaty of Vienna, in accordance with which their King surrendered the duchies to Austria and Prussia.

**War with Denmark**

The sequel to the Danish War of 1864 was, as Bismarck anticipated, a quarrel between Austria and Prussia over the disposition of the spoils. Austria at once proposed that the duchies be made a separate state under a German prince of their own, who would be, of course, a member of the loose German Confederation; and the Diet of the Confederation, by a small majority, endorsed the Austrian proposal. Bismarck's reply was to deny the right of the Diet to interfere in a matter which concerned Austria and Prussia alone. As neither of these felt quite ready for war, diplomatic negotiations were undertaken between them, leading to the temporary convention of Gastein (August 1865), whereby, pending a final settlement, Schleswig would be occupied and administered by Prussia, and Holstein by Austria.

Before precipitating a civil war in Germany between Prussia and Austria, Bismarck took care to ensure the former against the danger of foreign intervention in behalf of the latter. Austria, he knew, would be the champion of the German Confederation which had been erected in 1815 under the joint guarantee of the great powers of Europe. Might not one or another of the great powers join with Austria to prevent him from supplanting that Confederation with a closely knit national state under Prussian auspices? He gave thought to Great Britain, Russia, and France, and also to the newly founded kingdom of Italy. From Britain he expected no trouble. British opinion was unmistakably favorable to Prussia, partly by reason of the free-trade policy of the Prussian *Zollverein* in contrast with its protectionist policy of Austria, and partly by reason of the romantic antipathy of English liberals to any Con-

**Preparing for War with Austria**


AUSTRIA AND PRUSSIA IN THE GERMAN CONFEDERATION IN 1865
BOUNDARY OF GERMAN CONFEDERATION
FREE CITIES ARE UNDERLINED
PRUSSIAN LANDS
AUSTRIAN LANDS
SWEDEN
DENMARK
Copenhagen
BALTIC SEA
Memel
MEMEL R.
Königsberg
EAST PRUSSIA
Danzig
POLAND
Warsaw
RUSSIA
SCHLESWIG
HOLSTEIN
Lübeck
MECKLENBURG
Hamburg
Bremen
HANOVER
Berlin
ODER R.
POSEN
Breslau
GALICIA
NETH.
WESTPHALIA
Cologne
RHINELAND
EMS R.
SAXONY
THURINGIA
Prague
BOHEMIA
MORAVIA
BEL.
LUXEMBURG
Sedan
Frankfurt
HESSE
PALATINATE
WÜRTTEMBERG
BAVARIA
DANUBE R.
Vienna
Budapest
AUSTRIA
HUNGARY
Metz
MOSELLE R.
MEUSE R.
Strasbourg
Munich
CARINTHIA
DRAVA R.
TYROL
CARNIOLA
SAVA R.
Trieste
SWITZERLAND
VENETIA
ISTRIA
OTTOMAN EMPIRE
Venice
Milan
PO R.
DALMATIA
ADRIATIC SEA
SAVOY
Lyons
RHONE R.
Genoa
Florence
ITALY
FRANCE
Nice
Marseilles
CORSICA (FR.)
PAPAL STATE
200 MILES
TRM

tinental power, such as Russia or Austria, which opposed national freedom and union. Nor did Bismarck anticipate any trouble from Russia. He knew that the Tsar had been offended by Austria's refusal to aid Russia during the Crimean War; and he was sure, on the other hand, that the Tsar was grateful for Prussia's offer of assistance to Russia in suppressing the Polish revolt of 1863.[1]

The attitude of France was more problematical. French opinion was much more anti-Prussian than anti-Austrian, and quite hostile to the establishment of a united, powerful Germany on the Rhine. Bismarck understood Napoleon III, however, and thought it safe to gamble on the French Emperor's natural timidity, on the difficulties which at the moment he was encountering in far-away Mexico, and on the unpreparedness of the French army. Bismarck took the trouble, as we have seen, to visit Napoleon III at Biarritz in October 1865, to solicit his benevolence, and vaguely to hint to him that, if Prussia were given a free hand in Germany, France might get some "compensation." [2]

From Italy Bismarck expected more than neutrality. This state had been formally erected in 1861, but it conspicuously lacked two provinces—papal Rome, guarded by French troops, and Venetia, still held in Austria. There was no immediate prospect of acquiring Rome, but with Prussia's aid Italy might acquire Venetia. In the circumstances, the Italian government was receptive to Bismarck's overtures, and in April 1866 it concluded an alliance with him: if war broke out within three months, Italy would join Prussia and obtain Venetia from Austria.

It was now the business of Bismarck to provoke Austria to war. He fomented intrigues against the Austrian administration of Holstein; and when Austria, unable to obtain satisfaction from him, complained to the Frankfurt Diet of the German Confederation, he declared that Austria had thereby violated the convention of Gastein. He at once dispatched Prussian troops to occupy Holstein and oust the Austrian officials, and almost simultaneously he submitted to the Diet a scheme for reforming the Confederation and excluding Austria from it. By this time—in June 1866—the Austrian government at Vienna was thoroughly aroused against Bismarck and Prussia; it called upon the Diet to reject the "reform" and to authorize a

**Aggression against Austria**

[1] On this revolt, see below, p. 771.

[2] See above, p. 722.

general mobilization throughout Germany in order to restrain Prussia from interfering with Austrian rights in Holstein and in the Confederation. The Prussian representative in the Diet protested, but the representatives of most of the other states sided with Austria and voted accordingly. The pro-Austrian attitude of the lesser German states was taken in response to the personal wishes of their respective sovereigns, who foresaw a diminution of power and prestige if the loose German Confederation should be "reformed" into a close union under the leadership of Prussia; but their attitude was applauded, in central and southern Germany, by many liberals who feared Prussian conservatism and by Catholics whose cultural sympathies were Austrian.[1]

The action of the Diet was interpreted by Bismarck as tantamount to a joint attack upon Prussia by the other German states. He recalled the Prussian representative from Frankfurt, announced Prussia's secession from the Confederation, and proclaimed to the world that against Austria and its German allies Prussia would fight a "defensive" war for the national union of Germany. Italy, of course, was soon found on the Prussian side. And so astutely had Bismarck managed the affair that public opinion abroad was preponderantly favorable to Prussia.

**Seven Weeks' War and Austrian Defeat**

A brief Seven Weeks' War ensued in 1866 between Prussia and Italy, on one side, and Austria and lesser German states, on the other. Austria was not nearly as well prepared as Prussia. Moreover, Austrian armies had to fight defensively and simultaneously on two widely separated fronts—in Bohemia against invading Prussians and in Venetia against invading Italians—and all the while the Austrian government was not quite certain of the loyalty of the Hungarians. In fact, the Hungarians were loyal, for reasons which we shall presently indicate. In fact, too, the Austrian army in Venetia repulsed the Italians, and an Austrian fleet in the Adriatic defeated an Italian squadron. What really brought disaster to Austria was the Prussian military machine. It moved with vigor and speed. First it broke the feeble resistance of the lesser German states, one by one, before they had time to complete their

[1] In central Germany the kingdoms of Saxony and Hanover, and in southern Germany the kingdoms of Bavaria and Württemberg, the duchies of Hesse-Darmstadt and Hesse-Cassel, and the free city of Frankfurt, were allied with Austria.

mobilizations and join hands with Austria. Then it moved with its full force against the army which Austria managed to assemble in Bohemia. The resulting battle of Sadowa (Königgrätz), on July 3, 1866, was the decisive engagement of the war. It was an overwhelming Prussian victory, and Austria sued for peace.

By the treaty of Prague (August 1866), Austria was obliged to cede Venetia to Italy and Holstein to Prussia, to pay a small war indemnity, and to consent to the dissolution of the German Confederation and the erection of a North German Confederation of which Prussia would be the head and from which Austria would be excluded. Thus while the new Italy was absorbing more Italians, a large number of Germans—the Austrian Germans—were being cut off from the new Germany. Bismarck confirmed Prussian dominance by the arrangements which he made after the Seven Weeks' War with the lesser German states. Some of them he annexed outright in order to round out Prussia's misshapen territories, to increase its population and economic resources, and to strengthen its military position. Into Prussia, accordingly, he incorporated the duchies of Schleswig-Holstein, the kingdom of Hanover,[1] the duchies of Hesse-Cassel and Nassau, and the free city of Frankfurt. These additions were important. For the first time, the Hohenzollern sovereign of Prussia was King of compact and continuous lands stretching from Russia and Denmark to the Main River and the French frontier; he gained more than 27,000 square miles of territory and almost five million subjects. Henceforth, excluding Austria, two-fifths of the area and two-thirds of the population of all Germany belonged to Prussia.

**Prussian Annexations**

The lesser German states north of the Main River which were not annexed outright by Prussia—twenty in number—Bismarck joined with Prussia in 1867 in a new and closely knit North German Confederation. Each state retained a measure of local autonomy, but all were subordinated to a federal government, whose executive authority was vested in the King of Prussia as hereditary "President,"

**Prussia's North German Confederation**

[1] Hanover had been joined in a personal union with Great Britain from 1714 to 1837, when Queen Victoria succeeded to the throne of the latter. The law of succession in Hanover prescribed that its sovereign must be male, and hence in 1837 her uncle became King Ernest of Hanover, and he was succeeded in 1851 by his son, George V. In 1866 this George V was deposed and exiled, and Hanover was annexed to Prussia.

assisted by a chancellor and ministers responsible to himself. The legislative powers were entrusted to a bicameral parliament comprising (1) a federal Council (Bundesrat) of personal representatives of the sovereigns of the several states, and (2) an imperial Diet (Reichstag) of elected representatives of the people in the Confederation. The Prussian King as President of the North German Confederation would direct its foreign affairs and army and he might declare war.

Certain German states remained outside the North German Confederation. In addition to German Austria, there were the four states immediately south of the Main River: the kingdoms of Bavaria and Württemberg and the grand-duchies of Baden and Hesse-Darmstadt. In these states, with the exception of Baden whose Grand-Duke was pro-Prussian, both princes and people were hostile to any political union with Prussia, the princes fearing a diminution of their own importance and the people dreading the imposition of compulsory military service and the probable enactment of anti-Catholic or anti-liberal legislation. Toward these south German states, however, Bismarck adopted a conciliatory attitude, while missing no chance to alarm them with the possibility of French aggression at their expense. Indeed, he "protected" them by negotiating secret treaties of defensive alliance whereby if Prussia or one of them should be attacked by a foreign power, such as France, the others should come to the assistance of the party attacked. Bismarck trusted to the growth of anti-French feeling to bring the four states of southern Germany into eventual political union with Prussia.

**Independence of South German States**

One factor of inestimable value in resigning the German people, south as well as north, to Prussian leadership was a remarkable change which the Seven Weeks' War produced in Bismarck's attitude toward liberalism and in the attitude of liberals toward him. In 1867 he restored the full operation of the Prussian constitution and asked a bill of indemnity from the Prussian parliament for the illegalities of which he had been wantonly guilty during the preceding four years; the liberal majority in the parliament met him halfway and passed the bill with unanimity and enthusiasm. In the same year, he sponsored the provision in the new constitution of the North German Confederation that its Reich-

**Bismarck's Concessions to Liberal Democracy**

stag should be elected by direct and universal manhood suffrage. To this there was objection from some Prussian conservatives, but he assured them that the German masses bade fair to be more conservative than the middle class and more patriotically devoted to the maintenance of a strong central government. As a result of these popular concessions, a new political party took shape, known as the National Liberal Party and recruited largely from the bourgeoisie and in many instances from former Progressives. Its main object was to uphold Bismarck in his national endeavors and hence to subordinate, though not wholly to surrender, the earlier liberal demands for free constitutional government.

All the developments which we have just been describing—the rise of the National Liberal party, the expansion of Prussia, the formation of the North German Confederation and its military alliances with the four independent states of South Germany—emerged from the Seven Weeks' War of 1866. They clearly indicated that the Germans would soon have a powerful national state under Prussian guidance.

### 3. NATIONALISM IN THE HABSBURG EMPIRE AND CREATION OF THE DUAL MONARCHY OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

The Austrian Empire of the Habsburgs, unlike Italy or Germany, was not confined in 1850 to a single nationality but embraced a variety of peoples—Germans, Magyars, Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Rumanians, and Italians. Hence the problem which was presented here by the rise of liberal nationalism was not one of creating a unified national state, as in Italy or Germany, but rather of preserving an old-fashioned polyglot Empire against disruption. Metternich, during his long conduct of Austrian affairs from 1810 to 1848, had succeeded in repressing both nationalism and liberalism and in keeping the Empire intact. But his downfall amid the revolutionary commotions of 1848 was the signal for a liberal nationalistic upsurge which temporarily plunged the Empire into chaos and civil war and threatened its very existence.[1]

Though by 1850 order was forcefully restored and Metternich's repressive policies were being newly pursued by the young Emperor Francis Joseph, the twin movements of nationalism and liberalism were not stopped. On the contrary, they continued to

[1] See above, pp. 667–670.

inspire agitation among the several subject peoples, most obviously among the Hungarians, for national self-government, and thereby to imperil the Empire's territorial integrity and governmental centralization.

To defend its Italian provinces and prestige, Austria was obliged to go to war with Sardinia and France in 1859; and its ensuing defeat and loss of Lombardy, coupled with the creation of an Italian national state in 1860–1861, served to quicken nationalist unrest throughout the Empire, especially in Hungary, Bohemia, and German Austria.

Confronted with the danger of a repetition of the domestic revolution of 1848, the Emperor Francis Joseph made concessions. In 1860 he extended the powers of the provincial Diets in Bohemia and Croatia and restored the Hungarian Diet as it had been before 1849. Then, in 1861, he promulgated for the whole Empire a constitution, according to which the levying of taxes and the enactment of laws would be subject to the approval of a central parliament elected by the provincial Diets and meeting regularly at Vienna. This Austrian constitution did not work well. The central parliament proved to be a cockpit for spokesmen of rival nationalities within the Empire, and the Hungarian leaders particularly demanded the substitution of a federal for a centralized system of parliamentary government. Nevertheless, Francis Joseph's gesture of "constitutionalism" and his appointment of a liberal ministry were pleasing to many "progressives" at home and abroad.

**Austrian Constitution of 1861**

Only five years later—in 1866—the Austrian Empire again suffered military defeat, this time at the hands of Prussia in the Seven Weeks' War. The results for the Empire were grievous. It lost its primacy in Germany and was excluded from the German national state which Prussia was building. It also had to cede its Italian province of Venetia to the new Italian national state. And it was now prey, in intensified manner, to internal strife among its several nationalities.

The Austrian Germans, cut off from the larger national Germany, were doubly anxious to maintain political and social ascendancy in the Habsburg Empire of which they constituted a numerical minority. On the other hand, the Slavic peoples in the Empire, resentful of subjection, renewed their demands for national autonomy. Their leaders

**National Strife**

held a congress at Vienna on the morrow of the battle of Königgrätz (July 1866) and endorsed a plan for transforming the Austrian Empire into a "pentarchy," or federal union of five self-governing states: (1) German Austria, (2) Magyar Hungary, (3) Czech Bohemia, (4) Polish Galicia, and (5) a Yugoslav state of Croats, Serbs, and Slovenes.

Against the Slavic plan were arrayed not only the Austrian Germans but the Magyar patriots of Hungary. These were devoted to the memory of the old Hungarian state; they were resolved to sacrifice none of its historic provinces, peopled though some of them were by Croats, Serbs, and Slovaks; and the Magyars, although hostile to German interference from Vienna in their own national affairs, were bitter against the Slavs for the decisive part which they had played in 1849 in enabling the Vienna government to put down the Hungarian revolt.[1] Louis Kossuth, who had led that revolt, continued from exile to preach Magyar rebellion against the Empire, but in the 1860's his influence declined at home, while that of Francis Deák rose. Deák believed that the Magyars could better satisfy their ambitions through partnership within the Empire than through rebellion against it. Mutual opposition to the Slavic peoples would cement an alliance of Magyars and Germans. He accordingly advocated the transformation of the centralized Empire into a Dual Monarchy. And in the expectation that the Emperor Francis Joseph would see the problem of imperial reorganization as he saw it, Deák exerted his influence to assure the loyal cooperation of Hungary with Austria in the war of 1866.

Deák gambled successfully. Francis Joseph recognized, when military disaster of 1866 followed so closely upon military defeat in 1859, that the Habsburg Empire could not go on as it had been, that a drastic internal change must be made. He imagined, too, that his own position would be less endangered by a Dual arrangement, such as Deák and the Magyars urged, than by a Pentarchy, such as the Slavs proposed. So, after due negotiations, a new political regime was instituted in east-central Europe by the "Ausgleich," or "Compromise," of 1867. By this settlement, the Habsburg dominions were divided into two parts: (1) Austria, embracing Austria proper, Bohemia, Galicia, Carniola, and the Tyrol; and (2) Hungary,

**Dual Monarchy**

[1] See above, p. 676.

including Hungary proper, together with its crown-lands of Croatia, the Banat, and Transylvania. Each part would have a constitution and parliament of its own, and each would be independent of the other in most respects. Yet the two would be united by a common sovereign—to be known henceforth by the dual title of "Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary"—and by a common army, common foreign relations, and certain common ministers. Nationalism was triumphant in Hungary, as in Germany and Italy.

It was not so with the Slavic peoples in the Habsburg dominions. Austria, it is true, made special concessions to its Polish subjects in Galicia, and Hungary partially appeased the Croats by according them a degree of local autonomy in 1868. Yet neither Poles nor Croats were satisfied; and the Czechs were especially disgruntled that Bohemia was not accorded the same national freedom as Hungary.

### 4. ROUNDING OUT THE GERMAN EMPIRE AND THE ITALIAN KINGDOM

After the defeat of Austria in 1866, France was the only European power which seemed minded and perhaps able to stop the fruition of Cavour's plans for a completely unified Italy or Bismarck's plans for a German national state under Prussian leadership. French troops still garrisoned Rome, and in 1867 they repulsed an armed effort of Garibaldi to overthrow the temporal rule of Pope Pius IX and annex his state to Italy. Simultaneously, the French Emperor was warning Bismarck that the South German states must not be incorporated in the North German Confederation and that France would expect "compensations" for Prussian expansion. But the gains made by Prussia and Italy in the war of 1866 only whetted the appetite of their patriots.

Bismarck desired a war with France. He believed that the Prussian army was superior to the French, and that the South German states, in the patriotic enthusiasm engendered by war, would throw in their lot with Prussia and the North German Confederation. He must, of course, get France to declare the war, so as to show the world that Prussia was not the aggressor. But he knew that French patriots were irritated by the recent spectacular victories of Prussia and could be expected to egg on Napoleon III to make demands which Prussia would refuse.

How Napoleon made demands on Bismarck for territorial "compensation" in 1866–1867, and how they were rejected, we have already told. We have also told how, finally, Bismarck's published account of King William's refusal of a French demand in 1870 aroused such passions at Paris that Napoleon III and his parliament declared war against Prussia.[1]

**Franco-Prussian War**


The Franco-Prussian War began in July 1870. France was without allies, while Prussia was actively supported by the North German Confederation and the four states of South Germany. The first and decisive phase of the struggle, culminating in the French disaster at Sedan in September 1870, has been sketched in another place.[2] It remains to sketch the second and concluding phase and to indicate some of the war's immediate consequences.

With the surrender of Napoleon III, Marshal MacMahon, and the main field army of the French at Sedan, German forces tightened their sieges of Strasbourg and Metz while large German armies advanced rapidly on Paris. Bismarck let it be known that he would not make peace with France unless Germany should be safeguarded against future French interference by "regaining" Alsace and Lorraine and holding the Rhine as a really German river. On the other hand, the new republican government of France declared that it would "not cede an inch of French soil or a stone of French fortresses." So the war continued, after Sedan, from September 1870 to January 1871.

Léon Gambetta, the war minister of the French republic, escaping in a balloon from Paris just as the Germans were closing in about the French capital, did his utmost to arouse the countryside to continuing resistance. He improvised armies out of surviving remnants of regiments. He proclaimed a *levée en masse* of all men from twenty-one to forty years of age. He had the recruits hastily drilled and he despatched one force after another in frantic endeavors to relieve the beleaguered French armies at Paris, Metz, and Strasbourg. Such resolute endeavors astonished the invading Germans, but the outcome was never in doubt.

Strasbourg capitulated to the Germans late in September. In October, Marshal Bazaine, with shameful pusillanimity, surrendered to the Germans the fortress of Metz, together with a French

[1] See above, pp. 724–726.
[2] See above, pp. 727–728.




PRUSSIA IN THE NORTH GERMAN CONFEDERATION OF 1867 AND THE HOHENZOLLERN GERMAN EMPIRE OF 1871

NAMES OF REMAINING FREE CITIES WITHIN THE EMPIRE ARE UNDERLINED

T.M

army of 150,000 men. Paris held out until January 28, 1871, and then surrendered only because its population was freezing and starving. Four days after the capitulation of Paris, an armistice was arranged in order to admit of the election of a French National Assembly which should possess authority to conclude peace. The preliminaries, agreed to at Versailles between Bismarck and Adolphe Thiers, were most reluctantly ratified by the Assembly in March; and the definitive treaty was signed at Frankfurt in May 1871. France ceded to Germany the whole of Alsace, excepting Belfort, and the eastern part of Lorraine, including the fortress of Metz, and agreed to pay an indemnity of five milliard francs (one billion dollars). German troops remained in occupation of northern France until the indemnity was paid (in 1873).

Of the results of the Franco-Prussian War, the most striking was the fulfillment of Bismarck's plan for the unification of Germany and the establishment of a German Empire under Prussian Hohenzollern leadership. Just as the Prussian statesman had anticipated, the fact that South Germans fought in the war shoulder to shoulder with North Germans aroused all over Germany a popular patriotic ardor strong enough to overcome princely jealousies and liberal scruples. By November 1870, while the war was still in progress, treaties of union were negotiated by Bismarck on behalf of the North German Confederation with the governments of the several South German states. These treaties, duly ratified by the respective sovereigns and parliaments, simply extended the North German Confederation so as to include the southern states and changed its name to the "German Empire." The King of Prussia, instead of being "President of the Confederation," was henceforth to be styled "German Emperor."

**Creation of Hohenzollern German Empire**

By a curious irony of fate, the solemn ceremony of inaugurating the German Empire was held on January 18, 1871, exactly 170 years after the Prussian Hohenzollerns assumed the title of King;[1] and, as the Germans were still besieging Paris, the ceremony was held in the hall of mirrors in the palace of Louis XIV at Versailles, "in the ancient center," the official report explained, "of a hostile power which for centuries had striven to divide and humiliate Germany." There, surrounded by sovereigns, generals, and soldiers, Bismarck read the imperial decree which sealed the

[1] See above, p. 294.

first part of his life-work, and the Grand Duke of Baden led the loud cheers for King William I of Prussia, now, by the grace of God and the will of his fellow princes, German Emperor.

The Franco-Prussian War thus hastened the creation of a Prussianized German Empire. It also confirmed the preeminence of the German military machine. Thereafter Austria must abandon every thought of avenging Sadowa, and France, for many a year to come, would be unequal to the task of avenging Sedan.

**German Annexation of Alsace-Lorraine**

In one respect, Bismarck, as later events disclosed, overreached himself. That was in the taking of Alsace-Lorraine from France. He took the provinces for patriotic and military reasons. His military advisers pointed out that the new frontier of the Vosges Mountains would be easier for Germany to defend in another war with France than the old frontier of the Rhine River and that the fortresses of Strasbourg and Metz would provide additional security for Germany. Besides, Bismarck heeded the pleas of German patriots that the provinces had belonged to the medieval German Empire, that the majority of their population still spoke German, and that their "reannexation" to Germany would strengthen the new Empire. Nevertheless, a large majority of the people of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871, regardless of what language they might speak, showed themselves French and not German in national sentiment; their elected representatives protested against the compulsory cession of the provinces.

**Italy's Seizure of Rome**

The Franco-Prussian War enabled the Italians as well as the Germans to round out and strengthen their national state. On the eve of Sedan, Napoleon III, hard pressed for troops, withdrew the French garrison from Rome [1] and left Pope Pius IX to defend his temporal rule as best he could with only the assistance of his personal guards and a small force of miscellaneous foreign volunteers. Then, when the collapse of the Second French Empire at Sedan made it clear that Napoleon III could not again intervene at Rome, the government of King Victor Emmanuel II, with Bismarck's approval, ordered an Italian army of 60,000 men to invade and occupy the Papal State. The Pope protested and made a show of armed resistance. At the first tidings of bloodshed, however, he directed his little army to cease firing, and on September 20, 1870—less than three

[1] See above, pp. 726, 742.

weeks after Sedan—the troops of Victor Emmanuel entered Rome. Thus did the Rome of the Popes, which had endured for more than twelve centuries, become the Rome of the Italian nation. A plebiscite ratified the appropriation of the Papal State by the kingdom of Italy, and in 1871 Rome became the national capital.

The fall of Napoleon III permitted the undoing of another part of his work. In this instance, the Russian Tsar, also with Bismarck's benevolent approval, denounced in October 1870 the articles of the treaty of Paris of 1856 which limited Russian naval forces and armaments in the Black Sea;[1] and a conference of the powers, meeting in London in March 1871, formally assented. It was an omen of renewed Russian aggression against the Ottoman Empire.

### 5. BACKWARDNESS OF EASTERN EUROPE AND THE RUSSIAN TSARDOM UNDER NICHOLAS I AND ALEXANDER II


During the era from 1852 to 1870, while national states with constitutional government were being established in central Europe for Italians, Germans, and Hungarians, eastern Europe continued to be characterized by autocratic non-national empires: the Ottoman Empire of the Sultans, and the Russian Empire of the Tsars.[2]

**"Backwardness" of Eastern Europe**

That eastern Europe lagged behind western (and central) Europe may be attributed to certain peculiarities in its historical development. For centuries its social structure and political practices had been more Asiatic than European. Its religion, whether Moslem among the Ottoman Turks or Orthodox Christian among the Russian and Balkan peoples, differed from both the Catholic and Protestant Christianity of central and western Europe and was much less independent of state control than these. In the nineteenth century, moreover, the newer mechanized industry penetrated very slowly into eastern Europe and, prior to 1870, produced no such effects there as it did elsewhere in Europe. The East was still marked by a relatively small middle class, whether of intellectuals

[1] See above, p. 714.

[2] The Austrian Empire, we should bear in mind, was midway politically as well as geographically between central and eastern Europe; like the Russian and Ottoman Empires, it was not a national state, but, unlike them, it experimented with liberal constitutional government in 1848 and formally adopted it in the 1860's.


SHRINKAGE OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, 1680-1870
400 MILES
AUSTRIA
HUNGARY (TO AUSTRIA, 1699)
Vienna
Budapest
PODOLIA (TO POL. 1699, TO RUSS. 1793)
BUKOVINA (TO AUST. 1775)
MOLDAVIA
BESSARABIA
JEDISAN (TO RUSS. 1792)
Odessa
RUSSIA
(TO RUSS. 1783)
Azov
(TO RUSS. 1774)
CASPIAN SEA
BANAT (TO AUST. 1718)
WALLACHIA 1829
RUMANIA 1861
CRIMEA (TO RUSS. 1783)
Sevastopol
BOSNIA
SERBIA 1829
(TO AUST. 1815)
DOBRUJA
Kuchuk Kainarji
BLACK SEA
GEORGIA (TO RUSS. 1803)
MONTE-NEGRO, 1715
BULGARIA
Batum
ITALY
ADRIATIC SEA
ALBANIA
MARITZA R.
Adrianople
Constantinople
Salonica
Ankara
ARMENIA
Smyrna
ANATOLIA
Athens
AEGEAN SEA
IONIAN ISLANDS, (TO GREECE, 1864)
GREECE (INDEP. 1832)
TIGRIS R.
MESOPOTAMIA
EUPHRATES R.
RHODES
CRETE
CYPRUS
LEBANON, 1861
SYRIA
Beirut
OTTOMAN EMPIRE IN 1680
AREAS LOST, 1680-1870
OTTOMAN EMPIRE IN 1870
AUTONOMOUS STATES, ONLY NOMINALLY DEPENDENT ON THE EMPIRE IN 1870
DATES ARE THOSE OF LOSSES TO THE EMPIRE THROUGH FOREIGN CONQUEST, NATIONAL REVOLT, OR ENFORCED GRANT OF AUTONOMY

or of business men, and by a wide social chasm between nobles and officials, on the one hand, and a vast mass of ignorant peasants, on the other.

**Ottoman Empire and Balkan Nationalism**

The backwardness of the Ottoman Empire was especially fateful. Unable to keep pace with the economic, military, and political progress of the West, it ceased to be the great expanding power which it had been in the sixteenth century and fell victim in the nineteenth century to internal weakness and foreign aggression. It particularly suffered from the Napoleonic wars and the spread of nationalism among the Christian population of its European provinces.[1]

The consequent Greek and Serbian revolts we have discussed in another place: how they were aided by France and Britain and by imperial Russia and how they were brought to partially successful issue in 1829–1832.[2] The greater part of the Greek peninsula and some of the Greek islands in the Ægean (though not by any means the whole Greek nationality) were incorporated in an independent Greek kingdom under the joint guarantee of Russia, France, and Great Britain and with a German prince —Otto of Bavaria—as constitutional sovereign. Almost simultaneously the Ottoman province of Belgrade was recognized as the autonomous principality of Serbia under a native "hereditary prince," and the Rumanian principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia were accorded a more limited autonomy.

After 1832, nationalism was intensified in the Balkans, partly because of the successes of the Greeks and Serbs, partly because of the evident weakness of the Ottoman Empire, and partly because of interested promptings in foreign countries—at times from romantic patriots, especially in France and Britain, and more often from statesmen who grasped any opportunity to gain prestige for their own governments. Greece and Serbia aspired to become bigger and labored to infuse all Greeks and Serbs with an eager desire for complete national freedom and unity. Rumanians, also, commenced to be taught that they were a distinctive Latin nationality, with a glorious ancient history and with a rosy future. There were patriotic stirrings, likewise, among Bulgarians.

Only the Turks and their fellow-Moslem Albanians and Arabs

[1] See above, p. 576.

[2] See above, pp. 636–637.

were still imperially minded and largely unaffected by nationalism. The Turks, it should be remembered, constituted a governing and land-holding minority in the European provinces of their Empire. They had hitherto been comparatively tolerant of their Christian subjects, but with the development of a subversive nationalism among the latter, the Turks resorted to strenuous methods to hold them in check. Turkish "atrocities" and "massacres" were a concomitant of rising nationalism among the Balkan peoples, and Balkan nationalists not only repaid their Turkish "oppressors" in kind but also worked upon the sympathy of Christian Europe by dwelling upon their suffering and oppression. The story of Balkan nationalism in the nineteenth century is not a lovely one for Turks or for the Balkan peoples—or for Europe at large.

**Russian Empire and Subject Peoples**

The huge Russian Empire resembled the Ottoman Empire in that it was fundamentally an autocratic and military state, the large majority of whose subjects were poor and illiterate. It was, however, much stronger than the Ottoman Empire for, despite its economic backwardness as compared with western Europe, it managed, from the vast size of its territory and population, to maintain a big army and the prestige of a great power. Unlike the Ottoman Empire, too, the majority of its European inhabitants belonged to a single nationality—the Slavic "Great Russian" nationality—occupying the central part of the country and stretching out from Moscow in all directions.

In fact, the Russian Empire might be described as a Great Russian national state which, under its autocratic sovereigns since the time of Peter the Great, had been surrounding itself with a wide fringe of dependent alien lands. In the far northwest of the Empire, Finland retained the rank of grandduchy and the old-fashioned feudal constitution which it had had before its cession by Sweden in 1809;[1] and at the extreme west, the large portion of Poland which Russia obtained from the peace settlement at Vienna in 1815 had been treated as a separate constitutional kingdom until its unsuccessful rebellion in 1831.[2] Other conquered territories—and Poland after 1831—were administered as integral parts of the Russian Empire. Such was the fate of the Ukraine,

[1] See above, p. 575.
[2] See above, pp. 660–661.

whose "Little Russian" peasant population dwelt in the southwest of the Empire and spoke a Slavic dialect akin to, but somewhat different from "Great Russian." Such, too, was the lot of the former grandduchy of Lithuania, embracing two principal nationalities: Byelorussians ("White Russians") in the east, interspersed with Great Russian landlords; and Lithuanians in the west, interstrewn with Polish landlords. Such, also, was the position of Bessarabia, in the far southwest corner of the Empire, where Rumanian peasants were mingled with Russian colonists. Such, finally, was the case with the Baltic provinces: Estonia had a peasantry of Finnish stock; Livonia and Courland had a peasantry of Latvian nationality, akin to the Lithuanian; and all three provinces had landlords who were Germans partially Russianized.

Nationalism made slow and slight headway in the nineteenth century among Latvians, Estonians, Lithuanians, Byelorussians, or Ukrainians. These peoples seemingly entertained no desire for political freedom, and the only "national" demands which they voiced were for the Tsar's toleration of their linguistic and religious peculiarities. On the other hand, Finns and Poles alike felt the full nationalist fervor of western and central Europe. The former jealously defended their privileged position within the Russian Empire, and the latter were chronically rebellious.

Nationalism among the Great Russians took one of two forms —"Westernism" or "Slavophilism." The first was imitative of the contemporary liberal nationalism of England, France, and Italy. Its Russian advocates wished to "westernize" the Empire, to transform the existing autocracy into a liberal, constitutional government, and to industrialize the country. "Slavophilism," on the other hand, was an indigenous reaction against the "Westernizers." Its apostles lauded and sought to preserve whatever they thought was distinctive of Slavic civilization: the autocratic Tsardom, half political and half religious; the traditional Orthodox Church; the social customs and institutions of the mass of agricultural peasants, centering particularly in their village communities, or "mirs."

**"Westernizers" and "Slavophiles"**

Both "Westernizers" and "Slavophiles" talked about the "Slavic" nationality and tended to regard Russian nationalism as an aspect of a higher Slavic nationalism. But whereas the "Westernizers" looked forward to a voluntary confederation of diversely

liberal Slavic states—Russia, Poland, Bohemia, etc.—the "Slavophiles" emphasized the "sacred mission," incumbent on the Russian people as the purest and most powerful of all the Slavs, of safeguarding and promoting the common cause of traditional "Slavdom" at home and abroad.

The Russian Tsars, from the very nature of their political principles and traditions, were not disposed to countenance, in the abstract, the liberalism of the Westernizers or even the extreme nationalism of the Slavophiles. Alexander I (1801–1825) had toyed for a time with the thought of granting a constitution to Russia, and in his dreamy way he had fancied himself in various nationalist roles—in respect of Russia itself and in respect of Poles and Finns. But Alexander's chief hobbies, like his predecessors', were making a military show and intriguing for imperial expansion. He actually obtained Finland, Bessarabia, and the lion's share of Poland.

Nicholas I (1825–1855) was more hard-headed. There could be no misunderstanding about his attitude toward liberalism. He began with merciless suppression of a rebellious "liberal" outbreak among his troops at St. Petersburg—the so-called Decembrist revolt[1]—and he continued to punctuate his reign with thoroughly reactionary measures. In 1848 he expostulated with the King of Prussia about the latter's "surrender" to "Western revolution," and next year he dispatched an army to help the Austrian Emperor crush the national movement in Hungary.[2] Nicholas was no more a friend of abstract nationalism than of liberalism.

**Tsar Nicholas I**

Nevertheless, a Russian Tsar could perceive in the spread of nationalism among neighboring peoples a practical means of widening the influence and territory of his Empire. He might advantageously champion the cause of Slavic or Orthodox peoples against the Ottoman Empire or perhaps even against the Habsburg Empire.

This use of alien nationalism for Russian imperial purposes was first conspicuously demonstrated by Nicholas I in the war which he waged with the Ottoman Empire in 1828–1829.[3] Thereby, he not only assured independence to Greeks, autonomy to Serbs, and special privileges to Rumanians, but he obtained

[1] See above, pp. 617–618.
[2] See above, p. 676.
[3] See above, p. 637.

for the Russian Empire an extension of territory in the Caucasus and the reputation of being the protector of Orthodox and Slavic peoples. This reputation he confirmed in 1849 by his military expedition against the Hungarians, who were dangerously "liberal" and at the same time were "oppressing" Slavic Croats and Slovaks and Orthodox Rumanians. Shortly afterwards he was secretly proposing to Britain a partition of the Ottoman Empire and was ostentatiously claiming a virtual protectorate over all Orthodox Christians within it. Over this question, and doubtless for the fulfillment of far-reaching designs, he went again to war with the Turks in 1853. This time, Britain and France (and Sardinia) intervened to protect the Ottoman Empire against Russian "aggression." The resulting struggle, the Crimean War (1854–1856), we have discussed elsewhere.[1] Here we may recall that the war halted Russian interference in the Ottoman Empire and temporarily lowered the prestige of the Tsar's army and government.

The check to Russian imperialism did not signify any check to Balkan nationalism. The several peoples in southeastern Europe only clamored the louder after 1856 for cultural and political independence, and for the realization of their desires they now sought, and sometimes obtained, the assistance of France and Great Britain instead of Russia's. Rumanian demands for the union of Moldavia and Wallachia under a single prince and a single parliament were granted in 1862, mainly through the good offices of the French Emperor, Napoleon III.[2] Greek ambitions were fed by Great Britain's cooperation in deposing the unpopular Bavarian King of Greece, Otto (1832–1862), in selecting a more acceptable sovereign in the person of a Danish prince who in 1863 took the title of George I, "King of the Hellenes," and in permitting the Greek national state to annex the Ionian Islands which Britain had held since 1815. Moreover, Serbian security and pride were enhanced by Great Britain's prevailing upon the Ottoman Sultan in 1867 to withdraw the petty garrisons which until then he had maintained in certain fortresses in the autonomous principality of Serbia. It was thus obvious during the 1860's that not Russia, the imperial rival of the Turks, but

[1] See above, pp. 714–715.
[2] See above, pp. 718–719.

Britain and France, the professed defenders of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, were actively abetting a nationalism which was endangering this Empire.

In the meantime, the check which the Crimean War administered to Russian imperialism in the Balkans had significant effects within the Russian Empire. Nicholas I died in the midst of the war, and his son and successor, Alexander II (1855–1881), was soon faced with the necessity not only of negotiating an humiliating peace with France, Britain, and the Turks, but also of allaying domestic unrest. Amid criticism of the conduct and outcome of the war, the "Westernizers" pressed upon the Tsar their demands for political and social reforms within Russia. To allay the unrest at home and to regain prestige abroad, Alexander II devoted his major attention, for some seven or eight years after the Crimean War, to establishing his reputation as a "reforming Tsar." The first problem of internal reform which he tackled was social, having to do with the Russian peasants.

**Tsar Alexander II**

Russia, it must be remembered, was overwhelmingly an agricultural country, and when Alexander II came to the throne the majority of his subjects were still in a condition of serfdom, similar in kind to the serfdom which had prevailed in western Europe in the middle ages and worse in degree. It is true that northern Russia was inhabited by land-owning peasants, that the extreme south was studded with economically independent colonies of Cossacks,[1] and that serfdom had already been abolished in the Baltic provinces and in Poland.[2] Yet nine-tenths of the whole arable land of the Empire were still embraced in large estates, some belonging to the Tsar and the imperial family and the rest to some 100,000 noble families. Each such estate was divided into two parts, the produce of the one going directly to the landlord and that of the other for the support of a community (mir) of peasants.

**Russian Serfdom and Its Abolition**

Under the system of serfdom, as developed in Russia, the position of the peasants was sorry. They were "attached to the

[1] The Cossacks were Russian colonists on the frontiers of the Empire, particularly in the South and in Siberia, who were endowed with special privileges and bound in return to give military service for specified periods under specified conditions.

[2] Serfdom was abolished in the grandduchy of Warsaw (the main part of what was later Russian Poland) in 1807, and in the Baltic provinces in 1816–1819.

soil"; that is, without their lord's consent they could not leave the estate on which they were born, and the transfer of an estate from one lord to another automatically transferred the peasants' allegiance. To their lord the peasants paid dues, for him they performed manual labor, to him they rendered obedience as to a personal master. Sometimes lords detached their peasants from the land and sent them to work in the cities, requiring them to remit a fixed portion of their earnings and reserving the right to call them home at will. Sometimes lords employed peasants in household service virtually as slaves; of these there were about two million in 1855. Doubtless in many parts of Russia there were kindly and lenient landlords and considerate taskmasters, but too often the nobles and their overseers were cruel or capricious. They could make exorbitant demands upon their peasants' strength and funds and visit disobedience with corporal punishment. Under serfdom, furthermore, the mass of peasants remained almost wholly illiterate and quite unable to improve their minds or better their fortunes. And there can be no doubt that serfdom contributed greatly to the retention of primitive and wasteful methods of farming and hence to the general economic backwardness of Russia and to the chronic financial difficulties of its government.

To reform the Russian land system was an herculean task. Yet it was undertaken by Alexander II, with results, both fortunate and unfortunate, which we shall now indicate. Setting an example by freeing first the serfs on the estates belonging to members of the imperial family, and then with dogged pertinacity and cautious compromise overcoming the natural opposition of interested and selfish landlords, the Tsar at length promulgated a general emancipation decree, in March 1861, the sixth anniversary of his accession to the throne. The decree abolished all legal rights of noblemen over peasants. The serfs who were living detached from the soil, whether as domestic servants or as town laborers, obtained their personal liberty but no right to property. The serfs who were working on large estates secured their liberty and also an interest in a portion of the land which, bought from the nobles with money advanced by the government, was turned over to the village communities (mirs) to be parceled out for use among the resident peasants. The benefits of even partial emancipation gradually appeared in an enlarged area of cultivation, increased

value of land, greater yield of taxes, growth of export trade, and improved general condition of the peasantry.

There were also less happy results of Alexander II's abolition of serfdom. Many peasants found themselves in a worse economic plight than before. Lands alloted to them were too small to provide them with anything like a comfortable living, and for whatever land they got they were burdened with long-term installment payments of the money which the government advanced as compensation to nobles. Besides, while the peasants were freed from the jurisdiction of noblemen's courts, they were subjected to the regulations of their village communities and to the tax-gatherers and police officials of the central government. And the treatment of emancipated peasants by the state authorities was often harsh and corrupt. It has been remarked wisely, though perhaps a little strongly, that the decree of Alexander II liberated the peasants from the nobles only to make them "serfs of the State." Many ex-serfs, of course, received no land at all; and a large proportion of these, together with some of the others, tended to seek town work and to swell the proletariat and slums of the cities.

Alexander II did not confine his reforming activities to the emancipation of serfs. In 1864 he instituted a political reform—the creation of provincial assemblies—which optimistic "Westernizers" interpreted as preliminary to his establishment of a constitutional, parliamentary regime. The decree of 1864 provided that each district of the thirty-four administrative provinces, or "governments," into which Russia had been divided since the eighteenth century, was to have a local assembly, or *zemstvo,* composed of landed nobles and of delegates indirectly elected by townsfolk and peasants, and that each zemstvo was to levy local taxes and exercise local authority over public works, churches, schools, prisons, poor relief, and public health.

**Political and Judicial Reforms**

Judicial reform was also undertaken by Alexander II. In 1862 he decreed that the trial of civil and criminal cases should be transferred from administrative officials to a hierarchy of courts modeled after those in western Europe: justices of the peace, elected locally; district and circuit judges; and a senate, acting as court of final appeal. Accompanying the decree were instructions for the codification of the laws, for the appointment of prosecuting attorneys, for the use of jury trial in criminal cases, and

for holding trials in public rather than in secret. From his decree, however, the Tsar significantly excepted one kind of judicial trial—that of political offenders, for whom the old secret and arbitrary administrative procedure was retained.

Such were the main reforms of Alexander II: emancipation of the serfs in 1861, reorganization of the judiciary in 1862, and creation of the zemstvos in 1864. In addition to these, the Tsar during the same period encouraged the establishment of some elementary and technical schools, accorded a measure of liberty to the press, and advanced plans for railway construction and for developing the mineral resources of his Empire.

By 1865, however, ten years after his accession, the reforming spirit of Alexander II was spent. He had never been at heart a liberal. What reforms he had instituted were an impulsive response to the protest of Russian Westernizers against a regime which had suffered humiliating foreign reverses in 1854–1856. By 1865 the Crimean War was a thing of the past, and a much more recent occurrence—the Polish Rebellion of 1863—was discrediting the Westernizers and throwing the Tsar into the arms of reactionary Slavophiles.

**Polish Revolt of 1863 and Alexander II's Reaction**

For some time before 1863 Polish patriots had been organizing secret societies and agitating for the restoration of their country's independence. In 1863 they precipitated open rebellion at Warsaw against the Russian government. The rebellion was not nearly so formidable as the revolt of 1831 had been. It was merely a struggle of groups of ill-armed patriots against regular troops, and it was marked by no real battle. From the nations of western Europe, the Polish leaders received only sympathy; [1] and Bismarck, for the sake of his domestic and foreign policies, offered to the Tsar the armed assistance of Prussia. The Tsar, however, had no need of Prussian help. His own army put a speedy end to the disorders in Poland, and his governors and police agents inflicted dire penalties on surviving rebels and suspects.

Slavophiles and other Russian conservatives were not slow to advise Alexander II that the troubles in Poland had been accentuated by his leniency and his concessions to the Westernizers. The advice was welcome to the Tsar. He willingly turned back on the political path which he had been following, and from 1865 he was as reactionary as his predecessor. Nothing more was heard

[1] On the French attitude, see above, p. 720.

of a parliament for Russia. The provincial zemstvos were forbidden to express political opinions, and their acts were made subject to veto by the imperial governors. Rigorous press censorship was restored. The central government assumed the right to distinguish by administrative decree between political offenders and ordinary criminals; the former could be arbitrarily seized by the police and either kept indefinitely in prison or bundled off to some place of detention in Siberia without judicial formalities.

With the cessation of his reforming efforts within the Russian Empire, Alexander II applied himself anew to plans for its expansion at the expense of the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, almost as soon as he had curbed nationalism in his own Polish provinces, he was abetting nationalism in the Balkans. Then in 1871, in the midst of the Franco-Prussian War, he repudiated the treaty of Paris of 1856 and, with the support of Bismarck, secured recognition of his right to refortify the Crimean peninsula and to reestablish a Russian fleet on the Black Sea. He was preparing for new and forceful aggression.



# APPENDIX

EUROPEAN STATES AND THEIR SOVEREIGNS, 1500–1870

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

# EUROPEAN STATES AND THEIR SOVEREIGNS, 1500–1870

## ALBANIA

*Part of Ottoman Empire, 1478–1913*

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## AUSTRIA

Maxmillian I, *Archduke,* 1493–1519
Charles I, 1519–1520 (*Holy Roman Emperor as Charles V, 1519–1558; King of Spain; Prince of the Netherlands*)
Ferdinand I, 1520–1564
Maximilian II, 1564–1576
Rudolph II, 1576–1612
Matthias, 1612–1619
Ferdinand II, 1619–1637
Ferdinand III, 1637–1657
Leopold I, 1658–1705
Joseph I, 1705–1711
Charles II (*VI as Holy Roman Emperor*), 1711–1740
Maria Theresa, 1740–1780
Joseph II, 1780–1790 (*Holy Roman Emperor, 1765–1790*)
Leopold II, 1790–1792
Francis I, *Archduke,* 1792–1804 (*Holy Roman Emperor, 1792–1806*); *Emperor,* 1804–1835
Ferdinand I, *Emperor,* 1835–1848
Francis Joseph, 1848–1916

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## BAVARIA

Albert IV, *Duke,* 1465–1508
William IV, 1508–1550
Albert V, 1550–1579
William V, 1579–1598
Maximilian I, *Elector,* 1598–1651
Ferdinand Maria, 1651–1679
Maximilian II Emmanuel, 1679–1726
Charles Albert, 1726–1745 (*Holy Roman Emperor as Charles VII, 1742–1745*)
Maximilian III Joseph, 1745–1777
Charles Theodore, 1778–1799
Maximilian IV Joseph, *Elector,* 1799–1806; *King,* 1806–1825
Louis I, *King,* 1825–1848
Maximilian II, 1848–1864
Louis II, 1864–1886

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## BELGIUM

*To Spain, 1504–1713*
*To Austria, 1713–1797*
*To France, 1797–1815*
*To Holland, 1815–1830*
Leopold I, *King,* 1831–1865
Leopold II, 1865–1909

## BOHEMIA

Ladislaus II, *King*, 1471–1516 — Louis, 1516–1526
*Part of Austria, 1526–1918*

## BRANDENBURG

*See Prussia*

## BULGARIA

*Part of Ottoman Empire, 1393–1878*

## CROATIA

*To Hungary, 1102–1918*

## CZECHOSLOVAKIA

*See Bohemia; Slovakia*

## DENMARK

John, *King*, 1481–1513
Christian II, 1513–1523
Frederick I, 1523–1533
Christian III, 1533–1559
Frederick II, 1559–1588
Christian IV, 1588–1648
Frederick III, 1648–1670
Christian V, 1670–1699
Frederick IV, 1699–1730
Christian VI, 1730–1746
Frederick V, 1746–1766
Christian VII, 1766–1808
Frederick VI, 1808–1839
Christian VIII, 1839–1848
Frederick VII, 1848–1863
Christian IX, 1863–1906

## DUTCH NETHERLANDS

*See Holland*

## ENGLAND

*See Great Britain*

## ESTONIA

*To Teutonic Knights, 1346–1561* — *To Sweden, 1561–1721*
*Part of Russian Empire, 1721–1918*

## FINLAND

*To Sweden, 1290–1809*

*To Russian Empire, 1809–1918*

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## FLORENCE

*See Tuscany*

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## FRANCE

Louis XI, *King*, 1461–1483
Charles VIII, 1483–1498
Louis XII, 1498–1515
Francis I, 1515–1547
Henry II, 1547–1559
Francis II, 1559–1560
Charles IX, 1560–1574
Henry III, 1574–1589
Henry IV, 1589–1610
Louis XIII, 1610–1643
Louis XIV, 1643–1715
Louis XV, 1715–1744
Louis XVI, 1744–1792
*Republic (First), 1792–1804*
Convention, 1792–1795; Directory, 1795–1799; Consulate, 1799–1804
Napoleon I, *Emperor*, 1804–1814
Louis XVII, *King*, 1814–1824
Charles X, 1824–1830
Louis Philippe, 1830–1848
*Republic (Second), 1848–1852*
Napoleon III, *Emperor*, 1852–1870
*Republic (Third), 1870–1940*

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## GERMANY

*Part of Holy Roman Empire*, to 1806
*German Confederation under presidency of Austria*, 1815–1866
*North German Confederation under presidency of Prussia*, 1867–1871
*See Austria; Bavaria; Holy Roman Empire; Prussia; Saxony*

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## GREAT BRITAIN

*Sovereigns of England and Ireland, 1485–1707*

Henry VII, *King*, 1485–1509
Henry VIII, 1509–1547
Edward VI, 1547–1553
Mary I, 1553–1558
Elizabeth, 1558–1603
James I (*VI of Scotland*), 1603–1625
Charles I, 1625–1649
*The Commonwealth*, 1649–1660 (Oliver Cromwell)
Charles II, 1660–1685
James II (*VII of Scotland*), 1685–1688
William III and Mary II, 1689–1694
William III, 1694–1702
Anne, 1702–1714 (*of Great Britain after 1707*)

*Sovereigns of Scotland, 1488–1707*

James IV, *King*, 1488–1513
James V, 1513–1542
Mary (Stuart), 1542–1567
James VI, 1567–1625 (*James I of England, 1603–1625*)
[*Succession as in England and Ireland, 1603–1707, and as in Great Britain after 1707*]

### *Sovereigns of Great Britain*

Anne, *Queen*, 1707–1714
George I, *King*, 1714–1727
George II, 1727–1760
George III, 1760–1820
George IV, 1820–1830
William IV, 1830–1837
Victoria, *Queen*, 1837–1901

### *Some Prominent Ministers of Great Britain*

Sir Robert Walpole, 1721–1742
William Pitt (Earl of Chatham), 1756–1761
Earl of Bute, 1762–1763
George Grenville, 1763–1765
William Pitt (Earl of Chatham), 1766–1768
Lord North, 1770–1782
Earl of Shelburne, 1782–1783
William Pitt (the younger), 1783–1801, 1804–1806
Duke of Portland, 1807–1809
Spencer Perceval, 1809–1812
Earl of Liverpool, 1812–1827 (Viscount Castlereagh, *Foreign Secretary*, 1812–1822; George Canning, *Foreign Secretary*, 1822–1827)
George Canning, 1827
Duke of Wellington, 1827–1830
Earl Grey, 1830–1834 (Viscount Palmerston, *Foreign Secretary*)
Viscount Melbourne, 1834
Sir Robert Peel, 1834–1835
Viscount Melbourne, 1835–1841 (Viscount Palmerston, *Foreign Secretary*)
Sir Robert Peel, 1841–1846
Lord John Russell (Earl Russell), 1846–1852 (Viscount Palmerston, *Foreign Secretary*)
Earl of Aberdeen, 1852–1855
Viscount Palmerston, 1855–1858
Earl of Derby, 1858–1859
Viscount Palmerston, 1859–1865
Earl Russell, 1865–1866
Earl of Derby, 1866–1868
Benjamin Disraeli, 1868
Wm. E. Gladstone, 1868–1874

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### Greece

*To Ottoman Empire, 1453–1829*
*Republic*, 1829–1832
Otto I, *King*, 1832–1862
George I, 1863–1913

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### Holland

*To Spain, 1504–1581*
William I, the Silent, *Stadholder*, 1581–1584
Maurice, 1584–1625
Frederick Henry, 1625–1647
William II, 1647–1650
John DeWitt, *Grand Pensionary*, 1650–1672
William III, *Stadholder*, 1672–1702 *(King of England and Scotland, 1689–1702)*
John William, *Nominal Stadholder*, 1702–1711
William IV, *Nominal Stadholder*, 1711–1748; *Hereditary Stadholder*, 1748–1751
William V, 1751–1795
*Republic*, 1795–1806
Louis Bonaparte, *King*, 1806–1810
*To France, 1810–1813*
William I, *King*, 1813–1840
William II, 1840–1849
William III, 1849–1890

## Holy Roman Empire

Maximilian I, *Emperor*, 1493–1519
Charles V, 1519–1558
Ferdinand I, 1558–1564
Maximilian II, 1564–1576
Rudolph II, 1576–1612
Matthias, 1612–1619
Ferdinand II, 1619–1637
Ferdinand III, 1637–1657
Leopold I, 1658–1705
Joseph I, 1705–1711
Charles VI, 1711–1740
Charles VII, 1742–1745
Francis I, 1745–1765
Joseph II, 1765–1790
Leopold II, 1790–1792
Francis II, 1792–1806 (*after 1804 as Francis I, Emperor of Austria*)

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## Hungary

Ladislaus II, *King*, 1490–1516
Louis II, 1516–1526
*Same sovereigns as Austria, 1526–1918*

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## Ireland

*See Great Britain*

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## Italy

Victor Emmanuel II, *King*, 1861–1878

*See Lombardy; Naples; Papacy; Sardinia; Savoy; Sicily; Tuscany; Venice*

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## Latvia (Lettland)

*To Teutonic Knights, 1237–1549*
*To Poland, 1549–1629*
*To Sweden, 1629–1721*
*Part of Russian Empire, 1721–1918*

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## Lithuania

*Union with Poland, 1501–1793*
*Part of Russian Empire, 1793–1918*

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## Livonia

*See Latvia*

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## Lombardy (Milan)

Sforza family, 1450–1535
*To Spain, 1535–1714*
*To Austria, 1714–1797*
*To France, 1797–1815*
*To Austria, 1815–1860*
*To Italy*, after 1860

## MONTENEGRO

*To Ottoman Empire, 1490–1696*
Danilo, *Prince-Bishop*, 1696–1735
Sava and Vasilije, 1735–1782
Peter I, *Prince*, 1782–1830
Peter II, 1830–1851
Danilo I, 1852–1860
Nicholas I, *Prince*, 1860–1910; *King*, 1910–1918

## NAPLES

*To Aragon (Spain), 1443–1713*
*To Austria, 1713–1738*
Charles III, *King*, 1738–1759 (*King of Spain, 1759–1788*)
Ferdinand IV, 1759–1806
Joseph Bonaparte, 1806–1808
Joachim Murat, 1809–1815
Ferdinand I, 1815–1825
Francis I, 1825–1830
Ferdinand II, 1830–1859
Francis II, 1859–1860
*To Italy, 1860*

## NETHERLANDS, BELGIAN

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## NETHERLANDS, DUTCH

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## NORWAY

*To Denmark, 1397–1814*
*Union with Sweden, 1814–1905*

## OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Mohammed II, *Sultan*, 1451–1481
Bayezid II, 1481–1512
Selim I, 1512–1520
Suleiman II, "the Magnificent," 1520–1566
Selim II, 1566–1574
Murad III, 1574–1595
Mohammed III, 1595–1603
Ahmed I, 1603–1617
Mustapha I, 1617–1618
Othman II, 1618–1623
Murad IV, 1623–1640
Ibrahim, 1640–1648
Mohammed IV, 1648–1687
Suleiman III, 1687–1691
Ahmed II, 1691–1695
Mustapha II, 1695–1703
Ahmed III, 1703–1730
Mahmud I, 1730–1754
Othman III, 1754–1757
Mustapha III, 1757–1773
Abdul Hamid I, 1773–1789
Selim III, 1789–1807
Mustapha IV, 1807–1808
Mahmud II, 1808–1839
Abdul Medjid, 1839–1861
Abdul Aziz, 1861–1876

## PAPACY

Alexander VI, *Pope*, 1492–1503
Pius III, 1503
Julius II, 1503–1513
Leo X, 1513–1521
Adrian VI, 1522–1523
Clement VII, 1523–1534
Paul III, 1534–1549
Julius III, 1550–1555
Marcellus II, 1555
Paul IV, 1555–1559
Pius IV, 1559–1565
Pius V, 1566–1572
Gregory XIII, 1572–1585
Sixtus V, 1585–1590
Urban VII, 1590
Gregory XIV, 1590–1591
Innocent IX, 1591
Clement VIII, 1592–1605
Leo XI, 1605
Paul V, 1605–1621
Gregory XV, 1621–1623
Urban VIII, 1623–1644
Innocent X, 1644–1655
Alexander VII, 1655–1667
Clement IX, 1667–1669
Clement X, 1670–1676
Innocent XI, 1676–1689
Alexander VIII, 1689–1691
Innocent XII, 1691–1700
Clement XI, 1700–1721
Innocent XIII, 1721–1724
Benedict XIII, 1724–1730
Clement XII, 1730–1740
Benedict XIV, 1740–1758
Clement XIII, 1758–1769
Clement XIV, 1769–1774
Pius VI, 1775–1799
Pius VII, 1800–1823
Leo XII, 1823–1829
Pius VIII, 1829–1830
Gregory XVI, 1831–1846
Pius IX, 1846–1878

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## PIEDMONT

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## POLAND

John I Albert, *King*, 1492–1501
Alexander, 1501–1506
Sigismund I, 1506–1548
Sigismund II, 1548–1572
Henry of Valois, 1573–1574 (*Henry III of France, 1574–1589*)
Stephen Bathory, 1575–1586 (*Prince of Transylvania*)
Sigismund III Vasa, 1587–1632
Ladislaus IV, 1632–1648
John II Casimir, 1648–1668
Michael Wisniowiecki, 1669–1673
John III Sobieski, 1674–1696
Augustus II, 1697–1704 (*Elector of Saxony*)
Stanislaus I Leszczynski, 1704–1709
Augustus II (*restored*), 1709–1733
Stanislaus I Leszczynski (*restored*), 1733–1734
Augustus III, 1734–1763 (*Elector of Saxony*)
Stanislaus II Poniatowski, 1764–1795
*Partitioned among Russia, Prussia, and Austria, 1795–1918*
*Grand-Duchy of Warsaw, 1807–1815*
*"Congress" Poland, 1815–1831*
Alexander I, *King*, 1815–1825
Nicholas I, 1825–1831
*Incorporated in Russia, 1831–1918*

## PORTUGAL

Emmanuel I, *King*, 1495–1521
John III, 1521–1557
Sebastian, 1557–1578
Henry, 1578–1580
*To Spain, 1580–1640*
John IV, 1640–1656
Alphonso VI, 1656–1667
Pedro II, 1667–1706
John V, 1706–1750
Joseph, 1750–1777
Maria I and Pedro III, 1777–1786
Maria I, 1786–1816
John VI, 1816–1826
Pedro IV, 1826 (*Pedro I, Emperor of Brazil, 1826–1831*)
Maria II, 1826–1828
Miguel, 1828–1834
Maria II, 1834–1853
Pedro V, 1853–1861
Louis I, 1861–1889

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## PRUSSIA

### *Electors of Brandenburg*

Joachim I, *Elector*, 1499–1535
Joachim II, 1535–1571
John George, 1571–1598
Joachim Frederick, 1598–1608
John Sigismund, 1608–1619
George William, 1619–1640
Frederick William, "The Great Elector," 1640–1688
Frederick III, 1688–1701 (*Frederick I, King in Prussia, 1701–1713*)

### *Kings of Prussia*

Frederick I, *King*, 1701–1713
Frederick William I, 1713–1740
Frederick II, "the Great," 1740–1786
Frederick William II, 1786–1797
Frederick William III, 1797–1840
Frederick William IV, 1840–1861
William I, 1861–1888

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## RUMANIA

### *To Ottoman Empire, 1500–1856*

Alexander Cuza, *Prince*, 1856–1866
Charles I, *Prince*, 1866–1881; *King*, 1881–1914

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## RUSSIAN EMPIRE

Ivan III, "the Great," *Tsar*, 1462–1505
Basil IV, 1505–1533
Ivan IV, "the Terrible," 1533–1584
Theodore I, 1584–1598
Boris Godunov, 1598–1605
Michael, 1613–1645
Alexius, 1645–1676
Theodore II, 1676–1682
Ivan V and Peter I, 1682–1689
Peter I, "the Great," 1689–1725
Catherine I, 1725–1727
Peter II, 1727–1730
Anna, 1730–1740
Ivan VI, 1740–1741
Elizabeth, 1741–1762
Peter III, 1762
Catherine II, "the Great," 1761–1796
Paul, 1796–1801
Alexander I, 1801–1825
Nicholas I, 1825–1855
Alexander II, 1855–1881

### SICILY

*To Aragon (Spain), 1409–1713*
*To Savoy, 1713–1720*
*To Austria, 1720–1736*
*To Naples, 1736–1860*
*To Italy, 1860*

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### SLAVONIA

*See Croatia*

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### SLOVAKIA

*To Hungary, 906–1918*

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### SLOVENIA (CARNIOLA, ETC.)

*To Austria, 1300–1809*
*To France, 1809–1813*
*Part of Austria, 1813–1918*

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### SPAIN

Ferdinand and Isabella, *King and Queen*, 1479–1504
Ferdinand and Philip I, 1504–1506
Ferdinand and Charles I, 1506–1516
Charles I, 1516–1556 (*Holy Roman Emperor as Charles V*)
Philip II, 1556–1598
Philip III, 1598–1621
Philip IV, 1621–1665
Charles II, 1665–1700
Philip V, 1700–1746
Ferdinand VI, 1746–1759
Charles III, 1759–1788
Charles IV, 1788–1808
Joseph Bonaparte, 1808–1813
Ferdinand VII, 1813–1833
Isabella II, 1833–1868
Amadeo, of Savoy, 1870–1873

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### SWEDEN

*To Denmark, 1397–1523*
Gustavus I Vasa, *King*, 1523–1560
Eric XIV, 1560–1568
John III, 1568–1592
Sigismund, 1592–1599 (*King of Poland, 1587–1632*)
Charles IX, 1599–1611
Gustavus II Adolphus, 1611–1632
Christina, 1632–1654
Charles X, 1654–1660
Charles XI, 1660–1697
Charles XII, 1697–1718
Ulrica Eleonora, 1718–1720
Frederick I, 1720–1751
Adolphus Frederick, 1751–1771
Gustavus III, 1771–1792
Gustavus IV, 1792–1809
Charles XIII, 1809–1818
Charles XIV (Bernadette), 1818–1844
Oscar I, 1844–1859
Charles XV, 1859–1872

## TUSCANY

Alessandro Medici, *Duke,* 1523–1537
Cosimo I, *Grand-Duke,* 1537–1574
Francis I, 1574–1587
Ferdinand I, 1587–1605
Cosimo II, 1605–1621
Ferdinand II, 1621–1670
Cosimo III, 1670–1723
John Gaston, 1723–1737
Francis, 1737–1765 (*Duke of Lorraine; Holy Roman Emperor, 1745–1765*)
Leopold I, 1765–1790 (*Holy Roman Emperor, 1790–1792*)
Ferdinand III, 1790–1801
*To France, 1801–1815*
Ferdinand III, 1815–1824
Leopold II, 1824–1860
*To Italy, 1860*

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## TWO SICILIES

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## VENICE

*Republic to 1797*
*To Austria, 1797–1805*
*To France, 1805–1814*
*To Austria, 1814–1866*
*To Italy, 1866*

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*See Croatia; Montenegro; Serbia; Slovenia*



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## PART II

## DYNASTIC AND ECONOMIC STATECRAFT, 1500–1789

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### Predominance of France and the Bourbons

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## For Chapter VII

### Conflict in Germany and Expansion of Russia

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## PART III

## REVOLUTIONARY TRANSITION, 1625–1815

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